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woofiedog
11-08-2006, 12:58 AM
An article [10 pages]on the He-177 and the B-29 bombers from the Air Classics magazine.

THE BEST OF PLANES, THE WORST OF PLANES THE BOEING B-29 AND THE HEINKEL HE 177 BOMBERS

Air Classics, Sep 1998 by Rhodes, O Thompson

Link: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3901/is_199809/ai_n8823174

http://www.luftwaffepics.com/LCBW/He177-7s.jpg

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-29-ramp2.jpg

http://members.tripod.com/~jellies2/b29-a.jpg <div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v438/woofiedog/WOOFIEDOG.jpg

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woofiedog
11-08-2006, 12:58 AM
An article [10 pages]on the He-177 and the B-29 bombers from the Air Classics magazine.

THE BEST OF PLANES, THE WORST OF PLANES THE BOEING B-29 AND THE HEINKEL HE 177 BOMBERS

Air Classics, Sep 1998 by Rhodes, O Thompson

Link: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3901/is_199809/ai_n8823174

http://www.luftwaffepics.com/LCBW/He177-7s.jpg

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-29-ramp2.jpg

http://members.tripod.com/~jellies2/b29-a.jpg <div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v438/woofiedog/WOOFIEDOG.jpg

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leitmotiv
11-08-2006, 02:03 AM
Well, I'm a big fancier of both. In their own way they were top performers once they were in their stride. The He 177 had a long and notorious development period just to get its revolutionary engine system to work. The He 177 wasn't able to do much as an anti-shipping aircraft, nor was it much more than a big target when used over the extremely bomber-unfriendly UK in the winter nights of '43-44, but, when KG1 had three Gruppen of them (90 aircraft), it was able to bomb with impunity on the Eastern Front. Only the extreme shortage of avgas after the oil offensive by the Allied heavies grounded them---permanently---to leave fuel for the fighters.

The B-29 appeared to be a failure several times in its career. Like the He 177, it was rushed into service. It required a massive modification "campaign" to fix the dozens of defects just so they could go overseas. The next hurdle was adjusting tactics when it was obvious high altitude daylight bombing was a no-go over Japan due to the jetstream. The decision to turn them into medium altitude unarmed night bombers (guns and ammunition left on the ground) was revolutionary for the AAF bomber clique. LeMay was the AAF's bomber tactics expert and he organized the 20th AF into a machine for incinerating cities. The B-29 was the indispensible delivery means for the atomic bombs. No other bomber in the world had both the carrying capacity and the range to deliver the A-bombs.

IL-2 should have had a He 177A-5.

HuninMunin
11-08-2006, 02:20 AM
You just have to love the Griffon.
The 111 has this specific look of weaponry that can give a shiver down your spine; the 177 looks like the big brother of it.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

------------------------------------------------------------
....I understand that you understand almost nothing in computer technology(regarding how to get all features working well in one great code and how to get it fully optimized for all aspects of the game and where developers must go for compromisses), because you are speaking bla-bla-bla about things that you don't know. Sorry I don't like to offend you. But it looks like it looks. - Oleg Maddox
------------------------------------------------------------

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Simon "Hunin" Phoenix
Servant of Wotan and Tyr
True knight of the Endlich-Thread

Heliopause
11-08-2006, 02:25 AM
Nice post, thanks. It really brings out the effort the designers and manufacturers had to put into it.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://i22.photobucket.com/albums/b334/PauseHelio/fokker_now.jpg
"Once (I think it was 31st aug. 1940), I was in a fight with four Hurricanes over Dover.
I was back over the channel when I saw another Hurricane coming from Calais, trailing white smoke, obviously in a bad way.
I flew up alongside him and escorted him all the way to England and waved goodbye.
A few weeks later the same thing happened to me.
That would never have happened in Russia - never". (Erich Rudorffer - 109 pilot)

leitmotiv
11-08-2006, 04:34 AM
Truly the 111 was champion in looks, HuninMunin. The 177 was briefly the king of the Eastern Front. It was supposed to be ready in 1941 ---the old myth that the Germans did not build a heavy bomber is not true. Due to its engine it was delayed two years. Goring had been led to believe it had four separate engines---when he found out they were two linked, he was furious. The linked engines were chosen to allow the 177 to dive---as stipulated by Udet (by the way, this is not generally known, and it was brought up a few years ago in AEROPLANE or FLY PAST, the Manchester was intended to dive bomb, too, so Udet's obsession was not unique). The twin nacelles were to lessen drag. The 177 is best known as a carrier of the Hs 293 anti-ship missile or for its use in the mini-Blitz of 1943-44, but it was most effective on the Eastern Front where it flew too high and was too well armed for the Sov fighters to be effective against it.

http://avia.russian.ee/gallery/picture.php?dir=234&p=10

The-Pizza-Man
11-08-2006, 04:39 AM
The germans wanted all(most) their bombers to be dive bombers right? Isn't it a large part of the reason why they had so much trouble building a heavy bomber.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://users.tpg.com.au/rowdie/evasig.jpg

Ratsack
11-08-2006, 04:54 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
...Only the extreme shortage of avgas after the oil offensive by the Allied heavies grounded them---permanently...
... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Red Army. Romania. August 1944.

cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

leitmotiv
11-08-2006, 05:07 AM
Ernst Udet, the famous WWI fighter ace and post-war stunt pilot/bon vivant, was in charge of research and development in the Luftwaffe until his suicide in the fall of 1941. He was extremely impressed by the American Curtiss biplane fighter/dive-bomber of the early '30's. He created the requirement for the Ju 87 dive bomber, and he changed the requirement for the Ju 88 to insist it be redesigned as a dive-bomber. It was intended to be an unarmed fast bomber like the later British Mosquito. His obsession with dive-bombing extended to altering the requirement for the big Heinkel heavy bomber to make it a dive bomber. This meddling was disastrous because the Luftwaffe urgently needed a heavy bomber for strategic operations. The modifications to make the 177 a dive bomber were to no avail---it was too big and too heavy for dive bombing (as was the Dornier 217 which also was redesigned to dive bomb). Udet bet the farm on the Me 210 which was supposed to be a wonder plane---dive-bomber, fighter, fast bomber, recon plane. It was a disaster and Messerschmitt was churning them out. Udet's management of research and development was a catastrophe for the Luftwaffe.

Before the Red Army reached Ploesti, the 15th Air Force had bombed it thoroughly, and the combined offensive against Ploesti and the vital German synthetic fuel plants in the spring of 1944 forced the Luftwaffe to choose between fueling non-jet bombers and fighters and jet-bombers. The non-jet bombers lost.

Ratsack
11-08-2006, 05:54 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
...Before the Red Army reached Ploesti, the 15th Air Force had bombed it thoroughly... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's one thing to bomb, and another to bomb effectively.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
...and the combined offensive against Ploesti and the vital German synthetic fuel plants in the spring of 1944... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

...caused the Germans to dig into their stockpiles of fuel stocks but had limited effect on supplies to frontline units. The fuel shortages that gripped the Germans were chronic, rather than acute at this stage. The acute and crippling shortages came after the resumption of the oil-bombing offensive in July / August, which coincided with the Soviet capture of Ploesti.



<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
...forced the Luftwaffe to choose between fueling non-jet bombers and fighters and jet-bombers.... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

This assumes rather than demonstrates the thesis.

I'm not saying bombing had no effect. Rather I'm suggesting the significance of the bombing offensive tends to be overstated, particularly by advocates of air power. Given we're discussing this on a flight sim board, it's a fair bet most of us on this board are 'advocates' or 'fans' of airpower at some level. Those of us in our thirties or forties in the English-speaking world were brought up on the propaganda of the post-war, interservice rivalry between the new USAF and its old masters. Arnold, Spaatz, Doolittle and co had axes to grind, and they were ground out in public (anybody remember Jimmy Stewart in 'Strategic Air Command'?).

I'm tending these days towards the view that the significance of the 'strategic' bombing offensive (whatever that is supposed to mean) has been vastly overstated at the expense of the fighters who actually won air superiority over North Africa, Sicily, Italy, France, Germany, etc, etc, etc...

end rant.


cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

Thanatos833
11-08-2006, 06:35 AM
^^^You make a good point, but then air-superiority on it's own serves no purpose, air-superiority needs to be won so that planes of other types can perform their missions. If we assume that the strategic bombers didn't play that big a role surely air-superiority would have only played a role if other aircraft such as close air support, reconaissance and so forth would have been able to do their missions to good effect.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://img88.imageshack.us/img88/9285/do17in9.jpg

The Dornier Do-17, another brilliant example of German engineering, a ?Schnellbomber" which could just outrun all fighters, this plane led to the German victory in the Battle of Britain and indeed, the Second World War.

leitmotiv
11-08-2006, 01:59 PM
Point well taken, ratsack. Strategic bombing in Europe was a mixed bag regarding effectiveness. I like bombers but I'd rather be kicked than be a cheerleader for them. I'm relying on the commentary of Alfred Price in his LAST DAYS OF THE LUFTWAFFE for the effects of strategic bombing on the 177 program. I am 54 and have been through all the waves of fashions from uncritical ra-ra-ing strat bombing in the '50's to the complete dismissal of it as a waste and a moral outrage. Best way to gauge its effects is to study what, if any, strategic, operational, or tactical effects it had on the German war effort. In the case of the 177, its effect was decisive---as one commentator put it---the fuel shut-off to the heavies ordered by the Luftwaffe distributed grounded 177s all over Europe providing American long-range fighter pilots with big targets for strafing runs.

woofiedog
11-09-2006, 01:11 AM
A quick story about stealing a He-177...

Rafwaffe, The
Flight Journal, Feb 2003 by Peter Gosling

Link: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3897/is_200302/ai_n9204393/pg_3

Probably the most spectacular coup was the acquisition of a Heinkel He 177A-5/R6 heavy bomber. It was "liberated" in September after D-day from the Toulouse/Blagnac airfield, which was in still occupied France.

Link for KG-40 & KG-100 colors:
http://www.owl.cz/picture/max_navod_48005.jpg
http://www.modelforum.cz/web/view.php?cisloclanku=2006041202

Also... has to be translated, Links:
http://www.europa1939.com/luftwaffe/bombarderos/he177.html
http://perso.orange.fr/sous.marin/heinkel177.htm

http://www.lietadla.com/lietadla/nemecke/he-177/he-177_kok.jpg

http://www.lietadla.com/lietadla/nemecke/he-177/he-177_pod.jpg

http://www.lietadla.com/lietadla/nemecke/he-177/he177_mk101.jpg <div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v438/woofiedog/WOOFIEDOG.jpg

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leitmotiv
11-09-2006, 01:45 AM
As usual, great stuff, woofiedog---many thanks! Didn't know about the 177 swipe. Great story.

Aaron_GT
11-09-2006, 02:54 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Point well taken, ratsack. Strategic bombing in Europe was a mixed bag regarding effectiveness </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


Too often bombing was of the wrong targets (ones not sufficiently strategic), with bombs spread too widely, insufficient coordination between USAAF and RAF (sadly often the fault of the RAF) and insufficient follow up. Things did improve on the whole in 1945 with much more concentration on things like communications (rail, bridges, waterways). It's a what-if, but the war might have been a little shorter if there had been more concentration on hitting oil and synthetic oil, with day-and-night coordination. Whether concentration on ball bearings would have had a significant effect is more debateable as the Germans switched to other forms of bearing some of which turned out to be cheaper and easier to produce. It's much harder to work around a lack of fuel, even with the large quantity of horse drawn transport in the German army.

In a sense hitting fuel and communications together has a synergistic effect: if you are forced to go offroad then you need more fuel per mile travelled and a lack of fuel becomes amplified.

Tactical and operational level bombing with heavies tended to have a better overall record.

p1ngu666
11-09-2006, 04:40 AM
udet wanted dive bombers cos at that time people couldnt hit sh1t with level bombers.

think it was gurnicka (spellin) in the spanish civil war, surposidly going after a bridge, in the middle of a town.

town got flattened, bridge untouched...<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://premium1.uploadit.org/pingu666/spitfiresig.jpg

Kurfurst__
11-09-2006, 05:14 AM
This one is pretty interesting IMHO, via Manfred Griehl :

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e133/Kurfurst/he177a0.jpg <div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42333000/jpg/_42333631_puskasbudapest_ap203b.jpg
In memoriam Puskás Ferenc,2 April 1927 - 17 November 2006.
Nyugodjon Békében - May he rest in Peace.

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/
Kurfürst - Your Resource for Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance!

"The Me 109 was exceptional in turning combat. If there is a fighter plane built for turning combat , it has to be the Messer! Speedy, maneuverable (especially in the vertical) and extremely dynamic."
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Ratsack
11-09-2006, 06:46 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Aaron_GT:
...

Tactical and operational level bombing with heavies tended to have a better overall record. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


And to this:

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Thanatos833:
^^^You make a good point, but then air-superiority on it's own serves no purpose, air-superiority needs to be won so that planes of other types can perform their missions. If we assume that the strategic bombers didn't play that big a role surely air-superiority would have only played a role if other aircraft such as close air support, reconaissance and so forth would have been able to do their missions to good effect.

</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I contend that the most effective bombing of all was tactical and operational, and that the most effective tactical and operational bombing was done by fighters and mediums. That?s a simplistic summary of the position, but it provides some idea of where I?m coming from.

Expanding a little, I view the entire strategic bombing enterprise as misguided in terms of the conventional principles of war. One of the most important of those principles is that, having chosen to fight, one of your key aims should be to destroy the enemy?s main force. In the context of the WWII air war, the ?enemy?s main force? is their air force and, more particularly, their air defense system. ?Air defense system? is a modern term, but it nevertheless refers to the full set of elements that together comprise the main threat to your use of the enemy?s air space. To wit, their radar, fighter control system, infrastructure (airfields, fuel depots, etc), FLAK, and ? finally and most importantly - their fighters and aircrew. This is the ?main force? that, once defeated, will allow you to exploit your mastery of the enemy?s air.

This principle was well known. It was explicitly enunciated by Clauswitz, and its implications in WWII were demonstrated very clearly by the Luftwaffe and RAF during the Battle of Britain.

The strategic bombing concept, particularly as embodied in the U.S.A.A.F.?s strategic bombing doctrine, turned this basic principle of war on its head. The strategic bombing doctrine sought to apply force not to the enemy?s main force, but instead to the BASES OF SUPPORT for that main force. These ?bases of support? were initially meant to be the bottlenecks in German industry in general. As the bombing war progressed into 1943, the targets were refined to bottlenecks in armaments production, and then into bottlenecks in aircraft production, and then into bottlenecks in fighter production.

At this stage (mid-to-late 1943), the USAAF were in effect trying to destroy the German air force in production, while the German air force IN BEING was still shooting them out of the skies (Schweinfurt, Stuttgart, etc, etc, etc). The U.S.A.A.F.?s bombing policy at that point boiled down to the attempt to exploit mastery of the air before they had actually won it. This is why I say the strategic bombing doctrine turns Clauswitz on his head: it attempts to exploit the victory over the enemy?s main force while the enemy?s main force remains in-being, un-fought and un-defeated.

The main contribution of the daylight bombing campaign to that point was to force the Germans to place fighter resources in Germany, and thus to incur losses on the Jagdwaffe. However, we shouldn?t delude ourselves that the losses inflicted on the Jagdwaffe were going to be decisive, and they certainly weren?t going to be decisive before the losses inflicted on the 8th Airforce became prohibitive.

The worm turned with the introduction of long-range escorts, in particular the P-51B in December 1943. As the escorts became more numerous, Jagdwaffe losses began to climb. In the first half of 1944 the fighters of the 8th Airforce performed a real execution job on the German day fighters. This fine victory in 1944 is usually what is referred to when the strategic bombing offensive is credited with winning air superiority over the continent and thus making D-Day possible. Leaving aside for the time being the argument over whether this victory did in fact achieve air superiority over the beaches on D-Day, the fact remains that the victory in question was won by the 8th Airforce fighters over the German fighters. Restating that differently, the victory over the German day fighters was not won by the bombers, but by the fighters. In Clauswitz?s terms, the 8th Airforce defeated the enemy?s main force by destroying one, key element of the German air defense system: the fighters and their aircrew. In this context, the heavy bombers were the bait that drew the Jagdwaffe to combat. The subsequent campaigns against oil and anything else were the exploitation phase.

This raises a key question about the strategic bombing doctrine. If the attempt to destroy the German air force in production failed ? which it clearly did ? can strategic bombing be said to have been effective? I would argue that it can?t. The apologists for strategic bombing point to the air superiority argument, but that?s not what the strategic bombing campaign set out to do, and was in any case a victory won not by bombing but by fighting.

If we go a little further, and put the strategic bombing campaign within the context of the entire air campaign, its victories must share the stage with other outstanding achievements, most of which were performed by tactical air forces. The air superiority over Normandy on D-Day, for example, was achieved by the tactical air forces that flew the 20,000 sorties over the beachhead that day. The transport plan, to which the strategic bombing forces of Britain and the US had to be dragged kicking and screaming, was finally rendered effective by the fighter bombers employed against the bridges over the Seine. To these we should add the destruction of German armour at Mortain, and the subsequent rout at Fallaise. Finally, we should consider that the tactical air forces operating over France in June 1944, destroyed German planes at two or three times the rate that the 8th Airforce did between January and June 1944.

German day fighter losses from Jan 1944 to the beginning of Jun 1944 were on the order of 2,262, which was nearly all of the 2,283 available at the beginning of the year (Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat, (Quantum, London, 1999), p.182). This is the well-known victory to which I referred above.

In contrast, in June 1944, the same source (Murray) gives Luftwaffe losses in France alone as:

931 on operations
67 non-combat
183 due to other causes

This gives a total of 1,181 aircraft written off in France alone, in less than four weeks. While this figure includes other types than fighters, it is also true that most of these losses were the result of the activities tactical air forces. They destroyed in roughly four weeks half the number of fighters destroyed OVER FIVE MONTHS of strategic effort. In other words, if the rate of loss over Jan-May was too high for the Germans to sustain, then what the tactical air forces did to the Luftwaffe over the course of June was a complete blood bath. (Bear in mind that Murray has positive views of the strategic bombing campaign, and positively gushes in his praise of Spaatz: ibid p. 207. The figures themselves tell a different story, however.)

It is this relative rate of killing between the strategic and tactical air forces that makes me think it wasn?t such a flash idea to use large, expensive, four-engine bombers with a crew of ten as bait for single-engine fighters. In my view, there existed a better way, which I?m not going to go into right now. Maybe later.

Cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

FlatSpinMan
11-09-2006, 07:07 AM
Interesting post, ratsack. I'd never thought of it in those terms before.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://i5.photobucket.com/albums/y184/FlatSpinMan/sig.jpg
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul.

Kurfurst__
11-09-2006, 11:32 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ratsack:
German day fighter losses from Jan 1944 to the beginning of Jun 1944 were on the order of 2,262, which was nearly all of the 2,283 available at the beginning of the year (Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat, (Quantum, London, 1999), p.182). This is the well-known victory to which I referred above. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

While I generally agree with your points and think your post is very well written, I can't refrain not to comment on this statistics. 2262 destroyed out of 2283 in five months, that's grand and a hugely impressive statistic, save for the fact it's pretty much meaningless and originally most likely invented to emphasize the takeover of air superiority by the Allies.

In demonstration : the RAF Fighter command lost around 1000 fighters in just 3 months of fighting during the late summer of 1940, which is similiarly close to the starting force of little over 1000 in July 1940 - it's not hard to find such 'impressive' statistics.

