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View Full Version : Were the Germans right to keep their top aces in the field?



Xiolablu3
03-16-2007, 06:52 AM
I was thinking about it this morning.

Wouyldnt Germany have been better putting Hartmann, Rall and other top pilots in charge of training new recruits rather than leaving them in the field?

Surely if they could have passed their great knowledghe and skill onto their junior pilots, it would have been better as a whole for Germany?

Once RAF and USAAF pilots got enought kills I htink they were taken away to be instructors, I think? Surely this is the better way?

Rather than having 20 or sao top aces in the feield killing maybe 1 enemy per day, their experience could be passed onto many more pilots and would be invaluable in training schools.

What do you guys think?

Xiolablu3
03-16-2007, 06:52 AM
I was thinking about it this morning.

Wouyldnt Germany have been better putting Hartmann, Rall and other top pilots in charge of training new recruits rather than leaving them in the field?

Surely if they could have passed their great knowledghe and skill onto their junior pilots, it would have been better as a whole for Germany?

Once RAF and USAAF pilots got enought kills I htink they were taken away to be instructors, I think? Surely this is the better way?

Rather than having 20 or sao top aces in the feield killing maybe 1 enemy per day, their experience could be passed onto many more pilots and would be invaluable in training schools.

What do you guys think?

tigertalon
03-16-2007, 07:11 AM
Yeah, that's an interesting question.

Firstly, Germans never expected the war to last that long, so from this perspective their choice was correct...
Secondly, those aces were a great tool of nazi propaganda machine to boost morale of other soldiers/pilots/whole country...
Thirdly, the morale and skill-gaining of pilots serving under and flying together with these "immortal gods" was certainly higher...
Fourthly, aces alone were shooting down enormous quantities of enemies. 100kills+ aces alone (around 100 of them) shot down more than 15.000 enemy planes....

carguy_
03-16-2007, 07:59 AM
Yeah and to add to that,most of them top aces didn`t want to stay in a comfy school like some cowards sitting out the whole war.Just like Witmann.

I wonder if they thought they wouldn`t get killed.Because in early `44 the numbers were so poor that even if any of them scored 20kills/day there still would be 5+ planes to shoot him down,regardless if those were n00bs or not.

Also bear in mind that in late `44 they didn`t have good candidates for pilots anyway.Through the war criteria got quite low.It was to get pilots or have empty planes sitting in the field.

Another thought comes to my mind,the Oberkommando Luftwaffe didn`t really listen to the experten.Tacitcs could be altered,more pilots could be saved.Instead planes were used in dimwitted tactics,particulary taqctics which serverd the VVS/RAF better.


On a sidenote,it is quite interesting that with no direct correspondence,RAF and VVS both built very good T&B fighters,whereas Luftwaffe fighters were quite poor in that regard and there wasn`t a really good German T&Ber.We can talk bout later powerful 109s and Doras but those were outclassed by Yak9U,P63,Spitfire and the Tempest already.

I do think though that 30 pilots with 1.500experience are a better use than say one ace with 3.000 experience ,let alone 30n00bs with 1.000 experience.

stathem
03-16-2007, 08:09 AM
IMO, no they weren't.

There's also the question of promotion to leadership; the best killers do not neccessairily make the best leaders of men. (obv some might)

The RAF and USAAF took account of this in promotion; whereas the Luftwaffe tended more to promoting to flight command the highest scorers.

Another mistake, again IMO.

DKoor
03-16-2007, 08:17 AM
That's a very good idea if it could work in reality.
Because there could have been some very real "pedagogical" obstacles http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif
Perhaps some of them were like Nishizawa, he was assigned to train youngsters, but failed miserably in spite of being Japan No.1 ace. He wasn't suited for that kind of job.

Kurfurst__
03-16-2007, 08:39 AM
A couple of thoughts :

a, Aces scored formed a small minority, and scored the vast majority of victories. Removing aces is removing the combat potential of the unit. Why accumulate experience if it's not put to use..?

b, You don't actually need a 300-victory ace to teach a rookie that which one is the rudder. How to take off. How to turn.

c, The aces did train rookies. Once a rookie finished it's training, he was assigned to an Ergänzungseinheit, or 'Replacement unit', kinda like OTU in the RAF. There he would get some skill on his operational type from old pilots before assigned to a combat unit.

d, When he arrived to a combat unit, he was usually taken 'under the wings' of an older, experienced pilot as a wingman. Initially, the newbie would do nothing else but follow the leader, keep him safe, keep his eyes open how things are done, and most important of all, how to stay alive. Hartmann himself was trained exactly like that. Training did not cease ether - when not flying mission, older pilots would take up the new ones and do mock dogfights, pass on actual tactics.

