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darkhorizon11
10-03-2006, 10:51 PM
Or LACK THEREOF!!! psych! http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

Actually this is a serious topic that I've almost never heard talked about, but it seems like a very pivotal aspect of WWII.

From what I've read over the years the German intelligence community was one of the most cunning in WWII, perhaps even one upping the Allies. Yet I've never seen a thread here posted about it or a TV show about it.

What did German intelligence officers do after the war? Especially the ones who were already spying in another country, did they just assimilate into the population? Obviously some surrendered or were caught, but is it possible some are still out there today just living out their lives in GB, the old Soviet Union or even the US? They certainly accomplished some amazing things.

I know for one the Germans were very crafty, dropping intelligence agents behind enemy lines. To do this so stealthily they did it at night flying aircraft of the KG 400, basically captured Allied aircraft like B-17s. I've heard this actually went on as late as April of 1945.

In the second to last chapter of the book Tumult in the Skies, which is the war stories James Goodson a pilot in the USAF is in a German prison camp in 1945. He barters his way out of being shot and actually has a casual meeting with an SS intelligence officer. At one point during the conversation the officer actually pulls out a copy of the blueprints of the Rolls Royce engine used in the British Meteor jet, and explains the principle of jet engine theory to the surprised Goodson. Pretty impressive since the British went to great lengths protect their jet technology.

Again the expertise and talents of the German intelligence showed through later in the war with the crash of one of the YP-80 prototypes in about March of 1945 in Kansas. Quite literally before the American papers could print the story (although it incident was kept pretty hush) the German propaganda ministry somehow found out about the crash and dennounced the American attempts as jet technology as a joke!

Then perhaps in the ultimate irony, I've heard repeatedly over the years that the heirarchy and structure of the SS (minus the political attitudes and propaganda appeal) was copied in the formation of the modern CIA...

What made the Germans such masters at this craft of intelligence?

darkhorizon11
10-03-2006, 10:51 PM
Or LACK THEREOF!!! psych! http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

Actually this is a serious topic that I've almost never heard talked about, but it seems like a very pivotal aspect of WWII.

From what I've read over the years the German intelligence community was one of the most cunning in WWII, perhaps even one upping the Allies. Yet I've never seen a thread here posted about it or a TV show about it.

What did German intelligence officers do after the war? Especially the ones who were already spying in another country, did they just assimilate into the population? Obviously some surrendered or were caught, but is it possible some are still out there today just living out their lives in GB, the old Soviet Union or even the US? They certainly accomplished some amazing things.

I know for one the Germans were very crafty, dropping intelligence agents behind enemy lines. To do this so stealthily they did it at night flying aircraft of the KG 400, basically captured Allied aircraft like B-17s. I've heard this actually went on as late as April of 1945.

In the second to last chapter of the book Tumult in the Skies, which is the war stories James Goodson a pilot in the USAF is in a German prison camp in 1945. He barters his way out of being shot and actually has a casual meeting with an SS intelligence officer. At one point during the conversation the officer actually pulls out a copy of the blueprints of the Rolls Royce engine used in the British Meteor jet, and explains the principle of jet engine theory to the surprised Goodson. Pretty impressive since the British went to great lengths protect their jet technology.

Again the expertise and talents of the German intelligence showed through later in the war with the crash of one of the YP-80 prototypes in about March of 1945 in Kansas. Quite literally before the American papers could print the story (although it incident was kept pretty hush) the German propaganda ministry somehow found out about the crash and dennounced the American attempts as jet technology as a joke!

Then perhaps in the ultimate irony, I've heard repeatedly over the years that the heirarchy and structure of the SS (minus the political attitudes and propaganda appeal) was copied in the formation of the modern CIA...

What made the Germans such masters at this craft of intelligence?

TeufelHund84
10-03-2006, 10:55 PM
Weisbier, wienerschnitzel, bratwurst, Oktoberfest.

It's too crazy not to be true.

p1ngu666
10-03-2006, 11:18 PM
there photorecon sucked tho

sukebeboy
10-03-2006, 11:25 PM
Really? Most of what I've read all suggest that German Intelligence during WWII was laughably incompetent. There were far too many seperate branches which lead to a lot of in-fighting. There was a serious problem with upper echelon types surrounding themselves with yes men rather than listening to criticisms.

A lot of it stemmed out of non skilled but long time members of the Nazi party being promoted above professionals whose loyalty was suspect. This was especially true when looking at members of the police force. A large number of intelligence, and especially counter-intelligence operatives were drawn from the interwar police force. The higher level investigators were often placed in subordinate positions to what were basically low ranking patrolmen who joined the party in the early days.

Ob.Emann
10-04-2006, 01:53 AM
German Intelligence certainly did have it's successes, mostly in the field of encryption and SIGINT (look for information on "forschungsampt". David Irving has also written very extensively on the subject) but German intelligence during WWII was marred, in my opinion, by almost incredible timidity (Hitler forbade the Abwehr from carrying out political assassinations, for example) and a great divergence in the loyalties and agendas of its chiefs (Admiral Canaris being a through-and-through traitor certainly didn't help the Abwehr's effectiveness).

For an excellent overview of German Intelligence successes and failures, as well as VERY revealing insight on WWI through Cold War-era espionage (the chapter dealing with ULTRA has some very interesting revelations regarding its effectiveness), I HIGHLY RECOMMEND "The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the 20th Century" by Philip Knightley.

WOLFMondo
10-04-2006, 02:08 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by sukebeboy:
Really? Most of what I've read all suggest that German Intelligence during WWII was laughably incompetent. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree. Nearly all German agents who got into the UK were either then turned as double agents, fed false information or captured pretty quickly. Its the one thing the Germans didn't do well.

Waldo.Pepper
10-04-2006, 02:12 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">From what I've read over the years the German intelligence community was one of the most cunning in WWII, perhaps even one upping the Allies. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

OMG where have you read that?

IMO an excellent book on the subject is David Kahn's Hitler's Spies.

http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Spies-German-Military-Int...1734?ie=UTF8&s=books (http://www.amazon.com/Hitlers-Spies-German-Military-Intelligence/dp/0306809494/sr=1-1/qid=1159948660/ref=sr_1_1/102-8001025-3501734?ie=UTF8&s=books)

The title is misleadingly sensational as the book deals with the more common and mundane work of intelligence gathering. Y-service, battlefield recon, etc. etc. It is excellent, perhaps even definitive.

As for what became of German Spies at the close of the war. Well ALL the assets they tried infiltrate into England were caught and many turned (look up the XX Committee for more information). ALL the assets that they tried to infiltrate into the USA were caught, most executed. (SEE OPERATION PASTORIUS). Gehlen who was a (flawed) expert on the Soviet Union became an asset for the CIA. Otto Johns (see the book Twice Through the Lines) did likewise. But these are the luminaries, most reverted to their former lives, and livelihoods if they survived at all.

I am racking my brain to think of ANY German Intelligence success during the war. And the only one that I can think of off hand in the Englandspiel conducted against the SOE by Giskes. (and even that these days is being thrown into question).

Most of the agents dropped by KG200 accomplished almost nothing of value whatsoever, as the populace that they were expected to operate in was distinctly hostile to Nazi Germany. Agents dropped by the allies into occupied Europe could count on a measure of support that their German counterparts could never hope to simulate.

Finally, for a rather good account of allied agents being dropped into Germany see Piercing the Reich by Joseph A Perpisco.

Waldo.Pepper
10-04-2006, 02:22 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">here photorecon sucked tho </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


Roger that! See: Evidence in Camera by Constance Babbinton Smith. She was a (or rather THE) photo interpreter for England. She was highly skilled. Anyway at the end of the war they were eager to see their counterparts in the Luftwaffe, to learn how they dealt with photo intelligence. They were quite disappointed with what they found. In comparing it to there own elaborate and sophisticated effort, they typified the German effort as 'nothing.'

ImpStarDuece
10-04-2006, 02:27 AM
There is a copy of the June 1940 German intelligence summary for the air campaign against the UK in Wood and Dempster's "The Narrow Margin" and its quite humourous in its inaccuracy and flippancy and very revealing in its attitudes.

I'll dig it up and post some of the better exercpts when I've got the book to hand as a mate has it at the moment.

stathem
10-04-2006, 02:31 AM
Good post, Waldo, that tallies with what I've seen of the subject.

On the subject of successes though, I've seen that the Germans had some success prior to Battle of Bulge with infraltration (sorry about the spelling) of allied lines. I'd have to dig the book out to get details though.

Additionally, didn't the Kriegsmarine havesome of the RN codes in the early part of the war?

waffen-79
10-04-2006, 03:38 AM
I'll let the people with the books take this one, but my personal opinion is that German Military Intelligence were not up for the challenge... not even close

Something completly different was the German Military Logistics and Strategy.

Whenever threads like the P-51 won teh war or T-34 won teh war appear, I chuckle http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

You see, ESPIONAGE won teh war http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

some quick espionage examples that turned the tide of the war:

1. Yamamoto's death
2. Midway Battle
3. Ardennes Offensive
4. Kursk
5. Malta
6. El Alamein
7. Battle of the Atlantic

and of course

8. D-Day

NagaSadow84
10-04-2006, 04:20 AM
One of the Brandenburger-Commandos became a military advisor of Mao Tse-Tung.

NagaSadow84
10-04-2006, 04:37 AM
Well, they managed to breach the Bell-A-3-System used for the overseas-communication between Roosevelt and Churchill.

Deadmeat313
10-04-2006, 04:45 AM
I read an excellent book called €˜The End Of The Beginning€ by Phil Craig and Tim Clayton. It follows on from their first work €˜Their Finest Hour€, and focuses on the early-ish stages of the war in 1942. They go into some detail about the intelligence (SIGINT) work of the Germans in North Africa. The US had attached a liaison officer called Bonner Fellers to the British command in Africa, to report in detail to his superiors as to the strength, organisation, miliraty spirit, supply, disposition etc of the British forces. The US were eager to know how well their allies were fighting the war, and Bonner Fellers gave them regular and detailed updates.

Unfortunately, the US cryptography wasn€t up to scratch, and Fellers€ transmissions were routinely being intercepted and read by the Germans. They were a goldmine of information, and had such effect that Rommel€s staff noted that he always waited for dispatches before issuing any daily orders to his troops. Fellers€ reports told Rommel exactly where the British were, how well they were supplied and indicated the morale level of their troops €" along with any other observations that he cared to make.

This situation went on for the better part of the year. It took some time for the British (who initially feared a spy in their army staff) to realise the source of the leak. It then took them further weeks to find a way diplomatically suggest to the US that they review their high level diplomatic cryptography.

The damage Bonner Fellers€ reports did to the British war effort seems immense, but blame can€t be put on the man himself. It was a failure further down the line. When the US realised what had happened they quietly recalled him, and gave him something of a heroes welcome back home. He was not told what had happened, only that his mission was a €˜success€.

How much of Rommel€s reputation as €˜The Desert Fox€ can be attributed to Fellers€ detailed and regular reports is debatable, but it must have given him a significant advantage over his British counterparts €" and literally allow him to consistently strike where his enemy was weakest. The US changed their codes before Montgomery was put in charge, so he never had to fight Rommel in such an unequal intelligence environment. The previous British leaders all had their reputations severely bashed by their continual reverses by the German leader.

T.

Grue_
10-04-2006, 04:49 AM
Weren't a lot of Rommel's successes in North Africa assisted by German intelligence reading the messages of the US military attache in Cairo?

Ruy Horta
10-04-2006, 04:56 AM
German Intelligence was a mixed bag. Sometimes they were very effective, like North-Africa up to El Alamein, and sometimes it was absolutely incapable as in the Soviet Union.

Canaris was inept as a Intel chief and part of the Abwehr leadership was involved in actively plotting against Hitler before the war started.

On the technical side the Germans seem to have been quite competent, but their infiltration work was often naively amaturist.

However their special ops like the Brandenburgers achieved some spectacular successes, which have been more or less overshadowed by similar allied actions.

WOLFMondo
10-04-2006, 04:57 AM
Not spotting D-day a mile off and misleading the Germans in North Africa was a classic case of idiotic intelligence.

Ruy Horta
10-04-2006, 05:18 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Deadmeat313:
The US changed their codes before Montgomery was put in charge, so he never had to fight Rommel in such an unequal intelligence environment. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Although this kind of intel was very handy, it didn't dictate the fighting. Rommel did what he did best, as he had shown in WW1 and in France, long range penetration and cutting off communications.

Of course having some idea of the enemy's intention helps in planning your counter moves. Rommel was thus able to attack during the build up phase, keeping the initiative.

However we should not forget the counter impact of Ultra on the African campaign. Rommel WITH more supplies and material might not have needed the level of intel in the first place to gain even more spectacular results. All in all, up to El Alamein their was an intel parity, so Monty actually got his unequal situation: in his favor!

He may have had his flaws, but Rommel did understand what kind of war (or at least campaign) winning opportunity can be created by daring action.

Rommel's reputation is hardly based on intel alone.

bazzaah2
10-04-2006, 05:36 AM
I was just thinking about this one the other week.

ULTRA made a massive contriubtion to the war; I saw a talking head claim once that the codebreakers at Bletchley Park took a couple of years off the war.

The Allies managed spectacularly to pull the wool over the Germans eyes on a good few occasions.

The Germans, afaik, had nothing similar and completely failed to recognise the potential that intelligence could play in the conduct of the war and so failed to develop their intelligence in anything like as systemtic a way as the British did with ULTRA.

Plus we had Alan Turing.

DomJScott
10-04-2006, 05:45 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by WOLFMondo:
Not spotting D-day a mile off and misleading the Germans in North Africa was a classic case of idiotic intelligence. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
Both example are not really idiotic intelligence more a case of excellent counter intelligence. Certainly in North Africa I think you can't blame the German intelligence. D-Day Wasn't BAD intelligance on the German part although to think that such a big invasion was just a decoy is a bit bad but being decieved again was just great work by the british intelligence agencies.

Deadmeat313
10-04-2006, 06:03 AM
Ruy Horta: I agree actually that this was probably one of the few occasions where the German Intelligence service came close to what the Allies enjoyed for the better part of the war. Also, Rommel was an incredible commander in any case. I have read (and been very impressed by) his exploits in the First World War, never mind WWII. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

Another book about the history of GCHQ I read years ago, detailed much of the early intelligence war between Britain and Nazi Germany. A lot of German successes exploited British failures. One example was that the British pre-war intelligence agents on the continent were all given the same cover identity €" as British Passport officials (IIRC). The Germans simply arrested all of these at the start of hostilities and the network was shattered.

Later, SOE agents had to be parachuted blind into hostile territory, hoping to be able to link up with Resistance movements in occupied territories. They were often picked up immediately by the Germans and were immediately pressed into service feeding false information back to their masters. To cover for this eventuality the agents had been issued with a code prefix, which they had to transmit before every report. A report sent without the prefix was to be discarded and the agent classified as €˜compromised€. One captured agent was horrified to find that despite the fact that he€s omitted the security prefix, his transmissions were still being treated as valid by the British. The Germans stood over his shoulder and monitored him as he transmitted, and made him send a message to say he had linked successfully with a fictional Dutch resistance group. The message asked for supplies to be sent, and further agents inserted. The British complied, and the new agents were picked up on landing. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif

This agent (I can€t remember his name €" I read this ages ago) was even reprimanded in a message for not including his code prefix in his messages! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/blink.gif At one point - despite the close supervision - he managed to fit the word CAPTURED into his regular broadcast. It had no effect.

I hope that chap survived and was given a medal after the war. He had balls.

T.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

BBB_Hyperion
10-04-2006, 07:45 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by bazzaah2:
I was just thinking about this one the other week.

ULTRA made a massive contriubtion to the war; I saw a talking head claim once that the codebreakers at Bletchley Park took a couple of years off the war.

The Allies managed spectacularly to pull the wool over the Germans eyes on a good few occasions.

The Germans, afaik, had nothing similar and completely failed to recognise the potential that intelligence could play in the conduct of the war and so failed to develop their intelligence in anything like as systemtic a way as the British did with ULTRA.

Plus we had Alan Turing. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Here is something declaring otherwise
Original Link
http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/18/18371/1.html

Google Translator English
http://translate.google.com/translate?u=http%3A%2F%2Fww...ev=%2Flanguage_tools (http://translate.google.com/translate?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.heise.de%2Ftp%2Fr4%2F artikel%2F18%2F18371%2F1.html&langpair=de%7Cen&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&prev=%2Flanguage_tools)

Waldo.Pepper
10-04-2006, 08:50 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Later, SOE agents had to be parachuted blind into hostile territory, hoping to be able to link up with Resistance movements in occupied territories. They were often picked up immediately by the Germans and were immediately pressed into service feeding false information back to their masters. To cover for this eventuality the agents had been issued with a code prefix, which they had to transmit before every report. A report sent without the prefix was to be discarded and the agent classified as €˜compromised€. One captured agent was horrified to find that despite the fact that he€s omitted the security prefix, his transmissions were still being treated as valid by the British. The Germans stood over his shoulder and monitored him as he transmitted, and made him send a message to say he had linked successfully with a fictional Dutch resistance group. The message asked for supplies to be sent, and further agents inserted. The British complied, and the new agents were picked up on landing. Angry Blue Guy </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is the Englandspiel i referred to initially.

Read this

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Englandspiel

and this

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3324807.stm

The Radio Intercept success of the Afrika Korps is also mentioned in Bodyguard of Lies by Anthony Cave Brown. Also Brown suggests that the tightening up of British radio security started at about the same time that the fortunes of the Afrika Korps decline started.

Ruy Horta
10-05-2006, 10:55 AM
There were MANY reasons beside the loss of intel that explain why the Panzer Armee Afrika lost at El Alamein and lost the war in Africa at the same time.

Put this way it appears as if any German success in the theatre was all about a single securty leak...

The German offensive ran out of steam, mostly due to both Ultra and the focus on Stalingrad. These two factors had a huge impact on African supplies.

While the German supply and replacement issues were worsening and logistic lines getting longer, the British were going through the opposite process, supplies and replacements were getting in and the logistics were much simplified.

Add now the loss of German intel and the cards are heavily stacked in favor of the British defenders.

The Panzer Armee was run on a shoestring and most of its success was indeed based on Rommel's audacity, but he was the first to recognise that his success was hanging by a string. Once he was forced to fight a battle of attrition it was more or less finito in Afrika.

Hitler often gets the blame of German failures, but in Africa this is pretty much correct.

Kurfurst__
10-05-2006, 11:39 AM
I think German intelligence is has just bad press, and it's achivements are generally not acknowladged. Far too many post-war allied writers wrote ill-willed and ill-informed stories on it, and most of them are just taking shots and confidently say that those guys of course 'were not up to our boys'. It's just arrogance rather than research.

All in all the whole history of intelligence and spying is just far too complex, even more than any other aspect of the war that some could be summed up as excellent and other performance dismissed as idiocy. The German intelligence service(s, as there were quite a few organisations around) has their high marks and low marks in their history just as everybody else. Overall I don't think they did bad, some of their successes were stunning. British authors never fail to (over)praise Ultra for example, but how is that story if shed in light? Obviously it was great success of great importance, but... Ultra wasn't infallible, and the reflector light it gets is largely because that was pretty much the only, framented insight view into German command levels, and planning. This was something that live agents do - had those agents not been round up by the German counter intelligence in a brilliant action that is known the Venlo-incident just before the war, in which pretty much all British agents were rounded up. Hence the heavy reliance on Ultra, but Ultra itself was not infallible, and many crucial times it provided no information - the Ardennes offensive, Market Garden, the Channel Dash, just to name a few. Nor did it work all the time, during the Battle of the Atlantic there were months when Ultra went silent and gave no information. Espionage was an up and down matter on both sides. Speaking of Ultra, while it's importance is generally, and rightly so! - acknowladged, far less is written on the fact that Allied transmissions were also regualry intercepted and broken, Uboots getting invaluable information on convoy locations via their own codebreaking B-Dienst service - with similiar months of 'silence ' as with Ultra sometimes. And so on, this is just a part on the electronic intelligence, the list can go on and on. To me, the greatest intelligence success was that of the German post(!!!) service, who managed to tap the transatlantic line and break the coding machine guarding the conversations between Churchill and Roosevelt. From about 1944 till late 1944 (when the Allies advance on ground prevented it), Hitler had these transcripts of these conversations between the highest level leaders next to his [i]Frühstück[/], outlaying Allied plans on the highest level.

Anyone interested in the literature on this I would recommend two books :

Ladislas Farago's "The game of the Foxes" or something like that, which is a more or less complete history of German intelligence, very heavily sourced, from primary material, namely captured material of german secret services held in US archives in microfilms. It goes into great detail on a great many subjects, german agents in the US, how they got hold of the Norden sight before the war (and the British who were not shown for years despite being allies!), the tapping of the transatlantic line, how the British counter intelligence turned agents and their successfull misinformation operation before DDay etc.