Overall the statistic is rather meaningless in itself, creating such is just a matter of selecting a long enough period in which losses start to approach operational strenght at previous date; but as said, it's overall meaningless since actual weakening of the force is brought by the inability to replace losses, if we are to speak in absolute terms. This appearantly did not happen as not only the Jagdwaffe was not crushed but in numbers it kept increasing till the end of the war, you can't really speak of destruction of the enemy main force, as you can't speak about it in the case of the RAF-FC; naturally, avarage pilot quality suffered, but this again ignores the fact that the bulk of the losses were effecting the inexperienced, green pilots who had no idea initially how to survive an engagement - fluctation was high.

It's more appropriate to speak of the relative change of forces; the air superiority was one not by the Jagdwaffe's shrinking of force, number of sorties or so on - that's a typical misunderstanding - but by the massive increase of USAAF fighter and bomber sorties and and force relative to the Jagdwaffe. Of course it is also a question to what strenght the Jagdwaffe would increase if it would not take the hammering and high lossess it did in Jan-May 1944, which kept it from growing in strenght as much it could unchecked.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42333000/jpg/_42333631_puskasbudapest_ap203b.jpg
In memoriam Puskás Ferenc,2 April 1927 - 17 November 2006.
Nyugodjon Békében - May he rest in Peace.

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/
Kurfürst - Your Resource for Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance!

"The Me 109 was exceptional in turning combat. If there is a fighter plane built for turning combat , it has to be the Messer! Speedy, maneuverable (especially in the vertical) and extremely dynamic."
- Major Kozhemyako, Soviet fighter pilot of the VVS

Ignored Posters : AKA_Tagert, Wurkeri, Gibbage, LStarosta, Sergio_101.

Xiolablu3
11-09-2006, 11:58 AM
Its a shame about the engine problem on the He177, it looks very similar to the B29 apart from that 'feature'.

Werent the Luftwaffe producing 1000 fighters a month in 1944? That would mean that if they lost 2000 odd in 4 months, they would still have more than they started with.

EDIT : One thing I didnt realise, is that the He177 is a tail dragger? I always thought it had undercarriage B29 style.?<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

--------------------------------------------------------------------
"I despise what you say; I will defend to the death your right to say it."
-Voltaire

Xiolablu3
11-09-2006, 12:22 PM
WoofieDog thats an excellent read about the RAFWAFFE.

'Beamont found that flying the Ju 88 was similar to flying a de Havilland Mosquito; it had pleasantly light controls and required only a little trimming. He obviously enjoyed himself throwing the German night fighter about the sky until he noticed a Mosquito in the vicinity, and the two of them proceeded to engage in a mock dogfight. Circling together, they found that the two aircraft were a good match, and it was only because of Beamont's unfamiliarity with the Junkers that he ended up with the Mossie on his tail.'

'Several Luftwaffe aircraft, however, came to England in rather more spectacular ways. On June 23, 1942, Oberleutnant Armin Faber was flying his Focke-Wulf Fw 190A-3 and was feeling pleased with himself after completing a successful sortie over England that had disposed of two Spitfires. He was returning home to his squadron, III./JG2, stationed on the Channel coast at Maupertus-sur-Mer. As he flew across the narrow stretch of water, he must have felt full of satisfaction at a job well done and was probably looking forward to an evening's celebration in nearby Cherbourg. On sighting the airfield, he executed a victory roll and landed. Unfortunately, to his dismay, he was not confronted by his crew chief full of congratulations but by a large RAF sergeant brandishing a pistol. Faber had landed at the RAF station of Pembrey, situated on the south coast of Wales. It was a mistake anyone could have made. His navigation was 180 degrees off, and he had crossed the Bristol Channel instead of the English Channel. His mistake gave the RAF a present of the fighter that was then wreaking havoc among the Spitfires.'

'Faber's arrival was particularly gratifying, since the RAF, being eager to acquire one of these aircraft, was in the process of planning a snatch operation known as Operation Airthief at an airfield on the French coast. The operation was to take place in July 1942; Supermarine test pilot Jeffrey Quill was to be landed, steal an Fw 190 and fly it home. Luckily, Oberleutnant Faber saved them the trouble.

Once the surprise had worn off, the RAF's new acquisition was supplied to eager test pilots who tested it in mock combat with a Hawker Typhoon, P-51 Mustang, P-38 Lightning and various marques of Spitfire. Several other Fw 190s came into RAF hands in a similar manner. One of them was flown for nearly 50 hours by Len Thorne--one of the surviving test pilots at the AFDU. Len, now in his eighties, remembers his flights in this machine well: "Having mastered the techniques of takeoff and landing, I thoroughly enjoyed the eight months of the assignment. The high cruising speed, well in excess of 300mph, compared very favorably with the Spitfire and was similar to the Merlin-engine Mustang, the Thunderbolt, Typhoon and Tempest. The cockpit was roomy and well laid out, and the teardrop canopy gave excellent visibility. In my estimation, the Fw 190 A-3 is classed with the Spitfire VIII or IX and the Mustang III. It was one of the best fighters of WW II.'

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3897/is_200302/ai_n9204393/pg_1

The whole of it is a great read http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

Thanks Woofie<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

--------------------------------------------------------------------
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major_setback
11-09-2006, 12:35 PM
Short video documentary of the 177:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A2j95wBHfYA

More video:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bb9QSMOjsrA&mode=related&search=<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y129/major-setback/Signaurepic004BESTframe014small.jpg
<span class="ev_code_PINK">My Aim is True.</span>

fordfan25
11-09-2006, 02:56 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by HuninMunin:
You just have to love the Griffon.
The 111 has this specific look of weaponry that can give a shiver down your spine; the 177 looks like the big brother of it. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>yes ugly things do make people shiver http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-tongue.gif<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-
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p1ngu666
11-09-2006, 03:44 PM
b29 also had engine issues, but not as bad<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://premium1.uploadit.org/pingu666/spitfiresig.jpg

HuninMunin
11-09-2006, 03:44 PM
http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/59.gif

EDIT
@ two posts up<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

------------------------------------------------------------
....I understand that you understand almost nothing in computer technology(regarding how to get all features working well in one great code and how to get it fully optimized for all aspects of the game and where developers must go for compromisses), because you are speaking bla-bla-bla about things that you don't know. Sorry I don't like to offend you. But it looks like it looks. - Oleg Maddox
------------------------------------------------------------

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Simon "Hunin" Phoenix
Servant of Wotan and Tyr
True knight of the Endlich-Thread

woofiedog
11-09-2006, 11:05 PM
Xiolablu3... Thank's... And a Excellent story about Oberleutnant Armin Faber and his misjudgment of landing field's. LoL

http://www.rccaraction.com/fj/images/plane_profiles/fw190/FW_01.jpg
A captured G-3 model is test-flown.

A bit more to add to the story...

The Commanding Officer at Fairwood, Group Captain David Atcherley drove to Pembrey to fetch the German pilot, Oberleutnant Armin Faber. During the journey, the prisoner narrowly escaped being shot, when Atcherley accidently squeezed the trigger of his service revolver when the car hit a particularly bad pothole in the road. The discharged bullet hit the car door just inches away from Armin Faber! The German spent the next two days as a reluctant guest at Fairwood Common before being escorted by train from Swansea's High Street Station to London for further interrogation. The German plane proved to be an invaluable find for the British, putting the British-made Typhoons to shame, and the technology gleaned from the aircraft significantly contributed towards the 1945 design of the Hawker Sea Fury.

Return of a legendary Focke-Wulf FW 190 F-8 to the air... Link: http://www.white1foundation.org/

*When the Focke Wulf Fw 190 - White 1 takes to the air, we will be treated to sounds rarely heard since the end of WWII. This is because White 1 will be powered by an original BWM 801 radial engine. There are very few working 801s left today and none are currently flown.*

Also... The Focke-Wulf 190 was not distributed in large numbers to non-German air forces, but Turkey and Hungary were notable exceptions. France also used the FW 190 in the post-war period. Many other nations captured FW 190s, or received very few of the type.

Link: http://fw190.hobbyvista.com/foreign.htm

http://fw190.hobbyvista.com/erinc1.jpg
Two Turkish FW 190 Aa-3s in flight with a Turkish Spitfire (E. Ozgur)

Turkey - Focke-Wulf 190 Aa-3 [1]
In the middle of 1942 the RLM issued an export order for FW 190s to be sent to Turkey. Turkey received 72 FW 190 Aa-3 (a for auslandisch - foreign) aircraft between October 1942 and March 1943. The first FW 190 Aa-3 was built in August 1942. The FW 190 Aa-3 received its own Werk Nummer block, 0134 101 - 0134 172 (although it is not known if W.Nr 110, 123, 146 and 148 were handed over). These aircraft were basically FW 190 A-3s, with BMW 801 D-2 engines, and FuG VIIa radios. However, they did not have FuG 25 radios, and had an armament fit of four MG 17s, with the option of installing two MG FF/M cannon in the outer wing position.


And Thank's to All that have taken the time to post added materials and thoughts on this thread. Thank's! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-happy.gif<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

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WWMaxGunz
11-10-2006, 02:48 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ratsack:
It is this relative rate of killing between the strategic and tactical air forces that makes me think it wasn?t such a flash idea to use large, expensive, four-engine bombers with a crew of ten as bait for single-engine fighters. In my view, there existed a better way, which I?m not going to go into right now. Maybe later.

Cheers,
Ratsack </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Lack of just such a plane that might have struck the moved industries deep in Russia is one
thing pointed out as a mistake Hitler made, just like sending troops in without winter gear.
More motors, more range.
How much did German initial disruption of Russian industry from bombing achieve in time that
bought Germany against Russian replacements and upgrade tanks, planes, artillery?

Bombing must be effective, why else does the other side put up such great effort to stop it?

AWL_Spinner
11-10-2006, 03:04 AM
Nice video of the 177.

Seeing the size of that thing makes you realise what a ridiculous idea it was to insist it was dive capable.

That and the insistence 262s be used as Jabos.

And the light twin fixation.

And the invasion of Russia.

And a hundred other lucky decisions for the Allied forces.

http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

Cheers, Spinner

<hr class="ev_code_hr" />
o Squads! Take a look at the ADW War (http://adwwar.com/en/#), it's fantastic!
o Spinner has been alive in ADW for a maximum of: 3hrs 38mins!

Sergio_101
11-10-2006, 03:23 AM
It's a hob nailed joke to even think of a B-29
and a He-177 in the same light.
He-177 was a total disaster. A poor design
with dangerously flawed engines.
There was never even a glimmer of hope for
the He-177. Even if it worked safely it was
an under powered dog. Slow, lacking
a good payload at range.

B-29 was the future. It had it's own problems
but they were fixed before the Atomic bombings
in August 1945.
I find it funny, laughable, the comment about
the "revolutionary engine system". Nothing
new or "revolutionary" there. GM Allison had
done the same thing with the V-3420.
It was VERY reliable. There was even a B-29
built with the V-3420 for power.
The B-39 was faster than the B-29 by a huge margin, more reliable
and had the potential for longer range and greater payload.
No one seems to have a good reason why the
R-3350 was not abandoned for the V-3420.


The only arena the He-177 competes with the B-29 in
is the Teutonic imagination. The uberplane, if it's
german it has to be better. If any Allied aircraft
manufacturer had had the gall to try to sell that P.O.S.
to their goverment they would have found themselves
with a contract to build WAGONS.

He-177 was easily one of the "Worlds Worst Airplanes"
and is in fact in the book "Worlds Worst Airplanes"http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

He-177 did one good thing. It used up valuable resources
and hastened VICTORY! http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

LEXX_Luthor
11-10-2006, 03:32 AM
Gunz:: <BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Bombing must be effective, why else does the other side put up such great effort to stop it? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/25.gif

Correct. The bombings hurt production and held it lower than what it could have been under Speer's late war ramping, but could never kill production. That required Army occupation on the ground in 1945. But it still hurt, or the 8th Air Force could be considered as doing nothing but conducting fighter sweeps which all sides learned to ignore early on. Another thing is to look at the extremes that the Germans went to create false or deceptive visual/radar ground targets for the RAF night bombers and the burning smoke to conceal targets from day bombers. Also, the stunning amounts of flak used to defend Germany was never useful against fighters, but against bombers. Overall, it was a close call, as I am *thinking* that conventional strategic bombing like we saw in WW2 only works if the bombing country has greater production resources than the defender, and has the freedom to devote production to strategic bombers and not defensive fighters or Army.

Perhaps most importantly, the bombing carried the war into Germany (and Japan) far earlier than the "ally" armies could do. Imagine German production ramped up under Speer but without being held back to some degree by the bombings -- the Bf-109Z would have made it out of the shop. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/11.gif

I had read that the greatest failure of the strategic bombing was not going after the electrical generating ability that kept the German factories running. The steel mills targeted were hard to destroy...the equipment especially, and were quickly repaired faster than expected. Or so I read.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

__________________
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Ratsack
11-10-2006, 05:17 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by WWMaxGunz:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ratsack:
It is this relative rate of killing between the strategic and tactical air forces that makes me think it wasn?t such a flash idea to use large, expensive, four-engine bombers with a crew of ten as bait for single-engine fighters. In my view, there existed a better way, which I?m not going to go into right now. Maybe later.

Cheers,
Ratsack </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Lack of just such a plane that might have struck the moved industries deep in Russia is one
thing pointed out as a mistake Hitler made...
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

?mainly by those interested to promote the importance of strategic bombing. Hitler?s armies were defeated by the Red Army in being. Remember that the bulk of the T-34s used in the critical period between Dec 1941 and Aug 42 came out of the Stalingrad Tractor Factory (STZ), supplied with armor plate from the Red October foundry and with the F-34 gun being manufactured at Barrikady. The bulk production from the factories in Omsk and those moved to the Urals did not come on line until after Op Neptune.

In any event, the reference to Hitler?s idiocy is a red herring in this context. The real point is the amount of damage bombing may have done to Soviet industry. I?ll return to this below.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by WWMaxGunz:
More motors, more range.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Here you are conflating the long-range bomber plane with the strategic bombing doctrine. The former may serve the latter, and the latter may provide the framework for the use of the former, but they are not the same thing. My critique is of the doctrine, not the plane.

For example, the long range B-52 can be loaded with JDAMS and used for precision tactical strike (as they were in Afghanistan). This is a tactical application of a long-range platform. The doctrinal background to this application is, however, about as far removed from the strategic bombing doctrine as chalk is from cheese. We mustn?t confuse the platform with the application, or worse, with the doctrine.



<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by WWMaxGunz:
How much did German initial disruption of Russian industry from bombing achieve in time that bought Germany against Russian replacements and upgrade tanks, planes, artillery?
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I?m not really sure what you were getting at here, but I?ll have a stab at it. I think you were asking how much time the Germans bought themselves by the disruption they caused Soviet industry during their initial attack in 1941. Close?

The answer is that I don?t know. However, the army rather than the air force caused that disruption, so I?m not clear on the relevance of this issue to a defense of the strategic bombing doctrine. You?ll have to elaborate on that for me.



<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by WWMaxGunz:
Bombing must be effective, why else does the other side put up such great effort to stop it? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is a very weak argument. I can think of at least one strong reason a government would work to halt or minimize bombing, without any regard for the economic or military effectiveness of that bombing: domestic politics. A government could not be seen to do nothing, even if they actually were doing nothing. The Nazis in particular were incredibly paranoid about civilian morale, even to the point that Gauleiter effectively vetoed the full mobilization of the German economy on the grounds that the populace might revolt: no butter to go with the guns! It seems ridiculous in hindsight to suppose the Nazi totalitarians could?ve been jittery about domestic control, but these good old boys stymied every attempt of Dr Todt and Goebbels to implement the total war economy. It wasn?t until after Stalingrad ? February 1943!!! - that Speer and Goebbels were able to stick it down their throats, by which time it was nearly three years too late. Thank goodness.

But in any event, the reaction of the defenders merely indicates that you are applying your force. It does not mean and it does not follow you are applying your forces in the best way possible. This would be a very dangerous basis on which to evaluate and refine your strategy, to say the least.

Tangentially, this raises another of the issues that is pertinent to my critique of the strategic bombing doctrine, and that is the set of assumptions the doctrine relied upon. The first is that the bombers are able to destroy the target. There?s no point in bombing if your bombs fall to no effect. Well, it transpired that the strategic bombing prophets miscalculated here on two fronts. Firstly, they over estimated the destructive effect of the relatively small 500 lb bomb. Secondly, they OVER estimated the accuracy with which this ?teeny weenie? bomb (in the words of the R.A.F. song) could be delivered to the target.

Given that there was no practical way to improve the accuracy of high altitude bombing to any degree that would significantly increase the lethality of the bombs, the only way to retrieve this mistake was to increase the number of bombers over the target. This meant that all of the initial estimates of the relative cost of the offensive were wildly incorrect. The ramifications of this were enormous and hardly need pointing out.

The second poor assumption was that the enemy (German) war economy would be working to capacity, and that any serious damage to existing infrastructure would be reflected in an immediate and commensurate drop in output. This was, as I noted above, completely wrong. The Germans were not working to capacity: indeed, nothing like it. This allowed them to make good much of the damage caused by bombing simply by reallocating existing excess capacity. As 1943 progressed, this reallocation from civilian to military industry resulted in the massive production increases achieved in 1944. As a consequence, there was never a shortage of bearings, or fighters or any other critical manufactured commodity until after air superiority was secured. This reinforces the argument from my previous post that strategic bombing doctrine put the exploitation cart before the air superiority horse.

The proposition that I made earlier was that it was not very clever to use expensive ten-man bombers as bait in the air superiority stakes. I did not say that bombing had no effect. Rather, I am arguing that the proponents of strategic bombing got it wrong in thinking that the air weapon transcended the normal rules of war. They argued the strategic bomber could bypass the requirement for an air superiority victory and move straight to the exploitation, and the young men of the U.S.A.A.F had to prove this theory with their bodies. It took quite a few thousand of their young lives to prove the proposition wrong and induce the theorists to change to an air superiority strategy. The air superiority strategy is embodied in the Point Blank directive, which instructed the 8th Airforce to go after the Luftwaffe where ever they could find it: in the air, on the ground or in the factories.

It is critical to note that the Point Blank directive was, in effect, a tacit admission that the strategic bombing experiment had failed. The strategic bombers had signally failed to destroy the Luftwaffe ? much less the entire Wehrmacht ? in production. The wheels were not grinding to a halt for lack of bearings, or of rubber, or of guns, or of fighters, or tanks, etc. The Point Blank directive instructed the Allied air forces to defeat the Luftwaffe in detail, and this was in fact how it was done.

To summarize, I argue that the strategic bombing doctrine that contended that the enemy?s forces could be defeated by destroying their bases of support, rather than by defeating them in the field, was demonstrated to be wrong. It was wrong at the conceptual level in that it failed to include the enemy?s air force (air defense system) in its implicit definition of the enemy?s force. By this exclusion, it failed to recognize that warfare FOR the air is the necessary prerequisite for effective warfare FROM the air. In the war as it was actually fought, the heavy bomber could not be applied effectively until air superiority was won.

Furthermore, I have alluded to the argument that, if air superiority was the goal of Point Blank, then there were better ways to achieve than to use the heavies as bait. I?ve not yet expanded on that, but I might do tomorrow.


cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

Blutarski2004
11-10-2006, 08:19 AM
Ratsack,

Thank you for a lucid, insightful, and thought provoking presentation. Comments follow.

Strategic bombing in WW2 indeed fell far short of its pre-war promises. OTOH, it is also fair to say that it was a strategic weapon still in its doctrinal infancy. It was the first time that pre-war theories and assumptions about strategic bombing had been put to the test. Many were found to be false.