Finally, I don't believe the LW was alone with the practice of keeping pilots in the frontline. The VVS certainly did not, most smaller Axis countries did not, and I am not sure if the RAF Fighter Command would withdrawn pilots regularly either - Johnson, Clostermann was fighting for years, till the end of the war AFAIK. IMHO the US practice of ToDs was much more politically inspired, to keep home moral high, rather than of military nature, plus the fact that the US armed forces were built from the scratch (no mass armies or air forces in 1930s) and probably had a shortage of experienced servicemen resulting from the sudden expansion.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">whereas the Luftwaffe tended more to promoting to flight command the highest scorers. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's pretty much false, and somehow absurd in the face that the highest scorers were usually the ones with the most sorties flown, and the most experience about what happens in air combat. Hartmann for example, despite being the top scorer in the Luftwaffe, was still just Hauptmann (Captain) at the start of 1945; he managed to become a Squad leader in October 1944, by which time he had more than 300 victories and hundreds of combat sorties behind him; he did not assume command of I/JG52 until as late as February 1945. Marseille, the top scorer of the Western Front, never become a Gruppenkommandeur. etc.

csThor
03-16-2007, 08:59 AM
They had no choice about it. All the time from the Spanish Civil War to the end in 1945 the Luftwaffe had to rely on their core of highly-experienced airmen to achieve a high degree of success. You can make a sweep across all branches of the Luftwaffe - fighters, bombers, Stukas, ground-pounders or recon - and you'll find men with almost excessive combat experience who form the core of their units, who are responsible for astonishing successes and who kept the spirit of the newcomers up.

There was no possibility for a ToD system as the human reserves weren't there. As Kurfürst said a lot of veterans served in Ergänzungsgruppen for limited timeframes to teach fresh pilots in the art of air combat, though. But being an experienced and successful pilot doesn't make one a good teacher, too. It doesn't make one a good leader, either. There are more than enough examples of very able fighter pilots promoted beyond their own leadership abilities (Nowotny being the most prominent "victim" here) while other highly able unit leaders were sacked because of a lack of aerial victories.

BadA1m
03-16-2007, 09:32 AM
Wow, an interesting discussion, a lot you of guys have brought up really good points. I never really thought about how good at training the experten would be and quite frankly, having thought on it some, I don't believe many would be very good at it any more. Certainly giving pointers to already trained but green pilots in the field is much different from a staff position at a flight training school, I should thing such a job would drive a fighter pilot mad, and crazy people make lousy teachers. BTW nice civil discussion.

BadA1m
03-16-2007, 09:34 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by DKoor:
That's a very good idea if it could work in reality.
Because there could have been some very real "pedagogical" obstacles http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif
Perhaps some of them were like Nishizawa, he was assigned to train youngsters, but failed miserably in spite of being Japan No.1 ace. He wasn't suited for that kind of job. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

perfect example of said good point!

R_Target
03-16-2007, 09:58 AM
I'm not sure how many combat pilots were sent back to teach rookies. USN practice appeared to be to break up a squadron at the end of it's tour to form more new squadrons.

WOLFMondo
03-16-2007, 10:31 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Xiolablu3:


Once RAF and USAAF pilots got enought kills I htink they were taken away to be instructors, I think? Surely this is the better way?
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The RAF pilots just got put on rotation, reassigned for an easy period i.e. with a second line squadron or training unit in an easy area then rotated back into a frontline squadron.

horseback
03-16-2007, 10:32 AM
As was pointed out in an earlier post, the German leadership was not willing to commit the resources and manpower for widespread pilot training when it would have done some good. They were convinced that the war was already as good as over by the summer of 1940, and spending Germany's limited treasury on expanded pilot training might not have been politically expedient. My reading of German memoirs (Galland, especially) indicates that Germany was not on a war economy footing until after the Battle of Britain, when the attrition had already begun.