The other is the book of Walther Schellenberg, who's been a high ranking intelligence officer of the german counter-intelligence during the war - a sort of a memoir providing interesting, but of course subjective insight.

Kurfurst__
10-05-2006, 11:47 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
There were MANY reasons beside the loss of intel that explain why the Panzer Armee Afrika lost at El Alamein and lost the war in Africa at the same time.

Put this way it appears as if any German success in the theatre was all about a single securty leak...

The German offensive ran out of steam, mostly due to both Ultra and the focus on Stalingrad. These two factors had a huge impact on African supplies.

While the German supply and replacement issues were worsening and logistic lines getting longer, the British were going through the opposite process, supplies and replacements were getting in and the logistics were much simplified. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Indeed, if anyone looks up the opposing forces it's hard to believe Rommel even got as far as he did, and held out at El-Alamein and got out of relatively well and intact. For the German high command, Africa was little more than uneasy neccessity to help out the italians from **** they made for themselves, and as the expeditionary forces sent their - the DAK, a single corps as matter of fact - reflected this, being the absolute minimum for operation. For the British otoh, North Africa was THE theatre of war and sent everything there. IMHO Montgomery's 'fame' there is totally undeserved - he barely managed to win with overwhelming superioty in manpower and material, failed to make the victory decisive by encircling and destroying the DAK in retreat, despite the vastly superior motorisation and strategic mobility he enjoyed, worst of all he just took all the credit for something that was essentially the merit of his precedessor(s).

DuxCorvan
10-05-2006, 04:04 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
Canaris was inept as a Intel chief and part of the Abwehr leadership was involved in actively plotting against Hitler before the war started.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Canaris was not an inept. He was a self-motivated double agent, and a true representant of secret resistance against Hitler. He tried desperately to end a war he never desired, and a regime he despised and feared. Most of his 'failures' were in fact calculated sabotages. His grisly torture and death in the hands of the nazis should earn him a bit of a respect, IMHO.

mhuxt
10-05-2006, 05:26 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
This agent (I can€t remember his name €" I read this ages ago) was even reprimanded in a message for not including his code prefix in his messages! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


http://www.answers.com/topic/erik-hazelhoff-roelfzema

Waldo.Pepper
10-05-2006, 06:05 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
I think German intelligence is has just bad press, and it's achievements are generally not acknowledged. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Goodness where to begin....

I think I agree with the sympathies behind your words, but not the words.

"I think German intelligence is has just bad press."

I agree. But it was deserved as well, for they served a totalitarian dictatorship. They were factionalized in a way that those of us who have never lived under such a system can ever fully appreciate. To be certain, large Intelligence interpretation and gathering organizations or today conduct turf wars and infighting, but this is nothing compared to the Machiavellian backstabbing that went on within Nazi Germany's various services, where an individuals very survival depended on their cunning.

Barbarossa is arguably as important a secret to the Germans as was D-Day to the allies. While it was likely impossible for the Germans to have kept their intentions to attack secret. The Soviet government was also told (by various sources... The British, the GRU - through not one but two sources!) details of the attack. Including the actual DATE, of the attack. (Still with all this, lot of good it did them!) Revealing the date to an enemy! Now that's what I call an intelligence failure!

"All in all the whole history of intelligence and spying is just far too complex, even more than any other aspect of the war that some could be summed up as excellent and other performance dismissed as idiocy."

While I sympathize with this view I feel that you over state it. It is not so impenetrable as your statement would have us believe I think.

Re Ultra.

"(It) was pretty much the only, fragmented insight view into German command levels, and planning."

I disagree with this, as the Allies had Canaris and many many other sources. (Of course I include the USSR in with the allies here.)
But even more importantly this statement ignores the larger value that Ultra offered. Perhaps the greater value of Ultra lay in its ability to read the mundane day to day housekeeping records of various military units of Germany.

Information such as this is highly prized, and tragically often overlooked by lay people such as ourselves.

Things like, the transfer of individual personnel from one location to another. If for example you learn that Joseph Schmitt, is the adjutant officer for JG26 and that he has been transfered from one location to another. And this had happened six months previous, immediately before a move of the unit from one airfield to another. You can infer from the this that JG26 is about to move again. This very example happened, and was demonstrated in the 6 part BBC documentary The Secret War, during the Ultra episode. The housekeeping information, was what was really valuable, NOT access to lofty plans.

Venlo Incident. While calling this a German success is true it is also about as significant as being the best tidily winks player in all the world. The damage done had no grand repercussions, except of course to those poor unfortunates who lost their lives) Yes the Germans rolled up the SIS ring in Czechoslovakia. However, they would have likely done this as they tightened their grip on the country anyway. The greater damage done by Venlo was perhaps it made the British wary of German resistance groups.

Really Kurfurst I am sorry to comment on Farago, but I think he is a hack author and largely discredited. Especially after his book - Aftermath: Martin Borman book, claims to have found Martin Borman in Bolivia. Really Farago, is the "Martin Caiden" of Intelligence authors. He is the stuff of pulp fiction and far from a serious scholar in my opinion. Almost anybody would have been a netter choice. Nigel Wests books are all excellent. (Most on topic is his Intelligence Myth's of the Second World War.)

Citing Schellenburg to bolster your case that German intelligence during the Inter war Years and WW2 is kind of wrong headed too I feel, and a gift to those who wish to further denigrate what little the German Intelligence communitee achieved.

Here is a brief sysnopsis of the Intelligence achievements of Schellenberg:

He was responsible for the Venlo incident.

Counterfeited British currency, which achieved little also.

Was the controller of asset Cicero (in Turkey).

Managed an SS Brothel (the notorious Salon Kitty) that spied on his own people. (And representatives of allied nations - like the hapless Count Ciano of Italy). In effect this great spy master was a pimp!

The Wikpedia article is kind of a litany of his near misses, and outright failures. But most damagingly asserts (correctly too I think) that Schellenberg -

"saw himself as one of the great spymasters of his era. He failed to realize
, however, that by the end of the Second World War every German spy in Britain had been detected and either imprisoned, executed or turned to work for the British security services."

fighter_966
10-05-2006, 07:47 PM
German intelligence was far more better at least technically advanced than allies rememeber for example what happened that one Murmansk convoy .....Enigma machine? any one?.. It took allied for almost three years to crack or the Mussolini how he was saved??.Yes they made blunders bigger than life...Lucky us. And Rommel wouldnt get that far without good intelligence (read book Rommel Hero of the desert) It was close call in Africa that Rommel woudnt Win.

Kurfurst__
10-06-2006, 02:23 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Waldo.Pepper:
I think I agree with the sympathies behind your words, but not the words.

"I think German intelligence is has just bad press."

I agree. But it was deserved as well, for they served a totalitarian dictatorship. They were factionalized in a way that those of us who have never lived under such a system can ever fully appreciate. To be certain, large Intelligence interpretation and gathering organizations or today conduct turf wars and infighting, but this is nothing compared to the Machiavellian backstabbing that went on within Nazi Germany's various services, where an individuals very survival depended on their cunning. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I just don't get it. Their intel had quite a few successes, some of them major. Should these be ignored for either moral reasons or because the lack of cooperation between organisations that made these actual successes harder to achieve...? Should we ignore the specific facts because of generalisations?

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Barbarossa is arguably as important a secret to the Germans as was D-Day to the allies. While it was likely impossible for the Germans to have kept their intentions to attack secret. The Soviet government was also told (by various sources... The British, the GRU - through not one but two sources!) details of the attack. Including the actual DATE, of the attack. (Still with all this, lot of good it did them!) Revealing the date to an enemy! Now that's what I call an intelligence failure! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

To that I can only say that one had to blind, deaf and without brain to actually fail to acknowladge the intention of some 4 million people gathering on his border. Plus, I don't see what does German Intelligence have to do with the failure of the German Army and co. to keep it's things secret - esp. as I presume there were. My grandma for example managed to spy out the Kursk offensive single handedly. It was bit difficult to miss those endless chains of railroad wagons loaded with tanks, heading to the East...! All night and day..

Now the comparison with the DDay is interesting, as you probably know the jerry intel was making some achievements there. They managed to find out the date, and noted Normandy as the likely place, and were reading allied transmissions to resistance groups - hardly a secret for even at the time the 'Longest Day' it was known. They alerted the army about the upcoming invasion, it was those infallible Heer generals who screwed up to react accordingly.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
Re Ultra.

"(It) was pretty much the only, fragmented insight view into German command levels, and planning."

I disagree with this, as the Allies had Canaris and many many other sources. (Of course I include the USSR in with the allies here.) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Certainly they had (though I did not include commie networks, their work was easier for plenty of commies around!), but were these significant, and in any case, why is such a heavy reliance on ULTRA then? As for the Commie groups, they were certainly very very successfull - for a while. In the end they were just like german agents in britian, found, turned and rounded up. The Red Orchestra being prime example of this.
In brief, typical spy story with typical ending. After all, the agents we may know of are always the unsuccessful ones.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">But even more importantly this statement ignores the larger value that Ultra offered. Perhaps the greater value of Ultra lay in its ability to read the mundane day to day housekeeping records of various military units of Germany.

Information such as this is highly prized, and tragically often overlooked by lay people such as ourselves.

Things like, the transfer of individual personnel from one location to another. If for example you learn that Joseph Schmitt, is the adjutant officer for JG26 and that he has been transfered from one location to another. And this had happened six months previous, immediately before a move of the unit from one airfield to another. You can infer from the this that JG26 is about to move again. This very example happened, and was demonstrated in the 6 part BBC documentary The Secret War, during the Ultra episode. The housekeeping information, was what was really valuable, NOT access to lofty plans. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes on the other hand, I've read some original Allied intel on LW air, and sometimes it's just tragically poor informed. Most of the time they have no idea on new enemy planes at all, after they in service for months; what they capable of, and funny part is the completely misinformed guessing - GM-1 boost is again not heard until months it was introduced, and their guess from their pilot encounters that it's kind of a 'fake smoke' device... Of the FW 190, they didn't even seem to hear about at all. Me 209s, FW 190Ds in 1943, Dieppe, Ardennes and so on. Yes I agree that housekeeping records are interesting and can be in cases valuable, but looking at the conclusions they draw from them are make you think lots of guess and even more wishful thinking was included, even small problems were magnified to extreme and far reaching conclusions were drawn. To me that reads as the need to work from very fragmanted and limited information. Typically if some unit reports they cannibalised a plane for spares, the intel was immidiately projecting dire lack of supply parts globally.. Why, I noted already. No professional spy network, resistance amateurs had their limits. Intermittent operation of Ultra, being unable to crack codes all the time. Moreover, the possiblility to obtai any info was entirely up to that wheter the Germans were tranmissioning on radio lines, or used the ground lines, the latter could not be intercepted and thus could not be read at all.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Venlo Incident. While calling this a German success is true it is also about as significant as being the best tidily winks player in all the world. The damage done had no grand repercussions, except of course to those poor unfortunates who lost their lives) Yes the Germans rolled up the SIS ring in Czechoslovakia. However, they would have likely done this as they tightened their grip on the country anyway. The greater damage done by Venlo was perhaps it made the British wary of German resistance groups. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hmmm, rounding up basically the entire British spy network in German home turf not significant...? OK...

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Really Kurfurst I am sorry to comment on Farago, but I think he is a hack author and largely discredited. Especially after his book - Aftermath: Martin Borman book, claims to have found Martin Borman in Bolivia. Really Farago, is the "Martin Caiden" of Intelligence authors. He is the stuff of pulp fiction and far from a serious scholar in my opinion. Almost anybody would have been a netter choice. Nigel Wests books are all excellent. (Most on topic is his Intelligence Myth's of the Second World War.) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I can't and won't comment on his other books. I can only say the relevant work, the Game of the Foxes is well researched, and well sourced and referenced, please note if there are problems in that book. As for Nigel West, I haven't read him, but looking at his titles he seem to be another of those 'Allied' authors who do a good job describing the working of their on services, while arrogantly and ill-informed he summarly dismisse the enemy's, like Dempster and Wood manage to state some ridiculus lines in their books. I am sure Mr. Nigel West is a good source on Allied intelligence, though. Could be entirely wrong it that though.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Citing Schellenburg to bolster your case that German intelligence during the Inter war Years and WW2 is kind of wrong headed too I feel, and a gift to those who wish to further denigrate what little the German Intelligence communitee achieved. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Nope, I did not cite him, nor used him to 'bolster my case', merely noted that it's worth to read someone's book who's in the middle of some of those events. its a 1st hand account.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
Here is a brief sysnopsis of the Intelligence achievements of Schellenberg:

He was responsible for the Venlo incident.

Counterfeited British currency, which achieved little also.

Was the controller of asset Cicero (in Turkey).

Managed an SS Brothel (the notorious Salon Kitty) that spied on his own people. (And representatives of allied nations - like the hapless Count Ciano of Italy). In effect this great spy master was a pimp!

The Wikpedia article is kind of a litany of his near misses, and outright failures. But most damagingly asserts (correctly too I think) that Schellenberg -

"saw himself as one of the great spymasters of his era. He failed to realize, however, that by the end of the Second World War every German spy in Britain had been detected and either imprisoned, executed or turned to work for the British security services." </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Wikipedia has a lot of funny things contained. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif
This rather sounds like that Schellenberg who rounded up British spies in the Reich, made quite some damage to British currency and controlled the infamous Cicero is a bit of a thorn in the side, and irritates some who feel he needs to be discredited and displayed as an idiot. If he's been such a small figure, why the herculean effort to discredit him, hmm? Napoleon being depicted by some even today as a crazy, bloodthirsty 'dwarf' (at 170 cm iirc) comes to the mind. Or that classic from Das Boot, re:after hearing some nasty comments on Churchill from German radio, the captain notes that despite being a paralytic fatheaded imbecile, he makes things quite hot down here for us ! http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif

Waldo.Pepper
10-06-2006, 06:04 AM
"Their intel had quite a few successes, some of them major. Should these be ignored for either moral reasons or because the lack of cooperation between organizations that made these actual successes harder to achieve...? Should we ignore the specific facts because of generalizations?"

No generalizations were made by myself (at least none that I am aware of.) My point in this passage is to offer an potential explanation of why they were so terrible at processing the information that they obtained. Because, of the fratricidal nature of their own Government.

"To that I can only say that one had to blind, deaf and without brain to actually fail to acknowledge the intention of some 4 million people gathering on his border."

Please do not try and put words in my mouth. I believe that this is exactly the point I was making (first) when I mentioned that ... "it was likely impossible for the Germans to have kept their intentions to attack secret."

We agree on this point, as well as others too I imagine. My point in this passage what to illustrate what a clanger it was to allow the DATE of the invasion to fall into the hands of the USSR. (and again a fat lot of good it did the Russians - for they bungled the processing of the information as badly as did the Germans when it came to D-Day.)


"Plus, I don't see what does German Intelligence have to do with the failure of the German Army and co. to keep it's things secret."

You€re kidding here right? You must be. Surely you realize that within the Intelligence communities of every modern state there exist organization which are responsible for the maintenance of secrets? Surely you've heard of the Gestapo? (and the SD!?) How they terrorized the population, into obedience.

Do you remember the case of the Bf110 night fighter that was forced down in Switzerland? Do you know what the Gestapo did to the families of the members of the crew? To recap: the Gestapo had heard erroneously (Fancy that! They got it wrong! Funny eh?) that the crew had 'landed in Switzerland'. They mistook this as a defection and treated the family members 'harshly', until THEY REALIZED THEIR MISTAKE. Why do you think this was? Because it was part of their responsibility to preserve secrets.

Re Germany and D-Day

"They managed to find out the date, and noted Normandy as the likely place, and were reading allied transmissions to resistance groups - hardly a secret for even at the time the 'Longest Day' it was known. They alerted the army about the upcoming invasion, it was those infallible Heer generals who screwed up to react accordingly."

I do not want to put words in your mouth. Forgive me if I do by mistake. But, if I stipulate that all the above quote was factual, then I think (because you are a little unclear here) that in your view the Intelligence gathering services were essentially infallible regarding D-Day and the entire fault of the processing of the information lies with the Army. (and presumably in your view other branches of the German armed forces, I.E. Luftwaffe.)

If that is the case then it belies a fundamental misunderstanding on your part, of the responsibilities of the various Intelligence Services of the German State. Gathering and Processing go hand in hand.

You seem to keep citing gathering successes, and I seem to keep pointing out that gathering is not enough, and often the German failures were in interpretation and other failures to process. There is never enough information and processing of it is always fraught with danger.

The situation is analogous to the threat that liberal democracies face today, from well organized terrorist groups. "Bin Laden: determined to attack America." Is a document of equal import to the discussion papers circulating within German circles in 1944. "The Allies Determined to Make landings in Norway." and "Calais" and "Greece" etc etc etc.

Which report do you pay attention to? How much weight do you give each report, when you have a new credible threat each day/week/month? This is the REAL failing of the Germans.


"I did not include commie networks, their work was easier for plenty of commies around!"

A MAJOR failing in your analysis, is to ignore the Soviet effort (which was shared - though SPARINGLY with the Western Allies). Furthermore, to my ears at least, it sounds dismissive of you to refer to them as "Commie" networks. There work was no less dangerous to them as it was to the Western Allies.

"Yes on the other hand, I've read some original Allied intel on LW air, and sometimes it's just tragically poor informed."

Again you make the same error, I think, in concentrating on raw information, rather than what was achieved with the Information at hand. (Which is the same error that the Germans made, IMHO. You are emulating them, and their errors, with your analysis and concentration on the gathering and ignoring the processing.)


"Hmmm, rounding up basically the entire British spy network in German home turf not significant...? OK..."

Please I ask again, do not put words in my mouth. It is beneath you. The results of Venlo were to round up a ring of British agent in Czechoslovakia. Also the Germans obtained a list of British SIS agents working within Britain. (Hardly much of a coup here, as the SIS ranks in 1939 were woefully small, and would expand out of all recognition in the coming war years. As for the Czech assets, like I said earlier they would have rounded up the assets in Czechoslovakia anyway (like they did the Rotte Kapelle). This was all but inevitable.

Re: Farago.
Me on Farago: I have read his books. I own his books. He IS NOT credible.

You on Nigel West. "I haven't read him." and "looking at his titles he seem..."

I think your 'gathering' here is faulty and subjective, and because of it your 'processing' is non-existent. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

On poor Walter again;

"Nope, I did not cite him, nor used him to 'bolster my case', merely noted that it's worth to read someone's book who's in the middle of some of those events. its a 1st hand account."

So let me get this straight. You didn't mention the Schellenburg book to support your contention that he was responsible for a veritable litany of significant successes?

I acquiesce, you didn't cite Schellenburg to bolster your assertions. I am glad we see eye to eye on this point. His book is a first hand account, but saying that does nothing to make his authorship any more valuable that Hitler's book Mein Kampf, makes him out to be an excellent General/State Leader/Tyrant/ - (whatever you want-fill in the blank!)

So you (yet again I am afraid) make the same error of processing the information that the German Intelligence services did. (Schellenberg wrote the book. He was there. Therefore it is AUTOMATICALLY somehow MORE VALUABLE, I.E. a better source.) Surely you don't think that he has no 'axe to grind' or to put it bluntly an embattled reputation to rehabilitate.

"If he's been such a small figure, why the Herculean effort to discredit him, hmm?"

The only Herculean effort going on here I think is on your part, to prop up an individual who had been comprehensively discredited.

By your logic, the libraries of books written about Hitler, must be a Herculean effort to discredit his genius. I don't believe for a minute that this is what you are suggesting. But I hope you see my point. Your assumption that the mere volume of material somehow imparts positive or negative attributes on a person. Forgive me, but I think this another processing error on your part.

But if it will make you happy I won't mention Schellengburg again. Thus proving, using your flawed logical argument, that he was a boob.

stathem
10-06-2006, 06:25 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
Now the comparison with the DDay is interesting, as you probably know the jerry intel was making some achievements there. They managed to find out the date, and noted Normandy as the likely place, and were reading allied transmissions to resistance groups - hardly a secret for even at the time the 'Longest Day' it was known. They alerted the army about the upcoming invasion, it was those infallible Heer generals who screwed up to react accordingly.

</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Lol, Kurfurst. British Intelligence fed the Germans the correct date and place of the invasion deliberately €" in order to lend credence to the later reports that the invasion was a feint and the real thrust was coming later in the Pas de Calais. And €" it worked!


I€m sure you€re familiar with the name of the agent involved.

Ruy Horta
10-06-2006, 01:43 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by DuxCorvan:
Canaris was not an inept. He was a self-motivated double agent, and a true representant of secret resistance against Hitler. He tried desperately to end a war he never desired, and a regime he despised and feared. Most of his 'failures' were in fact calculated sabotages. His grisly torture and death in the hands of the nazis should earn him a bit of a respect, IMHO. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>^

Dux,

Although I am not an authority on the subject I did read more than one book on German military intelligence, including three specifically on Wilhelm Canaris.

The conspiracy was much more driven by the people around Canaris than by the admiral himself. His role was one of indecision.