Yet, I cannot help but recall the comments of Speer to the effect that if the Allies had persisted in their attack campaign against the German refinery system, Germany would have been militarily crippled in six months. In that sense, strategic bombing might be viewed less as a blind alley and more as a series of wrong turns taken by people who did not really know either their way or their vehicle.

My personal opinion, based upon my grasp of its ultimate effects upon both Germany and Japan, is that strategic bombing was never a war winning weapon in and of itself. Douhet was patently wrong in this respect.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

BLUTARSKI

Saburo_0
11-10-2006, 10:22 AM
Ratsack,

I tend to share your views about the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign. Though you have put it much better than I could. 2 pts. to add tho
1. One benefit of the AAF/RAF campaign was to force the Germans to direct resources to oppose the attacks. Flak guns, weapon development etc. I believe this is mentioned in Alfred Price's Last Year of the Luftwaffe. An unintended effect but an important one in a war of attrition.
2. I wonder what would have happened if the 8th AF had directed its attacks at road and rail networks from the beginning?

Oh and the point made by someone else that the real change was not in reducing Luftwaffe strength but in the incredible increase in allied fighter and tactical units by D-Day.
So we need to realize that this was a war of attrition and question whether the strategic bombing offensive was the best way to win such a battle. Once again expensive 10 man bombers were probably not the most efficient bait available.

Aaron_GT
11-10-2006, 11:08 AM
Ratsack,

I would agree that the tactical and operational bombing role was best served by fighter bombers an d (fast) light and medium bombers. My point was that the effectiveness of heavy bombers was also probably best when employed in roles other that strategic. If strategic bombing had been more focused it might have been a bit different.

In terms of super bombers perhaps the ultimate would have been (and this very much would include atomic bomb delivery) the plane which Barnes Wallis devised around the grand slam bomb . This was unarmed but designed to operate above 40,000 ft, climbing to this altitude over friendly territory. With a climb done as it flew out rather than in a spiral its range could have been considerable. Never built, of course, as the requirement in the end was to churn out the more ordinary Lancasters (which of course could carry the grand slam) and then move onto jet bombers and missiles.

leitmotiv
11-10-2006, 01:12 PM
Strategic bombing in WWII is a very complex subject. First of all, the roots were in WWI in the German zeppelin and heavier-than-air raids on Britain. Both the British and the Germans noted the disproportionate reaction to the raids by the civilian populace, especially to the first airplane attacks by day in 1917. There was near-panic in London. The British required a huge effort to blunt the airplane raids, consisting of gun defenses, tracking and early-warning systems, and fighter squadrons. None of this was lost on either side. Before WWI was over, the new RAF and the Govt was fully committed to the idea of strategic bombing, and, in particular, to "morale bombing" (direct attacks on the civilian population).

Ironically, considering the present morass, it was in Iraq in the 1920's and '30's that some of the theories of bombing were tested, and believed to have been proved. Due to manpower expenses, the government of the day in Britain was willing to try an experiment called "Air Control" where, for the first time, an air arm would police an area of the empire instead of the army. This involved RAF aircraft carrying out punitive raids on unruly Iraqi tribes whenever they became rebellious. The program worked, and this lesson was not lost on the bombing adherents.

Douhet was actually a late-comer to the debate. Before he ever wrote his books the idea was firmly implanted in the fledgling air forces of the world that strategic bombing, if carried out with the utmost brutality and violence, would crush the enemy, and avoid the incredible human cost of land warfare.

In the 1920's and '30's there was a general belief in Western Europe that bombers would bring about a colossal disaster to the great cities by dropping poison gas bombs, incendiaries, and high explosive. The amount of fear, and the exaggerated claims of effectiveness by the RAF terrified both government officials and civilians. In the early '30's Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin announced to the country "the bomber will always get through" and that the only way to avoid annihilation was to threaten the other side with destruction from the air. Thus, by 1939, Britain and Germany had spent a great deal of money on civil defense and evacuation plans to deal with the threat of the bomber. In the '30's, the Soviets built the world's first massed strategic bombing force with around 1,000 TB-3 series four-engine bombers. The existence of this force was supposed to have had a significant part in the decision by the Japanese to not join in the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 after they had received a heavy dose of bombing from the heavies in the 1939 "incident" in Manchuria.

In the 1930's the RAF perfected its idea of the invincible bomber capable of fighting its way into Germany. It was to have four engines and turrets for its guns. Before the war broke out in September 1939, the British had ordered the Stirling, Halifax, and Manchester. At the same time as the bomber force was being built, there was an insurgent movement within the RAF led by Dowding which was determined to make sure the bomber would not always get through. At the same time as the top commanders in the RAF were selling the heavies to a worried British public, Dowding, building upon the air defense plan the British used in WWI, and adding superb interceptors, and radar, was perfecting his ideas for defense against bombing---against the resistance of his superiors (for example, the Air Staff as late as 1940 tried to replace the Hurricane and Spitfire with the Defiant, which was their idea of a interceptor for destroying bombers). Paradoxically, the British were at the forefront of both strategic bombing and the defense against strategic bombing.

The irony was that the RAF had done little to develop devices for night navigation, had trained little for night navigation, had done little to develop bombs, and had not even trained much in bombing. Just before the war Bomber Command discovered its bombers had trouble navigating by day around the U.K. France and Britain expected war in 1942 when their rearmament would conveniently have reached its completeion, not in 1939 when the momentum was just beginning. Germany, while having delayed its strategic force until the expected arrival of the He 177 in 1941, did devote a great deal of energy to developing navigation aids to not only get bombers to the area of their targets, but even to blind bomb with a startling degree of accuracy. They even had a specialist high-tech bombing unit in place in 1939, KGr100.

All the bomber enthusiasts in the U.S and U.K. had funded their programs (in the case of the U.S., miniscule until WWII) through the adroit use of publicity and by claiming the bomber would be the universal bromide to prevent war, or, if war came, to make it short and comparatively bloodless. This was the bomber dream---to end forever the possibility of a repeat of WWI.

With the coming of war, the RAF Bomber Command suffered a continous seriess of checks on its pre-war claims. First of all, it was pathetically weak, utterly incapable of significant action. The few essays in bomber domination were disastrous---bombers could not hit ships at sea, bombers were massacred by fighters, the government would not allow them to attack strategic targets inside Germany for fear of retaliation by the stronger German bomber force against France, and they were discovering the complete unpreparedness of Bomber Command to operate at night. With the release from restrictions from bombing in Germany after 10 May 1940, the bombing war began in earnest, but Bomber Command was still weak (less than 300 medium bombers). The heavies were a year away and the government was still not prepared to produce bombers in a quantity which would allow a sustained air offensive. The Blitz changed this.

In 1940 the Germans, once again, tutored the British. First their bombers hammered the British fleet in Norway, and demonstrated the impossibility of conducting effective naval and sea operations when the other side had air superiority. Then their tactical bombing facilitated the overrunning of Western Europe. The British day bombers were proved to not be self-defending, as claimed, and were massacred. The mediums were too precious to use in daylight, and the attempts to find a decisive way to use such a tiny force were in vain. Meanwhile, German bombers hammered an aircraft factory in England using Lorenz beam equipment---with a small force, in the dead of night, and bombing blind.

The winter of the bombs was the making of Bomber Command. The near-knock-out blow on Coventy's factories in the fall of 1940, the devastation and near-depopulating of Plymouth, and the crushing blow on London on 10 May 1941 all had a huge impact. While none were decisive, they pointed the way to the "Bomber Barons." The German radio navigation devices showed the British how to overcome the limitations of flying at night. The Blitz removed all moral compunction in the government and in many of the British people about devastating Germany. The burning of the British cities created a desire to hammer the Germans mercilessly by all means available.

In 1941 Bomber Command learned it was incapable of bombing accurately at night (the Butt Report), and, by early 1942, Bomber Command was was still weak. Some wanted to redeploy bombers to be deep Atlantic sub hunters in Coastal Command. Bomber Command was facing dissolution. The coming of Air Marshal Harris in February 1942 was the turn of the tide. The government had a theory about how to make bombing decisive and it was the brainchild of Churchill's scientific advisor Professor Lindemann. He had a made a detailed and systematic study of the German incendiary raids on the U.K., and had worked out a calculous of incendiary tonnage applied to German industrial workers' dwellings to kill or "dehouse" them wholesale. The belief was that accurate bombing was impossible at night so the best use of bombing was to burn out factories and workers together with massed raids on industial areas. The ante of war had just been raised to a new and cold-bloodedly horrible level, but the Germans had, as Churchill said "sown the wind and reaped the whirlwind."

Harris completed the process by carefully studying the German bombing methods to work out the means to compress the raids in time and space for massive concentration in order to create uncontrollable fires which would overwhelm local fire departments. By borrowing bombers from training units, he was able to mount three near 1,000 bomber raids which did considerable damage to Cologne, raised British morale, demonstrated to the suffering Soviets the British were doing their bit with a strategic attack on Germany, inflicted a war indemnity on the German people which Churchill and his Cabinet did not believe they would be willing to pay, and faced Hitler with the possibility of severe damage to German production. At the same time, Harris tried several bold daylight raids, using the brand-new Lancasters, to see if heavies could, indeed, be self-defending, and if their massive carrying capacity could be used against pin-point targets. Despite the heavy armor carried by the Lancs, their .303 caliber guns were their undoing. Harris immediately wanted .50 calber guns, and, instead of being helped, ran head-on into official bureaucracy which stalled the introduction of the heavier guns for two years. Harris was also forced to deal with conflicting intelligence from RAF and government agencies reporting on German production, bombing effectiveness, and formulating bombing policy. Since 1940 there had been numerous "bottleneck" theories including oil production and aircraft production among others. Harris found the Lindemann theory clear and do-able---burn-out the industrial areas and the workers and all else would follow from this.

This was the policy followed by Bomber Command until it was diverted to supporting the railway bombing prior to D-Day in 1944. The results were severe damage to the Ruhr in 1943 forcing the decentralization of production in Germany, and Hamburg was burned killing thousands and forcing the evacuation of thousands. In the fall of 1943 Harris embarked on his great plan---the destruction of Berlin, which he believed would bring Germany to surrender. He asked for three thousand Lancasters and the Americans to join in the operation---he received neither. The operation failed conspicuously. Not only was Berlin not destroyed but the German night fighters were on the verge of making Bomber Command's night operations impossible due to heavy losses.

By the spring of 1944, strategic bombing could point to one clear cut success---the British raids on northern Italy in 1943 broke the shaky morale of the fed-up Italians, brought down Mussolini, and led the King to surrender Italy to the Allies---and Italy was immediately occupied by the Germans.

The Americans commenced their bombing operations with a mixture of optimism and hubris. They believed they would show the British how to bomb during the day and would win the war by destroying targets with direct attacks on the industries and not by area bombing. Simply put, their hopes were undone by European weather which forced them to bomb blind most of the time with little in the way of advanced equipment to help. Thus, the Americans were area bombing, but were doing so unsystematically without the tactics developed by the British, without their devices, and without the cover of night. This had a profound influence on AAF planners in Washington and on the greatest American bombing tactician, Curtis LeMay, who was appointed to command the 20th Air Force's B-29s in 1945. They recognized daylight precision bombing had been a flop in Europe, and it was proving to be a flop against Japan due to the high altitude jet stream, and due to the high degree of decentralization of production in Japan where machines had been dispersed to residential areas to foil American precision attacks on factories. Thus, in the Pacific, far from Harris wagging a finger to say "I told you so," the Americans made a radical shift to low altitude area bombing with incendiaries which devastated Japan. With the use of the atomic bombs, which presented the suicidal Army and Navy diehards in the government with a near-supernatural fait accompli to which they could bow without losing face, strategic bombing finally proved to be decisive.

Europe proved to be a mixed bag. By the summer of 1944, Bomber Command was hitting more accurately at night than the Americans were by day due to radical changes in bombing tactics which were adopted during the pre-D-Day bombing. The Achilles heel of the German war economy, oil production, was found and struck after much wrangling by the Americans. The winter/spring 1944 American assault on the German aircraft industry was decisive in that it forced the Germans to come up and fight on the American's terms and the air battles killed or put out of action the bulk of the best remaining German fighter pilots. The German fighters would not have risen to the bait unless the aircraft factories had been the targets---a classic example of strategic cooperation between the bombers and fighters. The bombers had the range to reach deep into Germany to hit the fighter plants with crushing pattern bombing, and the fighters had the range to go with them. This was perfect all-arms coordination. No tactical bomber could have done this. The Germans took huge losses in their fighters in Normandy because they were fighting with their third-string who had not been properly trained due to lack of aviation gas. They continued to take heavy losses until November 1944 when Hitler realized flak was then more effective than the untrained and grossly outnumbered crews he had left in the fighter arm. From this time onward the fighters were mainly grounded.

To argue tactical air versus strategic bombing in WWII is pointless. Strategic bombing would have been tried. It was inevitable. The belief was so strong and so widespread that the heavy bomber was a war-winning weapon in itself that this alone would have guaranteed an attempt would have been made to end the war with it. The Germans even succumbed to the temptation to use their tactical bombers strategically against England hoping to bomb them into surrender in 1940-41. There can't be any denying that strategic bombing affected the German war effeort, but it was never decisive. That the German mobile units had to depend on capturing American fuel dumps to keep going in the Ardennes offensive in December 1944 demonstrated the effect of strategic bombing. That the German fighter arm was so degraded it was not able to give air cover to Reich or the army from the late spring of 1944 demonstrated the effect of strategic bombing. The Americans tried to use fight-bombers as strategic bombers in Vietnam and the program failed conspicuously. Hanoi sank to its knees in three weeks of pummeling by SAC's B-52s in December 1972 after resisting the fighter bombers for four years in 1965-68. From a purely technical standpoint, tactical bombers are not able to deliver the tonnage to be effective. If you want to destroy a factory, you have to pattern bomb it. No tactical bomber attack could have crushed the morale of the Iraqi Republican Guard units in the 1991 Gulf War. The B-52s could.

Haigotron
11-10-2006, 01:42 PM
Can someone explain how having 2 linked engines (first of all what is linked between them?) helped with divebombing?

Thank you http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://i40.photobucket.com/albums/e204/haigotron/il2banner.png
The End is Nigh: The World will END in two weeks...be sure!

leitmotiv
11-10-2006, 01:47 PM
Two nacelles instead of four decreased drag. Udet envisaged a super Ju 88. Supposedly, a four-engine, four nacelle dive bomber was aerodynamically impossible. As it transpired, the He 177 was too heavy to dive bomb regardless. Even the smaller Do 217 proved to be too heavy for dive bombing.

Haigotron
11-10-2006, 01:53 PM
thanks leitmotive, but what does it mean by linked? intake is linked?<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

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The End is Nigh: The World will END in two weeks...be sure!

Aaron_GT
11-10-2006, 02:01 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">In the 1930's the RAF perfected its idea of the invincible bomber capable of fighting its way into Germany. It was to have four engines and turrets for its guns. Before the war broke out in September 1939, the British had ordered the Stirling, Halifax, and Manchester. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Excellent essay, leitmotiv, but a bit extra. Handley-Page and Avro originally pitched what ultimately became the Halfix and Lancaster (the former was pretty much a total redesign) to P.13/36, which was a specification for twin-engined medium bombers. The Stirling was the true 4 engined heavy in that it was pitched to B.X/36 (X=1??) which called for a 4 engined aircraft. The Stirling was rather bigger than the other two, and had a better short-range load. It was hampered by its short wings (which were not due to hangar restrictions as some claimed) which limited ceiling, plus its bombbay (which was less adaptable).

In the end the twin-engined predecessor to the Halifax wasn't even built, and the Manchester's engines were unreliable, hence the move to a 4-engined version. So quite a parallel with the He-177, except that the Lancaster was much more widely used than the He-177.

Aaron_GT
11-10-2006, 02:09 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">If you want to destroy a factory, you have to pattern bomb it. No tactical bomber attack could have crushed the morale of the Iraqi Republican Guard units in the 1991 Gulf War. The B-52s could. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Here I'd argue that B-52s were being used in a tactical role, but just with a bigger bomb load capacity, much like attacks by Lancasters, B24s, etc in Normandy in 1944. If you have the bombers you may as well use them, though.

With regard to attacks on factories, in Kosovo in 1999 fighter bombers and missiles (which have similar warhead sizes to the load of modern fighter bombers) were used to take out factories. But then a modern fighter bomber packs the load capacity of a heavy bomber of WW2.

leitmotiv
11-10-2006, 02:52 PM
Let's get the terminology correct:

Tactical bombing is bombing in direct support of land or sea battles, in the area of operations of either. Strategic bombers bombing Caen during the Normandy fighting is an example of heavy bombers used tactically.

Strategic bombing is attacking distant targets in the enemy's heartland such as industries, tank or aircraft parks, military bases, civilian areas, ports, refineries, or railroad stations.

In Vietnam, almost all the bombing B-52s did was in direct support of land battles, but, when they were used against Hanoi in '72, it was strategic bombing.

leitmotiv
11-11-2006, 01:49 AM
What I was maladroitly and inelegantly describing was that the He 177's engines were two engines, side-by-side, driving a common propellor shaft. The Germans were unable to make even a prototype for a 2000hp engine, like the British were developing for the Typhoon, so they came up with 2000hp by a novel approach.

woofiedog
11-11-2006, 07:12 AM
Image Gallary of WWII Aircraft Engines...

Links:
http://www.enginehistory.org/buckel_galleries.htm
http://www.luftarchiv.de/index.htm?http://www.luftarchiv.de/motoren/benz.htm

http://www.enginehistory.org/Gallery/JimBuckel/Allison%20V-3420%20for%20Fisher%20P-75A%20Eagle%201-18.JPG
Jim Buckel... Allison V-3420

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/69/Napier_Sabre01.jpg/800px-Napier_Sabre01.jpg
Napier Sabre

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/58/Aircraft_engine_DB_610_front.jpg/800px-Aircraft_engine_DB_610_front.jpg
Daimler-Benz DB 610

http://www.luftarchiv.de/motoren/db_610.jpg <div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v438/woofiedog/WOOFIEDOG.jpg

Hunter 82's PC component shop
http://www.magnum-pc.com/
https://usm.channelonline.com/magnumpc/storesite/Search/External/

Sergio_101
11-11-2006, 12:56 PM
Having the reference books here I have
gone over the V-3420 and DB-610 designs as
closely as I can having no actual
blue prints, only high quality drawings and photos
intended for public use, not engineering review...

The V-3420 has one possible design advantage.
A common crankcase instead of two seperate
crank cases on a common gear box.
This simplifies oil scavanging and greatly reduces
external plumbing and complexity.
The common crankcase, although also having two
crankshafts, also should be of greater strength.

In the few projects that used the V-3420 it's
reliability was excellent. The Fischer XP-75
had over heating problems, not the fault of the engine.http://1000aircraftphotos.com/Contributions/Larkins/2972L.jpg

Note the use of 4 twinned Allison V-1710s.
Is it then a 4 engined bomber using V-3420s
or is it a 8 engined bomber using V-1710s?


Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

Ratsack
12-08-2006, 04:24 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
Strategic bombing in WWII is a very complex subject. First of all.... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

G'day Leitmotiv,

I?ve been meaning to come back to this for ages but I haven?t got around to it. My apologies for the tardy response.

You gave an interesting run down on the development of the strategic bombing campaign during WWII in the post above (page 2 of this thread). For the purposes of this discussion, I would like to separate the USAAF?s contribution from that of the RAF Bomber Command, given that they fought virtually separate campaigns until early 1944. Focussing on the daylight campaigns also keeps the breadth of the discussion more manageable. In addition, the Americans came to strategic bombing with a well-articulated theory and doctrine, and it?s this that I wish to critique. By contrast, the RAF fell to night bombing as the best that was possible under the circumstances. It was an example of the technical tail wagging the strategy dog. Where the British approach was inherently pragmatic, the U.S. approach was doctrinal.