To a large degree, the German civilian population was carefully insulated until things had already gone to hell in a handbasket. Many pilots wrote that when they came home on leave from France or Russia that their family and friends' lifestyle was unchanged from before the war, and the contrast was hard to take.

By contrast, most of southern and eastern England was very much on the frontlines and subject to attack almost throughout the war. There was a lot more urgency early on, and the involvement of experienced aces in training and development of tactics was used as much for morale as for the direct value they may have had in those roles.

Every combat aircrewman had the opportunity to get a six month respite from combat, although a few found ways around their rest periods by seeking a posting to another combat zone, like North Africa or the China Burma India theater, or going into nightfighters.

The Americans used the British system as a model, although a few avoided the War Bond tours with greater skill than others, such as Bong (who was home in the late spring of 1944 'touring' with Bob Johnson and back in combat by the August) or Blakeslee (who served in combat almost continuously from early 1941 to September of 1944).

Generally, though, the average fighter pilot had a limited combat lifespan; he would burn out after a certain amount of hazard, stress and wounds, regardless of his victory count. In some cases, disease or a health problem could take a top contender off the board, as Joe Foss' malaria kept him from re-entering combat with a Corsair squadron did, or Gunther Rall's infected wounds kept him from the last six months or so of the war.

The German experten who survived to run up huge scores were freaks both in terms of statistics and opportunity. Several were shot down well over 10 times, at a time when two out of every five pilots shot down did not survive.

But the overwhelming majority kept going back up, not because they "had to." There were plenty of opportunities to take a 'rest' tour of some sort if one truly needed it, but the 'jaeger' system relied on starpower, anmd the sense of duty these men had didn't allow for them to take time off for 'unnecessary' rest and recuperation.

One should note here that the Soviets had a similar attitude, although the powers that be were quick to note pilots who had the knack for teaching and developing effective tactics and doctrine, and pull them out of combat for period of instructor duty. Pokryshin is notably one such; he spent a great deal of time teaching and mentoring on top of his duties as a combat leader.

By contrast, the Western Allies had the manpower and training infrastructure to ensure that no man was irreplaceable by late 1943. A man returning home after 50 or 100 combat sorties rarely had a crises of conscience about leaving his comrades still fighting. He was usually assured that he'd done his part and earned at least a rest.

cheers

horseback

Bremspropeller
03-16-2007, 10:46 AM
There are lots of things to take into considerarion.

First, one needs to be a LEADER to train new pilots and make effective warriors out of them.
You can't just take any 150+ killwh0re and try to let him teach newcomers the dos and don'ts of aerial combat.
Some aces were leaders, many weren't (for example Marseille was a brilliant pilot and marksman, but he sucked in leadership - besides creating a certain spirit among his squadron. However, spirit alone doesn't shoot down enemy planes).

The next issue was the Lw being unable to maintain a certain standard in training. When they realized it was time to reassign priorities in pilot training, it was already to late and an unfillable gap had already developed (tat one led to the ever decreasing training-standards toward war's end).
Rall for example mentioned that untill his refreshment training for the new german Luftwaffe (trained by USAF-IPs), he never even heard of things like checklists.

The list goes on...

Ruy Horta
03-16-2007, 10:59 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Xiolablu3:
I was thinking about it this morning.

Wouldnt Germany have been better putting Hartmann, Rall and other top pilots in charge of training new recruits rather than leaving them in the field?

What do you guys think? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

A lot of these top aces were taken out of the fight, but many of them simply wanted to get back in ASAP. Plenty of early Experten who moved up in the command chain.

Up to 1942 Luftwaffe fighter pilots were well trained, including instructions from combat experienced instructors, Hartmann was part of the war trained generation. Were they ready for war, no they needed further operational training (like any fighter pilot), but they were trained up to the best standard possible.

The Luftwaffe might have had some benefit of more rotation (although I've come across many examples of experienced pilots being lost shortly after long leave, or other duties, seemingly having lost their edge).

Bottomline Germany simply couldn't spare the pilots from combat compared to the US and the Commonwealth, with their seemingly endless pool of aircrew.