Also his actions that started him towards his rise as Abwehr chief, IMHO leaves somes room for discussion. He did play his (dirty) part in the right wing movement.

And yes, there are plenty of examples of his ineptness as leader of the Abwehr.

With all respect, but I am sticking to my words.

Oster, now that is someone that deserves much more praise.

Kurfurst__
10-06-2006, 02:05 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stathem:
Lol, Kurfurst. British Intelligence fed the Germans the correct date and place of the invasion deliberately </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

They supposed to protect that information, not give it directly to the Germans.
British intellegence was a complete bunch of idiots - IF this is true...

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"> €" in order to lend credence to the later reports that the invasion was a feint and the real thrust was coming later in the Pas de Calais. And €" it worked!

I€m sure you€re familiar with the name of the agent involved. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Unlikely story, possible born post-war, or at the moment you typed it. Misinformation was part of the spy game from beginning, and it's utterly naive to think that any intelligence would not understand that any information supplied could be a fake. A short version of Neptune were indeed handed over to the Germans via a double-agent - but that was days after the invasion took place already.

Problem is that the date the Germans know from broadcast to the French resistance. The Verlaine poem, that was a sign to resistance groups that the invasion would take place n 48 hours was captured and it's meaning was understood as early as 14 October 1943, referenced in report Abw. 4508/43. When the first part was broadcasted on 1 June 1944, the Abwehr gave a final warning to to the OKW and Rundstedton the 4th June, and in their notice they warned that the Invasion will took place on the 6th and gave Normandy as the most probably place of invasion. Fatally, many high ranking officiers were away on leave, and their adjutants did not pass over the message to them.

In any case, the time was known before the invasion, and from the text of the final warning that notes Normandy and not another place, Allied misinformation campaign that tried to persuade them otherwise appear to have been not so successfull as stated post-war..

Kurfurst__
10-06-2006, 02:43 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Waldo.Pepper:

No generalizations were made by myself (at least none that I am aware of.) My point in this passage is to offer an potential explanation of why they were so terrible at processing the information that they obtained. Because, of the fratricidal nature of their own Government. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's a generalisation again.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
"To that I can only say that one had to blind, deaf and without brain to actually fail to acknowledge the intention of some 4 million people gathering on his border."

Please do not try and put words in my mouth. I believe that this is exactly the point I was making (first) when I mentioned that ... "it was likely impossible for the Germans to have kept their intentions to attack secret."

We agree on this point, as well as others too I imagine. My point in this passage what to illustrate what a clanger it was to allow the DATE of the invasion to fall into the hands of the USSR. (and again a fat lot of good it did the Russians - for they bungled the processing of the information as badly as did the Germans when it came to D-Day.) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

... and the point?

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
"Plus, I don't see what does German Intelligence have to do with the failure of the German Army and co. to keep it's things secret."

You€re kidding here right? You must be. Surely you realize that within the Intelligence communities of every modern state there exist organization which are responsible for the maintenance of secrets? Surely you've heard of the Gestapo? (and the SD!?) How they terrorized the population, into obedience.

Do you remember the case of the Bf110 night fighter that was forced down in Switzerland? Do you know what the Gestapo did to the families of the members of the crew? To recap: the Gestapo had heard erroneously (Fancy that! They got it wrong! Funny eh?) that the crew had 'landed in Switzerland'. They mistook this as a defection and treated the family members 'harshly', until THEY REALIZED THEIR MISTAKE. Why do you think this was? Because it was part of their responsibility to preserve secrets. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You've gone in great lenght trying to draw and analouge between keeping a singe fighter's tech in secret and the deployment of 3-4 million troops on the border. You've already acknowladged such scale operation was nearly impossible to hide, yet you keep saying it's the intelligence fault that it did not prevent it. I ask :

HOW?


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
Re Germany and D-Day

"They managed to find out the date, and noted Normandy as the likely place, and were reading allied transmissions to resistance groups - hardly a secret for even at the time the 'Longest Day' it was known. They alerted the army about the upcoming invasion, it was those infallible Heer generals who screwed up to react accordingly."

I do not want to put words in your mouth. Forgive me if I do by mistake. But, if I stipulate that all the above quote was factual, then I think (because you are a little unclear here) that in your view the Intelligence gathering services were essentially infallible regarding D-Day and the entire fault of the processing of the information lies with the Army. (and presumably in your view other branches of the German armed forces, I.E. Luftwaffe.)

If that is the case then it belies a fundamental misunderstanding on your part, of the responsibilities of the various Intelligence Services of the German State. Gathering and Processing go hand in hand.

You seem to keep citing gathering successes, and I seem to keep pointing out that gathering is not enough, and often the German failures were in interpretation and other failures to process. There is never enough information and processing of it is always fraught with danger. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You try to force the same theory to everything about processing, and then you're surprised it isnt' work.

Let's look at the bare facts: Abwehr maneged to find out the exact date, likely place of invasion, and forwarded the info the Army headquarters. Sidenote, they also did found out about Operation Tiger. That's gathering and processing - with a correct conclusion. I still don'ts see why the intel is to be blamed, when it pass on a perfectly good report that some idiot fails to properly let know his superiors - most of whom who happen to be on leave btw - about it on the Army HQ.

Or isn't some pervert allience between allied authors and the infallible Prussian generals in keeping to blame Hitler/intel for whatever...?

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
The situation is analogous to the threat that liberal democracies face today, from well organized terrorist groups. "Bin Laden: determined to attack America." Is a document of equal import to the discussion papers circulating within German circles in 1944. "The Allies Determined to Make landings in Norway." and "Calais" and "Greece" etc etc etc.

Which report do you pay attention to? How much weight do you give each report, when you have a new credible threat each day/week/month? This is the REAL failing of the Germans. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You're speculating that there were, there must have been alternate reports coming in. A pretty weak foundation to build you castle on, don't you think? Then, on this weak foundation you even make up their titles, and finally you turn your theory, how must have been, into fact, how it was... It's hard to see it as the intel's processing error that messages did not reach those intended for mere personal faults, who failed to forward them properly. That's the failing of the staff, not the intel.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
"I did not include commie networks, their work was easier for plenty of commies around!"

A MAJOR failing in your analysis, is to ignore the Soviet effort (which was shared - though SPARINGLY with the Western Allies). Furthermore, to my ears at least, it sounds dismissive of you to refer to them as "Commie" networks. There work was no less dangerous to them as it was to the Western Allies. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

There's no failing, I am not writing a book on intelligence here that contains every aspect. And as for commies, I have long aquintance with them, so I can call them just commies. Furthermore if you read what i say I actually imply how more successfull those commies were with live agents gathering information than the Western allies.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Again you make the same error, I think, in concentrating on raw information, rather than what was achieved with the Information at hand. (Which is the same error that the Germans made, IMHO. You are emulating them, and their errors, with your analysis and concentration on the gathering and ignoring the processing.) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Nope, no error on your part but you seem to try hard to dismiss the facts when it comes to very poor PROCESSING on part of the Allied intelligence. Examples were qouted for that, and the proof is there, processing gives you conclusion, and the conclusion that was arrived was in that example that the FW 190 was some obsolate French fighter, the FW 190D had DB 603 and was around 1943, GM-1 was some odd German gadget that produced 'fake smoke', or that because a single Gruppe cannibilised a few oldish planes, there were huge short supply on spares in the whole Luftwaffe. This was their conclusions that they passed on to the troops, based on their processing - they were all flawed. You seem to wish to ignore that fact, that no side was perfect nor stupid, but equally made mistakes.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
"Hmmm, rounding up basically the entire British spy network in German home turf not significant...? OK..."

Please I ask again, do not put words in my mouth. It is beneath you. The results of Venlo were to round up a ring of British agent in Czechoslovakia. Also the Germans obtained a list of British SIS agents working within Britain. (Hardly much of a coup here, as the SIS ranks in 1939 were woefully small, and would expand out of all recognition in the coming war years. As for the Czech assets, like I said earlier they would have rounded up the assets in Czechoslovakia anyway (like they did the Rotte Kapelle). This was all but inevitable. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Excuse me, do you try to imply to me that without the Germans simply learning the exact identity of British agents, they would be still rounded up anyway...? This hypothesizes thst those agents were absolute idiots to start with.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
Re: Farago.
Me on Farago: I have read his books. I own his books. He IS NOT credible.

You on Nigel West. "I haven't read him." and "looking at his titles he seem..." </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Other than you don't like Farago, you fail to note WHY he is not credible. And looking on Nigel West's titles, you are free to prove he's a good source on German intel rather than the usual dismissing, ill-informed arrogant comments I've got used to from Anglo-Saxon authors on anything not Anglo-Saxon.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">So let me get this straight. You didn't mention the Schellenburg book to support your contention that he was responsible for a veritable litany of significant successes?

I acquiesce, you didn't cite Schellenburg to bolster your assertions. I am glad we see eye to eye on this point. His book is a first hand account, but saying that does nothing to make his authorship any more valuable that Hitler's book Mein Kampf, makes him out to be an excellent General/State Leader/Tyrant/ - (whatever you want-fill in the blank!) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I fail to see the point, apart from arguing for arguements sake.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">So you (yet again I am afraid) make the same error of processing the information that the German Intelligence services did. (Schellenberg wrote the book. He was there. Therefore it is AUTOMATICALLY somehow MORE VALUABLE, I.E. a better source.) Surely you don't think that he has no 'axe to grind' or to put it bluntly an embattled reputation to rehabilitate. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

..then what, whom? The avarage post-war Anglo-Saxon author, often not even reading German and never seen any primary source from the Abwehr etc., who tends to go into lenghty schoolboy bravado about his own guys,and dismiss everything he is ignorant of...? OR?


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">"If he's been such a small figure, why the Herculean effort to discredit him, hmm?"
The only Herculean effort going on here I think is on your part, to prop up an individual who had been comprehensively discredited.

By your logic, the libraries of books written about Hitler, must be a Herculean effort to discredit his genius. I don't believe for a minute that this is what you are suggesting. But I hope you see my point. Your assumption that the mere volume of material somehow imparts positive or negative attributes on a person. Forgive me, but I think this another processing error on your part.

But if it will make you happy I won't mention Schellengburg again. Thus proving, using your flawed logical argument, that he was a boob. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Blah-blah-blah... and your point? The only one I could make out is that you're allergic to Schellenberg's name, which means you can't be trusted to be objective on him.

luftluuver
10-06-2006, 05:23 PM
If the nazis (can use that word since Kurfurst uses the word commie) knew the Allies were landing in Normandy then why were the troops so surprised when they saw 1000s of ships off the Normandy beaches?

Why were the reserves held back if the time and place of the invasion was known?

Why was Rommel away from his HQ if the date and place of the invasion was known?

Why were not LW units not transferred to the area if the date and place of the invasion was known?

Why were not Heer units not sent to reinforce the Normandy units if the time and place of the invasion was known?

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">and in their notice they warned that the Invasion will took place on the 6th and gave Normandy as the most probably place of invasion. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
Obw Kurfurst, the date for the invasion was to be June 5 1944 NOT June 6 1944.

Low_Flyer_MkVb
10-06-2006, 06:01 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Sidenote, they also did found out about Operation Tiger. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


Source, please.

Waldo.Pepper
10-06-2006, 06:39 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Waldo.Pepper:

No generalizations were made by myself (at least none that I am aware of.) My point in this passage is to offer a potential explanation of why they were so terrible at processing the information that they obtained. Because, of the fratricidal nature of their own Government. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's a generalisation again. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It is not a generalization in any way! It is pointing out a SALIENT FACT about the very nature of the German Government which you are totally dismissing to the folly of your analysis. If you fail to understand this critical aspect of the Government of Hitler, you will never understand how they could have gotten so many things, so terribly wrong.

Good book on the subject! Read What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy. It€s all about decision making with Nazi Germany, and how information did not flow. Look I shall make you a gift even. I can email you this book!

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
"To that I can only say that one had to blind, deaf and without brain to actually fail to acknowledge the intention of some 4 million people gathering on his border."

Please do not try and put words in my mouth. I believe that this is exactly the point I was making (first) when I mentioned that ... "it was likely impossible for the Germans to have kept their intentions to attack secret."

We agree on this point, as well as others too I imagine. My point in this passage was to illustrate what a clanger it was to allow the DATE of the invasion to fall into the hands of the USSR. (and again a fat lot of good it did the Russians - for they bungled the processing of the information as badly as did the Germans when it came to D-Day.) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

... and the point?[/QUOTE]

The point it to illustrate how poor was German security. PLEASE!!! For the THIRD time now it would have been a hopeless for the Germans to keep their intentions from being discovered about invading the USSR. Do you not understand that letting the USSR learn the DATE OF THE INVASION, is the failing that could have been concealed? Do you not understand the significant advantage surprise offered any invading Army? (enemy troops in barracks etc.) This is precious information that should have been concealed, and was not. A failure.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
"Plus, I don't see what does German Intelligence have to do with the failure of the German Army and co. to keep it's things secret."

You€re kidding here right? You must be. Surely you realize that within the Intelligence communities of every modern state there exist organization which are responsible for the maintenance of secrets? Surely you've heard of the Gestapo? (and the SD!?) How they terrorized the population, into obedience.

Do you remember the case of the Bf110 night fighter that was forced down in Switzerland? Do you know what the Gestapo did to the families of the members of the crew? To recap: the Gestapo had heard erroneously (Fancy that! They got it wrong! Funny eh?) that the crew had 'landed in Switzerland'. They mistook this as a defection and treated the family members 'harshly', until THEY REALIZED THEIR MISTAKE. Why do you think this was? Because it was part of their responsibility to preserve secrets. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You've gone in great lenght trying to draw and analouge between keeping a singe fighter's tech in secret and the deployment of 3-4 million troops on the border. [/QUOTE]


Actually NO! This is what you are doing when you return again and again to the minutae of the technology of the GM-1. Do you really think that this incredibly minor detail is on par with GRAND STRATEGY?

No you have misunderstood completely! My point ONCE AGAIN, is to point out how poor was German Security, and to further emphazise that it is a primary responsibility of the Intelligence Community, rather than the vast rank and file of the military, whom you seem to blame.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
Re Germany and D-Day

"They managed to find out the date, and noted Normandy as the likely place, and were reading allied transmissions to resistance groups - hardly a secret for even at the time the 'Longest Day' it was known. They alerted the army about the upcoming invasion, it was those infallible Heer generals who screwed up to react accordingly."

I do not want to put words in your mouth. Forgive me if I do by mistake. But, if I stipulate that all the above quote was factual, then I think (because you are a little unclear here) that in your view the Intelligence gathering services were essentially infallible regarding D-Day and the entire fault of the processing of the information lies with the Army. (and presumably in your view other branches of the German armed forces, I.E. Luftwaffe.)

If that is the case then it belies a fundamental misunderstanding on your part, of the responsibilities of the various Intelligence Services of the German State. Gathering and Processing go hand in hand.

You seem to keep citing gathering successes, and I seem to keep pointing out that gathering is not enough, and often the German failures were in interpretation and other failures to process. There is never enough information and processing of it is always fraught with danger. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You try to force the same theory to everything about processing, and then you're surprised it isnt' work.[/QUOTE]

It matters not to me whether my argument works or not. It is a fact that you seem unable to appreciate.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Let's look at the bare facts: Abwehr maneged to find out the exact date, likely place of invasion, and forwarded the info the Army headquarters. Sidenote, they also did found out about Operation Tiger. That's gathering and processing - with a correct conclusion. I still don'ts see why the intel is to be blamed, when it pass on a perfectly good report that some idiot fails to properly let know his superiors - most of whom who happen to be on leave btw - about it on the Army HQ. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


You are focusing on the specific yet again. Please try to follow along. The decision makers IN ANY COUNTRY, are bombarded with reports on a daily basis. When you say that €¦ €œwhen it pass on a perfectly good report that some idiot fails to properly let know his superiors€ €¦ you don€t seem to understand that this report is BURRIED under a mountain of other reports that conflict with the accurate information.

Please, do you understand that?

Do you understand that it is the responsibility of the Intelligence community to PROVIDE CLEAR INFORMATION in a MANNER than will allow the Government to make the correct decision.

This processing, is where they failed. It is not that they did not learn the basis facts, but that they failed to COMPREHEND THEM, in the vast encyclopedia of information at their fingertips.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">€œYou're speculating that there were, there must have been alternate reports coming in. A pretty weak foundation to build you castle on, don't you think? Then, on this weak foundation you even make up their titles, and finally you turn your theory, how must have been, into fact, how it was... It's hard to see it as the intel's processing error that messages did not reach those intended for mere personal faults, who failed to forward them properly. That's the failing of the staff, not the intel.€
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Really I am sorry but this passage of yours reveals more to me what little you know. I am not speculating about ANYTHING!

I mentioned NORWAY, CALAIS, and GREECE for very specific reasons! Read the following passage and learn please.

€œ€¦ it was also imperative to conceal the place, though the Allies were preparing to invade France, Hitler must be convinced that they had the means and the intention to mount other invasions around the periphery of his empire; and he must be misled about where in France the Allies would land. Thus Fortitude included elaborate deceptions that were designed to threaten Norway, the Pas de Calais, and the bay of Biscay, and Mediterranean coasts of France, their object being, in conjunction with continuing threats to the Balkans and the military operations in Italy, to tie down German forces in those areas before, during and after Neptune.€

and

€œTo keep the German armies in southeastern Europe in place during June, the Germans were to be led to believe that, since no large-scale Cross-Channel operation would be possible until late summer, the main Allied effort in the spring of 1944 would be against the Balkans. These operations would consist of (a) an Anglo-American assault against the Trieste coast, (b) a British assault against Greece, and (c) an Anglo-Russian landing on the Black Sea coast of Rumania to threaten the Germans' main supplies of natural oil at Ploesti. Turkey would be invited to join the Allies to provide bases for operations against the Aegean Islands and the invasion of central Europe through Greece.€

OK buddy! There is NORWAY, CALAIS, and Greece. Who is speculating now? This Allied deception effort contributed to the MOUNTAIN of papers on the desks of the Germans.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
"I did not include commie networks, their work was easier for plenty of commies around!"

A MAJOR failing in your analysis, is to ignore the Soviet effort (which was shared - though SPARINGLY with the Western Allies). Furthermore, to my ears at least, it sounds dismissive of you to refer to them as "Commie" networks. There work was no less dangerous to them as it was to the Western Allies. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

There's no failing, I am not writing a book on intelligence here that contains every aspect. And as for commies, I have long aquintance with them, so I can call them just commies. Furthermore if you read what i say
[/QUOTE]

I did!
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">I actually imply how more successfull those commies were with live agents gathering information than the Western allies. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I understood that point of yours initially.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">You seem to wish to ignore that fact, that no side was perfect nor stupid, but equally made mistakes. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No you are putting words in my mouth. In fact I said that there is never enough information and processing is always fraught with danger and pitfalls. NOWHERE have I said that ANY STATE, is immune from this fact.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
"Hmmm, rounding up basically the entire British spy network in German home turf not significant...? OK..."

Please I ask again, do not put words in my mouth. It is beneath you. The results of Venlo were to round up a ring of British agent in Czechoslovakia. Also the Germans obtained a list of British SIS agents working within Britain. (Hardly much of a coup here, as the SIS ranks in 1939 were woefully small, and would expand out of all recognition in the coming war years. As for the Czech assets, like I said earlier they would have rounded up the assets in Czechoslovakia anyway (like they did the Rotte Kapelle). This was all but inevitable. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Excuse me, do you try to imply to me that without the Germans simply learning the exact identity of British agents, they would be still rounded up anyway...? This hypothesizes thst those agents were absolute idiots to start with.
[/QUOTE]

No you do not understand. Certainly learning all the name was a coup. And I have stated that. But I have also stated that as the Germans tightened their grip on Czechoslovakia, this roundup would have been inevitable.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
Re: Farago.
Me on Farago: I have read his books. I own his books. He IS NOT credible.

You on Nigel West. "I haven't read him." and "looking at his titles he seem..." </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Other than you don't like Farago, you fail to note WHY he is not credible. And looking on Nigel West's titles, you are free to prove he's a good source on German intel rather than the usual dismissing, ill-informed arrogant comments I've got used to from Anglo-Saxon authors on anything not Anglo-Saxon.[/QUOTE]

YET AGAIN, you attempt to put words in my mouth.
I have never stated that Nigel West is a good source on German intel. I mentioned him as an example of an author who is CREDIBLE. You reveal your BIGOTRY with your comments on Anglo Saxon authors. This bigotry has blinded you to the possibility that there can be anything of value in their authorship.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">So let me get this straight. You didn't mention the Schellenburg book to support your contention that he was responsible for a veritable litany of significant successes?