The main part of your narrative with which I disagree is the contention that the heavy bombers were the only thing that could?ve drawn the Jagdwaffe to combat - and thus to destruction - in early 1944. I think this is untrue, and that there were other ways to achieve this. To demonstrate this point, what follows is an analysis of what the Allies knew about the conduct of air operations by 1943, and how that knowledge might have been applied to the daylight air strategy. What we?ll see is that there was already plenty of information and experience available on which to base an alternative and more effective strategy. I will then outline what that strategy might have looked like in practice.


The Germans themselves had demonstrated that a direct attack on the air defence system itself would draw the defenders. We know that during the Battle of Britain the RAF was hardest pressed when the Luftwaffe went after the southern airfields and Sector Stations. During the period from 15 August 1940 until the end of the first week of September 1940, the Germans pressed the Fighter Command almost to breaking point. Dowding was nearing the point where he either had to withdraw his force from southern England, or let his command be destroyed. The reason this attack caused such a problem was that Fighter Command had to defend the target ? itself ? or cease to exist as a coherent force. The German attacks on the Sector Stations in August were critical. As it was put in the West Point military history of WWII:

?had [the Germans] understood the situation, they doubtless could have deprived the Fighter Command of mass and economy of force by punching out its brains in its control rooms.

This is from Thomas E. Greiss (ed.), ?The Battle of Britain?, in The Second World War: Europe & the Mediterranean, (Avery, New Jersey, 1989), p. 76. The important point here is that while the Germans didn?t understand the significance of these strikes, the RAF did.

We also know that the most destructive individual German bombing strikes were performed by relatively small numbers of bombers that attacked with surprise, usually from low altitude. An excellent example of this is the one of the attacks on the station at Biggin Hill in early August. A formation of nine (9!!) Ju-88s, escorted by twelve Bf-109s, separated from a larger formation milling on the French side of the Channel during the early evening, and dropped to just below some cloud at 5,000 feet to cross the Channel. They hit land and headed for Biggin, where they achieved complete surprise as they made:

?a fast, low run on the airfield on the hill. While the 109s strafed, each bomber dropped two weapons so that eighteen bombs wrecked workshops, the M.T. yard, the armoury, the meteorological office, and the N.A.A.F.I. The Sergeants? Mess, the W.A.A.F. quarters, and the airmen?s barracks were made uninhabitable. Most of the transport, carefully dispersed, was badly damaged: two Spitfires were burnt out, all electricity, water and gas mains were cut, most telephone communications were out, and thirty nine personnel were killed.

The bombers escaped unmolested, and the escorts engaged some interceptors on the way out. This relatively tiny force ? a mere 21 aircraft in all - performed the single most destructive raid of the Battle, for the loss of a single 109. (From J.E. (?Johnnie?) Johnson, Full Circle, (Cassel & Co, London, 2001), p. 146.)

Thirdly, we know that the German attacks on the radar system had a crippling effect on Fighter Command. On the morning of 12 Aug., the Germans attacked the radar stations at Dover, Rye, Pevensey, and Dunkirk (Kent), putting some of them out of action for several hours. The integrated coverage of the south coast was compromised. (David E. Fisher, A Summer Bright and Terrible, (Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005), p. 168.) Attacks over the next three days knocked out more stations, so that by evening of 15 Aug., six out of the total of only 20 Chain Home stations were down, including Ventnor, which was out for eleven days. (ibid, p.180, and Greiss (ed), ?Battle of Britain?, pp. 75-6.)

The loss of early warning and plotting information meant that Fighter Command was blind in the region where the Chain Home stations were out of action. This meant the loss of the main force-multiplier for the defence. The Germans considered these attacks unproductive and discontinued them after the Commanders? conference on 15 Aug., but they were simply wrong in this judgement. The Brits, who were on the receiving end of the damage, knew far better what this attack was really worth if the Germans had pursued it. It would have been decisive. (Greiss)

I have used the word ?we? above, saying that ?we? know these things. The ?we? to whom I am referring is not just us, sitting at our computers nearly seventy years after the fact, with the full benefit of hindsight. I am actually referring to the Allies at the time, and in particular, to the RAF. The RAF had learned these lessons, at terrible cost. By the end of 1940 they had demonstrated the value of an integrated air defence system and, even more valuably, they understood the circumstances under which such a system could be defeated. Nobody understood the problems better than they.

The fact of the matter was that the Germans, despite their dilettante approach to strategy during the Battle, had inadvertently pointed the way. By extensively testing the British defence system, they had demonstrated to the British ? and anybody else who cared to pay attention - the attack methods that worked and those that didn?t. The four key lessons are as follows:

1. critical elements of the air defence system, such as the radar and sector stations, were vulnerable to precision air attack. To this list might be added the radio transmitters used to direct the interceptors.

2. where the air defence system was defeated or disrupted, the defenders were forced to use highly ineffective pre-radar tactics of standing patrol and guidance by non-expert ground observers.

3. where the air defence system could be defeated or evaded, it was possible to bomb with minimal losses; and

4. very small numbers of bombers delivering their weapons accurately from low altitude could do far more damage than large formations bombing from high altitude. Accuracy was more valuable than quantity of bombs delivered.

The Germans had actually mapped out the road to air superiority in airspace under the enemy?s radar control. All that was required was Allied air leaders able and willing to heed the lessons. The irony of this is that the Allies spurned this unintended gift, preferring instead to hurl themselves in frontal assault against the German air defence system.

Part two of this post to follow.

cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

Ratsack
12-08-2006, 04:24 AM
Part Two

In light of the clear lessons of the Battle of Britain, it is my contention that the Allies had available to them a viable air strategy that would destroy the German air defence system and deliver the conditions necessary for the destruction of German industry on a vast scale. It would achieve this without the requirement for huge fleets of heavy bombers, bombing inaccurately from high altitude. It would also do the job with far fewer losses than those the USAAF finally accepted to achieve the same ends.

At the highest level, the strategy is simple and obvious: attack and destroy the German air defence system. The key benefit of destroying the air defence system is that once it is disabled or destroyed, the Allies would be able to attack any target they chose, and do so more effectively, and with lower losses. The targets could include German industry, oil production, transport, ?leadership? targets, and so on. As Adolf Galland put it in The First and Last, once the war for the air was won, the Allies could conduct warfare from the air at will.

For the purposes of planning a series of operations to destroy the German air defence system, the Allies could consider the key elements of that system to be:
* the German fighters themselves;
* the airfields and their supporting infrastructure;
* the radar sites and their supporting systems;
* the control centres;
* the radio navigation beacons; and
* the large, powerful radio transmitters used to transmit instructions to aircraft in the air.

As the British had discovered to their discomfort during the Battle of Britain, all of these elements of the system were vulnerable to air attack. The question then becomes, what sort of operations could be conducted to destroy or neutralise this target set? The answer is what I would term, the ?Air Superiority? strategy, and it comprises a number of tasks, some of which can be conducted simultaneously.

The first task would be intelligence collection: the sites must be located. For the airfields and controls centres this would be a matter of aerial reconnaissance and human-source intelligence from France and the Low Countries. The location of the nav. beacons, radio transmitters and radar sites would require an intensive electronic intelligence (ELINT) campaign. The British were already well advanced in this regard by 1942. Indeed, in the lead up to D-Day in 1944, all of the German radar sites around Calais were located and destroyed, with a single exception that was left as part of a deception operation. The capability was there. (See Operation TAXABLE. John Terraine, The Right of the Line, (Wordsworth, Ware, 1997), p. 629.) The British also had a very well developed signals intelligence (SIGINT) system in place, and this would be useful later also.

The second task would be the construction in Britain of the force suited to destroy these targets. The bomber requirement would be for aircraft able to deliver weapons with a high degree of accuracy. This requirement rules out high-altitude bombing: there would be no requirement to plaster a target area and measure the accuracy of the attack by calculating the percentage of weapons that landed within 2 km of the target. The requirement would be to deliver the bombs to the target and destroy it, first time. The weapons themselves need not be particularly heavy, like the 4,000 lb ?cookie? aerial mines used by Bomber Command. Bombs in the 1,000 lb category would be sufficient for most purposes, provided they were dropped with sufficient accuracy. Aircraft available in 1943 that were capable of performing this role include the B-25, B-26, A-20 (Boston), Mosquito, P-47, P-38, Hawker Typhoon, and Mustang I. By the end of 1943 we could add the P-51B and Tempest V to this list.

For the fighter roles, the obvious choices are the P-38, P-47, P-51, Tempest and Spitfire. While the Spit IX as it existed in 1943 could be used for short-range roles, there was no technical reason its range could not have been improved in 1943 by adding the rear fuselage tank that was introduced in 1944. Either way, the Spitfire IX would be a valuable addition to the force. The tasks of the fighters would include escort, sweep, flak suppression, strafing and fighter-bombing.

In addition, the force would also require an airborne ELINT capability in the later stages of the campaign. This could be based on existing British ELINT technology, and fitted in an existing heavy or large medium bomber airframe (B-17, B-24, Lancaster, Halifax, Wellington, etc). Tasks would include monitoring German radar and radio activity to confirm radar / radio kills, identify new sites, and monitor repaired sites.

These first and second tasks would be carried out concurrently, so that when the target list was ready, the force would be deployed and ready to attack.

The third task would be the first operational phase. The objective would be to clear the Luftwaffe and its supporting organisation out of northern France. In particular, the attacks would concentrate on the German early warning system (i.e., radar sites). There would be two immediate pay offs from this assault. Firstly, it would give the Allies air superiority into northern France, allowing Allied air forces in Britain to move to the exploitation phase. This might include the interdiction of German communications, which would have obvious benefits in the lead up to the cross channel invasion. German forces in France could be paralysed in daylight hours, again with obvious benefits to the planned invasion.

Secondly, the removal of German radar sites in France would vastly reduce German early warning and response time for raids further into Germany itself. The radars in France picked up Allied formations as they gathered over England: anything flying higher than 5,000 feet was visible on the Freya systems out to a range of roughly 100 miles. (Gordon Swanborough & William Green, The Focke Wulf Fw190, (David & Charles, London, 1976), p.102) That early warning would be eliminated, particularly for aircraft operating at lower altitudes. This attack would begin the erosion of the force-multiplying effect of the German air defence system.

Given that the Germans fighters tended to avoid combat with superior Allied formations until 1943, we might expect the early parts of this assault to proceed with minimal resistance until the Germans understood that the target was their entire air defence capability. Then the fighters would be drawn to combat. We could therefore expect a lot of short, sharp engagements as the German fighters attempted to intercept. These would fall away as the warning system was destroyed. The German fighters would either withdraw to airspace under German radar control, or resort to ineffective standing patrols. In addition, the nature of the targets would ensure that in most cases it would not be necessary to dispatch aircraft that need escort: a group of Mustangs, Typhoons or P-38s - some carrying bombs or rockets, some without - could take out the radar sites AND look after themselves if the Jagdfwaffe show up.

On the ground, we would expect the Germans to take counter measures. These would include camouflaging their radar sites, deployment of mobile radar systems and changes to their operational practices, such as ?blinking?. We would also expect them to beef up their light AAA defences around radar sites. However, destruction of fixed sites serviced with landline communications would probably lead the Germans to use radio to communicate from radar sites to control centres. This would be another source of ELINT and SIGINT for the Allied controllers.

The next phase would be the extension of the attack further to the East. This would require the longer-ranged aircraft (P-38, Mustang I, P-51) acting in the escorting role, and it would also require the introduction of the airborne ELINT capability. The objective would be to clear the Luftwaffe right out of western Europe to the German border. This second phase of the assault would benefit from the effects of the first attacks because the Germans would have far less warning of the Allied attacks. As a consequence, they would have a reasonable chance of achieving surprise in attacks on Western Germany.

The airborne ELINT would be deployed in Allied-controlled airspace well behind the assaulting aircraft, with a heavy local fighter escort. It would search for operational sites along or near the path of the assault group, and alert the fighters of the assault group so they could find those sites and shut them down. For the fighters, the lines separating escort, target support and attack would thus become very thin.

Strong resistance could be expected from the start of this phase. The air-to-air combats would be heavy, and the escorts would have to be numerous to ensure the success of the bombing. However, as with the first attack phase, the nature of the attacking aircraft ? mostly fighter types ? would make the interception job very expensive for the Germans. For those attacks requiring heavier bomb loads, fast bombers (i.e., Mosquito) could be used.

Nearly all of the action described so far would take place at low-altitude. The notable exception is the airborne ELINT function, which would be carried out at high altitude, but well inside friendly airspace. The main reasons for this are to reduce or eliminate early warning, and to provide the bombing accuracy necessary to actually destroy targets. There would be no requirement in this force for large, high-altitude aerial battleships. Speed and accuracy would be the primary attributes of the Air Superiority air force.

The rest of the campaign follows fairly obviously on from there, with each phase biting further into the German defence system, and each benefiting from the destruction wrought by the previous assault. By the end of it, the German air defence system of radar, communication and control, airfields, aircraft and aircrew would be in ruins. Germany would be laid bare to the heavy bombers, who could then incinerate any and all targets they chose, with pinpoint accuracy and minimal losses. There would, for example, be no attacks on ball bearing plants that reduce production by X percentage. The attack would be delivered with excellent accuracy from 5-15,000 feet (to stay out of the light AAA), and the ball bearing complex would be WIPED OUT. Substitute oil or your target of preference.

This is in stark contrast to how the daylight offensive was actually carried out. The formations formed up over England, circling over the Wash to gain height. They were picked up by German radar, and the Jagdwaffe went into action, pre-positioning fighters and crews at forward bases. The assault would then go in, against a fully alerted and active air defence system. The Germans would vector their interceptors into the path of the bombers and try to arrange their attacks so that they went in where the escorts were thinnest or absent altogether. The rest of the story is very well documented.

In tactical terms, the approach adopted by Spaatz and Eaker before him was very primitive. The tactic that finally worked was attrition. The bombers kept coming in numbers that grew faster than the defending force could grow to keep up. If you consider the USAAF heavy bomber losses at Schweinfurt (either raid), they amounted to 60 planes. That is a loss rate of 25% from an attacking force of 240 bombers. And yet in Big Week, the USAAF lost 59 heavies in a single attack on Berlin. The difference was that the attacking force was more than 1,000 bombers strong. A 6% loss rate is tolerable, even though the losses in absolute terms were practically the same. The escorts helped by increasing German losses and reducing American losses, but this shouldn?t disguise the fact that the strategy Spaatz was pursuing was one of attrition. It was the aerial equivalent of defeating machine guns by human wave assault.

Thus my contention that the daylight strategic bombing offensive as carried out was unnecessarily expensive, and unnecessarily long. It was needlessly primitive in tactical approach, and it did not represent a combined arms offensive at all, but rather the single-minded pursuit of a theoretical ideal that placed the primacy of an independent air strategy above all else. It was in fact the very antithesis of combined arms.


cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

Maj.Kaos
12-08-2006, 12:00 PM
Very good thread! My uncle was 20 year bomber pilot with USAF. We've had good talks about various a/c. His remark about the B-29 was that the pilots referred to engine status as "three turning, one burning". Apparantly the flight engineer had a really busy job monitoring the engines.

One of my college professors was USAF officer involved with the strategic bombing campaign review in post-war Europe, said their reports were mostly stamped confidential and promptly ignored because the value of the bombing results were dubious at best, and the general impression among their group was that great sacrifices were made for mediocre results.

I read that Germany's weapon production increased many fold during the bombing campaign. But that may be due to switching from civilian production to military production. The Nazis hadn't really taken the total war thing seriously, thinking they could beat the Allies with superior weapons, instead of superior numbers.

What I find ironic is the fire bombings of Hamburg, Bremen, and Dresden, etc. later in the war. The German bombing of Britain during summer of '41 showed the Allies that civilian morale only stiffened against the bombings. So, just what did the Allies expect to achieve with these retaliation bombings? A warm, fuzzy revenge feeling?

hop2002
12-08-2006, 02:16 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">What I find ironic is the fire bombings of Hamburg, Bremen, and Dresden, etc. later in the war. The German bombing of Britain during summer of '41 showed the Allies that civilian morale only stiffened against the bombings. So, just what did the Allies expect to achieve with these retaliation bombings? A warm, fuzzy revenge feeling? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually it was during the autumn/winter of 1940 and spring of 1941 that Germany bombed the British civilian population.

However, what the allies expected to achieve can be summed up in a letter from Herschel Johnson to the US secretary of state describing the effects of German bombing of British cities in 1940:

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">At numerous industrial plants, in this part of England, where
hundreds of workmen are employed, only a neglible percent of
uch workpeople is not in one way or another adversely affected
i %n consequence of air raids. Loss of sleep is a factor even in
cases where the workmen remain at home and do not repair to shelters.
But, generally speaking, a more potent factor is worry induced
by the disintegration of family life. It requires little imagination
to comprehend what must be the state of mind of a workman who
begins his task in the morning knowing that his wife and children
are standing at some windswept bus stop both hungry and cold,
or what must be the state of mind of a workman who knows that
his wife and family must remain in a house which has been rendered
unfit for human habitation and which it is beyond his means to
repair.




The bombing of working-class residential districts in this
area has come to be accepted as an ingenious and effective move
on the part of Germany. Moreover, such bombing has come to be
viewed as even a greater menace than the damage actually done
to industrial plant. What happened at Coventry well illustrates
the devilish effectiveness of the bombing of districts inhabited
by working-class people. It seems to be pretty well established
that as many as 70,000 houses in the comparatively small city
of Coventry were affected by bombing and that of these 30,000
were made unfit for human habitation, and 7,000 demolished entirely.




The big raid on Coventry took place during the night of November
14-15, 1940. Since that time some weeks have elapsed and great
strides have been made in the direction of make-shift repairs
to damaged working-class residences. But there is not a sizeable
industrial enterprise in the whole of Coventry whose production
is not still being adversely affected by raiding has wrought
in the lives of Coventry working people. There hovers over that
city an apprehensiveness which has lingered since the raid took
place. This apprehensiveness is born of a realization that the
Germans can at will again do to Coventry what they did to it
during that one horrible night in November.




Intricate, costly, and heavy machine tools can be extricated
from the cellars of demolished manufacturing plants. Many of
them can be repaired and installed in new plant. But the workers
who man these machines, so long as they live as they do today,
can never attain the efficiency which, before the events in question
took place, they maintained as a mere matter of course. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's worth pointing out that absenteeism in German industry reached about 20% of the workforce in late 1943 and 1944. ie at any one time, 20% of the workers who were supposed to be at work were not.

Albert Speer, at the start of 1945, estimated that Germany had lost about 33% of production of tanks, aircraft and trucks in 1944 due to allied bombing.

Kurfurst__
12-08-2006, 04:05 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by hop2002:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">What I find ironic is the fire bombings of Hamburg, Bremen, and Dresden, etc. later in the war. The German bombing of Britain during summer of '41 showed the Allies that civilian morale only stiffened against the bombings. So, just what did the Allies expect to achieve with these retaliation bombings? A warm, fuzzy revenge feeling? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually it was during the autumn/winter of 1940 and spring of 1941 that Germany bombed the British civilian population. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I smell revinionism and relativisation. Oh, it's Hop again. It's curious that you claim that the British civillian population was targeted - the usual excuse for RAF terror raids in the war, 'they started it' - whenever even modern day British historians denies such version, forged in 1940 by wartime propaganda, sadly still repeated by some.