War on 4 fronts (west, south, east and reich) simply stretched the Luftwaffe beyond its ability to cope. Attrition simply could not be made up, leading to a downward spiral. As the Allies closed in, the training came under more pressure, first indirect (attrition and fuel targets), afterwards even directly (as you can judge from the Ar 96s being blown to bits on US guncam footage).

Simple fact remains that if you dig a little deeper, there are plenty of examples of veterans being pulled from the fighting, moving up the chain of command, deployed as instructors or other duties.

Besides, in the west, tours were also something of a wax nose, plenty of aircrew (at least commonwealth and for example dutch)who flew 2 or even 3 tours. Not sure, but IIRC this was even part of the regular RAF system.

Tour, non-ops duty, another tour, etc.

Ruy Horta
03-16-2007, 11:15 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by horseback:
As was pointed out in an earlier post, the German leadership was not willing to commit the resources and manpower for widespread pilot training when it would have done some good. They were convinced that the war was already as good as over by the summer of 1940, and spending Germany's limited treasury on expanded pilot training might not have been politically expedient. My reading of German memoirs (Galland, especially) indicates that Germany was not on a war economy footing until after the Battle of Britain, when the attrition had already begun. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Only in part correct, the 1940-42 trained pilots were trained with the best mix of pre-war and combat experience by mainly combat experienced instructors. There was still room for operational training with their assigned units.

Of course a pre-war veteran would consider any green pilot as too inexperienced even in 1942, but that's only to be expected.

Germany wasn't ready for a world war. The rapid victory over France reaffirmed the idea that the war could be limited, units even demobilized. Industry worked on a two shift basis, only limited numbers of a/c like the 109 being built, and by some twist of logic, since there were only limited numbers of a/c, you didn't need more trained aircrew than you could man a/c with..

But it became a world war and the forula that worked relatively well up to 1942, was stressed beyond its limits in 1943 and shattered in 1944.

BTW

The Anglo-American approach of airpower could not have worked for Germany. Regardless of the idea that Germany was after world domination, in fact it was still relatively small compared to either the British Empire, The United States and The Soviet Union (let alone these three powers combined).

It could not wage a balanced war on all fronts: land, air and sea.

A bigger air force would have weakened the army, something that would almost certainly have meant a quicker defeat (sorry for the air boys).

waffen-79
03-16-2007, 11:16 AM
They were right, besides, LW Experten were just D.A.M.N good

XyZspineZyX
03-16-2007, 11:37 AM
Hartmann was asked more than once to leave his unit and join one serving inside the homeland. He refused each time, always thinking he was more useful with his front line unit.

JtD
03-16-2007, 12:00 PM
I'd say it wasn't the best thing to focus so much on individual kills. It would have been better to have more homogeneous units with a more equal distribution of skill. I do think, however, that the aces were of great value in the field.

I'm pretty sure the Luftwaffe had plenty of 5+ aces that had to retire from active duty for one or another reason and could still be used for training with large effect. So essentially I see no reason to remove successful pilot from a combat unit just because they are successful

leitmotiv
03-16-2007, 12:18 PM
Lack of aviation spirit starting even in 1942 made moot any attempt to drastically increase the number of pilot trainees. The Luftwaffe tried to get more bang for its limited fuel buck by keeping high scorers in the ring.

Kurfurst__
03-16-2007, 12:29 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
Lack of aviation spirit starting even in 1942... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/354.gif

OFF : Ruy was cosumed with 300, appearantly! Must be good then! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/metal.gif

JuHa-
03-16-2007, 12:47 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by carguy_:
I wonder if they thought they wouldn`t get killed. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

From the memoirs of LW pilots I've read, they were afraid of the inevitable death waiting
for them. As they've been fighting for a long time and seen most of their comrades in arms
die, there wasn't much illusions left. Only the rookies thought that there wasn't much
of a risk in being a fighter pilot.

Rudel was an exception, at least on basis of his diary.

leitmotiv
03-16-2007, 01:17 PM
Oh dear, K raises his Pickelhaube Kopf. The Germans, as anybody who has the shallowest understanding of the economic history of the war knows, never had enough fuel for their massive commitments---Rumania's and Hungary's fields, and the synthetic fuel production could not meet their needs completely. This was why Hitler wanted the Baku oilfields, and why the failure to hold them was a disaster.

Xiolablu3
03-16-2007, 02:06 PM
I think Kurfy, as I did, thought that you meant lack of enthusiam for air war by the soldiers.