I acquiesce, you didn't cite Schellenburg to bolster your assertions. I am glad we see eye to eye on this point. His book is a first hand account, but saying that does nothing to make his authorship any more valuable that Hitler's book Mein Kampf, makes him out to be an excellent General/State Leader/Tyrant/ - (whatever you want-fill in the blank!) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I fail to see the point, apart from arguing for arguements sake.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">So you (yet again I am afraid) make the same error of processing the information that the German Intelligence services did. (Schellenberg wrote the book. He was there. Therefore it is AUTOMATICALLY somehow MORE VALUABLE, I.E. a better source.) Surely you don't think that he has no 'axe to grind' or to put it bluntly an embattled reputation to rehabilitate. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

..then what, whom? The avarage post-war Anglo-Saxon author, often not even reading German and never seen any primary source from the Abwehr etc., who tends to go into lenghty schoolboy bravado about his own guys,and dismiss everything he is ignorant of...? OR?

Exactly! I don€t recommend that you to read the AVERAGE postwar author. (which is what Schellenberg is!) Farago is FAR BELOW AVERAGE! For Christ's sake man he wrote a whole book on how he found MARTIN frikin€ BORMAN alive and well in Bolivia! Doesn€t this tell you ANYTHING about how poor his research is? Doesn€t this give you REASON to question EVERYTHING he has written? If it doesn€t, then you are a blind as those of whose reputations you are propping up.

LStarosta
10-06-2006, 10:26 PM
If the Germans were "intelligent", they wouldn't have lost.

csThor
10-07-2006, 12:45 AM
Good to see the same old shoulder-clapping again and again. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif
Can't you guys get over with this "my d*ck is longer than yours" tidares? It's starting to tire me.

LStarosta - modifiy your sentence. As a german I feel insulted. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/disagree.gif

Kurfurst__
10-07-2006, 05:49 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Waldo.Pepper:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Waldo.Pepper:

No generalizations were made by myself (at least none that I am aware of.) My point in this passage is to offer a potential explanation of why they were so terrible at processing the information that they obtained. Because, of the fratricidal nature of their own Government. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's a generalisation again. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It is not a generalization in any way! It is pointing out a SALIENT FACT about the very nature of the German Government which you are totally dismissing to the folly of your analysis. If you fail to understand this critical aspect of the Government of Hitler, you will never understand how they could have gotten so many things, so terribly wrong. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's not a salient fact, it's a matter of poor generalisation as you were told. You handle the whole 'German Goverment' as a single homogenous block, irrespective of departments and specific, individual men. No, according to you they were all the same, The Nazi Burocrat. Being clones, even their DNA was the same etc.
That's kinda simplistic as to say all the Jagdwaffe was made up by cloned Hartmanns..

THAT's generalisation, and as such, a useless base to draw conclusion.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Good book on the subject! Read What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy. It€s all about decision making with Nazi Germany, and how information did not flow. Look I shall make you a gift even. I can email you this book! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The book is written by a Californian scholar about the relation of Hitler and his diplomats and foreign policy...You argue that's somehow the same as the relation between the Intelligence and the Army.

Again, you just generalise, a bit like the author - 'in the evil tyrant dictatorship everyone fears' blahblahblah. Written by people who never lived under such conditions, btw..

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
"To that I can only say that one had to blind, deaf and without brain to actually fail to acknowledge the intention of some 4 million people gathering on his border."

Please do not try and put words in my mouth. I believe that this is exactly the point I was making (first) when I mentioned that ... "it was likely impossible for the Germans to have kept their intentions to attack secret."

We agree on this point, as well as others too I imagine. My point in this passage was to illustrate what a clanger it was to allow the DATE of the invasion to fall into the hands of the USSR. (and again a fat lot of good it did the Russians - for they bungled the processing of the information as badly as did the Germans when it came to D-Day.) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

... and the point?[/QUOTE]

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The point it to illustrate how poor was German security. PLEASE!!! For the THIRD time now it would have been a hopeless for the Germans to keep their intentions from being discovered about invading the USSR. Do you not understand that letting the USSR learn the DATE OF THE INVASION, is the failing that could have been concealed? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You certainly just love to use the word poor and failure in connection to German security/intelligence/whatever.

Let's see the facts again instead of capitals... First fact is that you already acknowladged that such scale operation is impossible to hide, but somehow this does not apply to the data of it... why? Aren't shipment dates turn up regularly in radio broadcast etc? The data was found out by the Sweedish and by Sorge in Japan (So was the date of DDay by Reile in 1944). Obviously spying and decyphering is something you can't protect against 100%, it's calculated risk and damage, losses that are inevitable, so how you blame the intel for that?

OTOH you completely ignore the fact that german intel was successfull in completely convincing Stalin that it's was Britain's turn. Deception operations were performed 'Haifisch' and 'Harpune', from April 1941 onwards false ship concentrations, reconnaissance flights and training exercises were done to show Britain is the target. Invasion plans were developed and some details were allowed to leak. From the reaction of Stalin, you can see it was quite successfull and and overall success.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Do you not understand the significant advantage surprise offered any invading Army? (enemy troops in barracks etc.) This is precious information that should have been concealed, and was not. A failure. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Uhm, the Red Army was completely surprised with troops pants down in the barracks. That's a matter of historical fact, and a success you try to look like a failure.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Actually NO! This is what you are doing when you return again and again to the minutae of the technology of the GM-1. Do you really think that this incredibly minor detail is on par with GRAND STRATEGY?

No you have misunderstood completely! My point ONCE AGAIN, is to point out how poor was German Security, and to further emphazise that it is a primary responsibility of the Intelligence Community, rather than the vast rank and file of the military, whom you seem to blame. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

So they were quite incapable of finding out the small details, but somehow they understood the grand strategy? Curious, then why are the repeated failures of allied intelligence to find out about large scale axis operations? I am sure you could yourself name half a dozen off the top of your head.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"><BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
Re Germany and D-Day

"They managed to find out the date, and noted Normandy as the likely place, and were reading allied transmissions to resistance groups - hardly a secret for even at the time the 'Longest Day' it was known. They alerted the army about the upcoming invasion, it was those infallible Heer generals who screwed up to react accordingly."

I do not want to put words in your mouth. Forgive me if I do by mistake. But, if I stipulate that all the above quote was factual, then I think (because you are a little unclear here) that in your view the Intelligence gathering services were essentially infallible regarding D-Day and the entire fault of the processing of the information lies with the Army. (and presumably in your view other branches of the German armed forces, I.E. Luftwaffe.)

If that is the case then it belies a fundamental misunderstanding on your part, of the responsibilities of the various Intelligence Services of the German State. Gathering and Processing go hand in hand.

You seem to keep citing gathering successes, and I seem to keep pointing out that gathering is not enough, and often the German failures were in interpretation and other failures to process. There is never enough information and processing of it is always fraught with danger. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You try to force the same theory to everything about processing, and then you're surprised it isnt' work. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It matters not to me whether my argument works or not. It is a fact that you seem unable to appreciate.[/QUOTE]

Nope the problem is that I am completely aware of the facts, what German intel found out of DDay and what not, while you are not aware and try to force your hypothesis onto real world events. But that's not how they happened.

Maybe it would help a lot to just accept the pure facts first, and then go on to conclusions.

So, in your version, what [b]exactly happened after German intel found out the date and place of the invasion?

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"><BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Let's look at the bare facts: Abwehr maneged to find out the exact date, likely place of invasion, and forwarded the info the Army headquarters. Sidenote, they also did found out about Operation Tiger. That's gathering and processing - with a correct conclusion. I still don'ts see why the intel is to be blamed, when it pass on a perfectly good report that some idiot fails to properly let know his superiors - most of whom who happen to be on leave btw - about it on the Army HQ. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


You are focusing on the specific yet again. Please try to follow along. The decision makers IN ANY COUNTRY, are bombarded with reports on a daily basis. When you say that €¦ €œwhen it pass on a perfectly good report that some idiot fails to properly let know his superiors€ €¦ you don€t seem to understand that this report is BURRIED under a mountain of other reports that conflict with the accurate information.

Please, do you understand that? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I understand that things did not happen in the way you understand them.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Do you understand that it is the responsibility of the Intelligence community to PROVIDE CLEAR INFORMATION in a MANNER than will allow the Government to make the correct decision. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

... so in each case the Goverment despite perfectly good evidence does not decide correctly, it's the fault of the intelligence?

I'd say it's the fault of the goverment, if it had the correct info.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">This processing, is where they failed. It is not that they did not learn the basis facts, but that they failed to COMPREHEND THEM, in the vast encyclopedia of information at their fingertips. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

At least that is how it existed in your opinion. Mayvbe you should just tell what happened, without any comments. Just the barebone facts.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">€œYou're speculating that there were, there must have been alternate reports coming in. A pretty weak foundation to build you castle on, don't you think? Then, on this weak foundation you even make up their titles, and finally you turn your theory, how must have been, into fact, how it was... It's hard to see it as the intel's processing error that messages did not reach those intended for mere personal faults, who failed to forward them properly. That's the failing of the staff, not the intel.€
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Really I am sorry but this passage of yours reveals more to me what little you know. I am not speculating about ANYTHING!

I mentioned NORWAY, CALAIS, and GREECE for very specific reasons! Read the following passage and learn please.

€œ€¦ it was also imperative to conceal the place, though the Allies were preparing to invade France, Hitler must be convinced that they had the means and the intention to mount other invasions around the periphery of his empire; and he must be misled about where in France the Allies would land. Thus Fortitude included elaborate deceptions that were designed to threaten Norway, the Pas de Calais, and the bay of Biscay, and Mediterranean coasts of France, their object being, in conjunction with continuing threats to the Balkans and the military operations in Italy, to tie down German forces in those areas before, during and after Neptune.€

and

€œTo keep the German armies in southeastern Europe in place during June, the Germans were to be led to believe that, since no large-scale Cross-Channel operation would be possible until late summer, the main Allied effort in the spring of 1944 would be against the Balkans. These operations would consist of (a) an Anglo-American assault against the Trieste coast, (b) a British assault against Greece, and (c) an Anglo-Russian landing on the Black Sea coast of Rumania to threaten the Germans' main supplies of natural oil at Ploesti. Turkey would be invited to join the Allies to provide bases for operations against the Aegean Islands and the invasion of central Europe through Greece.€

OK buddy! There is NORWAY, CALAIS, and Greece. Who is speculating now? This Allied deception effort contributed to the MOUNTAIN of papers on the desks of the Germans. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

...an effort that failed, for obviously the final report noted NORMANDY and the CORRECT date, and not any of those false information. Sorry buddy but just that the Allies attempted deception it does not automatically mean the other side was automatically deceived - it's an old trick everyone knew. Besides it seems the allies were working against themselves, making it so obvious to the Germans by spreading so many obviously false information. You seem to believe the Germans were giving equal weight to all of these, fact is that Hitler's intuition already in 1942 was that they'll try normandie. It didn't take much brains, for an invasion ports are needed.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
No you are putting words in my mouth. In fact I said that there is never enough information and processing is always fraught with danger and pitfalls. NOWHERE have I said that ANY STATE, is immune from this fact. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Glad we agree.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"><BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
"Hmmm, rounding up basically the entire British spy network in German home turf not significant...? OK..."

Please I ask again, do not put words in my mouth. It is beneath you. The results of Venlo were to round up a ring of British agent in Czechoslovakia. Also the Germans obtained a list of British SIS agents working within Britain. (Hardly much of a coup here, as the SIS ranks in 1939 were woefully small, and would expand out of all recognition in the coming war years. As for the Czech assets, like I said earlier they would have rounded up the assets in Czechoslovakia anyway (like they did the Rotte Kapelle). This was all but inevitable. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Excuse me, do you try to imply to me that without the Germans simply learning the exact identity of British agents, they would be still rounded up anyway...? This hypothesizes thst those agents were absolute idiots to start with.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No you do not understand. Certainly learning all the name was a coup. And I have stated that. But I have also stated that as the Germans tightened their grip on Czechoslovakia, this roundup would have been inevitable.[/QUOTE]

Let's just concentrate on the facts.

The Venlo incident lead to that British spy networks were eradicated within the Reich.
That's a success for the intel, and a barebone fact.
You say that would happen anyway. That's speculation, and a dubious one.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"><BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
Re: Farago.
Me on Farago: I have read his books. I own his books. He IS NOT credible.

You on Nigel West. "I haven't read him." and "looking at his titles he seem..." </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Other than you don't like Farago, you fail to note WHY he is not credible. And looking on Nigel West's titles, you are free to prove he's a good source on German intel rather than the usual dismissing, ill-informed arrogant comments I've got used to from Anglo-Saxon authors on anything not Anglo-Saxon. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

YET AGAIN, you attempt to put words in my mouth.
I have never stated that Nigel West is a good source on German intel. I mentioned him as an example of an author who is CREDIBLE.[/QUOTE]

That's grand, I just don't get why trouble mentioning mr West then, when he didn't write anything on our subject...?

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">You reveal your BIGOTRY with your comments on Anglo Saxon authors. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Nope, it's my experience. I've a read a lot more Anglo Saxon authors, and with a very few exceptions, they tend to be very vouge, generalising, and occasionally mixing arrogance and ignorance. Again, that's my EXPERIENCE with them. But it works the same way, obviously you have better possibilities to research say Britain's history when living in Britian, but restricted possibility to research other countries history.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">This bigotry has blinded you to the possibility that there can be anything of value in their authorship. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not at all, with Allied subjects which they usually know well. For everything else, they are best to be ignored - 'respect to the exception'!

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">So let me get this straight. You didn't mention the Schellenburg book to support your contention that he was responsible for a veritable litany of significant successes?

I acquiesce, you didn't cite Schellenburg to bolster your assertions. I am glad we see eye to eye on this point. His book is a first hand account, but saying that does nothing to make his authorship any more valuable that Hitler's book Mein Kampf, makes him out to be an excellent General/State Leader/Tyrant/ - (whatever you want-fill in the blank!) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I fail to see the point, apart from arguing for arguements sake.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"><BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
..then what, whom? The avarage post-war Anglo-Saxon author, often not even reading German and never seen any primary source from the Abwehr etc., who tends to go into lenghty schoolboy bravado about his own guys,and dismiss everything he is ignorant of...? OR? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Exactly! I don€t recommend that you to read the AVERAGE postwar author. (which is what Schellenberg is!) Farago is FAR BELOW AVERAGE! For Christ's sake man he wrote a whole book on how he found MARTIN frikin€ BORMAN alive and well in Bolivia! Doesn€t this tell you ANYTHING about how poor his research is? Doesn€t this give you REASON to question EVERYTHING he has written? If it doesn€t, then you are a blind as those of whose reputations you are propping up. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You still generalise. Many authors have poor or good books, as did Shakespeare had good and less good plays.

Specifically, what's your problem with 'The game of the foxes'? Can you expand on that, cite examples of inaccuracies etc?

Abbeville-Boy
10-07-2006, 05:50 AM
this seems to sum up the german intel abilities pre/during bob, a major factor to their failure to bring britain to its knees
The Luftwaffe was ill-served by their lack of intelligence on the British defences. The German intelligence services were fractured, driven by rivalries and their overall performance was amateurish. By 1940 there were few or no German agents operating in the UK and a handful of bungled attempts to insert spies into the country were foiled. This meant that the Luftwaffe had almost no recent knowledge of the workings of the RAF's air defences, in particular of the crucial command and control system that had been built before the war. Even when good information existed, such as 5th Abteilung's November 1939 assessment of Fighter Command strengths and capabilities, it was ignored if it did not match conventional wisdom.

For much of the battle the Luftwaffe operated 'blind', unaware of their enemy's true strengths, capabilities, and deployments. Many times the leadership believed that the Fighter Command's strength had collapsed, while raids against supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal defence installations. The results of bombing and air fighting were exaggerated, resulting in a Luftwaffe leadership that became increasingly disconnected from reality. This lack of leadership and solid intelligence meant that the Germans did not adopt any consistent strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the wall

Kurfurst__
10-07-2006, 05:59 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkVb:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Sidenote, they also did found out about Operation Tiger. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Source, please. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

German E-boots somehow turning up in numbers at the exact place and time of the excecise ('Excercise Tiger') for DDay landings, sinking quite few ships with 800 men lost might give a clue.

LStarosta
10-07-2006, 06:01 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by csThor:
Good to see the same old shoulder-clapping again and again. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif
Can't you guys get over with this "my d*ck is longer than yours" tidares? It's starting to tire me.

LStarosta - modifiy your sentence. As a german I feel insulted. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/disagree.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Note the quotation marks.

luftluuver
10-07-2006, 07:47 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:

German E-boots somehow turning up in numbers at the exact place and time of the excecise ('Excercise Tiger') for DDay landings, sinking quite few ships with 800 men lost might give a clue. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>In those early hours of 28 April off the south coast in Start Bay, Lyme Bay, a flotilla of eight LSTs (landing ship, tank) was ploughing toward Slapton Sands, transporting a follow-up force of engineers and chemical and quartermaster troops not scheduled for assault but to be unloaded in orderly fashion along with trucks, amphibious trucks, jeeps and heavy engineering equipment. Out of the darkness, nine swift German torpedo boats suddenly appeared. On routine patrol out of the French port of Cherbourg, the commanders had learned of heavy radio traffic in Lyme Bay. Ordered to investigate, they were amazed to see what they took to be a flotilla of eight destroyers. They hastened to attack.

The toll of the dead and missing stood at 198 sailors and 551 soldiers, a total of 749, not 800 Kurfurst.

German torpedoes hit three of the LSTs of which 2 sank (LST-507,LST-531), the other(LST-289) making back to port. When is 2 quite a few? Another example of Kurfurst's flair for the melodramatic. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif

LEBillfish
10-07-2006, 08:37 AM
Well besides the fact it is never "intelligent" to war.....Maybe it went something like this?

*One day Gunter and Fritz were digging a ditch in the hot sun, when Fritz suddenly stopped, and looked up to the top of the hill.

Fritz: Was ist los Gunter! Why ist we down in dis hole, getting grosse hot un tired vhile Boss Man ist up on de hill, zitting unter dat shade tree all nize un cool?

Gunter: Achtuliebe! Vo ist right Fritz I'll go up and see!

*So Gunter jumped out of the hole, and ran up the hill to where Boss Man Neville sat and said;

Gunter: Was ist los Bozz Man Neville! Why ist we down in dat hole, digging zat ditch, getting grosse hot un tired vhile du ist up on dis hill, zitting unter dis shade tree all nize un cool?

Boss Man Neville: Well Gunter ol'chap, that would be something called "intelligence".

Gunter: Vas? Intelligence, Vhat is that?

Boss Man Neville: Well Gunter ol'boy, I can't explain it to you but I can show you....

*Standing up, Boss Man Neville looked around for a moment then placed his hand against the large shade trees trunk.

Boss Man Neville: Ok now Gunter, I want you to pull back hard with your fist, and smash my hand all to bits.

Gunter: Nein Bozz Man, Ich could never do zat! Dis I cannot do!

Boss Man Neville: Come come ol'chap, it will be all right, you won't hurt my hand, now let loose a mighty blow!

*With that Gunter reared back, took aim and swung toward Boss Man Nevilles hand with a ferrocious blow....Yet just as his fist was about to connect suddenly Boss Man Neville moved his hand and Gunter smashed his on the tree.

Gunter: Shisse!! Achtuliebe, was ist los! Vhy Bozz Man Neville did you move der hand!

Boss Man Neville: (laughing) Well old boy that's intelligence!

*Suddenly Gunter cradling his hand stilled, and an expression came over his face as though all secrets of the universe had been revealed as he excitedly announced;

Gunter: Wundabar! Ich getz it now!

*and Gunter ran down the hill, hopped in the hole as Frtiz asked;

Fritz: Zo? Was is los? Did du find out vhy we ist down in dis hole, getting grosse hot un tired vhile Boss Man ist up on de hill, zitting unter dat shade tree all nize un cool?

Gunter: Ya! Ich habbe die anzwer unt vit de inzformation we can finally cruzh our mazters un rule ze vorld! It ist called!....Intelligence!

Fritz: Was? Intelligence, was ist zhat?!

Gunter: Vell, ich cannot exzplain it to you, zis I cannot do, BUT, ich can show you!

*Looking around knowing he needed a prop to help explain, hastilly selected...

Gunter: Vell, you zee zat shovel over der? Vell, pick up zat shovel unt smash my hand all to piezes!!

*As he swung his hand up in front of his own face.


(no offense meant to our German friends, just saw an opportunity to use an old joke about intelligence altering the slang used.....)

StG2_Schlachter
10-07-2006, 10:03 AM
Still not very appropriate http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-mad.gif

slipBall
10-07-2006, 10:44 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LEBillfish:
Well besides the fact it is never "intelligent" to war.....Maybe it went something like this?

*One day Gunter and Fritz were digging a ditch in the hot sun, when Fritz suddenly stopped, and looked up to the top of the hill.

Fritz: Was ist los Gunter! Why ist we down in dis hole, getting grosse hot un tired vhile Boss Man ist up on de hill, zitting unter dat shade tree all nize un cool?

Gunter: Achtuliebe! Vo ist right Fritz I'll go up and see!