Unfortunately for such agendas, there's no sign in the German operational orders for targetting civvies. In fact, the Germans themselves classified the following raids only as repraisal raids - an answer to predating and parellel British attacks on German population centres :

- 7 September 1940 (this was conducted as a repraisal of Bomber Commands bombing of Berlin a bit earlier)
- 16/17 April 1941
- 19/20 April 1941
- 10/11 May 1941

Essentially it was entially correct to note these attacks on the British civilian population were performed in 1941 - as repraisals to British attacks.

It's worth notin that 'terror bombing' was explicitely prohibted at the start of the battle, see Directive No. 17 'for the conduct of air and sea warfare aganist England', from 1st August 1940 :

'5. I reserve to myself the right to decide on terror attacks as measures of reprisal.'

Göing's general orders to the Luftwaffe, from 30th June 1940 are even more explicit in this matter :

'(A) The war against England is to be restricted to destructive attacks against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces. ... It is also stressed that every effort should be made to avoid unneccesary loss of life amongst the civillian population.'

Ie. on 14 Sept 1940, Jeschonek suggested Hitler the very thing, 'to bomb population districts in order to provoke mass panic in the English working class', was refused by Hitler, saying that :

'Attack on targets having military value are always top priority, as it destroys assets which are unrecoverable. As long as there are targets of military importance, we should stay with those'. Subsequently, Hitler gave order that 'attacks on London are to be directed, via broadening the attacked areas, against targets of military importance and targets of vital importance to the city, the line being drawn at railroad stations'.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
However, what the allies expected to achieve can be summed up in a letter from Herschel Johnson to the US secretary of state describing the effects of German bombing of British cities in 1940: </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It seems to be just Herschel Johnson's opinion, who probably did not have as good insight into the matters as the British had - and not that of 'The Allies'. He was probably just not in the correct position, not attanding to the British meetings and analyising at the time of the bombing, ie. the one another American, General Henry Arnold, from the USAAF Staff described in his book 'Global Mission'(1949). Unlike Herschel, Arnold did participate on such meetings, one in April 1941 :


'Lord Sinclair [head of the Air Ministry at the time] ... first took me to the Air Raid Precaution Office where there was a map showing the location of all bombs dropped. They were spread out all over London, in most cases close to railroad stations, switching points, power houses, transformers, bridges, docks, warehouses, and factories; but a lot were in the residental areas. Every bomb dropped was accurately plotted.'

Sir Basil Collier, author of the official history of Britain's Air Defenses, 'The Defence of the United Kingdom' (1957) wrote that :


'Altough the plan adopted by the Luftwaffe early September had mentioned attacks on the population of large cities, detailed records of the raids made during the automn and the winter of 1940-41 does not suggest that indiscriminate bombing of the civillians was intended. The points of aim selected were largely factories and docks. Other objectives specifically allotted to bomber-crews included the City [center of business and financial life] of London and the govermental quarter rounds Whitehall.'



<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">It's worth pointing out that absenteeism in German industry reached about 20% of the workforce in late 1943 and 1944. ie at any one time, 20% of the workers who were supposed to be at work were not. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Exact reference please.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Albert Speer, at the start of 1945, estimated that Germany had lost about 33% of production of tanks, aircraft and trucks in 1944 due to allied bombing. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Exact reference please.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42333000/jpg/_42333631_puskasbudapest_ap203b.jpg
In memoriam Puskás Ferenc,2 April 1927 - 17 November 2006.
Nyugodjon Békében - May he rest in Peace.

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/
Kurfürst - Your Resource for Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance!

"The Me 109 was exceptional in turning combat. If there is a fighter plane built for turning combat , it has to be the Messer! Speedy, maneuverable (especially in the vertical) and extremely dynamic."
- Major Kozhemyako, Soviet fighter pilot of the VVS

Ignored Posters : AKA_Tagert, Wurkeri, Gibbage, LStarosta, Sergio_101.

Nimits
12-08-2006, 05:00 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Unfortunately for such agendas, there's no sign in the German operational orders for targetting civvies. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

A) British night raids were originally targetted against targets of military value.

B) The Germans certainly did intentionally target civilians at Warsaw and Rotterdam, prior to the Battle of Britain.

Ratsack
12-08-2006, 05:46 PM
Kurfurst, Nimits,

This argument about the targeting of civilians is pointless. If you follow the 'who dunnit first' argument back to its logical conclusion, you end up with Brits using it in Iraq and elsewhere, then back to the Germans in 1917 against London, then back to the Italians in Libya, then we end up talking about blockade as an attack on civilians, and how far back do we want to take this? Drake? Masada? Babylon?

Civilians get killed, and the air weapon is no exception. It?s not unusual for civilians to be targeted, either. Historically, it?s been the norm. There was a brief interlude in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when white folk thought it a bit beastly to target white civilians, but that?s about as far as we can take it.

I suggest that this line of ?who was to blame? argument will only get this thread locked. Please don?t.

Cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

Kurfurst__
12-08-2006, 05:55 PM
I agree, Ratsack, and sorry for the offtrack. On my part i do not wish to continue it, anyway I made my point (which wasn't 'who to blame' as I believe this is silly, the WHY and HOW is so much more interesting, I was just putting some old myths to rest).<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42333000/jpg/_42333631_puskasbudapest_ap203b.jpg
In memoriam Puskás Ferenc,2 April 1927 - 17 November 2006.
Nyugodjon Békében - May he rest in Peace.

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/
Kurfürst - Your Resource for Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance!

"The Me 109 was exceptional in turning combat. If there is a fighter plane built for turning combat , it has to be the Messer! Speedy, maneuverable (especially in the vertical) and extremely dynamic."
- Major Kozhemyako, Soviet fighter pilot of the VVS

Ignored Posters : AKA_Tagert, Wurkeri, Gibbage, LStarosta, Sergio_101.

Sergio_101
12-08-2006, 06:14 PM
kurfie/Isegrim, perhaps you nees a refresher.

Germany DID START IT! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/mockface.gif
And in case you missed it, Germany LOST! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/bigtears.gif
Bombing civillians was never a German problem,
they did it well! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif
Mass murder of civillians was a German specialty! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif
Working people to death instead of murdering them outright was also a German thing. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/784.gif

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

Philipscdrw
12-08-2006, 06:36 PM
Keeping in character, eh Sergio? http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

That's an excellent article you've written there Ratsack (it's too informative to be merely a 'post', IMO! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif ) It could make an interesting 'what-if' campaign in FB too...<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

------------------------------------------------------------
PhilipsCDRw

PF_Tini's Simple Guide to Switching 4.04m, 4.05m, and 4.07m. (http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/7351046415)
Flying on Hyperlobby as EAF_T_Dozer

LStarosta
12-08-2006, 07:04 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
kurfie/Isegrim, perhaps you nees a refresher.

Germany DID START IT! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/mockface.gif
And in case you missed it, Germany LOST! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/bigtears.gif
Bombing civillians was never a German problem,
they did it well! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif
Mass murder of civillians was a German specialty! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif
Working people to death instead of murdering them outright was also a German thing. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/784.gif

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

+1

Next thing you know, they'll deny the Holocaust.

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

http://img109.imageshack.us/img109/1872/fe4ae1e074f2ea8e1878fa1kn2.gif (http://irwinnotguaranteed.ytmnd.com/)

Ratsack
12-08-2006, 11:14 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Philipscdrw:
Keeping in character, eh Sergio? http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

That's an excellent article you've written there Ratsack (it's too informative to be merely a 'post', IMO! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif ) It could make an interesting 'what-if' campaign in FB too... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks for the kind words. It's something that's bugged me since I was a kid. I always thought the popular 'histories' of this subject missed a few critical points.

cheers
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

Sergio_101
12-09-2006, 04:38 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Philipscdrw:
Keeping in character, eh Sergio? http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

That's an excellent article you've written there Ratsack (it's too informative to be merely a 'post', IMO! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif ) It could make an interesting 'what-if' campaign in FB too... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Really?
Don't like my cold slap of reality?
Kurfie is a bleeding apologist.
He needs a 'wake up' once in a while.

Kurfurst.....

Show me a Allied forced labor camp.
Show me an Allied death camp system where 6,000,000 "aryans" were murdered?
Show me where a few hundred civillians were herded into a church
then the building burned while those who escaped were machinegunned.
Cat got your tounge?

No Kurfie, it's impossible to escape the cold reality that GERMANY started
a terrible war, a war that resulted in the death od 55,000,000+ people.

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

Bewolf
12-09-2006, 04:49 AM
One could argue now that it was France and Britain declaring war on Germany, thus bringing the allies into the conflict, but eh.

Also that mixing up the holocaust with strategic bombing is a liiiitle bit off.
Especially, as it was shown, that it was other countries pioneering bombing civilians. In line of this tpoc, the british beeing the first "intentionally" bombing german population centers.

Now if you want to put such bombings at the same level as the holocaust, then have fun figuring out what that means to the allies and their bombing campaigns.

And finally both Warsaw and Rotterdam were legit to bomb by the genueva convention as they did not surrender (in time) and were not declared a free city. Bombings there supported ground operations, it was not strategical.

Especially the bombing of Rotterdam has an interesting background story to it.

But eh, the allies won the war and ppl love to think in black and white, suits the simple minded. Details tend to escape there.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

Bewolf

Never discuss with stupid people.
They'll drag you down to their level and beat you with experience.

Kurfurst__
12-09-2006, 05:16 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Philipscdrw:
That's an excellent article you've written there Ratsack (it's too informative to be merely a 'post', IMO! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif ) It could make an interesting 'what-if' campaign in FB too... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Indeed, these two posts have been an excellent analyisis, with truely looking for the answers of how to conduct a campaign, possible errors and counter-actions from the enemy... grats, I think I'll save it into txt.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42333000/jpg/_42333631_puskasbudapest_ap203b.jpg
In memoriam Puskás Ferenc,2 April 1927 - 17 November 2006.
Nyugodjon Békében - May he rest in Peace.

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/
Kurfürst - Your Resource for Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance!

"The Me 109 was exceptional in turning combat. If there is a fighter plane built for turning combat , it has to be the Messer! Speedy, maneuverable (especially in the vertical) and extremely dynamic."
- Major Kozhemyako, Soviet fighter pilot of the VVS

Ignored Posters : AKA_Tagert, Wurkeri, Gibbage, LStarosta, Sergio_101.

Vike
12-09-2006, 05:39 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:

Also that mixing up the holocaust with strategic bombing is a liiiitle bit off. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Indeed.I find sergio's post quite incredible,as usual BTW. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

Sergio,i think it's time for you to go to bed...

http://i76.photobucket.com/albums/j32/Vike01/troll.gif

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/34.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

@+<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://vike01.free.fr/images/avatars/signIL2.jpg
- AthlonXP 2400Mhz + 1024MB DDR CL 2.0
- Radeon 9800XT 460/790Mhz
- Saitek X-52 + Track IR 4 Pro
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Sergio_101
12-09-2006, 09:20 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Vike:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:

Also that mixing up the holocaust with strategic bombing is a liiiitle bit off. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Indeed.I find sergio's post quite incredible,as usual BTW. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

Sergio,i think it's time for you to go to bed...

http://i76.photobucket.com/albums/j32/Vike01/troll.gif

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/34.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

@+ </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

"Incredible"?
Come on guys, show me what is "incredible".
Germany invaded Poland.
"Allies" declare war in support of Poland.
Little happens after the Polish defeat, the
so called "Phony war" period.
Germany invades western Europe, heat is on.
Germany invades it's ally, the Soviet Union.

Simplified more than a little bit, but the
obvious is every agressive step is taken by Germany.

Japan bombs Pearl Harbor without provocation.
Hitler declares war on the US. Meerly a
formality.

You apologists never get it, the truth is never with you.

AND not a one of you can convince me that the
He-177 was anything more than a total failure.

Sergio

LStarosta
12-09-2006, 09:23 AM
LOL! I can't believe people here are attempting to excuse Nazi Germany from starting WWII.

I never cease to be amazed by the characters on this forum.

Yes, Bewolf... France and Britain started WWII! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/clap.gif

Have fun getting that one published... http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

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I_KG100_Prien
12-09-2006, 10:04 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LStarosta:
LOL! I can't believe people here are attempting to excuse Nazi Germany from starting WWII.

I never cease to be amazed by the characters on this forum.

Yes, Bewolf... France and Britain started WWII! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/clap.gif

Have fun getting that one published... http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well in some respects you could point at France and Britain etc for sharing some of the blame for the events that led up to WW2. The end of WW1 and the Treaty of Versailles for example.

Some could speculate that had the German Economy not been totally destroyed by the enormous amounts of money they had to pay to the Allied Powers to "pay for the damages caused by the war", some things may not have happened.

The German people would not have been so easily swayed by the Patrotic Propaganda that Hitler used to assume power over the populace. Remember that during the years before WW2 started the citizens in Germany wanted to rebuild and become a stable powerful country again and thusly were very open to the ideas Hitler had for building the country back up into a "superpower".

However things happened as they did and that cannot be changed. Germany did start WW2 there is no way to deny that. Just don't forget that there were events prior to September 1939 that contributed to them doing so. Remember, they didn't just decide "Lets start a war just for the heck of it".

Aaron_GT
12-09-2006, 10:10 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The German bombing of Britain during summer of '41 showed the Allies that civilian morale only stiffened against the bombings. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

If you look at confidential reports issued in 1941 regarding civilian morale there was extreme concern in Britain about a potential imminent collapse of morale, certainly in London. It was also noted that absenteeism was high with many choosing to leave London. This goes against the prevailing view that there was a 'Blitz spirit'. Many did stick it out, and bravely, but there was concern in the British government that Luftwaffe bombing was causing an adverse effect.

With regards to German orders, Kurfurst is correct. A friend of mine has one of the Luftwaffe maps of Coventry with the bombing areas marked, and they were military, the problem being that industry in Coventry was mixed in close to residential and historic areas (such as the Alvis works not far from the cathedral). Blaming the Luftwaffe for clearance of historic buildings and the horrible 1960s reengineering of the centre of Coventry that had actually begun in the 1930s is convenient.

This having been said the strictures on the Luftwaffe were as much a recognition of the fact that it was incapable at the time of mounting a strategic bombing effort and so each bomb needed to be effective - it simply lacked the capability for area bombing that the RAF later managed. Where the capability for terror bombing did exist (e.g. in Spain, Poland, Rotterdam) then it was used against civilians. Plus British reticence in 1939-41 about civilian targets also needs to be understood in the context of a force that was relatively weak, but a government that was in fear of reprisals on British cities. Once the Rubicon of attacks on civilians had been crossed, and bomber numbers had been increased (but accuracy was still low) then the landscape changed and there was no going back.

Aaron_GT
12-09-2006, 10:13 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The German people would not have been so easily swayed by the Patrotic Propaganda that Hitler used to assume power over the populace. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Plus Hindenburg who actually gave Hitler the job when it seemed that his star was waning and he could be controlled.

LStarosta
12-09-2006, 10:24 AM
That would mean that if someone stole my wallet, took my credit card numbers, committed identity fraud and ruined my life, I would have the right to shoot him in the face and go out and start shooting at all my neighbors?

C'mon...

Next excuse please...<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

http://img109.imageshack.us/img109/1872/fe4ae1e074f2ea8e1878fa1kn2.gif (http://irwinnotguaranteed.ytmnd.com/)

I_KG100_Prien
12-09-2006, 10:34 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LStarosta:
That would mean that if someone stole my wallet, took my credit card numbers, committed identity fraud and ruined my life, I would have the right to shoot him in the face?

C'mon...

Next excuse please... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not shoot him in the face, but certainly seek some kind of action against him for causing you major inconvienence. But what right did he have to steal your wallet and your identity? None, but he probably had his reasons for doing so. Doesn't make it okay for him to do it however.

You misread what I said as defence for starting a war. I was just pointing out that it wasn't started for "Just cause". There were reasons behind it, however that does not mean that said reasons were "right".

--edit--

Going to remain civil.

LStarosta
12-09-2006, 10:41 AM
Whatever, guys.

I'm going back to X-Wing Alliance.

At least we all know who started THAT war...

http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

http://img109.imageshack.us/img109/1872/fe4ae1e074f2ea8e1878fa1kn2.gif (http://irwinnotguaranteed.ytmnd.com/)

luftluuver
12-09-2006, 10:55 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by I_KG100_Prien:
Well in some respects you could point at France and Britain etc for sharing some of the blame for the events that led up to WW2. The end of WW1 and the Treaty of Versailles for example.

Some could speculate that had the German Economy not been totally destroyed by the enormous amounts of money they had to pay to the Allied Powers to "pay for the damages caused by the war", some things may not have happened.

The German people would not have been so easily swayed by the Patrotic Propaganda that Hitler used to assume power over the populace. Remember that during the years before WW2 started the citizens in Germany wanted to rebuild and become a stable powerful country again and thusly were very open to the ideas Hitler had for building the country back up into a "superpower".

However things happened as they did and that cannot be changed. Germany did start WW2 there is no way to deny that. Just don't forget that there were events prior to September 1939 that contributed to them doing so. Remember, they didn't just decide "Lets start a war just for the heck of it". </div></BLOCKQUOTE>Germany, and Austro-Hungary, started WW1. Then there was a little war between Germany and France in the 1870s. How far back do you want to go?

The Economic Recovery 1924 ? 1929
A number of changes in economic policy led to economic recovery from 1924 onwards. German diplomats negotiated with the US Government in late 1923 and early 1924. They sought to gain aid from the US and establish trading links that would enable them to stabilise the currency, which would then act as a stepping stone to economic growth.

The Dawes Plan was the result of negotiations between Germany and the US Government. The plan allowed the co-ordination of reparations repayments, making these more manageable. This involved paying reduced payments until 1929, when the situation would be reappraised. The scale of the reassessment is worthy o note, reparations payments in 1922 had been some $2 billion, the figure for 1914 was set at $50million. This large reduction in reparations payments was accompanied by a loan of $200 million from the US government which would allow for heavy investment in the German infrastructure. Linked to this agreement was the introduction of the new Reichsbank and the replacement of the old German Mark with the Rentenmark. The Dawes plan also provided for the gradual removal of French and Belgian troops from the Rhineland.

The introduction of the Rentenmark was highly significant, it allowed the currency to stabilise and supported by the Dawes Plan it stood a good chance of not succumbing to inflationary pressures as had previously happened. The new Rentenmark was valued at 1 Rentenmark to One Trillion old marks (no typographical error there). The Rentenmark was exchangeable for bonds in land and industrial plant ? in other words they were worth something. Inflation ceased to be a problem, the German people accepted the value of the new currency and businesses accepted it as being of worth.

The stability of the new currency couldn?t be taken for granted however and a range of new fiscal measures were implemented that would keep inflation and the exchange rate at acceptable levels. For example, the government opted to stop offering credit to industry as this had led to widespread speculation and consequently inflation. Borrowing therefore slowed and the circulation of money returned to ?normal? levels. Similarly the government altered the policy with regards the printing of money. Previously the government had increased the amount of money being printed as inflation had risen, this had simply led to prices rising even more rapidly. Now the government decided that the amount of money in circulation would be strictly limited to the real worth of economy.

In August of 1924 the Rentenmark was replaced by the Reichsmark, which was backed up by the German Gold Reserve, which had to be maintained at 30% of the value of all Reichsmark in circulation. This was combined with a range of new taxes that increased the tax burden of companies and individuals alike, reducing their spending power and enabling the government to reinvest a larger proportion of the nations wealth.