Unless I totally misunderstood what you BOTH meant.


Thanks for all your very interesting comments.

Kurfurst__
03-16-2007, 05:02 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
Oh dear, K raises his Pickelhaube Kopf. The Germans, as anybody who has the shallowest understanding of the economic history of the war knows, never had enough fuel for their massive commitments---Rumania's and Hungary's fields, and the synthetic fuel production could not meet their needs completely. This was why Hitler wanted the Baku oilfields, and why the failure to hold them was a disaster. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Big words, generalisations, ignorance, innuendo. You make up the story as you go, without even bothering to check it's true or not.
It must be true...!

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e133/Kurfurst/fig22.gif

AVIA 19/254 gives the avarage 1942 weekly consumption of a 100/130 grade aviation fuel as 13300 tons per weak, or 53 200 Tons per month in the 'United Kingdom Theatre', 28900/week for 1943 (=115 600 tons/month), for comparison.

Just pointing out you ain't know what you're blabbering about, that's all. Stupidness has a tendency to spread like wildfire, and I would not like you to infest others.

luftluuver
03-16-2007, 05:27 PM
What was the total British consumption Kurfurst? Kindly compare apples with apples. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

Kurfurst__
03-16-2007, 06:00 PM
I'd believe most if not all planes would be using 100 octane fuel, at least by 1942-43. At least the operational ones.

luftluuver
03-16-2007, 06:11 PM
You can't compare only the 'United Kingdom Theatre' with all of Germany's consuption.

Since you didn't comprehend, what was the German consuption in the Western Europe Theatre?

Kurfurst__
03-17-2007, 06:01 AM
Well that's a good point, probably there was avgas consumption in other theatres as well, like MTO. OTOH, most consumption of fuel would be related to bombers in England, plus UK Theatre is likely to include USAAF consumption.

In any case, the point was that in 1942 there was hardly a shortage of fuel in the LW. Not until after mid-1944.

JtD
03-17-2007, 06:36 AM
Since the start of WW2 in September 1939, Germany never had sufficient fuel production or supplies. Obviously the did not use more than they had, but if they had had more, they would have used more. In 1944, the shortages became so severe that they had a huge impact on all operations. But to say that everything was fine before 1944, is wrong. You can see from the chart Kurfürst posted, that about every major campaign meant that the fuel consumption exceeded production. Fuel has always been an issue.

luftluuver
03-17-2007, 07:26 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
Well that's a good point, probably there was avgas consumption in other theatres as well, like MTO. OTOH, most consumption of fuel would be related to bombers in England, plus UK Theatre is likely to include USAAF consumption.

<span class="ev_code_YELLOW">Doubtful, the Americans would have had their own numbers.</span>

In any case, the point was that in 1942 there was hardly a shortage of fuel in the LW. Not until after mid-1944. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>But look at the reserves and how they almost meet the production. '43 was when The Germans started to cut back on pilot training hours. Obvious on why they did.

Kurfurst__
03-17-2007, 08:12 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by JtD:
Since the start of WW2 in September 1939, Germany never had sufficient fuel production or supplies. Obviously the did not use more than they had, but if they had had more, they would have used more. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Following the same same logic, Britain had severe fuel supply problems as well. They were using half or perhaps comparable amount of avgas the Germany did appearantly. Obviously they did not use moe if they had more, they would use more, right?