*So Gunter jumped out of the hole, and ran up the hill to where Boss Man Neville sat and said;

Gunter: Was ist los Bozz Man Neville! Why ist we down in dat hole, digging zat ditch, getting grosse hot un tired vhile du ist up on dis hill, zitting unter dis shade tree all nize un cool?

Boss Man Neville: Well Gunter ol'chap, that would be something called "intelligence".

Gunter: Vas? Intelligence, Vhat is that?

Boss Man Neville: Well Gunter ol'boy, I can't explain it to you but I can show you....

*Standing up, Boss Man Neville looked around for a moment then placed his hand against the large shade trees trunk.

Boss Man Neville: Ok now Gunter, I want you to pull back hard with your fist, and smash my hand all to bits.

Gunter: Nein Bozz Man, Ich could never do zat! Dis I cannot do!

Boss Man Neville: Come come ol'chap, it will be all right, you won't hurt my hand, now let loose a mighty blow!

*With that Gunter reared back, took aim and swung toward Boss Man Nevilles hand with a ferrocious blow....Yet just as his fist was about to connect suddenly Boss Man Neville moved his hand and Gunter smashed his on the tree.

Gunter: Shisse!! Achtuliebe, was ist los! Vhy Bozz Man Neville did you move der hand!

Boss Man Neville: (laughing) Well old boy that's intelligence!

*Suddenly Gunter cradling his hand stilled, and an expression came over his face as though all secrets of the universe had been revealed as he excitedly announced;

Gunter: Wundabar! Ich getz it now!

*and Gunter ran down the hill, hopped in the hole as Frtiz asked;

Fritz: Zo? Was is los? Did du find out vhy we ist down in dis hole, getting grosse hot un tired vhile Boss Man ist up on de hill, zitting unter dat shade tree all nize un cool?

Gunter: Ya! Ich habbe die anzwer unt vit de inzformation we can finally cruzh our mazters un rule ze vorld! It ist called!....Intelligence!

Fritz: Was? Intelligence, was ist zhat?!

Gunter: Vell, ich cannot exzplain it to you, zis I cannot do, BUT, ich can show you!

*Looking around knowing he needed a prop to help explain, hastilly selected...

Gunter: Vell, you zee zat shovel over der? Vell, pick up zat shovel unt smash my hand all to piezes!!

*As he swung his hand up in front of his own face.


(no offense meant to our German friends, just saw an opportunity to use an old joke about intelligence altering the slang used.....) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>



http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-surprised.gif

Low_Flyer_MkVb
10-07-2006, 01:59 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">quote:
Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkVb:

quote:
Sidenote, they also did found out about Operation Tiger.


Source, please.


German E-boots somehow turning up in numbers at the exact place and time of the excecise ('Excercise Tiger') for DDay landings, sinking quite few ships with 800 men lost might give a clue. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Source, please.

Kurfurst__
10-07-2006, 02:55 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkVb:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">quote:
Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkVb:

quote:
Sidenote, they also did found out about Operation Tiger.


Source, please.


German E-boots somehow turning up in numbers at the exact place and time of the excecise ('Excercise Tiger') for DDay landings, sinking quite few ships with 800 men lost might give a clue. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Source, please. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Source. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif

Kurfurst__
10-07-2006, 03:00 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by luftluuver:
...On routine patrol out of the French port of Cherbourg, the commanders had learned of heavy radio traffic in Lyme Bay. Ordered to investigate, they were amazed to see what they took to be a flotilla of eight destroyers..... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

At least one source states German intel learned about the plans of the excercise. As for nine Schnellboots 'accidently' bumping into the LSTs, well, Allied command, once learning the location of a Uboot via ULTRA, usually sent out a patrol a/c which 'accidently' flow directly towards the Uboot, giving an alibi to why attack followed. Without an alibi the enemy will get an idea an change to codes.

Rest of the post was just the usual pathetic flamer's rubbish.

Low_Flyer_MkVb
10-07-2006, 03:23 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkVb:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">quote:
Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkVb:

quote:
Sidenote, they also did found out about Operation Tiger.


Source, please.


German E-boots somehow turning up in numbers at the exact place and time of the excecise ('Excercise Tiger') for DDay landings, sinking quite few ships with 800 men lost might give a clue. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Source, please. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Source. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not good enough. Source, please.

luftluuver
10-07-2006, 04:40 PM
No Kurfurst, it is another of your flair for the exagerated melodramatic. Can you ever state the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

So Kurfurst if German intel knew about the exercise then why did they not show up earlier? The exercise had been in operation for 5+ days before the E-boats made an appearance after slipping by the watch boat off Cherbourg.

The Slapton and Torcross area had for almost a year been used for practice landings.

Why if German intel was so good did the E-boats not show up again for the final training exercise FABIUS that took place between May 3-8?

Sergio_101
10-07-2006, 05:36 PM
German Intelligence in WWII

oxymoron......
http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/784.gif
Sergio

Sergio_101
10-07-2006, 05:39 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by luftluuver:
No Kurfurst, it is another of your flair for the exagerated melodramatic. Can you ever state the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

So Kurfurst if German intel knew about the exercise then why did they not show up earlier? The exercise had been in operation for 5+ days before the E-boats made an appearance after slipping by the watch boat off Cherbourg.

The Slapton and Torcross area had for almost a year been used for practice landings.

Why if German intel was so good did the E-boats not show up again for the final training exercise FABIUS that took place between May 3-8? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

If the Germans knew about the exercise then it would
have been attacked eariler for sure.
Also this would have tipped the Germans off
about the upcoming landings in France. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif

Typical Kurfie propaganda. A bunch of falsehoods
sprinkled with a little truth. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

Sergio

Interminate
10-07-2006, 08:07 PM
German Intelligence was the best then and today and always. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/10.gif

This is where I come to get the real goods, thank God you guys and gals are discussing this.

Waldo.Pepper
10-07-2006, 11:51 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">That's grand, I just don't get why trouble mentioning mr West then, when he didn't write anything on our subject...? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


Remember you asked for this. However, I doubt you will read all of this. (Since from reading your recent reply you have not taken the time to read my posts as you fail to even try to answer the issues that I am raising.)

-----------------------------------------


The strange case of Mutt and Jeff and how poor Ladislas Farago gets it wrong in The Game of the Foxes.

"Take, as an illustration, the true identities of two of MI5's famed wartime double agents, code-named MUTT and JEFF. These two men had been recruited as German spies in Norway and sent on a mission to Scotland in March 1941. Soon after their arrival in Banffshire they had been taken into custody and both had become enthusiastic double agents, sending misleading messages to their Abwehr controllers until February 1944. What were their real names, and what had become of them after the war? One author claimed to know, the inside story.

In 1971 the American historian Ladislas Farago said that he had accidentally stumbled on 800 yellow boxes of microfilm containing the Abwehr's complete secret archives. When I visited Farago in New York, he told me that the sealed boxes had lain undisturbed in the American National Archives since the war and were full of extraordinary secrets, including the records that revealed the identities of MUTT and JEFF. In Game of the Foxes Farago says of them: 'They went by a string of pseudonyms and registry numbers, but today we know that their real names were Olaf Klausen and Jack Berg.' I tried to track down Klausen and Berg, but instead of finding them I unearthed a book written in 1958 which lad been based on the 'secret service war diaries of Ibeneral Erwin Lahousen'. Lahousen was credited by the two authors, Charles Wighton and Gunter Peis, as having been the head of the Abwehr's sabotage division. Both MUTT and JEFF had been named: 'They were Jack Berg, a hairdresser in his middle twenties, and his friend Olav Klausen, about the same age and formerly a sergeant in the Norwegian Army.'

Lahousen's evidence seemed to confirm Farago's discovery in the Abwehr's secret archives. Or did it? The next book I found which mentioned two Norwegian agents was The Secrets of D-Day, which won the 1964 Prix de la Resistance and was written by Jacques Peyroles under the pseudonym 'Gilles Perrault'. He claimed that, according to an Abwehr report,

the Luftwaffe had bombed two towns in Scotland as a diversion when money and explosives were being dropped on 20 February 1943. The civilian casualties had been heavy. And the two Norwegians had been previously informed of the raid to be made on the towns near the dropping area. Would the British have deliberately sacrificed the lives of thousands of women and children in order to make the enemy believe that the two agents were still operating freely?

I discovered that Fraserburgh had been bombed that night but the sole casualty had been one child. Had this anything to do with MUTT and JEFF?

With more than a little unofficial help from intelligence sources, I was able to trace JEFF to Norway, where he was living under his real name, Tor Glad. We met in Oslo and he kindly put me in touch with his former partner, John Moe, alias MUTT, who was then living near Malmo in Sweden. Neither man had heard of Farago's book, and were somewhat bemused to learn of 'Klausen' and 'Berg'. Both recounted their experiences to me and I learnt how Fraserburgh had come to be bombed. A wartime plan, Operation OATMEAL, had been mounted to persuade MUTT and JEFF's German controllers to supply them with extra equipment by air. The plan called for a single Luftwaffe plane to parachute a canister containing money and a wireless transmitter into a dropping zone on the east coast of Scotland.

Initially the operation had gone well, and the canister had been retrieved by MUTT and his MIS escort. Unfortunately, and unexpectedly, the German pilot then decided to round off the evening by dropping a stick of bombs on the nearby fishing port of Fraserburgh. An eleven-year-old boy was killed in the raid and John Moe had been deeply upset. He had later transmitted a complaint to the Germans, claiming that the Luftwaffe's action had caused chaos and the extra police activity had endangered his mission by preventing him from leaving the area. As a result, he added, he had been obliged to spend two uncomfortable nights out in the open. The Abwehr apologized and undertook to prevent the Luftwaffe from repeating the exercise. The next time OATMEAL was staged, it was not accompanied by an air raid. Moe also wrote to the Mayor of Fraserburgh expressing his condolences."


-----

And now another case of Farago's flawed 'research' and writing efforts.

-----

Another glaring error of Farago's in The Game of the Foxes, is contention that an Agent supplied information that aided in Gunther Prien's successful raid on Scapa Flow, sinking the Ark Royal, when the war was not yet six weeks old.

The following is my summarization of an entire chapter. Which I have made into a pdf and made available to you here.

Orkney.Pdf.Zip (http://www.bigupload.com/d=F43091D4)

To be fair many other authors have gotten this wrong as well. Some as you will see more than once.

Among them:

Lauran Payne in The Abwehr
Kurt Singer in Spies and Traitors in World War Two.
Kurt Singer (again, and with more embellishment of the tale) in More Spy Stories.
E.H. Cookeidge pseud. (Edward Spiro) in Secrets of the British Secret Service.
Walter Schellenberg in The Labyrinth.
John Bullock in History of MI5.
Christopher Felix pseud. (James MacCarger) in The Spy and his Masters: A Short Course in the Secret War.
E.H. Cookeidge pseud. (Edward Spiro) in The Third Man.

"Such speculation is untenable. In the years since the war considerable research has been undertaken to establish the exact circumstances of the loss of the Royal Oak. Wolfgang Frank and Alexander McKee, to name but two independent investigators, have spent many hundreds of hours examining every aspect of U-47's mission to Scapa Flow. They have been unable to find any evidence to support the idea that a German spy had played a part in it. Furthermore, Gerald Snyder, the author of The Royal Oak Disaster, actually traced all the fifteen living survivors of the U-47's original crew of forty-four. All denied the participation of any spy. One, Herbert Herrmann, who had been the youngest member of Prien's crew, has become a naturalized British subject and now lives in Dumfriesshire in Scotland. He is emphatic on the issue of Oertel, Wehring et al. and should be allowed the last word: 'This mythical German spy in the Orkneys simply never existed.'"

-----------------------------------------------

In the Mutt and Jeff case.

if as Farago alone claims, his source was 'Secret Abwhehr archives' 'in 800 yellow boxes', how did Farago get it so wrong?

I won't ask you how the Germans got it wrong (that there had been heavy civilian casualties among other facts of their own case). Because the answer is that once again the Nazi service was misled.

As for the case of the Orkney agent;

Once again, if Farago has access to such a treasure trove of information (the 800 yellow boxes of Abwehr documents) how in the world did he get this wrong?

And lastly I have some news to tell you of your Schellenberg book that I bet you did not know. It was authenticated by one of those Anglo authors whom you have such high regard for.

"His posthumously published autobiography was authenticated by the distinguished academic and historian, Alan (now Lord) Bullock, who stated in the introduction:

'All these are episodes not from fiction but from the history of the last twenty years and they are described by the man who became the head of Hitler's Foreign Intelligence Service."

Nevertheless he too asserts a fictitious spy in the Orkneys.

All of the above digging and meticulous research was done by non other than Nigel West in the book I earlier mentioned (though I did get the name of the book wrong! I called it Intelligence Myths of the Second World War. When in fact it is called Unreliable Witness: Espionage Myths of the Second World War.)

Waldo.Pepper
10-08-2006, 12:42 AM
In the interests of clarity I shall address but a single point per post.

It's not a salient fact, it's a matter of poor generalisation as you were told. You handle the whole 'German Goverment' as a single homogenous block, [b]irrespective of departments and specific, individual men. No, according to you they were all the same, The Nazi Burocrat. Being clones, even their DNA was the same etc.
That's kinda simplistic as to say all the Jagdwaffe was made up by cloned Hartmanns..

THAT's generalisation, and as such, a useless base to draw conclusion.

You have completely missunderstood my words. I THINK DELIBERATLY! The SALIENT FACT - IS JUST AS YOU ARE STATING! That the German Government/Military/Intelligence Service WAS made up of individual human beings (human beings who feared for their lives too!) That IS what I am arguing! We are agreeing! But what you do not see, (AGAIN I think deliberatly) is what effect this would have on all levels of government (which include the Military and Intelligence Communities!)


-----

[Remember when I said

"Because, of the fratricidal nature of their own Government."

I think I may undestand the problem, now. (I apologize for using a word that you are not familiar with!) Go and look up fratricidal. It means the killing of your own brother. This was my poor choice of words.

I remember that you mentioned you had first hand experience with Communists. From this I think that this could mean that your backround is possibly Eastern European and that English is not your native language.

But when I used it, fratricidal, I intended that it be meant the following way. I meant that they were the opposite of monolithic. They were internally competitive. In fact they were TOO INTERNALLY COMPETITIVE. So much so, that it damaged their ability to function in the best interests of the nation. Do you understand? ]

-------



The book is written by a Californian scholar about the relation of Hitler and his diplomats and foreign policy...You argue that's somehow the same as the relation between the Intelligence and the Army.

Similar enough to be of value, to make the point that I made above....fratricidal ... remember? Do you understand now?


-----


"What if you had been one of Hitler€s employees? How would you have reacted each day at work, surrounded by subtle terror and the omnipresent threat of violence? On the surface, you raised the Nazi salute and hailed the Party€s success. But in the darker world, the one in which you lived under Gestapo surveillance, you had to struggle to survive. Each day you knew that your phones were tapped, your words recorded, your correspondence penetrated, and your actions observed. You witnessed your governmentabolish civil liberties, destroy parliamentary democracy, and strangle freedom of thought. And if you harbored any hopes of preserving your personal safety, those hopes were shattered when your government murdered your colleagues in a sudden burst of terror. Each day thereafter you defended your position from the Party rivals who aimed to push you out. All the while you struggled to glean your boss€s will, but he never shared it with you. In that world, information equaled more than power. You battled for information not just to protect and advance your career but to safeguard your life."

From What Hitler Knew.

-----

Now don't you think that this is the world that men like Canaris/Schellenburg/Gehlen suffered in? Can't you see how this would affect his ability to do a good job?

That is the single point that I have been trying to show you the importance of for over a day now.

Waldo.Pepper
10-08-2006, 01:00 AM
Re: Allies vs. Germany on Gathering and Security.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Actually NO! This is what you are doing when you return again and again to the minutae of the technology of the GM-1. Do you really think that this incredibly minor detail is on par with GRAND STRATEGY?

No you have misunderstood completely! My point ONCE AGAIN, is to point out how poor was German Security, and to further emphazise that it is a primary responsibility of the Intelligence Community, rather than the vast rank and file of the military, whom you seem to blame. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

So they were quite incapable of finding out the small details, but somehow they understood the grand strategy? Curious, then why are the repeated failures of allied intelligence to find out about large scale axis operations? I am sure you could yourself name half a dozen off the top of your head.


--------

Because the Allies were not perfect, anymore than I expect the Germans to be perfect. That is what I meant when I made the point with the following words:


"There is never enough information and processing of it is always fraught with danger."

(Note: the words NEVER and ALWAYS) Clearly, this applies to EVERYONE! I hope you read it like that.

Even though the Allies were not perfect, they were much, much better than the Germans during WW2, when it came to matters of Intelligence. (NOT brain power "boy that guy is smart or dumb intelligence" ... in case you are a little confused.) Intelligence - spying - deception etc.

[I am not trying to be a smart a*& here, - I promise. JUST CLEAR - OK!] http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif


Similarly, the Allies were not perfect when it came to security. But they were better (ovewrall) than the Germans were during WW2 at protecting information.

Waldo.Pepper
10-08-2006, 01:08 AM
Your view of the "Way things work".

"They managed to find out the date, and noted Normandy as the likely place, and were reading allied transmissions to resistance groups - hardly a secret for even at the time the 'Longest Day' it was known. They alerted the army about the upcoming invasion, it was those infallible Heer generals who screwed up to react accordingly."

I do not want to put words in your mouth. Forgive me if I do by mistake. But, if I stipulate that all the above quote was factual, then I think (because you are a little unclear here) that in your view the Intelligence gathering services were essentially infallible regarding D-Day and the entire fault of the processing of the information lies with the Army. (and presumably in your view other branches of the German armed forces, I.E. Luftwaffe.)

If that is the case then it belies a fundamental misunderstanding on your part, of the responsibilities of the various Intelligence Services of the German State. Gathering and Processing go hand in hand.

You seem to keep citing gathering successes, and I seem to keep pointing out that gathering is not enough, and often the German failures were in interpretation and other failures to process. There is never enough information and processing of it is always fraught with danger.[/QUOTE]

You try to force the same theory to everything about processing, and then you're surprised it isnt' work.[/QUOTE]

It matters not to me whether my argument works or not. It is a fact that you seem unable to appreciate.[/QUOTE]

Nope the problem is that I am completely aware of the facts, what German intel found out of DDay and what not, while you are not aware and try to force your hypothesis onto real world events. But that's not how they happened.

Maybe it would help a lot to just accept the pure facts first, and then go on to conclusions.

So, in your version, what exactly happened after German intel found out the date and place of the invasion?

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"><BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Let's look at the bare facts: Abwehr maneged to find out the exact date, likely place of invasion, and forwarded the info the Army headquarters. Sidenote, they also did found out about Operation Tiger. That's gathering and processing - with a correct conclusion. I still don'ts see why the intel is to be blamed, when it pass on a perfectly good report that some idiot fails to properly let know his superiors - most of whom who happen to be on leave btw - about it on the Army HQ. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


You are focusing on the specific yet again. Please try to follow along. The decision makers IN ANY COUNTRY, are bombarded with reports on a daily basis. When you say that €¦ €œwhen it pass on a perfectly good report that some idiot fails to properly let know his superiors€ €¦ you don€t seem to understand that this report is BURRIED under a mountain of other reports that conflict with the accurate information.

Please, do you understand that? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I understand that things did not happen in the way you understand them.


------

Kurfurst; Please elaborate, tell me more! What do you mean by the words - "I understand that things did not happen in the way you understand them."

What things?

Waldo.Pepper
10-08-2006, 02:51 AM
D-Day and Norway, Calais, Greece.


OK buddy! There is NORWAY, CALAIS, and Greece. Who is speculating now? This Allied deception effort contributed to the MOUNTAIN of papers on the desks of the Germans. [/QUOTE]


...an effort that failed, for obviously the final report noted NORMANDY and the CORRECT date, and not any of those false information. Sorry buddy but just that the Allies attempted deception it does not automatically mean the other side was automatically deceived - it's an old trick everyone knew. Besides it seems the allies were working against themselves, making it so obvious to the Germans by spreading so
many obviously false information. You seem to believe the Germans were giving equal weight to all of these, fact is that Hitler's intuition already in 1942 was that they'll try normandie. It didn't take much brains, for an invasion ports are needed.

--------------

You speaking of the FINAL REPORT interests me greatly. What was the date of this final report? Who is the author of that report?

Knowing the date and place of the invasion, definately important. But only if they did something meaningful with the information. You understand that don't you? You understadn that this is the great failure of German Intelligence during WW2 (Again processing of the information ... Reading Farago... goiod start. THINKING about what you are reading. Far better, in fact thinking about the information is the more critical aspect.)


Consider the following passage please. (Which speaks of CALAIS) one of the three places I mentioned that would be part of an allied deception operation. "This altered none of Foreign Armies West's strategic conceptions. Like everyone else, it continued to believe in another attack in the Pas de Calais. During the latter half of July, however, indications suggesting this became less frequent. On the other hand, there were no counterindications: Wild and his team saw no need to disabuse ihe Germans of their views. In fact, on the 21st, the Allies put up some lively reconnaissance activity in the 15th Army area, throwing a. new little scare into the Germans.