This constitutes quite a large change in the way that the economy was operated. Companies that were well organised, had sound business sense and were well managed would prosper. Those that had relied on credit would suffer ? the number of companies going bankrupt in Germany rose from 233 in 1923 to over 6000 in 1924. This resulted in the economy being more streamlined and efficient, success was possible but relied, perhaps, on prudence and careful planning.

Such was the stability of the economy by 1927 that the government felt it possible to introduce guarantees of income under welfare legislation. This image of improvements is supported by data relating to the economic recovery in general: wages rose in real terms throughout the period 1924 to 1929, the standard of living rose and the cost of living fell. All consequences of the industrial recovery triggered by the implementation of new policies and the benefits of the Dawes Plan. (Industrial output had reached its pre-war levels again by 1923 and this figure had been doubled by 1929, a useful measure of how far the economy did recover.

from http://www.schoolshistory.org.uk/ASLevel_History/week6_economicrecovery.htm

Then came the World Depression and the Americans calling in their loan.

Kurfurst__
12-09-2006, 11:17 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Aaron_GT:
Where the capability for terror bombing did exist (e.g. in Spain, Poland, Rotterdam) then it was used against civilians. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

As a matter of fact the commonly mentioned three 'precedents' - Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam - were just as much 'terror bombing' as London or Coventry. The case is the same, there's simply no trace of targeting civills/ their moreale in the German orders detailing the execution of these operations. At Guernica the bombing (with rather primitive methods, including old Ju 52s etc.) was aimed at a transport target, a bridge and the housing near it (it was hoped that collapsing houses would block the road - the same. Warsaw and Rotterdam were in direct support of the own troops (the besieging German army in Poland, which got a few own bombs in blue-on-blue accidents, and in Rotterdam it was in support of paratroopers who's situation was a little bleek). Wartime propaganda of the other side of course exagrevated the number of dead and the destruction, and is repeated ever since as a 'pretext'.

The destruction caused in these settlements were of course, very real. But at the same time it was not intended, and it has to be accepted that at the technical level of the era, colletaral damage has to be accepted.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42333000/jpg/_42333631_puskasbudapest_ap203b.jpg
In memoriam Puskás Ferenc,2 April 1927 - 17 November 2006.
Nyugodjon Békében - May he rest in Peace.

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/
Kurfürst - Your Resource for Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance!

"The Me 109 was exceptional in turning combat. If there is a fighter plane built for turning combat , it has to be the Messer! Speedy, maneuverable (especially in the vertical) and extremely dynamic."
- Major Kozhemyako, Soviet fighter pilot of the VVS

Ignored Posters : AKA_Tagert, Wurkeri, Gibbage, LStarosta, Sergio_101.

Maj.Kaos
12-09-2006, 11:37 AM
Nothing is black and white in history. Truth is definately subjective.

Germany did not start WW2. They invaded Poland. Hitler didn't say, "Hey, let's fight everybody, all at once!". If that had been his intention, Germany would have ramped up for total war long before hostilities actually started, and the war may have turned out very differently.

It was Britain and France who decided to draw the line with Germany, and rightly so, after the Anschluss with Austria and occupation of Czechoslovakia. But they didn't start WW2 either. They didn't want a global conflict, but rather wanted to stop German expansion of power.

How about Japan? Did it start WW2 by invading Manchuria in 1931 or so? (Sorry guys, don't remember exact dates).

Wars in the modern age are rarely invented, it's a political nightmare. (Well, Bush and Iraq are the exception, but that's another story).

LStarosta and Sergio might be basking in the arrogance of self-imposed ignorance, I dunno. Some people just can't see gray. It scares them.

I read recently that some 35,000 German POW's died of starvation and disease while in Western Allied camps after WW2. Not sure if it's true.

I'm very impressed with Ratsack's very well composed and lucid writing!

Sergio_101
12-09-2006, 12:05 PM
Hmmmmm, that's a weird twist to history.
Why, if Germany wanted only Poland did it
switch from the phony war phase (primarily leaflet bombing)
to the invasion of Holland, belgium and France?
Seems Hitler started a war and invited EVERYONE.
When a stalemate was reached in the sky over Britian (BOB)
why did the Third Reich invade the Soviet Union?
Why did Germany ally itself with other fasist
expansionist goverments?
Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
Germany's invasion of the Scandanavian countries
seems a bit like open hostile seisure of land?

Come on guys, we are not stupid. READ Mein Kamph.
I have.
READ IT.
It is CLEAR Hitler was all out for the conquest
of the Slavic lands for living space
for his "Greater Germany".

Hitler started the party, and invited the world.

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

joeap
12-09-2006, 12:09 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LStarosta:
Whatever, guys.

I'm going back to X-Wing Alliance.

At least we all know who started THAT war...

http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Another victim of Rebel/Jedi Propaganda. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif

luftluuver
12-09-2006, 12:22 PM
THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#taoo
http://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/index.html
http://orbat.com/site/sturmvogel/airrep.html#Ch7

Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945
Williamson Murray

downloadable from http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/catalog/books/Murray_B12.htm

Bomber Command
Monthly Operational Statistics
http://www.lancaster-archive.com/bc-Stats1.htm

Kurfurst__
12-09-2006, 12:27 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
Germany's invasion of the Scandanavian countries
seems a bit like open hostile seisure of land? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Operation Wilfred. Plan R4.

Google is Your Friend.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42333000/jpg/_42333631_puskasbudapest_ap203b.jpg
In memoriam Puskás Ferenc,2 April 1927 - 17 November 2006.
Nyugodjon Békében - May he rest in Peace.

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/
Kurfürst - Your Resource for Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance!

"The Me 109 was exceptional in turning combat. If there is a fighter plane built for turning combat , it has to be the Messer! Speedy, maneuverable (especially in the vertical) and extremely dynamic."
- Major Kozhemyako, Soviet fighter pilot of the VVS

Ignored Posters : AKA_Tagert, Wurkeri, Gibbage, LStarosta, Sergio_101.

Sergio_101
12-09-2006, 12:46 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by luftluuver:
Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945
Williamson Murray

</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Dull read, excellent information.
I have owned it since it was first published.
It's knock out blow for those Luftwhiners
that claim they were beaten by numbers alone.

It's a must have for any student of the 20th century.

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

luftluuver
12-09-2006, 12:53 PM
All the details in the planning of Weserubung had been completed by March, 1940; there remained only the setting of the precise date and hour. Concern about British intervention in Norway, which had subsided when the Finns had capitulated, was renewed when German Naval Intelligence reported that enemy submarines were concentrated west of the Skagerrak. At the March 26 Fuhrer Conference Raeder stated that he no longer felt that British intervention in Norway was imminent. Nevertheless he insisted that German forces would have to occupy Norway sooner or later.


Operation Wilfred was a British scheme to mine the waters between Norway and her islands in order to prevent German convoys fom using the neutral waters to transport high grade Swedish iron ore. The Allies assumed that Wilfred would provoke a German response in Norway. When that occurred, the Allies would implement Plan R4 and occupy Norway. [1]

Operation Wilfred was put into action on April 8, 1940, but shortly cancelled due to the following days German invasion, starting the Norwegian Campaign.


Seems the Germans had completed their plans even before the mining of Norwegian waters had started. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_eek.gif

Sergio_101
12-09-2006, 01:07 PM
Cool!

Seems every time you post propaganda you get kicked in the shins Kurfie!

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

Aaron_GT
12-09-2006, 01:25 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Seems the Germans had completed their plans even before the mining of Norwegian waters had started. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

All sorts of plans exist, though. You can't necessarily draw conclusions from the existence of plans (for example the USA drew up plans in 1930 for the invasion of Canada and Bermuda). Actions such as the invasion of Poland (or Norway), though, are somewhat unequivocal.

I also don't buy the explanations of Warsaw and Rotterdam in terms of moral equivalence to any Allied actions. Here you are talking about an expansionist regime bombing cities in support of its expansionist plan with little regard to civilian casualties. That's pretty indefensible.

Kurfurst__
12-09-2006, 01:58 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Aaron_GT:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Seems the Germans had completed their plans even before the mining of Norwegian waters had started. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

All sorts of plans exist, though. You can't necessarily draw conclusions from the existence of plans (for example the USA drew up plans in 1930 for the invasion of Canada and Bermuda). Actions such as the invasion of Poland (or Norway), though, are somewhat unequivocal. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Vidkun Quisling and initial German investigation

It was originally thought by German high command that having Norway remain neutral was in their interest. So long as the Allies did not enter Norwegian waters, there would be safe passage for merchant vessels traveling along the Norwegian coast to ship the ore that Germany was importing, and a large operation wouldn't be needed.

Grand Admiral Erich Raeder was one of the proponents of an invasion though, as he believed that the Norwegian ports offered the best facilities for German submarines for use in a siege of the British Isles, and that there was a possibility of the Allies landing in Scandinavia.

On 11 December 1939, Adolf Hitler and Raeder met with Vidkun Quisling, a pro-Nazi former Minister of Defense from Norway. Quisling told them that the threat of a British invasion of Norway was large, and that the Norwegian government would secretly support German occupation (the latter turned out to be a lie). He also informed them that he was in a position to ensure maximum co-operation with German forces, including relaxation of coastal guard and bases made available. Three days later, Hitler ordered OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) to begin investigation of possible invasion plans of Norway.

During a second meeting with Quisling on 18 December, Hitler reiterated his desire to keep Norway neutral, but indicated that should Allied forces extend the war to Scandinavia, he would counter appropriately. Suspicions arose that Quisling had overstated his strength for self-gain, and further plans for collaboration with him were dropped.

[edit] The Altmark Incident

Main article: Altmark Incident

On 14 February 1940, the German tanker Altmark, carrying 303 British Prisoners of War (POW), was permitted to travel through Norwegian waters. According to international rules any noncombatant vessel from a warfaring nation could seek shelter for some time in neutral waters if permitted. When a group of British destroyers appeared on February 16, Altmark sought refuge in a Norwegian fjord. Ignoring international rules and Norwegian neutrality, the HMS Cossack entered the fjord and attacked the Altmark, boarding it and liberating the prisoners.

While this violation of their neutrality angered the Norwegians, it also led to debate on both sides.

For the Allies, it was seen as a sign of Norwegian inability to prevent German misuse of the supposed neutral area for military purposes, and they nearly undertook a plan, proposed shortly after the fall of Poland by First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, to mine the area. It was only postponed in the hope that Norway might still agree to permit Allied troop movement to aid Finland.

[b]For the Germans, the Altmark Incident showed that the British were not in full compliance with Norwegian neutrality and Hitler ordered that the development of invasion plans be sped up. He did so to obtain assurance against Churchill's already existing plans to draw the Norwegians into the war and take control over the important harbour of Narvik. By 21 February, General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst was placed in charge of planning the invasion and command of the land-based forces.


Allied plans


Political and military background

Starting in the spring of 1939, the British Admiralty began to view Scandinavia as a potential theater of war in a future conflict with Germany. The British government was reluctant to engage in another land conflict on the continent that they believed would be a repeat of World War I. So they began considering a blockade strategy in an attempt to weaken Germany indirectly. German industry was heavily dependent on the import of iron ore from the northern Swedish mining district, and much of this ore was shipped through the northern Norwegian port of Narvik. Control of the Norwegian coast would also serve to tighten a blockade against Germany.

In October of 1939 the chief of the German Kriegsmarine, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, discussed with Hitler the danger posed by eventual British bases in Norway and the possibility of Germany seizing these bases before the United Kingdom could. The navy argued that possession of Norway would allow control of the nearby seas and serve as a staging base for future operations against the United Kingdom. However, at this time the other branches of the Wehrmacht were not interested, and Hitler had just issued a directive stating that the main effort would be a land offensive through the Low Countries.

Toward the end of November, Winston Churchill, as a new member of the British War Cabinet, proposed the mining of Norwegian waters. This would force the ore transports to travel through the open waters of the North Sea, where the Royal Navy could interdict them. However this proposal was turned down by the dovish Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, due to fear of an adverse reaction among neutral nations such as the United States. After the start of the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland in November 1939 had changed the diplomatic situation, Churchill again proposed his mining scheme, but was once more denied.

In December, the United Kingdom and France began serious planning for sending aid to Finland. Their plan called for a force to land at Narvik in northern Norway, the main port for Swedish iron ore exports, and to advance across Sweden into Finland. Conveniently, this plan would also allow the allied forces to occupy the Swedish iron ore mining district. The plan received the support of both Chamberlain and Halifax. They were counting on the cooperation of Norway, which would alleviate some of the legal issues. However, stern warnings issued to both Norway and Sweden resulted in strongly negative reactions in both countries. Planning for the expedition continued, but the justification for it was removed when Finland sued for peace in March.

Planning

Convinced of the threat posed by the allies to the iron ore supply, Hitler ordered the German high command (OKW) to begin preliminary planning for an invasion of Norway on 14 December 1939. The preliminary plan was named Studie Nord and only called for one army division.

Between 14 and 19 January the Kriegsmarine developed an expanded version of this plan. They decided upon two key factors. The first was that surprise was essential to reduce the threat of Norwegian resistance (and British intervention). The second was to use the faster German warships, rather than comparatively slow merchant ships, as troop transports. This would allow all targets to be occupied simultaneously, as the transport ships only had limited range. This new plan called for a full army corps, including a mountain division, an airborne division, a motorized rifle brigade, and two infantry divisions.

With the end of the Winter War, the Allies determined that any occupation of Norway or Sweden would likely do more harm than good, possibly driving the neutral countries into alliance with Germany. The new Prime Minister of France, Paul Reynaud, took a more aggressive stance than his predecessor though, and wanted some form of action taken against Germany.

It was agreed to utilize Churchill's naval mining offense Operation Wilfred, designed to remove the sanctuary of the Leads and force transport ships into international waters where the Royal Navy could engage and destroy them. Accompanying this would be Plan R4, an operation where, upon almost certain German counteraction to Operation Wilfred, the Allies would then proceed to occupy Trondheim and Bergen and destroy the Sola airfield.

The Allies disagreed over the additional Operation Royal Marine, where mines would also be placed in the Rhine River. While the British supported this operation, the French were against it, as they also depended on the Rhine and they feared German reprisals on French soil. Because of this delay, Operation Wilfred, originally scheduled for 5 April, was delayed until 8 April when the British agreed to perform the Norwegian operations separately from those on the continent.

Preliminaries

In February the British destroyer Cossack boarded the German transport ship Altmark while in Norwegian waters, thereby violating Norwegian neutrality, freeing 300 captive British sailors held also in violation of Norwegian neutrality (the Altmark was obliged to release them as soon as she entered neutral territory). Hitler regarded this as a clear sign that the United Kingdom was willing to violate Norwegian neutrality, and so became even more strongly committed to the invasion plan.

On 12 March, the United Kingdom decided to send an expeditionary force to Norway just as the Winter War was winding down. The expeditionary force began boarding on 13 March, but was recalled and the operation cancelled with the end of the Winter War. Instead the British cabinet voted to proceed with the mining operation in Norwegian waters, followed by troop landings.

The first German ships set sail for the invasion on 3 April, and on 8 April a British destroyer began laying the first mines in Norwegian waters. On 9 April the German invasion was underway.



<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">I also don't buy the explanations of Warsaw and Rotterdam in terms of moral equivalence to any Allied actions. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Neither do I. The bombing Warsaw and Rotterdam, much like the British bombing of Caen in 1944, which pretty much levelled the town and killed thousends as collateral damage, but were performed as direct air support to army operations, cannot be compared to systematic, pure terror bombings aimed to maximize civillian casulties.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Here you are talking about an expansionist regime bombing cities in support of its expansionist plan with little regard to civilian casualties. That's pretty indefensible. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I am not sure which country you're talking about. The most expanisionist country was the British Empire at the time, just look at the map of it's vast territories the colonized population. They seemed to have absolutely no problem with expansionism until they were the ones doing it. The 'bombing cities with little regard to civilian casualties' part an understatement.

Besides, I think a bit of historical pre-reading should not hurt on Poland and it's internal affairs and foreign policy between 1920-1939. In a brief summary, let just note the country behaved in a quite expansionist way towards both Russia and Germany in 1920, between 1920-1939 they were de facto run by a military junta which seriously proposed a 'pre-emptive' war on Germany in the 1930s, and ethnic rights left something to be desired, unless one considers concentration camps for non-Polish ethnics as such.

Overall, I am not sure where all this fingerpointing and moral justification attempts calling for wartime propaganda stories of the 'terrorbombing of Warsaw' etc. as proof really buys you, except just opening a can of worms about Churchill and his little plan of Norway that after all, was the reason why Norway was occupied by Germany, after the British plans there were trashed.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42333000/jpg/_42333631_puskasbudapest_ap203b.jpg
In memoriam Puskás Ferenc,2 April 1927 - 17 November 2006.
Nyugodjon Békében - May he rest in Peace.

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/
Kurfürst - Your Resource for Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance!

"The Me 109 was exceptional in turning combat. If there is a fighter plane built for turning combat , it has to be the Messer! Speedy, maneuverable (especially in the vertical) and extremely dynamic."
- Major Kozhemyako, Soviet fighter pilot of the VVS

Ignored Posters : AKA_Tagert, Wurkeri, Gibbage, LStarosta, Sergio_101.

LStarosta
12-09-2006, 02:01 PM
LOL@Kurfurst

Funny<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

http://img109.imageshack.us/img109/1872/fe4ae1e074f2ea8e1878fa1kn2.gif (http://irwinnotguaranteed.ytmnd.com/)

Sergio_101
12-09-2006, 02:22 PM
Kurfurst, only those who don't bother with reading
will believe that masterpiece of cheap propaganda
in your previous post. Dr Gobbels would be proud of you!

Facts mixed with spin and half truths, Kurfurst you are the master.
That your a bleeding NAZI has never been in question.
At least you have removed any glimmer of doubt with your last post.

Now, tell us the mass murder of 10,000,000 Jews Gypsies
and other "un-desireables" did not happen.
You must have an excuse for that!

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

jasonbirder
12-09-2006, 02:36 PM
The Nazi's genocide is horrific...but is it any more horrific than the millions murdered by Stalin?
Or do the Russians not count as being part of the allies...even though they were instrumental in defeating the Germans.

Sergio_101
12-09-2006, 02:41 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by jasonbirder:
The Nazi's genocide is horrific...but is it any more horrific than the millions murdered by Stalin?
Or do the Russians not count as being part of the allies...even though they were instrumental in defeating the Germans. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Rationalisation by equating levels of evil. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif
A popular copout here. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/bigtears.gif
Stalin was no better than Hitler. No kidding. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif

Try another one. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/59.gif

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

LStarosta
12-09-2006, 02:45 PM
I don't think he's excusing the Nazis but rather pointing out that there was horrible mass murder in the East too.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

http://img109.imageshack.us/img109/1872/fe4ae1e074f2ea8e1878fa1kn2.gif (http://irwinnotguaranteed.ytmnd.com/)

fighter_966
12-09-2006, 02:53 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
Kurfurst, only those who don't bother with reading
will believe that masterpiece of cheap propaganda
in your previous post. Dr Gobbels would be proud of you!

Facts mixed with spin and half truths, Kurfurst you are the master.
That your a bleeding NAZI has never been in question.
At least you have removed any glimmer of doubt with your last post.

Now, tell us the mass murder of 10,000,000 Jews Gypsies
and other "un-desireables" did not happen.
You must have an excuse for that!

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

My resouces says 6 million people but horrible anyway..Though before concentration camps in germany states everwhere in europe were giving
eutanasy to people which werent "suitable" to live in society.. that was before Adolf. Source is Book called Letters from point zero. Now I dont recall writer but If anyone has read book about 30year war.. He is finn swede historian . But only in Germany it went so far ...In Soviet Union the tally was about 12 million .The name of the book comes from the point were nuclear bomb explodes. Not so cheerfully reading ...