And following your logic, the only conclusion is that there's always 'shortage', regardless anything. Since, they can always use more fuel. If they use 100k tons, they have shortage because they don't use 200k tons. If they use 200k tons, they have shortage because they don't use 300k tons a month. And so on. The logic is flawed. The implication that consumption was artificially kept low 'to match production' (and thus, unfortunately conflict w theories 'shortage') is also absurd. It just doesn't work that way.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">In 1944, the shortages became so severe that they had a huge impact on all operations. But to say that everything was fine before 1944, is wrong. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, appearantly it was all fine before 1944. Consumption demands were met by production demands between 1939-1944, and if there was temporarily exceeding of production by consumption, it was made up from reserves, which were re-plenishing during more quiet periods. That's what reserves are for after all. Coupled with increasing production (doubled between 40-44), that is how the LW managed to build up huge reserves of avgas by early 1944 and that is how it could remain operational for quite some time after despite the bombing of the fuel industry.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">You can see from the chart Kurfürst posted, that about every major campaign meant that the fuel consumption exceeded production. Fuel has always been an issue. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You keep repeating it was 'an issue', but there's no evidence shown that it has been actually reducing the number of pilots trained, or the operations flown. If fuel has been 'always an issue', why there are huge quantities being consumed (100-200k tons/months) during the entire war up to 1944? Why is consumption increasing steadily up to 1944? And for God's sake, if fuel is that much of an issue, why the heck is the civillian sector allowed to consume considerable amount of avgas up to 1944? You seem to happily ignore all of these, and you don't quite seem to understand that the fact that consumption goes up and down is pretty normal. There's less flying in the winter, and more in the summer etc. Heavy operations drain more fuel. That's why everyone created large fuel reserves to serve as a buffer. If you'd look at similiar Soviet, Allied etc. graphs, you'd find the same trend.

Kurfurst__
03-17-2007, 08:21 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by luftluuver:
In any case, the point was that in 1942 there was hardly a shortage of fuel in the LW. Not until after mid-1944. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

But look at the reserves and how they almost meet the production.[/QUOTE]

The reserve go up during winter, when there's less flying, and go down during the great summer battles. It happens in every year.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">'43 was when The Germans started to cut back on pilot training hours. Obvious on why they did. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Looking at the LW's loss figures will make it obvious, indeed. They had to replace the pilots faster after the USAAF start to seriously enter the war and the Western aerial front started to mean more than skirmishing the marginal daylight attacks of RAF, for which task a mere two JGs deployed in the West were sufficient.

JtD
03-17-2007, 08:43 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:

Following the same same logic...following your logic... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Once again you missed a point and waste resources to put words in other peoples mouth. It's not my logic. I pointed out facts. It's your logic that made up the bullcrap you wrote. If you want to believe that less than 300000 tons of reserve gas in the decisive phase was the German High commands dream, feel free.

AKA_TAGERT
03-17-2007, 08:47 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Xiolablu3:
What do you guys think? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>I think they didn't have much of a choice

Kurfurst__
03-17-2007, 09:16 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by JtD:
Once again you missed a point and waste resources to put words in other peoples mouth. It's not my logic. I pointed out facts. It's your logic that made up the bullcrap you wrote. If you want to believe that less than 300000 tons of reserve gas in the decisive phase was the German High commands dream, feel free. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I see. Regardless of the facts, the conclusion you'll arrive will be always be the same. Regardless the amount of avgas used up, regardless of the reserves, regardless of the production figures, it's always 'shortage'. It's called preconception.

You claimed the operations were curtailed by lack of fuel, but failed to show any single evidence to either that a, the operations were curtailed at all, and if they were, b, lack of fuel was the reason behind. That sums it up.

K_Freddie
03-17-2007, 09:41 AM
With regard to the experten. From Hartmans book "The Blond Knight" I think he score was around 250 the last time he was captured and interrogated by the russians. They could not believe his score-card, and asked if he was the top scorer. His reply was No! as Galland was considered top ace with a score of ~100 in the west.

This raised their eyebrows, but then they 'flipped' when Hartmann said that the Luftwaffe pilots considered a Western front 'kill' 3x the value of and Eastern front one, as these pilots were better trained.

In most cases, at this time, this was probably the case, but when one considers the experten score cards, we should include the western front experten as well, with the math equations ??
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Viper2005_
03-17-2007, 09:44 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by AKA_TAGERT:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Xiolablu3:
What do you guys think? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>I think they didn't have much of a choice </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree.

Fighter pilots not flying might as well be KIA anyway. Once you get beyond basic flying skills and a few basic rules of thumb, its very difficult to teach people how to be successful in air combat, so ace pilots aren't an especially useful training resource.

Aces have a certain propaganda value, but propaganda doesn't matter much when you're back is to the wall. The priority is to throw everything you have at the enemy. If that means that your ace pilots die, that's tough.

The politicians probably had a pretty good idea of what lay in store for them in the event of defeat, so the survival chances of their fighter pilots (and other servicemen) probably wasn't very high on their list of priorities...