But thethe Germans soon recognized. Some came from what Foreign Armies West believed were the FUSAG forces intended for the second landing. Wild's double agents cleverly implied that (the tough German resistance had demanded these additional divisions. This fed the German belief that containment of the Normandy assault would best prevent the Pas de Calais landing.

But the withdrawal of forces from FUSAG weakened this body, despite the addition of more notional divisions to it. As early as 10 July Roenne had noticed that it was "qualitatively inferior" to the Normandy force and was consequently "no longer entrusted with the main role." But not until 27 July did he concede that it was
"improbable now that it will be used at short notice to attack a strongly fortified coastal sector." On the same day, Kluge's headquarters, while cautiously noting a rise in the total number of Allied formations to 92 as a result of new American arrivals, said for the first time that "the mass of the Anglo-American formations will be put into action in Normandy." Kluge
asked for the transfer of a number of divisions from other armies in his area to the bridgehead. Hitler allowed two of them. For the first time, he let one come from the 15th Army in the Pas de Calais. The next day he released two more divisions. One of these was from the 15th as well. But he was still nervous: he ordered that burned-out infantry or armored divisions
be placed behind the 15th Army as quickly as possible. Still, the reality of Normandy was beginning to overwhelm the theory of the Pas de Calais. On 3 August, with the Americans pouring out through Avranches, Kluge
transferred the LXXXIst Army Corps from the 15th to the 7th Army. Finally, on 7 August, concluding that a second major landing was "improbable," he ordered that
all possible formations from the Army Group B area be sent to the battle front. In a sense, that ended the Allied deception. The German
organs of acquisition had failed, and so the
intelligence officers and their commanders had fallen into the very trap that Clausewitz foresaw a century before. An officer "is lucky," he wrote, if the contradictions of many incoming reports "cancel each other out, and leave a kind of balance to be critically assessed. It is much worse for the novice if chance does not help him in that way, and on the contrary one report tallies with another, confirms it, magnifies it,
lends it color, till he has to make a quick
decision€"which is soon recognized to be mistaken, just as the reports turn out to be lies, exaggerations, errors, and so on."
This is what happened with the Germans. Only in their lack of recognition of their error did the general staff officers€"who may be regarded as novices to intelligence compared to most other armies of the world€"-deviate from Oausewitz's vision. For the deception had burned itselE so deeply into German minds that it smoldered there long after its effects had passed. Foreign Armies West kept FUSAG on its situation map until 31 October, indicating some belief to its
existence all that time. Even after it removed FUSAG from that map, it retained on it three nonexistent army headquarters€"the English 4th, the American 14th, and the Allied 1st Airborne. Indeed, the chief concept of the deception€"a second landing€" persisted even into the days when Hitler was preparing his last offensive,
which would become the Battle of the Bulge.

At a situation conference at 3:30 p.m. 28 November at the Reich chancellery in Berlin, Donitz brought up the possibility of an Allied landing in Holland. The conditions were poor, he admitted. But the Allied troops assembling south of the Thames, he said, thinking of the nonexistent men, would be able to flow rapidly to the front as soon as the Allied armies opened the Schelde. To this, the last drum tap of the
greatest deception of all time, which had cost him the war in the west, Hitler assented."


and this little tidbit.

At the conference, Hitler heard Jodl report Roenne's views. He was concerned, for it confirmed what had been his belief all along€"that despite the information in
the captured American documents, Normandy was only a diversion. But Hitler would not make up his mind about whether to issue fresh orders to the 15th Army panzers and infantry. He said he would make his final decision at the midnight conference. But before that conference, Jodl gave Hitler a message with the observation that
perhaps the Fuehrer should read it in conjunction with the orders to the resistance movements and the news that Marshall was arriving shortly to inspect Army Group Patton headquarters at Dover Castle. The message
was from Kuhlenthal, and it was his appreciation of Garbo's report:

After a personal exchange of views in London with my agents . . . and after considering the massive concentration of troops in eastern and southeastern England which are taking no part in the present operations, I have come to the conclusion that the (Normandy) operations are a maneuver. Its purpose is to entice our reserves into the bridgehead in order that the decisive assault can be launched at another point. ..
At midnight on June 9/10, Hitler pronounced: the
movement of the panzer and infantry divisions from the Pas de Calais to Normandy must not only be stopped, the 15th Army must also be strengthened. The orders were with Rundstedt and Rommel during the night; and they brought both field marshals to the brink of resignation.


and this one.... (which mentions the Balkans, remember Greece which I mentioned earlier?)

"An after-action report of cover and deception
operations in the European theater would note with satisfaction that Hitler, confronted with the task of collecting forces to keep his Balkans allies in line and avert a major disaster on the Russian front, had "elected to strip his garrison in France of three of its best divisions, while making no demands on four
mobile divisions in reserve in Italy." And Hitler himself would admit on August 31, 1944, that "if I had had (the SS Panzer Korps) in the West (on D-Day) this affair (the invasion) would probably have never occurred."

and this passage... (Norway ring any bells?)

"Bodyguard€"under its previous code name, Jael€"was proving effective. Of Hitler's estimated 302 divisions in the field in January 1944, some 179 were in Russia, 26 were in the Balkans, 22 in Italy, 16 in Norway and Denmark, and 59 in France. This dispersal of force revealed that while Hitler was certainly providing for a major assault in France, he had not ruled out the possibility of Allied expeditions in the Balkans and Scandinavia."

Scandinavia? You think that refers to Norway?

But wait there's more about Norway...

Fortitude North was aimed at Hitler's obsession about Scandinavia. The Fuehrer had once read an essay on naval strategy in the First World War by Wolfgang Wegener, a German admiral who believed that the Kaiser had lost that war because the British succeeded in pinning the High Seas Fleet in the German Bight. Wegener argued that if that fleet had been able to
break free and roam the Atlantic, the disruption of Britain's mercantile marine would have destroyed her capacity to wage war at all. Accordingly, Wegener argued, if another war came Germany must seize the ice-free ports of Norway. That was what Hitler had done in 1940; and thereafter he remained exceptionally
sensitive to any Allied threat to Scandinavia. Very strong forces of the Wehrmacht were stationed in Norway€" at one time the Fuehrer had all his capital ships and most of his submarines there€"and by November 7, 1943, the country was garrisoned with no less than 380,000 fighting men, a large air force, a panzer division, and over 1500 coastal defense guns and projectors. It would be Fortitude North's task to keep
those forces there during Neptune by spreading the fiction that Anglo-American and Russian forces were preparing to invade Norway. That was the reason for Budyenny's presence in Edinburgh. Soon other unusual activities would be centered there.The Allies had no intention of attacking Norway, but Fortitude North was not an idle exercise, nor an expenditure of men.' and military supplies that might have been better devoted to Neptune. The chief objective of the operation was to surprise the enemy and to save lives on D-Day.



-----

So after all this, if this is what you call an Allied failure - and a great German intelligence success. Then by God I pray for such failures in the future.

A final word about Barbarossa. When I mentioned that Barbarossa was as important as D-Day to the Germans the above material is what I was trying to get you to understand.

The Germans allowed the USSR to know the date of the invasion. The place was everywhere, and the fact tha one was comming could not be kept secret from the USSR (please read that last sentence again!- all I am talking about is the date.)

Letting the Soviet Unionj learn the DATE was a failure. However, it was a failure without consequence. As Stalin kept his Army at a peacetime state of readiness.... for reasons only known to him (despite your contentions of the success of the German deception operations. We will likely never know why Stalin did nothing. Some books mention that he hoped for peace and did not want to provoke HItler - but in my view we will never really know.



-----

A final note. I mentioned NORWAY, CALAIS, and GREECE. Then you accused me of fabricating the information regarding those aspects of the allied deception campaign. (I am holding my breath waiting for even the weakest most watered down apology, or acknoledgement that I in fact did nothing of the sort.

When I provided what I think is pretty convicing evidence of their existance ... you fell back to your position that the German learned the date and place of the D-Day landings... so it did not really matter that these deception operations has a positive impact for the success of D-Day.

And now lastly I have made a rather comrehensive post, that I think proves that they did nothing with the information of the time and place. So my final question to you is .... what good did knowing it do them? (Anymore than the USSR knowing the Date/Place of barbarossa....it is still an Intelligence failure? Get it?)


------

P.S. About the German Navies attack on the forces of Operation Tiger.

Is it your contention that every time an Allied vesseal was lost at sea, that this is the result of some piece of Intelligence that was obtained by the Germans? Because without evidence to support this, this farcical statement is what you are saying.

So what is your evidence (something more than mere coincidence of location please) to support your position that the German Navies attack on Operation Tiger was the result of good intelligence work?

(I hope for something clear and sensible, like a reference to SOME document or book. Or even a website (other than your MYSPACE page - where you list your theories).

Good luck.

Waldo.Pepper
10-08-2006, 03:24 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">At least one source states German intel learned about the plans of the excercise </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

What is the name of that source? (Other than you?)

+1 http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif (Until I am blue in the face!)

Sergio_101
10-08-2006, 05:34 AM
Allied, code breaking was very good.
Britian and the Americans broke the
Japanese "Purple" diplomatic code
and JN25, the Naval code.
Also Enigma was decoded. Enigma was truly
un breakable if not for the arrogance of
the Germans. Captured, stolen and copied
Enigma machines lead to the reading
of real time Enigma decrypts.

I know of NO German success with American or
British codes. the Japanese also had very
little success.
American Marines also had a real time code
machine that needed no paper decoding.
"Navaho Code talkers".

The problem that the western allies had is that
they were open societies. Espionage was EASY.
But the German intelligence as a whole was
a failure.
It also seems that the leadership, when warned,
failed to believe the reports.

"Razorblades and Refrigerators" became
300,000 aircraft.

Sergio

luftluuver
10-08-2006, 06:17 AM
Nice posts Waldo. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/25.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/25.gif

I don't think Kurfurst will answer you on 'what source' or any of your other questions as he will pull his typical 'exit stage left' disappearing act after getting pwnd, again.

Sergio_101
10-08-2006, 11:29 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by luftluuver:
Nice posts Waldo. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/25.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/25.gif

I don't think Kurfurst will answer you on 'what source' or any of your other questions as he will pull his typical 'exit stage left' disappearing act after getting pwnd, again. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


That's part of the propaganda pattern, as important
as it's composition is it's application. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif
When the propaganda is exposed and there is no
viable way to spread further
misinformation it is best to retreat never to respond
under these conditions. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

Therefore those who believe your **** will not doubt
your word, and those who expose you as a liar and a fraud
never get to prove your label as a propagandist. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif
But we all know that Kurfurst is worthy of that label. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

Sergio

LStarosta
10-08-2006, 11:45 AM
I love it how everyone gives the Germans a rim job even though they lost the war. Twice.

Interminate
10-08-2006, 12:11 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LStarosta:
I love it how everyone gives the Germans a rim job even though they lost the war. Twice. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

If you are wondering why this is, its because most people recognise a superior culture when they see it. Its just the way it is sometimes. The term "rim job" is an explicit sexual reference that really isn't appropriate in a FORUM. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif

LStarosta
10-08-2006, 12:15 PM
Yeah, Bremspropeller reeks of superiority. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

Ruy Horta
10-08-2006, 12:19 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LStarosta:
I love it how everyone gives the Germans a rim job even though they lost the war. Twice. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

http://www.thesimpleway.org/images/newkids.gif

La7_brook
10-08-2006, 12:28 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
Allied, code breaking was very good.
Britian and the Americans broke the
Japanese "Purple" diplomatic code
and JN25, the Naval code.
Also Enigma was decoded. Enigma was truly
un breakable if not for the arrogance of
the Germans. Captured, stolen and copied
Enigma machines lead to the reading
of real time Enigma decrypts.

I know of NO German success with American or
British codes. the Japanese also had very
little success.
American Marines also had a real time code
machine that needed no paper decoding.
"Navaho Code talkers".

The problem that the western allies had is that
they were open societies. Espionage was EASY.
But the German intelligence as a whole was
a failure.
It also seems that the leadership, when warned,
failed to believe the reports.

"Razorblades and Refrigerators" became
300,000 aircraft.

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE> wrong the german radio interception and cipher breaking service B-dienst proved extremely clever at reading royal navy codes there findings helped hitler successfully to invade norway in apirl 1940 by breaking the BAMS ,THE bams codes in 1941 helped germans to read codes sent to allied ships warning about positions timings and routes of u boats and were convoys were rerouted

Sergio_101
10-08-2006, 02:04 PM
Ok, BAMS got broken. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/touche.gif
First I have heard of it.
Did they continue to decypher the naval code
through 1945?

BAMS was a Civilian merchant naval shore to ship broadcast.
Perhaps the civilians were not as careful.

Sergio

fighter_966
10-08-2006, 07:35 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
Ok, BAMS got broken. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/touche.gif
First I have heard of it.
Did they continue to decypher the naval code
through 1945?

BAMS was a Civilian merchant naval shore to ship broadcast.
Perhaps the civilians were not as careful.

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
They also opened russian codes... one murmansk convoy was destroyed beacuse of that ..well

Sergio_101
10-08-2006, 08:53 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by fighter_966:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
Ok, BAMS got broken. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/touche.gif
First I have heard of it.
Did they continue to decypher the naval code
through 1945?

BAMS was a Civilian merchant naval shore to ship broadcast.
Perhaps the civilians were not as careful.

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
They also opened russian codes... one murmansk convoy was destroyed beacuse of that ..well </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I got a uncle that was sunk three times on the Murmansk run.
We think that may be some sort of a record for survival.

Yes you Ruskies, I got two family members that
delivered goods to Murmansk. Damn near got killed doing it. One was my father.

Sergio

darkhorizon11
10-08-2006, 10:21 PM
Shame on me look at what I started...

I still wonder though if any of those sneaky German spies did get away...

La7_brook
10-09-2006, 12:55 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LStarosta:
I love it how everyone gives the Germans a rim job even though they lost the war. Twice. </div></BLOCKQUOTE> if your thinking the germans got there *** kicked well u better read books on both sides , it was call a world war which means that it was as hard as wars get in air ,land and sea and code breaking game / breaking the BAMS codes in 1940 just about broke the brits ,meaning no D day , Enigma was not till 1943? but helped win the u boat war and then came D DAY of cause

Kurfurst__
10-09-2006, 01:19 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
I know of NO German success with American or
British codes.

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

"And now I go fish". - FDR.

Look it up.

PS: It appears Waldo has loads of more free time for this than I do, but that's what discussion boards are for - I'll get back to the subject.

Waldo.Pepper
10-09-2006, 02:21 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">I'll get back to the subject. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

And I'll be waiting for you when you can spare the time.



Are you sure you can't spare just a few moments to come up with a source for the Navy attack on Operation Tiger? (I mean after all the time you have already devoted to this.)

Thank you for the time you have been able to devote to this thread. I have enjoyed myself immensely.

Kurfurst__
10-09-2006, 02:59 AM
Hi, just a quickie. The reference to german intel influence on the E-boot attack I have read years ago in the "Top Gun" monthly flight magazine - it's basically something like the local version of 'Aeroplane' with some of the best hungarian military authors and some vets also publicising there. There was a reference about that intel found out in an article on Operation Tiger.

Looking at the general descriptions of the event, they note radio traffic as a probably cause of attracting the Schnellboots, but I doubt such small ships had serious radio equipment onboard for DF. Anyway, radio signals seem strange for a highly secret operation like this with BIGOTs onboard, I'd presume they'd held strictest radio silence. And B-Dienst was regularly decyphering naval/merchant codes through the war anyway.

La7_brook
10-09-2006, 03:16 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
Hi, just a quickie. The reference to german intel influence on the E-boot attack I have read years ago in the "Top Gun" monthly flight magazine - it's basically something like the local version of 'Aeroplane' with some of the best hungarian military authors and some vets also publicising there. There was a reference about that intel found out in an article on Operation Tiger.

Looking at the general descriptions of the event, they note radio traffic as a probably cause of attracting the Schnellboots, but I doubt such small ships had serious radio equipment onboard for DF. Anyway, radio signals seem strange for a highly secret operation like this with BIGOTs onboard, I'd presume they'd held strictest radio silence. And B-Dienst was regularly decyphering naval/merchant codes through the war anyway. </div></BLOCKQUOTE> germans had picked up the american radio traffic of the convoy in the english channel and launched an attack by E boats from home port of cherbourg, there was a cover- up by the americans

luftluuver
10-09-2006, 03:51 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:

I'll get back to the subject. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>Sure you will. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/clap.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/clap.gif And now, the exit stage left.

The Germans shore based listening stations noted a larger amount of radio traffic than normal and E-boats were sent to invesitgate.

Waldo.Pepper
10-09-2006, 05:57 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by La7_brook:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LStarosta:
I love it how everyone gives the Germans a rim job even though they lost the war. Twice. </div></BLOCKQUOTE> if your thinking the germans got there *** kicked well u better read books on both sides , it was call a world war which means that it was as hard as wars get in air ,land and sea and code breaking game / breaking the BAMS codes in 1940 just about broke the brits ,meaning no D day , Enigma was not till 1943? but helped win the u boat war and then came D DAY of cause </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I would like to comment on Enigma first, then the comment that Britain was just about beaten in 1940.

British began to read Enigma in 1940. From the Secret War by Brian Johnson.

"The first decodes at Bletchley were made, according to Welchman, in April 1940 during the Norwegian campaign. From that time the quality and number of intercepts rose steeply until, by the Battle of France in early May, the codebreakers in Hut 6 were reading a significant proportion of the Enigma traffic. It should, however, be emphasised that by no means all the signals were broken: some were only partially solved, others not at all. Certain keys took longer to recover, so a system of priority was used: the traffic which, from its origin as revealed by direction-finding and the call signs used, was considered to be the most important was dealt with first, and usually colour-coded red."

Furthermore it may surprise you to learn that the British were by no means the first to break the Enigma machine. That achievement goes to the Polish BS4 Service.

"To enable the cryptanalysts of BS4 to recover the Enigma ciphers, the Poles built an electro-mechanical device which Rozycki named a 'bomba' (after the ice-cream). This machine ran through all the possible settings of the three drums until settings were found which deciphered the message on the Polish-built copies of Enigma. No Polish bombas have survived, but in 1976 Rejewski made a sketch of one from memory for 'The Secret War' television programme. Precisely how they worked is not altogether clear, but they produced results, though they had certain drawbacks. In the first place, they were expensive to construct, and one bomba was required for each rotor setting; because of the reflection through the rotors, six bombas were needed for a given Enigma key. Secondly, they did not perform the entire operation: there was a complementary aid known as 'the light table'. This was, as the name implies, an illuminated table on which large perforated sheets of card were placed, one on top of another; they were then manipulated in a certain way until holes appeared where registration occurred, which represented possible drum settings.

Aided by a highly efficient radio interception service, the German Army and Air Force Enigma ciphers were being 'read' on a day-to-day basis. One intercept - from the Air Ministry in Berlin - was classic:

'To all airfields; bring in Ernst Rohm:
Dead or Alive.'

It was 30 June 1934, now known as 'The Night of the Long Knives', when Hitler ruthlessly disposed of former colleagues who might challenge him.

The Polish cryptanalysts of BS4 were able to improve their techniques, reaching a peak in the first six months of 1938 as German military traffic increased almost daily. However, their remarkable achievements came to an end on 15 December 1938: that was the day on which the Germans issued each Enigma machine with two additional rotors, so that the three operational rotors were now selected from five. Since each rotor setting required a bomba, the additional rotors increased the number of bombas needed by a factor of ten - from 6 to 60 - and of course the highly-trained staff to operate them. The Poles of BS4 simply did not have the time or the resources available from their peacetime budget. The Enigma traffic was once more secure."

Now commenting on the Brits almost being broken. I think not, not for any technical reason but for relative military power between the Allies and Axis. Simply stated; Germany could not win WW2 under almost any circumstances imaginable.


From Journal of Strategic Studies volume 8 Number 1. Alan J. Levine in his article: Was World War 2 a Near-Run Thing.

I quote his introduction and his summation.

"Yet despite - or perhaps because of-the enormous wealth of books and articles on the subject, a large number of popular misconceptions remain, many of them holdovers from the war years.

Perhaps one of the more remarkable of these misconceptions is the notion that the Nazis came very close to winning the war. One of the curious aspects of this belief is that it seems to be far more prevalent in the former Allied countries than in Germany. It is strange that the heirs of what would, on the face of things, seem to have been an enormously superior victorious coalition feel compelled to 'scare themselves' by reflecting on how close they came to disaster. At least, that is true in the West. The Soviets, by contrast, as exponents of a deterministic ideology, seem to regard an Allied and Soviet victory as inevitable. For once, perhaps, the Soviets' views may be somewhat closer to the truth than the view popular in the Western democracies. Ironically, their complacency may well be wrong as far as the Soviet Union itself is concerned, for the Nazis may well have come very close to defeating the USSR.