Bewolf
12-09-2006, 02:59 PM
Actually, Kurfürst is pretty much correct in his facts. That Germany was the overall agressor and thus guilty is out of question. But when it comes to details like bombings or strategic descisions, which were pretty much based on logic and reason to win a war, Germany didn't act any different then other countries during and prior in history, "including" for example Britain and France. And do not let me start on the american spanish war.

You maybe want to point out where Kurfürst spinned facts or put in half truths, Sergio?



I think you guys mix something up in serious here guys. The holocaust and the war itself. First of all it should be noted that the war was not led because of the holocaust. Up until the beginning of the war for example Britain and the US sent lots of Jews back, not allowing them to enter.

Having cleared that up we come to the war itself, which was a war of agression by Germany against Poland and eventually planned to include the USSR. Hitler wanted to size Poland the same way he did Czechoslowakia, not thinking France or Britain would intervene. He was wrong, certainly, that does not change the fact that it was those powers declaring war on germany. And just as a sidenote, they did not declare war on Russia for attacking Finland, nor for sizing the other half of Poland. Instead, they got allies with a country that to that point and in the future killed way more people then germany ever did.

This was pure politics, nothing to do with any morales here, in this regard comparable to world war I.

The same applies to the US later on. Just to put this into perspective again, it was the US taking hostile action against Germany first when starting to protect british convoys in international waters, openly fighting german subs.

And with any war, the winners both write history "and" define what was ok and was not. As a principle, when the allies did something, it was ok, right and justified. When the germans did the same it was vile and evil and unrightful. Why, because the germans started the war. Which they didn't. They started the war with Poland. The rest was started by the allies. Which btw. "was" the right thing to do, standing up for Poland. "But", and this is a big but, it does not justify crying about german starting the war against "them".
As many allied servicemen stated, had they lost the war, they would have trialed for war crimes. fact.

What differs here to other wars is indeed the Holocaust. The most terrible and disgusting event ever happend in history. But, just that does not make the strategic and tactical descisions of the german Luftwaffe any more or less evil then that of other countries. Quite the contrary, as in this case the Luftwaffe indeed "reacted" to allied actions, not started it when it comes to pure civilian terror bombings.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

Bewolf

Never discuss with stupid people.
They'll drag you down to their level and beat you with experience.

LStarosta
12-09-2006, 03:13 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by fighter_966:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
Kurfurst, only those who don't bother with reading
will believe that masterpiece of cheap propaganda
in your previous post. Dr Gobbels would be proud of you!

Facts mixed with spin and half truths, Kurfurst you are the master.
That your a bleeding NAZI has never been in question.
At least you have removed any glimmer of doubt with your last post.

Now, tell us the mass murder of 10,000,000 Jews Gypsies
and other "un-desireables" did not happen.
You must have an excuse for that!

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

My resouces says 6 million people but horrible anyway..Though before concentration camps in germany states everwhere in europe were giving
eutanasy to people which werent "suitable" to live in society.. that was before Adolf. Source is Book called Letters from point zero. Now I dont recall writer but If anyone has read book about 30year war.. He is finn swede historian . But only in Germany it went so far ...In Soviet Union the tally was about 12 million .The name of the book comes from the point were nuclear bomb explodes. Not so cheerfully reading </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It was 6 million Jews.

Hitler killed around another 6 million others.

And I thought the figure for the USSR was something like 20+ million.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

http://img109.imageshack.us/img109/1872/fe4ae1e074f2ea8e1878fa1kn2.gif (http://irwinnotguaranteed.ytmnd.com/)

Ratsack
12-09-2006, 03:29 PM
How on Earth did a discussion of strategic bombers and bombing become a half-baked discussion of war guilt? You guys amaze me.

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif

Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

fighter_966
12-09-2006, 03:29 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LStarosta:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by fighter_966:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
Kurfurst, only those who don't bother with reading
will believe that masterpiece of cheap propaganda
in your previous post. Dr Gobbels would be proud of you!

Facts mixed with spin and half truths, Kurfurst you are the master.
That your a bleeding NAZI has never been in question.
At least you have removed any glimmer of doubt with your last post.

Now, tell us the mass murder of 10,000,000 Jews Gypsies
and other "un-desireables" did not happen.
You must have an excuse for that!

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

My resouces says 6 million people but horrible anyway..Though before concentration camps in germany states everwhere in europe were giving
eutanasy to people which werent "suitable" to live in society.. that was before Adolf. Source is Book called Letters from point zero. Now I dont recall writer but If anyone has read book about 30year war.. He is finn swede historian . But only in Germany it went so far ...In Soviet Union the tally was about 12 million .The name of the book comes from the point were nuclear bomb explodes. Not so cheerfully reading </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It was 6 million Jews.

Hitler killed around another 6 million others.

And I thought the figure for the USSR was something like 20+ million. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Three million were killed in Auschwitz those three other were killed in different camps but I doubt that tally is somewhere 10 million
for notice there were differentkind of camps laborcamp and so called killing camp what suprized me that there were just 4 killing camp..Same resource ..But this is so OOOOTTTTT of
thread can we return to subject

Sergio_101
12-09-2006, 03:36 PM
Ok. I'll bite.
Kurfie http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/touche.gif

Do we call this a 8 engined bomber or a 4 engined bomber?
It's got 4 V-3420's(Twinned V-1710's)



<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
Having the reference books here I have
gone over the V-3420 and DB-610 designs as
closely as I can having no actual
blue prints, only high quality drawings and photos
intended for public use, not engineering review...

The V-3420 has one possible design advantage.
A common crankcase instead of two seperate
crank cases on a common gear box.
This simplifies oil scavanging and greatly reduces
external plumbing and complexity.
The common crankcase, although also having two
crankshafts, also should be of greater strength.

In the few projects that used the V-3420 it's
reliability was excellent. The Fischer XP-75
had over heating problems, not the fault of the engine.http://1000aircraftphotos.com/Contributions/Larkins/2972L.jpg

Note the use of 4 twinned Allison V-1710s.
Is it then a 4 engined bomber using V-3420s
or is it a 8 engined bomber using V-1710s?


Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE><div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

Ratsack
12-09-2006, 03:38 PM
Those of you arguing about Germany, Poland, Britain and France would do well to read

AJP Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, (Penguin, 1991), ISBN 014013672X

and

Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (Simon & Schuster, 1994), ISBN 067165991X


before posting again.

cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

LStarosta
12-09-2006, 03:44 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
Ok. I'll bite.
Kurfie http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/touche.gif

Do we call this a 8 engined bomber or a 4 engined bomber?
It's got 4 V-3420's(Twinned V-1710's)



<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
Having the reference books here I have
gone over the V-3420 and DB-610 designs as
closely as I can having no actual
blue prints, only high quality drawings and photos
intended for public use, not engineering review...

The V-3420 has one possible design advantage.
A common crankcase instead of two seperate
crank cases on a common gear box.
This simplifies oil scavanging and greatly reduces
external plumbing and complexity.
The common crankcase, although also having two
crankshafts, also should be of greater strength.

In the few projects that used the V-3420 it's
reliability was excellent. The Fischer XP-75
had over heating problems, not the fault of the engine.http://1000aircraftphotos.com/Contributions/Larkins/2972L.jpg

Note the use of 4 twinned Allison V-1710s.
Is it then a 4 engined bomber using V-3420s
or is it a 8 engined bomber using V-1710s?


Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE> </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

That makes my pee pee hard.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

http://img109.imageshack.us/img109/1872/fe4ae1e074f2ea8e1878fa1kn2.gif (http://irwinnotguaranteed.ytmnd.com/)

Ratsack
12-09-2006, 03:57 PM
So, given the experience of the air war over Europe, how do people think the aerial assault on Japan stacked up? Do we have any experts on that campaign in here?

cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

Sergio_101
12-09-2006, 04:08 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ratsack:
So, given the experience of the air war over Europe, how do people think the aerial assault on Japan stacked up? Do we have any experts on that campaign in here?

cheers,
Ratsack </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Air war over Japan was a rout. The Naval air
war was less of a rout, but by the end of 1942
the Japanese had lost any edge they may have posessed.
A few months ago I did some digging
about B-29 losses. More were lost to mechanical
failure than to fighters.
Of those lost to fighters most were forced down
to the level of the fighters by mechanical failure!
air war, European style never materialised over Japan.
Night fire raids were the name of the game.
The Japanese had no compitent night fighter force.
Day sweeps by P-51 and P-47Ns were mostly a one way fight.
It's hard to fight when your opponent is 100mph faster
and flying 10,000' higher than you can go!
Japan never posessed a good bomber force by European standards.
The "Betty" was the best they had, and to perform like
it did the equipment thought as necessary in Europe
was omitted. No self sealing fuel tanks, no armour
and very weak defensive armrament.
Japan was being bombed at will, any time.
Escorting fighters were there in swarms for day operations.

It was a rout.

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

hop2002
12-09-2006, 04:22 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">This argument about the targeting of civilians is pointless. If you follow the 'who dunnit first' argument back to its logical conclusion, you end up with Brits using it in Iraq and elsewhere, then back to the Germans in 1917 against London, then back to the Italians in Libya, then we end up talking about blockade as an attack on civilians, and how far back do we want to take this? Drake? Masada? Babylon? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The problem is, Isegrim doesn't just believe the Germans didn't start it, he argues that the Luftwaffe didn't target civilians at all.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Unfortunately for such agendas, there's no sign in the German operational orders for targetting civvies. In fact, the Germans themselves classified the following raids only as repraisal raids - an answer to predating and parellel British attacks on German population centres :
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh, they certainly called them reprisal raids. Unfortunately for the revisionists, Jodl is on record as planning raids designed to break British civilian morale as early as June 1940. From his diary:

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Together with propaganda and periodic terror attacks, announced as reprisals, this increasing weakening of the basis of food supply will paralyze and finally break the will of the people to resist, and thereby force its government to capitulate </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Of course, the Nazis always had an eye on the propaganda, they even went so far as to stage a fake attack by Poles on a German radio station as an excuse for war, murdering a Polish captive to provide "evidence". It's not surprising they tried to play the victim card, it's just sad that some still seem to believe it.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">In fact, the Germans themselves classified the following raids only as repraisal raids - an answer to predating and parellel British attacks on German population centres :

- 7 September 1940 (this was conducted as a repraisal of Bomber Commands bombing of Berlin a bit earlier) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Can you explain the 1000 British civilian deaths in August 1940? What about the fact that in August the most bombed target was airfields, with 1,004 tons, but the Luftwaffe's second favourite target was Liverpool, with over 450 tons and over 1,000 incendiary canisters?

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Essentially it was entially correct to note these attacks on the British civilian population were performed in 1941 - as repraisals to British attacks. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's worth pointing out to the others on this board that the Luftwaffe killed over 1,000 British civilians in August 1940, and about 20,000 in 1940 as a whole. The RAF killed about 1,000 German civilians in the whole of 1940.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Göing's general orders to the Luftwaffe, from 30th June 1940 are even more explicit in this matter :

'(A) The war against England is to be restricted to destructive attacks against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces. ... It is also stressed that every effort should be made to avoid unneccesary loss of life amongst the civillian population.' </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Goering on the 15th August:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Our night attacks are essentially dislocation raids, made so that the enemy defences and population shall be allowed no respite.
Even these, however, should where possible be directed against Air Force targets. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Goering on the 19th August:

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">There can no longer be any restriction on the choice of targets. To myself I reserve only the right to order attacks on London and Liverpool </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

He gave orders the same day for an attack on Liverpool.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Exact reference please. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Certainly. Overy, Why the Allies Won:

"In the Ford plant in Cologne, in the Ruhr, absenteeism rose to 25 per cent of the workforce for the whole of 1944. At the more distant BMW works in Munich the rate rose to one-fifth of the workforce by the summer of 1944."

Also Eagle in Falmes by ER Hooton says absenteeism increased from 4% in 1940 to 25% in 1944.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Exact reference please. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Certainly. Overy, Why the Allies Won:

"At the end of January 1945 Albert Speer and his ministerial colleagues
met in Berlin to sum up what bombing had done to production schedules
for 1944. They found that Germany had produced 35 percent fewer tanks
than planned, 31 percent fewer aircraft and 42 percent fewer lorries
as a result of bombing."

Ratsack
12-09-2006, 04:50 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ratsack:
So, given the experience of the air war over Europe, how do people think the aerial assault on Japan stacked up? Do we have any experts on that campaign in here?

cheers,
Ratsack </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Air war over Japan was a rout. The Naval air
war was less of a rout, but by the end of 1942
the Japanese had lost any edge they may have posessed.
A few months ago I did some digging
about B-29 losses. More were lost to mechanical
failure than to fighters.
Of those lost to fighters most were forced down
to the level of the fighters by mechanical failure!
air war, European style never materialised over Japan.
Night fire raids were the name of the game.
The Japanese had no compitent night fighter force.
Day sweeps by P-51 and P-47Ns were mostly a one way fight.
It's hard to fight when your opponent is 100mph faster
and flying 10,000' higher than you can go!
Japan never posessed a good bomber force by European standards.
The "Betty" was the best they had, and to perform like
it did the equipment thought as necessary in Europe
was omitted. No self sealing fuel tanks, no armour
and very weak defensive armrament.
Japan was being bombed at will, any time.
Escorting fighters were there in swarms for day operations.

It was a rout.

Sergio </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Beyond characterizing it as a ?rout?, what was done?

My reading on this subject suggests that the precision (i.e., bombing attacks with a C.E.P. &lt; 1.6 km qualify as ?precision?) doctrine was tried in Japan, but with little success. Two factors impinged: one was poor accuracy of bombing from very high altitude, and the other was the dispersed nature of Japanese manufacturing. There was no equivalent to the Ruhr in Japan.

The tactic was switched to low altitude night bombing with incendiaries. This sounds like area bombing to me, and the results sound similar, too. One raid on Tokyo killed 100,000 people. The change in operations suggests to me that the USAAF realized their doctrine of strategic bombing of the enemy?s industrial base had failed, in this case because there was nothing to bomb. The blockade enforced by the Allied navies (and the U.S. submarines in particular) had already shut Japanese industry down. So the air forces switched to pure terror bombing, building up to the enormous fire raid on Tokyo mentioned above. Of course, the atomic bombings themselves were the very apotheosis of terror bombing.

I wonder if the US Navy conducted an analysis of the combined effects of the blockade and bombing. If they did, this would be an interesting document.

Cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

Sergio_101
12-09-2006, 06:21 PM
As I remember the change from high altitude
precision bombing to low altitude saturation
fire bombing was made in a sort of evolutionary
process.
HE bombs were used in the beginning but it was
found that the path finders incendiary bombs
on night raids were doing more damage than the HE!
A mix was instituted and quickly changed to 100% magnesium
bombs on night raids.
Night low altitude raids made for fewer losses
and the lower altitudes meant less wear
and tear on the engines.
Eventually the bombers were stripped of all armament
for night raids.
This resulted in the ability of a B-29 to carry up to
20,000 lbs of incendiaries from Guam to Tokyo!

By the way guys, A high school teacher that was a Bombadier
told me they would climb to 25,000' for the ride to Japan
then do a long glide down to about 3,000' above ground level
for the bomb run.
They would do a long slow climb back up for the ride home.
Reason? A B-29 was a gas pig at low altitudes! It's optimum range
was at 25,000'.
That's a quote, not from research. Sorry, although he's deceased
I will not post his name.

sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

Ratsack
12-09-2006, 07:24 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
As I remember the change from high altitude
precision bombing to low altitude saturation
fire bombing was made in a sort of evolutionary
process.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

What does 'evolutionary' mean in this context? I'm not clear on what you're getting at.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
HE bombs were used in the beginning but it was
found that the path finders incendiary bombs
on night raids were doing more damage than the HE!
A mix was instituted and quickly changed to 100% magnesium
bombs on night raids.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, this is pretty much what the British discovered with their area bombing raids, too. In particular, they found that standing buildings burned better than rubble, but that buildings with the roofs removed by blast burned best of all. Thus the large blast bombs [EDIT]:quite apart from the buildings they knocked down, the cookies would rip the roofs off for a long way around the impact point.

I think it was Curtis LeMay (from memory) who opined that Japanese cities were built like fire lighters. [END EDIT]



<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Sergio_101:
Night low altitude raids made for fewer losses
and the lower altitudes meant less wear
and tear on the engines.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>


Yes, I've read it was a matter of losses, too. I'd not heard the matter of wear and tear before, though.

cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

hop2002
12-09-2006, 11:16 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">My reading on this subject suggests that the precision (i.e., bombing attacks with a C.E.P. &lt; 1.6 km qualify as ?precision?) doctrine was tried in Japan, but with little success. Two factors impinged: one was poor accuracy of bombing from very high altitude, and the other was the dispersed nature of Japanese manufacturing. There was no equivalent to the Ruhr in Japan.

The tactic was switched to low altitude night bombing with incendiaries. This sounds like area bombing to me, and the results sound similar, too. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's interesting that all 3 of the major strategic bombing air forces (Luftwaffe, RAF and USAAF) started out with a doctrine of attacking precision targets, and all 3 ended up area bombing cities with incendiaries (although all 3 never truely abandoned precision attacks, and devoted a fair percentage of their effort to that end)

For some reason, the critics of area bombing never seem to address the fact that the 3 forces all adopted area bombing in light of experience.

TheGozr
12-10-2006, 02:06 AM
Haaaa Bombers ! Great to ride and to pilot this one http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

http://www.gozr.net/iocl/images/fsx/B17fsx2.jpg <div class="ev_tpc_signature">

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Aaron_GT
12-10-2006, 02:45 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">For some reason, the critics of area bombing never seem to address the fact that the 3 forces all adopted area bombing in light of experience. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Admittedly hindsight is 20-20 vision but many suggest that more closely targeted raids might have been more effective, such as the pre-DDay bombing of communications. It has been argued that the switch from closely targeted raids to more diffuse targets in 1940 cost the Luftwaffe the Battle of Britain (although it is argued that even if the war in the air had been won an invasion wasn't plausible, but it might have forced an armistice).

Various suggestions have been made for changes that would have helped the Allied effort. For example in 1941 the British bomber force in North Africa was relatively modest, and it has been suggested that rather than scattering bombs over the Ruhr at night the use of numbers of heavy bombers tactically during the day (with escort, of course) against the Italians might have been more effective and contributed to an early close to that campaign, obviating the need for Operation Torch in November 1942, and paving the way for a potential North Western European invasion in 1943. Lots of what-ifs, of course!

Ratsack
12-10-2006, 02:53 AM
Well, the RAF in North Africa ended up leading the way. They came up with and perfected the system of combined land / naval / air operations that finally massacred the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean and was used effectively until the end of the war.

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Aaron_GT
12-10-2006, 05:53 AM
It was done largely with light bombers, though, including some pretty outdated models. I wonder what could have been achieved if Short Stirlings had been made available, for example.

Kurfurst__
12-10-2006, 06:09 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by hop2002:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Unfortunately for such agendas, there's no sign in the German operational orders for targetting civvies. In fact, the Germans themselves classified the following raids only as repraisal raids - an answer to predating and parellel British attacks on German population centres :
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh, they certainly called them reprisal raids. Unfortunately for the revisionists, Jodl is on record as planning raids designed to break British civilian morale as early as June 1940. From his diary:

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Together with propaganda and periodic terror attacks, announced as reprisals, this increasing weakening of the basis of food supply will paralyze and finally break the will of the people to resist, and thereby force its government to capitulate </div></BLOCKQUOTE> </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Curious that Jodl allagedly said/wrote that, and then orders of the exact contrary were issued to the troops...