JtD
03-17-2007, 10:00 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:

I see. Regardless of the facts, the conclusion you'll arrive will be always be the same. Regardless the amount of avgas used up, regardless of the reserves, regardless of the production figures, it's always 'shortage'. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I you say so...

On the other hand of course a chart showing that some fuel was being produced with some of it being consumed of course shows that there always was enough fuel. Or what?

What you don't seem to get is that the chart does not make a statement wrt the what was needed to what was produced ratio. You cannot use more than you have.

Fact is, German fuel, oil, avgas production and stock was always below planned, intended and wanted figures, maybe with the occasional short term exception. In general, the supply did not meet the requirements.

Kurfurst__
03-17-2007, 10:24 AM
Excellent, keep repeating it. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

XyZspineZyX
03-17-2007, 10:30 AM
Got gas? start your own topic on gas. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_razz.gif

ViktorViktor
03-17-2007, 12:20 PM
Back to the subject, guys.

Hermann Graf is an example of a top Luftwaffe ace who got excused from combat flying duties. He was fortunate enough to achieve 200 victories at a time (1942) when such a total was unheard of in the history of aerial combat. Shortly after his 200th victory, Graf was informed by Hermann Goring that he was "grounded for the remainder of the war". Luck seemed to be on Graf's side.

He was flown back to Berlin, and thereafter went on the road tour, giving a series of speeches prepared by the propaganda ministry. Graf was in fact transformed into a media idol by Goebbels and his cronies. After several months of this, Graf was given command of Jagdgruppe Ost (Hunter Group East), a finishing school for newly-trained Bf109 and Fw190 pilots. His role here was mainly an administrative one, and he spent alot of time building up a championship football (soccer) team, to the detriment of his effectiveness as a jagdgruppe leader. Later in the year, he was selected to lead a new high-altitude fighter unit (JG50), and became more and more involved in air combat again. He went on to become acting kommodore of JG1 and later of JG11. So in the end, the shifting fortunes of war forced the middle-aged Graf back into a fighter cockpit despite Goring's original pronouncement.

Graf went on to finish his flying career on the Eastern Front with his old unit, JG52, together with Eric Hartmann. Together they cleverly arranged to surrender themselves and all of JG52 to U.S. forces, fearing Soviet retribution. However, in accordance with a previous agreement with the Russians, Graf and Hartmann were handed over to the U.S.S.R, where they remained as prisoners until 1950s. So in the end, Graf's luck was very poor indeed.

LStarosta
03-17-2007, 12:40 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Were the Germans right to keep their top aces in the field? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Because they didn't have enough gasoline to put them in the air.

Aymar_Mauri
03-17-2007, 12:52 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by ViktorViktor:
...Graf and Hartmann were handed over to the U.S.S.R, where they remained as prisoners until 1950s. So in the end, Graf's luck was very poor indeed. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
Graf was released in 1950 because he decided to be more cooperative with the Soviets. Hartmann was only released in 1955 together with the last surviving german POWs.

Kettenhunde
03-17-2007, 01:12 PM
It was modern mechanized war. Everyone was short of fuel.

http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1174158495_stocksoffuel.jpg

http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1174158530_150grade5.jpg

http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1174158561_150grade3.jpg

http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/503_1174158585_150grade4.jpg

Even the United States never met it's production goals.

Guess this proves that the USAAF was grounded due to a lack of fuel!! Ubi-History rules!

Now Ubi is free to make my gameshape better.

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

Case closed.

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

All the best,

Crumpp

TSmoke
03-17-2007, 08:50 PM
"ViktorViktor"
Seems you have your information from a internet site or a poor excuse of a historical text.

Nothing personal towards you, but Hermann Graf is a deceased family member from my mothers side. We know the facts and true accounts behind his life and service to his country.

Please get it right or don't bother. you'll just offend us again. Thanks

ViktorViktor
03-18-2007, 12:09 PM
TSmoke, sorry if I offended you. I got my information from 'Graf & Grislawski' by Christer Bergström.

Ruy Horta
03-18-2007, 12:53 PM
TSmoke,

It would be interesting to know what you find so offensive about VV's post. In general Christer Bergström's double biography is considered to both good and sympathetic to its subjects (as in Graf and Grislawski).

BTW, are you familiar with Berthold Jochim's old biography? If you do, how do you rate that one?