But as far as the war as a whole is concerned, the Soviets are right: the chances of a complete Nazi triumph were certainly extremely small, and probably non-existent. Even in 1940, Nazi Germany had inserted itself in a cul-de-sac. It may be impossible to prove a negative -that Germany could never have won the war - and it would certainly be wrong to be dogmatic on this speculative subject. If, however, this article is provocative of investigation and discussion, it will serve a useful purpose."

His summation...

"In short, the only victories Germany might reasonably have hoped to achieve would not have vitally affected the outcome of the war. In most respects Germany was not strong enough to affect, nor within range of, the vital spots of the major Allied powers. The Nazis had failed to prepare for the war intelligently enough, and capped this by not mobilizing properly for war until 1942. All German successes were tied to one form of warfare, the blitzkrieg. When the Nazis embarked on war with enemies who were geographically immune to it, or had the space and resources to survive the initial blows, the results were inevitably disastrous for them."

If anyone wants the whole article let me know and I shall make arrangements.

My view is similar to Levine's, expecially when you consider the following map illustrating the odds stacked against the Axis powers.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v516/WaldoPepper/stratec%20atlas/Strategicatlas.jpg

I can however, think of a way for Germany to have won. And that is only if Allied leaders lost their nerve and allowed Hitler to win. Stalin was close to sueing for peace, it is said. If USSR had capitulated in say 1941, I think that this would have let to a rather lengthy period of stalemate between the Axis and the remaining Allies (chiefly the UK/USA Governments.) But who knows.

Waldo.Pepper
10-09-2006, 06:04 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
Hi, just a quickie. The reference to german intel influence on the E-boot attack I have read years ago in the "Top Gun" monthly flight magazine - it's basically something like the local version of 'Aeroplane' with some of the best hungarian military authors and some vets also publicising there. There was a reference about that intel found out in an article on Operation Tiger.

Looking at the general descriptions of the event, they note radio traffic as a probably cause of attracting the Schnellboots, but I doubt such small ships had serious radio equipment onboard for DF. Anyway, radio signals seem strange for a highly secret operation like this with BIGOTs onboard, I'd presume they'd held strictest radio silence. And B-Dienst was regularly decyphering naval/merchant codes through the war anyway. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thank you for taking the time to answer.

I can contribute some information on the event as well.

The information I have been able to find is confusing, perhaps even contradictory.

One source states that the German E boats were not on a random patrol, but neither was their intended target the flotilla of Exercise Tiger. They were sent out to attack a specific convoy off Portland Bill. Instead they intercepted exercise Tiger en route from Plymouth to Slapton Sands.

Exercise Tiger was not observing radio silence. The ships of Tiger had Radar which they used to detect the approaching German boats. That alone proves that they were not maintaining radio silence. Radar emissions are radio broadcasts.

However, in S-Boote,German E-Boats in Action 1939-1945
Dallies-Labourdette,Jean-Philippe. He writes:

In the afternoon of April 27, a Luflwaffe reconnaissance flight warned the S-Boote headquarters about a group of seven ships proceeding slowly west of Start Point 5O degrees North 4 degrees West. The 5th and 9th S-Boote flotillas were immediately put on alert and left Cherbourg at 22: 00. At first the Germans were unable to find the convoy, but came practically nose-to nose with 8 American LST's.


Here is what could have happened. Spotted by German planes the E-boats were directed to attack the original merchant convoy. They sortie to the general area, but do not find it. Instead they are painted by the radars of Exercise Tiger. The E-boats were often equipped with some very sophisticated electronics on them. Including, Metox, Hohentweil, and Naxos. All these devices were Radar detectors, each a slight improvement on the previous generation, which could indicate enemy radars at a range of 2000 meters (approx). The equipment gave no bearing information. However, I do also have a picture of an E-Boat mounting a radio DF loop.

The Tiger flotilla did receive radio warning of the presence of several E-boats in her navigation zone, but decided to continue with he excercise anyway. At 1: 30 a.m. LST 507 detected echos on her radar indicating that several small boats were rapidly approaching to the north of the convoy.

So I can imagine that the E-boats either did use their own on board DF antenna to find the Tiger flotilla or relied on their Radar detectors to spread out to 2000 meters abreast and sweep for the Tiger ships.

Bewolf
10-09-2006, 06:07 AM
Stalin "did" sue for piece. Twice in 1941, even granting Hitler a lot of the initial Barbarossa goals.

Hitler declined.

Waldo.Pepper
10-09-2006, 06:08 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:
Stalin "did" sue for piece. Twice in 1941, even granting Hitler a lot of the initial Barbarossa goals.

Hitler declined. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes I've heard that. If true that's amazing that once again HItler squandered such an opportunity to knock the USSR out of the war. I think I remeber reading that Hitler declined because he was interested in complete destruction of the Soviet state. I believe that Stalin was not agreeing to unconditional surrender. Which would have left a Russian state of some form.

Bewolf
10-09-2006, 06:14 AM
spot on.

Sergio_101
10-09-2006, 06:57 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:
spot on. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The scenario becomes,

Stalin surrenders land in a truce package.
Germany and the AXIS become strong enough to last through 1945.
Germany first policy favors the first atomic bomb to be dropped on Germany.
10,000 Allied bombers and 25,000 Allied fighters decend like a fog on Germany.
Germany and Japan capitulate after the atomic bombing of Dresden.
Stalin gets overthrown as weak in a pustch after Germany surrenders.

Sergio

BBB_Hyperion
10-09-2006, 09:43 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:
spot on. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The scenario becomes,

Stalin surrenders land in a truce package.
Germany and the AXIS become strong enough to last through 1945.
Germany first policy favors the first atomic bomb to be dropped on Germany.
10,000 Allied bombers and 25,000 Allied fighters decend like a fog on Germany.
Germany and Japan capitulate after the atomic bombing of Dresden.
Stalin gets overthrown as weak in a pustch after Germany surrenders.

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well of course there would be much more casualties on both sides. Capitulation i doubt as long there was a possible way to do something on similar scale to the other side. Like for example arming medium range rockets with serin gas as there many more possibilites . There were many materials with mass destruction ability that were much more available than atomic bombs where production material was short and took a massive amount of time to produce. That is a reason for the cold war as well fear of wmd to keep the balance. Japan and UK worked on biological weapons not to think about when such things would have been used on large scale. So figure yourself how much would have been left of the world once it was started ? Moral of ww2 is a twisted thing supporting 1 dictator to get another down is a little questionable. The choice of ww2 was stalin or hitler in europe obviously 2 bad choices.

La7_brook
10-09-2006, 11:49 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Waldo.Pepper:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by La7_brook:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LStarosta:
I love it how everyone gives the Germans a rim job even though they lost the war. Twice. </div></BLOCKQUOTE> if your thinking the germans got there *** kicked well u better read books on both sides , it was call a world war which means that it was as hard as wars get in air ,land and sea and code breaking game / breaking the BAMS codes in 1940 just about broke the brits ,meaning no D day , Enigma was not till 1943? but helped win the u boat war and then came D DAY of cause </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I would like to comment on Enigma first, then the comment that Britain was just about beaten in 1940.

British began to read Enigma in 1940. From the Secret War by Brian Johnson.

"The first decodes at Bletchley were made, according to Welchman, in April 1940 during the Norwegian campaign. From that time the quality and number of intercepts rose steeply until, by the Battle of France in early May, the codebreakers in Hut 6 were reading a significant proportion of the Enigma traffic. It should, however, be emphasised that by no means all the signals were broken: some were only partially solved, others not at all. Certain keys took longer to recover, so a system of priority was used: the traffic which, from its origin as revealed by direction-finding and the call signs used, was considered to be the most important was dealt with first, and usually colour-coded red."

Furthermore it may surprise you to learn that the British were by no means the first to break the Enigma machine. That achievement goes to the Polish BS4 Service.

"To enable the cryptanalysts of BS4 to recover the Enigma ciphers, the Poles built an electro-mechanical device which Rozycki named a 'bomba' (after the ice-cream). This machine ran through all the possible settings of the three drums until settings were found which deciphered the message on the Polish-built copies of Enigma. No Polish bombas have survived, but in 1976 Rejewski made a sketch of one from memory for 'The Secret War' television programme. Precisely how they worked is not altogether clear, but they produced results, though they had certain drawbacks. In the first place, they were expensive to construct, and one bomba was required for each rotor setting; because of the reflection through the rotors, six bombas were needed for a given Enigma key. Secondly, they did not perform the entire operation: there was a complementary aid known as 'the light table'. This was, as the name implies, an illuminated table on which large perforated sheets of card were placed, one on top of another; they were then manipulated in a certain way until holes appeared where registration occurred, which represented possible drum settings.

Aided by a highly efficient radio interception service, the German Army and Air Force Enigma ciphers were being 'read' on a day-to-day basis. One intercept - from the Air Ministry in Berlin - was classic:

'To all airfields; bring in Ernst Rohm:
Dead or Alive.'

It was 30 June 1934, now known as 'The Night of the Long Knives', when Hitler ruthlessly disposed of former colleagues who might challenge him.

The Polish cryptanalysts of BS4 were able to improve their techniques, reaching a peak in the first six months of 1938 as German military traffic increased almost daily. However, their remarkable achievements came to an end on 15 December 1938: that was the day on which the Germans issued each Enigma machine with two additional rotors, so that the three operational rotors were now selected from five. Since each rotor setting required a bomba, the additional rotors increased the number of bombas needed by a factor of ten - from 6 to 60 - and of course the highly-trained staff to operate them. The Poles of BS4 simply did not have the time or the resources available from their peacetime budget. The Enigma traffic was once more secure."

Now commenting on the Brits almost being broken. I think not, not for any technical reason but for relative military power between the Allies and Axis. Simply stated; Germany could not win WW2 under almost any circumstances imaginable.


From Journal of Strategic Studies volume 8 Number 1. Alan J. Levine in his article: Was World War 2 a Near-Run Thing.

I quote his introduction and his summation.

"Yet despite - or perhaps because of-the enormous wealth of books and articles on the subject, a large number of popular misconceptions remain, many of them holdovers from the war years.

Perhaps one of the more remarkable of these misconceptions is the notion that the Nazis came very close to winning the war. One of the curious aspects of this belief is that it seems to be far more prevalent in the former Allied countries than in Germany. It is strange that the heirs of what would, on the face of things, seem to have been an enormously superior victorious coalition feel compelled to 'scare themselves' by reflecting on how close they came to disaster. At least, that is true in the West. The Soviets, by contrast, as exponents of a deterministic ideology, seem to regard an Allied and Soviet victory as inevitable. For once, perhaps, the Soviets' views may be somewhat closer to the truth than the view popular in the Western democracies. Ironically, their complacency may well be wrong as far as the Soviet Union itself is concerned, for the Nazis may well have come very close to defeating the USSR.

But as far as the war as a whole is concerned, the Soviets are right: the chances of a complete Nazi triumph were certainly extremely small, and probably non-existent. Even in 1940, Nazi Germany had inserted itself in a cul-de-sac. It may be impossible to prove a negative -that Germany could never have won the war - and it would certainly be wrong to be dogmatic on this speculative subject. If, however, this article is provocative of investigation and discussion, it will serve a useful purpose."

His summation...

"In short, the only victories Germany might reasonably have hoped to achieve would not have vitally affected the outcome of the war. In most respects Germany was not strong enough to affect, nor within range of, the vital spots of the major Allied powers. The Nazis had failed to prepare for the war intelligently enough, and capped this by not mobilizing properly for war until 1942. All German successes were tied to one form of warfare, the blitzkrieg. When the Nazis embarked on war with enemies who were geographically immune to it, or had the space and resources to survive the initial blows, the results were inevitably disastrous for them."

If anyone wants the whole article let me know and I shall make arrangements.

My view is similar to Levine's, expecially when you consider the following map illustrating the odds stacked against the Axis powers.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v516/WaldoPepper/stratec%20atlas/Strategicatlas.jpg

I can however, think of a way for Germany to have won. And that is only if Allied leaders lost their nerve and allowed Hitler to win. Stalin was close to sueing for peace, it is said. If USSR had capitulated in say 1941, I think that this would have let to a rather lengthy period of stalemate between the Axis and the remaining Allies (chiefly the UK/USA Governments.) But who knows. </div></BLOCKQUOTE> ya we all know that ,but they qwere not reading Enigma till 43 , and have u not heard of the u boat war ?

Waldo.Pepper
10-09-2006, 02:20 PM
@ La7_brook

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
ya we all know that ,but they qwere not reading Enigma till 43 </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

"From that time the quality and number of intercepts rose steeply until, by the Battle of France in early May, the codebreakers in Hut 6 were reading a significant proportion of the Enigma traffic."

This 'May' is the month of May in 1940.

What do you think of this with reference to your 1943 comment?

Bewolf
10-09-2006, 02:33 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by BBB_Hyperion:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:
spot on. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The scenario becomes,

Stalin surrenders land in a truce package.
Germany and the AXIS become strong enough to last through 1945.
Germany first policy favors the first atomic bomb to be dropped on Germany.
10,000 Allied bombers and 25,000 Allied fighters decend like a fog on Germany.
Germany and Japan capitulate after the atomic bombing of Dresden.
Stalin gets overthrown as weak in a pustch after Germany surrenders.

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well of course there would be much more casualties on both sides. Capitulation i doubt as long there was a possible way to do something on similar scale to the other side. Like for example arming medium range rockets with serin gas as there many more possibilites . There were many materials with mass destruction ability that were much more available than atomic bombs where production material was short and took a massive amount of time to produce. That is a reason for the cold war as well fear of wmd to keep the balance. Japan and UK worked on biological weapons not to think about when such things would have been used on large scale. So figure yourself how much would have been left of the world once it was started ? Moral of ww2 is a twisted thing supporting 1 dictator to get another down is a little questionable. The choice of ww2 was stalin or hitler in europe obviously 2 bad choices. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

That on the one hand. Both Germany and Britain had huge stockpiles of chemical weapons. Especially the germans at that. And unlike Japan Germany had means to reach the british homeland till the very end.

Added, most of the german army was busy in the east. No war with Stalin from 1941 with huge land gains in Russia = a lot more ressources both in Industry and natural ressources, also Rommel getting way more troops in Africa = Egypt Campaign most probably successful = England in huge troubles due to a much worsened supply situation. One could also argue about new invasion plans, though those are more unlikely. But England would have been in a far worse situation anyways.

But then again, this all is highly speculative and I also doubt Stalin would have waited long before he attacked again to get his territories back. In 43 or 44 maybe. All a not very productive "what if" thinking.

Waldo.Pepper
10-09-2006, 03:18 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">and have u not heard of the u boat war ? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

From the same article by Levine cited already.

"In March 1943, the supreme crisis of the Atlantic battle appeared to develop. In several convoy battles in the first three weeks of the month, the Allies suffered extremely heavy losses, provoking the fears noted by Roskill. Shortly afterwards, however, the situation was dramatically reversed. In April-May 1943, the Allied losses dropped, while a massacre of U boats occurred in the battles around the convoys. Shortly afterwards, Donitz actually had to withdraw the U-boats from the Atlantic for a time. The Allies had won the Battle of the Atlantic. A number of measures were responsible for the victory. Most important, perhaps, was the closing of the air gap and the provision of air cover for all threatened convoys by the allotment of escort carriers and very long-range land-based planes. New support groups of teams of escort vessels trained to work together were available to rein force the escorts of convoys under attack. (The allotment of escort carrier and support groups would have occurred earlier but for the North African operation.) The U-boat code, 'Triton', was cracked by the British in December 1942 though arguably this simply countered the Germans' own cryptographic efforts.

New equipment for escort vessels became available notably ten-centimeter microwave radars, high-speed high-frequency direction finders, improved depth charges and 'ahead-throw' weapons.
The nature of the crisis of March 1943, however, has often been misunderstood. The losses suffered in 1942-43, though serious, did not threaten Britain with starvation and immediate defeat. There was more than enough shipping to sustain the British people and war production. Rather, what was in danger was the collection of enough shipping to sustain future offensives Actually, sinkings of Allied merchant ships by all enemy causes during 1942 only slightly exceeded the total of Allied merchant ship construction for that year. The curve of construction actually passed that of U-boat sinkings alone in 1942. (Thus, the situation in the Atlantic even at its worst was not truly comparable to the situation in the Pacific, where American submarine caused a continual shrinkage of the Japanese shipping pool almost through out the war.)"

luftluuver
10-09-2006, 03:29 PM
***********
1939:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Sep39 48/178,621
Oct39 33/156,156
Nov39 27/72,721
Dec39 39/101,823
Tot39 147 (36.75/month)/509,321 (127,330.25/month)

British merchant ship construction capacity from 1939-1941 did not exceed 1.2 million GRT per year.
US merchant ship construction in 1939 was 0.242 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Aug39 19/2
Sep39 3/0
Oct39 13/3
Nov39 10/1/1
Dec39 5/1/1
Tot39 50/7/2 (an average of 10 patrols per month and 14% lost)

Thus for 1939, an average of 2.94 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 21 ships sunk (note that throughout these averages will be slightly inflated since they do not include the minor contribution of the Italian submarine fleet.)

1940:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan40 53/163,029
Feb40 50/182,369
Mar40 26/69,826
Apr40 6/30,927
May40 14/61,635
Jun40 66/375,069
Jul40 41/301,975
Aug40 56/288,180
Sep40 60/288,180
Oct40 66/363,267
Nov40 36/181,695
Dec40 46/256,310
Tot40 520 (43.33/month)/2,462,867 (205,238.91/month)
US merchant ship construction for 1940 was about 0.5 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan40 8/2
Feb40 10/3
Mar40 10/2
Apr40 19/3
May40 8/0/2
Jun40 18/3/1
Jul40 4/0
Aug40 16/2/1
Sep40 12/0
Oct40 13/2
Nov40 14/1
Dec40 6/0
Tot40 138/18/3 (an average of 11.5 patrols per month and 13% lost)

Thus for 1940, an average of 3.77 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 28.89 ships sunk.

1941:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan41 23/129,711
Feb41 47/254,118
Mar41 41/236,549
Apr41 41/239,719
May41 63/362,268
Jun41 66/325,817
Jul41 26/112,624
Aug41 27/85,603
Sep41 57/212,237
Oct41 28/170,786
Nov41 15/76,056
Dec41 23/93,226
Tot41 457 (38.08/month)/2,298,714 (191,559.5/month)
US merchant ship construction 1941 0.804 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan41 10/0
Feb41 18/3/2
Mar41 15/3/3
Apr41 14/2/2
May41 21/0/2
Jun41 22/2/3
Jul41 24/1/9
Aug41 42/5/9
Sep41 38/0/2
Oct41 37/0/6
Nov 41 27/5/5
Dec41 49/4/6
Tot 41 287/25/49 (an average of 23.9 patrols sailing per month and 8.7% lost)

Thus for 1941, an average of 1.59 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 18.28 ships sunk.

1942:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan42 56/310,224
Feb42 72/429,255
Mar42 93/507,514
Apr42 81/418,161
May42 129/616,835
Jun42 136/636,926
Jul42 96/467,051
Aug42 117/587,245
Sep42 96/461,794
Oct42 89/583,690
Nov42 126/802,160
Dec42 64/337,618
Tot42 1,155 (96.25/month)/6,158,473 (513,206.08/month)
British and Canadian merchant ship construction 1942 1.8 million GRT
US merchant ship construction 1942 5.433 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan42 50/2/5
Feb42 29/3/2
Mar42 32/2
Apr42 37/2/2
May42 23/3
Jun42 39/9/5
Jul42 45/7/3
Aug42 58/10/4
Sep42 52/8/8
Oct42 62/6/10
Nov42 54/8/6
Dec42 59/8/7
Tot42 540/68/57 (an average of 45 patrols sailing per month and 12.6% lost)

Thus for 1942, an average of 2.14 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 16.99 ships sunk.

1943:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan43 44/307,196
Feb43 67/362,081
Mar43 110/633,731
Apr43 50/287,137
May43 46/237,182
Jun43 17/76,090
Jul43 46/237,777
Aug43 20/92,443
Sep43 16/98,852
Oct43 20/91,295
Nov43 9/30,726
Dec43 8/55,794
Tot43 452 (37.67/month)/2,510,304 (209,192/month)
US merchant ship construction 1943 13.081 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan43 61/13/11
Feb43 72/8/9
Mar43 59/16/10
Apr43 95/35/18
May43 55/23/9
Jun43 46/23/9
Jul43 39/27/7 (49 total patrols of all types)
Aug43 33/12/6
Sep43 32/11/10
Oct43 62/23/9
Nov43 36/9/4
Dec43 31/10/2
Tot43 621/210/104 (an average of 51.75 patrols sailing per month and 33.8% lost)

Thus for 1943, an average of 0.73 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 2.15 ships sunk.

So, overall, the most successful year for the U-Boats was 1940, before the expansion of the force allowed for an increase of more than about a dozen patrols sailing per month, and well prior to the entry of the US and its shipbuilding capacity into the war. Worse, the performance of the U-Boat force in 1941 and 1942 never exceeded its performance in the first months of the war. And, after 1943 the U-Boat campaign became ever less relevent to the outcome of the war.

Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Tot44 125/663,308
Tot45 63/284,476

US merchant ship construction for 1944 was 12.257 million GRT
US merchant ship construction for 1945 (through 1 May) was 3.548 million GRT

U-Boat Fleet to 1Sep42
On 19Aug39 there were 57 U-Boats in commission, 20 sea-going U-Boats and 18 €˜ducks€ were fully ready to put to sea
Total number U-Boats deployed to 1Sep42 275
Total number lost 94
Total number retired 10
Total number available 171

U-Boat Fleet 1Sep42 to 1May45
Total number deployed 1Sep42 to 1May45 531
Total number lost 1Sep42 to 1May45 568

British controlled merchant shipping over 1,600 GRT (number/in thousands of gross tons)
3Sep39 2,999/17,784
30Sep40 3,75721,373
30Sep41 3,608/20,552
31Dec41 3,616/20,693

Thus, despite the €˜success€ of the U-Boat force in 1940 (relative to its performance in 1941 and 1942) it had no appreciable effect in reducing the size of the British merchant fleet.

Numbers of ships arriving and losses in North Atlantic convoys inbound to Britain (ships arriving/losses)
1939 700/5 (7.1%)
1940 5,434/133 ((2.5%)
1941 5,923/153 (2.6%)
1942 4,798/80 (1.7%)
1943 5,667/87 (1.5%)
1944 7,410/8 (0.1%)

The operational U-Boat force from 1943-1945 never approached a "steady 400-500 boat[s]." Rather, during 1942 the peak strength of boats assigned to combat flotillas (including those under repair for combat-damage and breakdowns, but excluding those assigned to school flotillas, experimental projects, or otherwise retired from combat) was 202, during November. The low in 1942 was 89 in January. The average monthly strength during 1942 was 143.83. The strength of the force peaked in May 1943 at 237. It had declined to a low of 159 by November. Average monthly strength during 1943 was 197.58. The peak strength during 1944 was 168 in February, the low was 146 in November. Average monthly strength in 1944 was 157.83. The peak strength in 1945 was April with 165, the low was May with 134, prior to the surrender.

At that, these were much better than 1939 (average of 19.5 monthly), 1940 (average of 18.75 monthly) and 1941 (average of 47.5 monthly). OTOH, the 'bang for their buck' was probably highest in 1940, which was also arguably the U-Boats most 'successful' year in terms of ships sunk per patrol and U-Boats lost per ship sunk

Giganoni
10-09-2006, 03:45 PM
Oh! Oh! I wanna throw in my two cents of biased cherrypicking of sources too! I'm just too lazy to figure them out. I will say that it does not surprise me that as the Allies began to turn the tide, their intelligence got better and better, while the Axis became less and less succesful. That, to me, just seems to be the nature of attritional warfare.

Of course I think it is healthy to be skeptic of events that all sides portrayed, even the Allied version. Maybe in the early years of the war one could make the case that "England did this" or "Germany did that" when it comes to intelligence, but after a certain point in the war I think(and all our posts are simply opinion) it is pointless to defend Axis intelligence or tout Allied intelligence.

As to Germany winning the war, well... I was surprised to learn just how long Germany waited to fully mobilize the country on a war footing (mid-late 42)and how, when on such a footing multiplied production of weapons (even with the allied bombing campaign) to levels that make me shudder to think at the loss of life (on all sides) had they started in 39. That being said, when people think of Germany, the panzers, the blitzkrieg, they often fail to realize that much of it was still a horse pulled army (like many armies of WW2 in my opinion).

Waldo.Pepper
10-09-2006, 04:31 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">attritional warfare. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Attrition warfare indeed! Despite all the successes and failures of each side this is to me sadly what the war boils down to: attrition AGAIN! Sad for all of those who were killed, and all of the leaders who believe that they made a dramatic difference.

Great posts luftlover and Giganomi (well I think so anyway).

Philipscdrw
10-09-2006, 05:43 PM
Never mind German intelligence, what about Soviet intelligence?

They had a spy in Bletchey Park, feeding raw Enigma decrypts straight to Moscow. On occasion, the UK would decide to send Enigma information to Russia, but would go to a lot of effort to disguise the fact that the Enigma is the source. Moscow would politely and silently take the disguised report, then chuck it in the waste-paper bin and go back to reading the original report straight from Bletchey...

darkhorizon11
10-09-2006, 07:38 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Philipscdrw:
Never mind German intelligence, what about Soviet intelligence?

They had a spy in Bletchey Park, feeding raw Enigma decrypts straight to Moscow. On occasion, the UK would decide to send Enigma information to Russia, but would go to a lot of effort to disguise the fact that the Enigma is the source. Moscow would politely and silently take the disguised report, then chuck it in the waste-paper bin and go back to reading the original report straight from Bletchey... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thats interesting, you got a link for that?

Waldo.Pepper
10-09-2006, 09:56 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by darkhorizon11:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Philipscdrw:
Never mind German intelligence, what about Soviet intelligence?

They had a spy in Bletchey Park, feeding raw Enigma decrypts straight to Moscow. On occasion, the UK would decide to send Enigma information to Russia, but would go to a lot of effort to disguise the fact that the Enigma is the source. Moscow would politely and silently take the disguised report, then chuck it in the waste-paper bin and go back to reading the original report straight from Bletchey... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thats interesting, you got a link for that? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

If I may..

Since the Germans had no knowledge of Bletchley Park operation there were no German spies involved but it was infiltrated by Soviet spies. One of them was John Cairncross who worked in Hut 3 for about a year. He maintained his apartment in London and travelled there for weekends. In London, he passed a selection of decrypts about the Russian front to his Soviet handler. Though the British supplied that information to the Soviets, John Cairncross compromised the Enigma secret. The second Soviet spy is only known by the code name of "Baron". His presence at Bletchley Park was known before 1942 from decrypts of Soviet messages from London to Moscow. The third spy was W. Weisband who worked as a Russian language specialist at Arlington Hall.

from here = http://www.avoca.ndirect.co.uk/enigma/enigmac.htm

La7_brook
10-09-2006, 10:21 PM
my point is u-boats and breaking the BAMS codes had England under the knife ,till Allies played catch with the navy intelligence

Giganoni
10-09-2006, 10:44 PM
Hmm, I don't know how we got to the U-boat War, interesting. I like Silent Hunter III, but I don't pretend to know the specifics of the U-boat Campaign. I have a book, not a great one, called The Submarine by Thomas Parrish. He states that Donitz believed he could win if he could sink 700,000 tons a month, the British believed they could not sustain losses of 600,000 tons a month (Don't know where he got these figures, like I said, not a great book). Still, looking at Lufts data, the Germans came close to it. I believe this data, however, was for 1940 or after "The Happy Times". It all goes back to attrition.

Had Donitz had the number of U-boats he had in 42 back in 1940, well he could have easily brought chaos to Britian (according to the Parrish Data). Of course, he did not because they didn't crank out the U-boats fast enough (and not fully mobilized for war too, Germany I mean).

Anyway, back to intelligence. Now I remember watching something, probably on the dreaded "History" Channel about a German interrogator who sorda "killed" people with kindness? Seems like a good individual then that would fall under German intelligence success (assuming it is not completely overblown.)

AndyHigh
10-10-2006, 03:04 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
I know of NO German success with American or
British codes. the Japanese also had very
little success.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don't know about much about German success, but atleast Finnish radio intelligence was able to read diplomatic messages of eight countries by 1944. Not all of them, but certain systems. Most important was thought to be U.S. diplomatic code used by its embassies. This information was propably not given to the Germans, as U.S. paid money in exchange as soon as they were informed in august '44 that their code was being cracked in Finland.

Soviet Union was different matter, and many of its military codes (like 2N, 3N, 4N and also 5N) were being read with variable success through the war (starting from Winter War 1939-40). This material was also often exchanced between countries fighting on axis side. I'll not go into detail in this. However one example worth mentioning was the case of convoys PQ18 and QP14 in Arctic Ocean september 1942. The order for their escort by soviet air force was coded only with two-digit method. This order was received by two finnish radio stations and it was opened immediately. The information was passed to germans who then attacked the convoy which lost 1/3 of its ships.

Low_Flyer_MkVb
10-10-2006, 05:01 AM
Well, I kneel humbled at Kurfy's feet. Having studied the build up to D-Day 6/6 1944 for over twenty years and having been professionally involved with various veterans organisations, interviewing said veterans and escorting wreath-laying ceremonies over the wrecks from Exercise Tiger, I thought I knew more than the average punter here. If you had only said in the first place Kurfy that you read some article in a magazine years ago and you doubt that such ships had serious radio equipment on board. Fantastic research and presentation.

I note that you're pushed for time Kurfy (not too pushed to stop you posting yet another piece of anti-Spitfire rhetoric in the F4U Corsair thread though, eh?) - so I'll give you a little present, just a few links to point your well-respected, mighty and unbiased historian's brain in the right direction. There are of course, contradictions - just as there are points agreed on. There is even a mention of the attack being due to a Lutwaffe recconaissance sortie. If you're too busy to read the links Kurfy, perhaps they might be of passing interest to others who are not so pressed for time or who would simply like to know more about these events and to make their own minds up, free from those who would pervert the truth to their own ends. It's interesting how the cover up story took a hold when the casualties were publicised so soon after the event...

I've just taken a quick look out of the window. Lyme Bay looks cold and grey today, very poor visibilty. I hope the weather's nicer where you are.

http://www.slapton.org/indextiger.htm

http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq20-1.htm

http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq20-2.htm

http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/historyweek/22-28apr.htm

http://www.divernet.com/news/stories/lst270404.shtml

http://www.mikekemble.com/ww2/tiger1.html

http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/d-day/tiger.htm

(There are, of course, links within links, many of which might lead you back to a site already visited, but that's life in the research trade, I'm afraid - so sorry to take so much of your valuable time)

stanford-ukded
10-10-2006, 06:39 AM
Wow, I don't think I've ever seen Kurfust get owned this bad.

Fantastic thread though, really interesting. Special tip of the cap to Waldo's contributions.

Kurfurst__
10-10-2006, 06:41 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkVb:
Well, I kneel humbled at Kurfy's feet. Having studied the build up to D-Day 6/6 1944 for over twenty years and having been professionally involved with various veterans organisations, interviewing said veterans and escorting wreath-laying ceremonies over the wrecks from Exercise Tiger, I thought I knew more than the average punter here. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

So you are a bartender? http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif

Nowadays we have so many professional researchers around, ranging from 13-year olds to bored office rats, all graduated at Google Universities. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif Why not you, too. Welcome onboard.

Care to list a few titles of your publications, after all you've been 'professionally studied DDay in the last 20 years', so I guess you wrote some at least.. as I would guess, you Sir have tons of information on that, I don't even dare to imagine what twenty friggin' years worth of research would turn up compared to this 5-min worth google search you showed here (of which I'll read of course, and thank you for posting it).

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">If you had only said in the first place Kurfy that you read some article in a magazine years ago and you doubt that such ships had serious radio equipment on board. Fantastic research and presentation. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well then kindly share the fruits your 20-years of research then?

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">If you're too busy to read the links Kurfy, perhaps they might be of passing interest to others who are not so pressed for time or who would simply like to know more about these events and to make their own minds up, free from those who would pervert the truth to their own ends. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

That means you're leaving already? Please don't do so early, we haven't learned to Only True Unperveted Truth from you yet!

It's interesting how the cover up story took a hold when the casualties were publicised so soon after the event...

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">I've just taken a quick look out of the window. Lyme Bay looks cold and grey today, very poor visibilty. I hope the weather's nicer where you are. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's a bit cold today around here, so, unfortunately, nope.

stanford-ukded
10-10-2006, 06:48 AM
I love the way that you slam Low Flyer but can't answer any of Waldo's points.

Kurfurst__
10-10-2006, 07:01 AM
Waldo has good points, and presents them in an intelligent, well-sourced manner. He will get a similiar answer from me to those points when I am near my books, and after I dealt with things I consider far more important in real life than a discussion, that can wait. Valuable discussions are not 500 replies/day. Oh, I can perfectly understand that for you or that ******ed imbecile luftluuver, who has no such disturbing factors such as friends, work, interests or family to distract you from your daily flaming routines or just come here and bark at me like a mad rabid dogs, it's sort of strange.

Low_Flyer_MkVb
10-10-2006, 07:10 AM
An interseting lession in Kurfynese there, boys and girls. Please read my original post then read kurfy's version. An interesting take.

Got to go now - late for my shift at 'The Dog & Duck' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif

I've got a good one for you all to sink your teeth into at closing time...

stanford-ukded
10-10-2006, 07:16 AM
Sorry if I offended you Kurfust.

Still, how did you know I don't have a job, a family, any friends or interests? Spooky.


Low Flyer: Those links were brilliant. Thanks.

ploughman
10-10-2006, 08:34 AM
I can't do it mate. I've even tried it with one eye closed looking through a pint of Ram Rod but I just can't get:

"Care to list a few titles of your publications, after all you've been 'professionally studied DDay in the last 20 years', so I guess you wrote some at least."


Out of:


"Having studied the build up to D-Day 6/6 1944 for over twenty years and having been professionally involved with various veterans organisations, interviewing said veterans and escorting wreath-laying ceremonies over the wrecks from Exercise Tiger, I thought I knew more than the average punter here."

Must be the weather. Exceptionally mild October thus far, eh?

luftluuver
10-10-2006, 09:38 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
Waldo has good points, and presents them in an intelligent, well-sourced manner. He will get a similiar answer from me to those points when I am near my books, and after I dealt with things I consider far more important in real life than a discussion, that can wait. Valuable discussions are not 500 replies/day. Oh, I can perfectly understand that for you or that <span class="ev_code_YELLOW">******ed imbecile luftluuver</span>, who has no such disturbing factors such as friends, work, interests or family to distract you from your daily flaming routines or just come here and bark at me like a mad rabid dogs, it's sort of strange. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>Quoted so that it is on record that Kurfurst can't be civil. (but what else is new? http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif) That is what he does when he getting pwnd and this time, he got pwnd real bad. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif I won't whine to Ivan like the little baby you are Kurfurst either.

Waldo.Pepper
10-10-2006, 07:45 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
Waldo has good points, and presents them in an intelligent, well-sourced manner. He will get a similiar answer from me to those points when I am near my books </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I sincerely look forward to this.



In the meantime, I am struck by something that I am picking up in tone about the 'cover up' following Tiger.

This tone I am speaking of seems to imply a cover up to conceal incopetence, or negligence rather than the legitimate security needs of preserving sources, methods, details of the then impending D-Day landings.

For fears that the Germans collected some prisoners, great efforts were made at the time to recover all the bodies of those killed. Even to the extent that divers were sent down shortly afterward.

Given this level of security mania, near obsessional paranoia even, I wonder why is it that some typify this as a cover up, rather then good basic security measures?

Is there more to this than I am unaware of? Were there prosecutions like after Pearl Harbour?

stathem
10-11-2006, 02:51 AM
Interesting thing I read just recently in €˜The recollections of Rifleman Bowlby€.

Three Germans used captured British uniforms to infiltrate the British lines in Italy in early €45. Seeking information they walked into a NAAFI and asked for €˜a cup of tea€ The NAAFI corporal promptly phoned the MPs who came and took them away.

No self-respecting squaddie of the time would ask for a €˜cup of tea€. It was always referred to as €˜a cuppa cha€.

Further indication that subtlety, nuance and observation are far superior to paranoia, torture and an almost fanatical devotion to paperwork.

Kurfurst__
10-11-2006, 07:05 AM
Quicky. Some German saboteurs dressed GIs in the Ardenness fell to their routines when they were asked by MPs to which unit they belong to... "1st Company" was the answer. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/blush.gif They're caught immidietely since US Army only had Able, Baker etc. companies by letter, whereas the Germans and continentals used numbers to designate.

OTOH the knowladge that US-dressed jerry commandoes were around caused quite some paranoia, and a lot more damage than the saboteurs themselves. I read somewhere MPs managed to 'catch' some US general for not answering properly to special questions related to baseball. Sit' was a bit hot for that officer for a while. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

Blutarski2004
10-11-2006, 11:08 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
I know of NO German success with American or
British codes. the Japanese also had very
little success.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>


German B-Dienst was in fact able to read British merchant shipping codes at intermittent times during the war. IIRC, Winton discusses this point in one of his books on the convoy war.

Blutarski2004
10-11-2006, 11:22 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Waldo.Pepper:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">and have u not heard of the u boat war ? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

From the same article by Levine cited already.

"In March 1943, the supreme crisis of the Atlantic battle appeared to develop. In several convoy battles in the first three weeks of the month, the Allies suffered extremely heavy losses, provoking the fears noted by Roskill. Shortly afterwards, however, the situation was dramatically reversed. In April-May 1943, the Allied losses dropped, while a massacre of U boats occurred in the battles around the convoys. Shortly afterwards, Donitz actually had to withdraw the U-boats from the Atlantic for a time. The Allies had won the Battle of the Atlantic. A number of measures were responsible for the victory. Most important, perhaps, was the closing of the air gap and the provision of air cover for all threatened convoys by the allotment of escort carriers and very long-range land-based planes. New support groups of teams of escort vessels trained to work together were available to rein force the escorts of convoys under attack. (The allotment of escort carrier and support groups would have occurred earlier but for the North African operation.) The U-boat code, 'Triton', was cracked by the British in December 1942 though arguably this simply countered the Germans' own cryptographic efforts.

New equipment for escort vessels became available notably ten-centimeter microwave radars, high-speed high-frequency direction finders, improved depth charges and 'ahead-throw' weapons.
The nature of the crisis of March 1943, however, has often been misunderstood. The losses suffered in 1942-43, though serious, did not threaten Britain with starvation and immediate defeat. There was more than enough shipping to sustain the British people and war production. Rather, what was in danger was the collection of enough shipping to sustain future offensives Actually, sinkings of Allied merchant ships by all enemy causes during 1942 only slightly exceeded the total of Allied merchant ship construction for that year. The curve of construction actually passed that of U-boat sinkings alone in 1942. (Thus, the situation in the Atlantic even at its worst was not truly comparable to the situation in the Pacific, where American submarine caused a continual shrinkage of the Japanese shipping pool almost through out the war.)" </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


..... Pretty much the conclusion of Clay Blair in his 2 volume set "The U-boat War".

Waldo.Pepper
10-11-2006, 10:26 PM
Hopefully we can end this on a laugh...

http://www.savethemales.ca/001399.html

Kurfurst__
10-12-2006, 01:50 AM
Brilliant ! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/touche.gif

The guy who come up with this should a David Irving price or something. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif

Sergio_101
10-12-2006, 04:03 AM
"Wow, I don't think I've ever seen Kurfust get owned this bad.

Fantastic thread though, really interesting. Special tip of the cap to Waldo's contributions."

Truth is that Kurfust is owned 99.9% of the time.
If taken at face value his volcanic propaganda
would have you believing
that Germany won and the post war era
is all just a mass of Allied propaganda.

What Kurfie is really doing is saying that the
German fighting man of WWII was poorly trained
and largely incompitent. (but we know different).

All that superior Tutonic weaponry failed to stop
the vastly inferior weapons of the Allies, most
notably American planes.

Numbers alone can't explain it since the overwhelming
numbers were not there
in the west untill after the invasion of France.

Yep, o'l turdfist earned his reputation as a propagandist.
And he's owned again, as usual!

Whip up another authentic graph in MS Paint Kurfie! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/784.gif

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

La7_brook
10-12-2006, 04:10 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
"Wow, I don't think I've ever seen Kurfust get owned this bad.

Fantastic thread though, really interesting. Special tip of the cap to Waldo's contributions."

Truth is that Kurfust is owned 99.9% of the time.
If taken at face value his volcanic propaganda
would have you believing
that Germany won and the post war era
is all just a mass of Allied propaganda.

What Kurfie is really doing is saying that the
German fighting man of WWII was poorly trained
and largely incompitent. (but we know different).

All that superior Tutonic weaponry failed to stop
the vastly inferior weapons of the Allies, most
notably American planes.

Numbers alone can't explain it since the overwhelming
numbers were not there
in the west untill after the invasion of France.

Yep, o'l turdfist earned his reputation as a propagandist.
And he's owned again, as usual!

Whip up another authentic graph in MS Paint Kurfie! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/784.gif

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE> Originally posted by Sergio_101:
I know of NO German success with American or
British codes. the Japanese also had very
little success. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/34.gif

luftluuver
10-12-2006, 04:58 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by La7_brook:
Originally posted by Sergio_101:
I know of NO German success with American or
British codes. the Japanese also had very
little success. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/34.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>Agh Brook, saying 'NO' is not the same a saying NEVER.