Allegedly, because doing a Google search for the alleged Jodl-quote, the only match I could find is another post from Hop2002 on another forum (using his Nashwan nick), and I still recall when this subject was discussed last time, Hop2002/Nashwan was so desperately arguing, that after making up fictionary timelines about 'who was the first', he even made up qoutes, and made no secret about it that these were just made up in response to citations from contemporary commanders of both sides prooving his version false.

So, I wonder, can you direct us to the exact origin of this alleged Jodl quote? Author, Title, Publisher and Publishing date, page...? Not that I say that it was absolutely impossible that he said that, after all he might have held such views (with little consequence, I might add, as Jodl had little say into anything, as he did not run things), as did others, but I am afraid the final stance on the subject was decided by Göing and Hitler, and from their issued directives it's quite clear that Jodl's alleged position was not shared, a case quite similiar to the ideas of some RAF 'bomber barons' who were more thirsty for civvy blood but were turned down.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Of course, the Nazis always had an eye on the propaganda, they even went so far as to stage a fake attack by Poles on a German radio station as an excuse for war, murdering a Polish captive to provide "evidence". </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

As did others. In this thread, we have already covered Winnie Churchill's little plan to commit agression against Norway and forcefully occupy it under the disguise of 'just helping out the poor Finns, but got lost on our way there'.

The problem is, the propaganda version (such as the Gleiwitz attack or the alleged German terror bombings made up by Allied press) and the actual orders are two different things. It has been described by Hinchliff how RAF BC bomber crews were instructed to incernate Dresden and concentrate all firebombs on a single central spot, and how afterwards a staged briefing was held for the press but now with fake instructions about perfectly acceptable targets and lots of warnings not to hit a single school and such. Looks like the British had one eye on propaganda as well. But, neither side did have to be shy amongst themselves about their plans. Churchill did not have to be shy when he wanted for a 'cold blooded calculation' of how to maximize German civillian casulties from gas bombardment. If one reads the Gleiwitz documents of orders, plans, it's quite clear what the nature was vs. the propaganda version. If one reads the Churchill's orders and plans on Norway, it's quite clear what the nature was vs. the propaganda version. If one reads the Göing or Hitlers directives, it's quite clear what the nature was vs. the propagandized version. Hitler's directives on the conduct of air war against England in which he forbids the bombing of civillian targets expect as repraisal for British raids are just as clear as his directive on the conduct of the war in the east by absolutely brutal means.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">It's not surprising they tried to play the victim card, it's just sad that some still seem to believe it. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

At least you show some self-criticism.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">In fact, the Germans themselves classified the following raids only as repraisal raids - an answer to predating and parellel British attacks on German population centres :

- 7 September 1940 (this was conducted as a repraisal of Bomber Commands bombing of Berlin a bit earlier) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Can you explain the 1000 British civilian deaths in August 1940? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's collateral damage. After all, it's been a month of heavy bombardment of aircraft factories, docks, warehouses etc. It's inevitable that some bombs fell aside and killed innocents, especially as aircraft factories, docks, warehouses are quite closely surrounded by housing, just a few meters apart. 1000 civillian deaths for month turns out to be about 32 deaths a day. Hardly points to an effort to all out terror bombing, such amount of people often die from a single suicide bomb attack, and obviously that is much less explosives involved than a single bomb that misses it's target and lands in the wrong place.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">What about the fact that in August the most bombed target was airfields, with 1,004 tons, but the Luftwaffe's second favourite target was Liverpool, with over 450 tons and over 1,000 incendiary canisters? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well Liverpool is one of the largest, if not the largest seaport of the UK, so what's surprising about it's port facilities and large warehouses were being bombed at the same time the Luftwaffe bombed Channel shipping and other ports as well? The UK declared war on Germany, declined some very generous peace proposals twice, so it seemed it's going to stay in war, in that case it needed to be beaten, and as such, cutting of it's imports was a quite a logical way of conducting war, don't you agree?


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"><BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Essentially it was entially correct to note these attacks on the British civilian population were performed in 1941 - as repraisals to British attacks. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's worth pointing out to the others on this board that the Luftwaffe killed over 1,000 British civilians in August 1940, and about 20,000 in 1940 as a whole. The RAF killed about 1,000 German civilians in the whole of 1940. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well probably their means of finding their targets during the night was unequal. The Luftwaffe had no problems finding it's targets durin the night, and bomb them with the accuracy those days allowed. This meant that quite a few bombs missed and caused civillian casulties. The RAF otoh had no comparable navigation devices, and even years later when Essen residental areas were bombed (or was supposed to be bombed) by the RAF BC, with the clear intent of killing as many civvies as possible, only a handful of bombs fell on the city killing maybe a dozen or two, but lots of bombs fell of the countryside or some other cities. They simply could not find an entire city at night, and without finding a city, it's pretty hard to cause civillian casulties in it, despite their 'best efforts'.

That is, if your numers of 1940's German civillians casulties hold any connection with reality, and were not made up on the spot.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Göing's general orders to the Luftwaffe, from 30th June 1940 are even more explicit in this matter :

'(A) The war against England is to be restricted to destructive attacks against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces. ... It is also stressed that every effort should be made to avoid unneccesary loss of life amongst the civillian population.' </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Goering on the 15th August:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Our night attacks are essentially dislocation raids, made so that the enemy defences and population shall be allowed no respite.
Even these, however, should where possible be directed against Air Force targets. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The full quote of Göing from 15th August :

'Until further orders, operations are to be directed exclusively against the enemy air force, including the targets of the enemy aircraft industry allocated to the different Luftflotten. Shipping targets, and particularly large naval vessels are only to be attacked where circumstances are particularly propitious. For the moment other targets should be ignored. We must concentrate our efforts on the destruction of the enemy air forces. Our night attacks are essentially dislocation raids, made so that the enemy defences and population shall be allowed no respite; even these, however, should wherever possible be directed against air force targets.'

It seems to be in perfect agreement with his orders


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
Goering on the 19th August:

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">There can no longer be any restriction on the choice of targets. To myself I reserve only the right to order attacks on London and Liverpool </div></BLOCKQUOTE> </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

A pinnacle of selective qouting, isn't it...?

The full order :


Hermann Göing August 19th 1940

Regarding the continuation of the attacks on the enemy Air Force and aircraft industry, the following points will require more attention than hitherto, if our losses are to be kept down to the minimum, and the enemy Air Force swiftly and irrevocably destroyed.

Untilfurther notice, the main task of Luftflotten 2 and 3 will be to inflict the utmost damage possible on the enemy fighter forces. With this are to be combined attacks on the ground organisation of the enemy bombers, conducted however in such a manner as to avoid all unnecessary losses. I will return later to the question of operations against the enemy aircraft industry.

The difficulties inherent in such a great task make it essential that while avoiding any rigid plan, the whole operation must be planned and carried through with the utmost care. This can only be possible if unit commanders at all levels are of the best type. I have therefore ordered that in future, unit commanders are to be appointed regardless of rank and exclusively from among the most suitable and capable officers. Where possible such officers should be appointed from their own unit.

Immediate steps are to be taken by Luftflotten, Korps and Gruppen to test the suitability of all subordinate unit commanders, with a view to effecting exchanges and removals where necessary. Not only unsuitable, but also highly inexperienced officers whose lack of experience may lead to unnecessary losses, must be replaced. Otherwise suitable but inexperienced officers must serve under a really seasoned commander until such time as the latter is prepared to recommend their promotion.

We must as far as possible avoid a state of ajfairs in which our aircrews are kept in constant readiness for operations, as this must inevitably fatigue our units. In the actual conduct of operations, commanders of fighter units must be given as free a hand as possible. Only part of the fighters are to be employed as direct escorts to our bombers. The aim must be to employ the strongest possible fighter forces on free-lance operations, in which they can indirectly protect the bombers, and at the same time come to grips under favourable conditions with the enemy fighters. No rigid plan can be laid down for such operations, as their conduct must depend on the changing nature of enemy tactics, and on weather conditions.

Wherever feasible, fighters are also to attack the enemy on the ground. They must however be protected on such missions by succeeding waves of other fighters. Twin-engined fighters are to be employed where the range of single-engined aircraft is insufficient, or where they can facilitate the breaking off from combat of single-engined
formations.

The protection of returning bombers and fighters over the Channel must be assured by specially designated fighter
formations. The same applies to the defence of our own ground organisation. Young pilots not considered sufficiently experienced to fly over England could usefully carry out this latter task under the leadership of veteran pilots. The training of these young pilots and the importance of adequate supervision during their first operations are matters which cannot be too strongly emphasised.

As long as the enemy fighter defences retain their present strength, attacks on aircraft factories must be carried out under cover of weather conditions permitting surprise raids made by solitary aircraft. Such operations demand the most meticulous preparation, but can achieve very satisfactory results. The cloudy conditions likely to prevail over England in the next few days must be exploited for such attacks. We must succeed in seriously disrupting the material supplies of the enemy Air Force, by the destruction of the relatively small number of aircraft engine and aluminium plants.


These attacks on the enemy aircraft industry are of particular importance, and should also be carried out by night. Should it however not be possible to locate an industrial target because of poor visibility or bad weather conditions, some other worthwhile target must be attacked. It would appear desirable for the purpose of night operations to allocate to units particular areas which they will come to know better during each successive raid. Within this area a list of target priorities should be drawn up, so that each sortie will produce some valuable result and flights will not be wasted due to the failure of the aircraft to find one particular target. There can no longer be any restriction on the choice of targets. To myself I reserve only the right to order attacks on London and Liverpool.

Experience has shown the efficieny of light anti-aircraft defences on enemy naval vessels. Crews must therefore take care not to fly over them unless they are actually to be attacked.

My remarks concerning the allocation to units of certain areas for night raids apply also to daylight operations. The more thoroughly the units know their operational areas, the greater will be their success. This is of special importance for fighter units.

Many barrage balloons have been shot down recently. Units should be advised not to attack such targets unless it is absolutely necessary for the conduct of the operation, or unless the attacking aircraft can do so in perfect safety.

Effective co-operation between bombers and fighters by means of conferences between unit commanders is essential for the success of combined operations and time must be allowed for this before an attack. Hurried orders and precipitate missions are impossible in the war against England; they can only lead to severe losses and setbacks.

To sum up: we have reached the decisive period of the air war against England. The vital task is to turn all means at our disposal to the defeat of the enemy Air Force. Our first aim is the destruction of the enemy?s fighters. If they no longer take the air, we shall attack them on the ground, or force them into battle by directing bomber attacks against targets within the range of our fighters. At the same time, and on a growing scale, we must continue our activities against the ground organisation of the enemy bomber units. Surprise attacks on the enemy aircraft industry must be made by day and by night. Once the enemy Air Force has been annihilated, our attacks will be directed as ordered against other vital targets.



Quite clear is that Göing was giving more free hand to his subordinates in selecting the specific targets within the main target he set, destruction of the enemy air force

.
REICHSMARSCHALL HERMANN GORING
Karinhall, August 19, 1940


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">He gave orders the same day for an attack on Liverpool. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, not 'on Liverpool', but very specific industrial targets within Liverpool, which was perhaps the most important British port in which supplies were unloaded. A perfectly valid target.

Those attacks Göing ordered that day, and which you imply to be 'terror attacks' were of very small scale attacks which disrupted the enemy fighter defences, kept them uncertain about enemy targets and as a matter of fact attacked docks :

Execution of this attack on Liverpool :

TUESDAY AUGUST 20th 1940

THE WEATHER:
Overcast and dull during the morning. Cloud base was very low in the north with rain in many places. As the morning progressed, the rain moved further south. London and the Thames Estuary remained cloudy and overcast, but the Channel area was fine with sunny periods.

OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:
The orders given by Göing in his Luftwaffe Command Orders Staff 1A (described in full in Document 36) were in part put into action during the night of the 19th/20th. In this document we see that Göing mentioned that the weather conditions expected in the next few days was cloud over much of Britain, and that we (the Luftwaffe) must take full advantage of the situation.

But these amounted to only small raids, between 12 and 15 He111 bombers attacked Liverpool and the Merseyside Docks and some dropped more bombs in the Midlands on the way back. Damage was only minimal and one He111 was shot down on the return journey over County Durham. These were some of the first bombs to be dropped on the City of Liverpool.


The Battle of Britiain official homapage notes of the events of the night of 19/20:

By night

Enemy activity was widespread but for the most part confined to raids by single aircraft. At midnight some 60 raids were plotted. Enemy aircraft were active off the coast and minelaying is suspected from the Thames Estuary to Northumberland. Two raids of 6+ penetrated inland, one to Derby and one to Middle Wallop. Single aircraft raids were mainly active in the Midlands and East Anglia, but raids were also reported in the Portsmouth, Bristol, South Wales, Liverpool, Hull, Newcastle and Edinburgh/Glasgow areas. Humber anti-aircraft guns claim to have destroyed and enemy aircraft at 2315 hours.

Portsmouth, Bristol, Liverpool - aren't these major ports in which most of Britiain's vital imports are unloaded...?


Detailed Summary

* Little Rissington was bombed at 2300 hours on 18th August and one Anson was destroyed. One service casualty is reported.
* St Athan RAF Station was bombed with 3 HE at 0003 hours and a hangar was hit and one aircraft damaged.
* At Broughton, near Swindon, 2 HE and some IB were dropped on Air Ministry property at 1340 hours. No reports of damage or casualties have been received.
* At 1350 hours, bombs were dropped at Shrivenham (Watchfield) Aerodrome. They fell outside the boundary and no damage resulted.
* Worthy Down Aerodrome suffered a dive bombing attack at 1424 hours by a single He111. Three 500lb bombs dropped, one damaging a hangar, one on the apron and one near another hangar causing considerable damage to buildings, cables and telephone wires and minor damage to four or five aircraft outside hangars. There were six minor casualties to personnel.
* At 1420 hours, a Ju88 attacked Harwell Aerodrome in steep dive releasing three heavy bombs and setting fire to three Wellingtons, which were totally destroyed.
* Coltishall Aerodrome was bombed at 1456 hours and an unfinished hangar was hit and slightly damaged. Several civilian casualties were caused, but the aerodrome itself is intact and no aircraft were damaged.
* Honington Aerodrome was subject to two attacks, the first at 1615 hours by a single aircraft using HE and incendiaries. Slight material damage was done and four Service dead and many injured are reported. The second attack was delivered by one Do17 at 1825 hours and resulted in heavy damage to one barrack block, two Wellingtons and one Magister. Six craters were formed on the aerodrome and one hangar roof was holed.
* At 1815 hours, nine HE and incendiaries were dropped on Air Ministry property at Brettenham. No casualties were caused.
* A hangar at Driffield Aerodrome is reported burning as a result of bombs dropped at 2258 hours.
* A single enemy aircraft raided Chelmsford at 1345 hours and dropped 23 HE in the residential area. Two houses were destroyed and casualties were 2 killed and 5 injured.
* At 1515 hours, an attack was made on the Llanreath oil tanks at Pembroke. Two hostile aircraft delivered salvoes which hit the tanks and started a serious fire which did not come under control until 0030 hours, 20th August. Of fifteen tanks, eight are involved containing many thousands of tons of petrol.
* Colchester was bombed twice at 1525 and 1745 hours. No damage was occasioned in the first raid, but in the second electric cables and telephones were hit.
* At Dover, five HE fell near the castle and three more inside the barracks at Guston, causing damage to huts and houses and several casualties.
* Five HE were dropped at Portland at 1610 hours by a single He111, apparently directed at the Mere Oil Fuel Depot. All fell on the Chesil Beach side of tanks and there are no reports of damage.
* At 1635 hours, a single aircraft raided the dockyard at Chatham, one building was wrecked by bombs.
* At Ablington, four HE fell at 1415 hours damaging two aircraft on the landing ground. One aircraftsman was killed.

* Casualties on Ground by Enemy Action:
o To RAF Personnel - 5 killed, 40 injured.
o To others - 23 killed, 74 injured


Hardly any sign of 'terror bombings', either in Göing's orders or in British casulty reports. The 23 killed is rather unfortunate, but given the extensive bombing of various targets during the whole day, it's unavoidable collateral damage. Worser ones happening in the near past, in the age of laser and GPS guided bombs.



<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Exact reference please. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Certainly. Overy, Why the Allies Won:

"In the Ford plant in Cologne, in the Ruhr, absenteeism rose to 25 per cent of the workforce for the whole of 1944. At the more distant BMW works in Munich the rate rose to one-fifth of the workforce by the summer of 1944." </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh, I see. So this is supposed to be the source for the previous statement you made :

"It's worth pointing out that absenteeism in German industry reached about 20% of the workforce in late 1943 and 1944. ie at any one time, 20% of the workers who were supposed to be at work were not."

It seems you mix up 'the German industry' as whole with on of the Ford factories in Köln, and one of the BMW factories in München.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
Certainly. Overy, Why the Allies Won:

"At the end of January 1945 Albert Speer and his ministerial colleagues
met in Berlin to sum up what bombing had done to production schedules
for 1944. They found that Germany had produced 35 percent fewer tanks
than planned, 31 percent fewer aircraft and 42 percent fewer lorries
as a result of bombing." </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It might have been that way, but in any case, it doesn't seem to be the case the Germans would be lacking either aircraft or tanks in nubmers in 1944. Quite the contrary, production of both aircraft and tanks peaked out towards the end of 1944 (in September for aircraft, with over 3000 produced, and in December 1944 for tanks, with 1854 produced), after the heavy attacks, as did the actual number of aircraft and tanks in service. Of course, without bombing it might have been even more, but it certainly did not make much of a difference in the supply of weapons of the German Army and Air Force.

As for the trucks, the situation does not seem to be much different from 1943, ie.

Planned and Actual Production of Trucks 1943/44
1943 1944

Planned 136571 113711
Actual 109085 87988
Difference between planned/produced :
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RocketDog
12-10-2006, 07:35 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
The UK declared war on Germany, declined some very generous peace proposals twice </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Those silly Brits declining Hitler's generous terms and fighting on! What fools!

Keep going, you're getting funnier and funnier.

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hop2002
12-10-2006, 10:22 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">So, I wonder, can you direct us to the exact origin of this alleged Jodl quote? Author, Title, Publisher and Publishing date, page...? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
Well, I suspect you're having difficulty finding it because Jodl wrote in German, and the translations differ slightly. The quote I used is from William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. can't find the page number now, but it's in the chapter on Sea Lion. (I was mistaken in that it wasn't from his diary, but rather his planning paper "The continuation of the war against England")

If you want another translation, it came up in Jodl's trial at Nuremberg:

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">"Together with propaganda and temporary terror attacks-declared to be reprisal actions-this increasing weakening of English food supply will paralyze the will of her people to resist and finally break and thus force its government to capitulate...."-Signed-';Jodl." </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/06-06-46.htm

Then there's John Ray's version, in The Night Blitz:

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">In conjunction with propaganda and terror raids from time to time, announced as reprisals, a cumulative reduction of Britain's food stocks will reduce the will of the people to resist, and then break it altogether, forcing the capitulation of their government </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

He also added:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">If 8 million people go mad, it might well turn into a catastrophe </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
(The population of London was about 8 million)

As to whether the plan was put in action, note the phrase "terror attacks-declared to be reprisal actions".

Then hear what Kesselring had to say:

"The 'reprisal raids' were also started". John Ray, the Night Blitz

Otto Bechtle, lecture to the Luftwaffe General Staff conference in 1944, describing the start of the night bombing of London:

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Economic warfare from the air could be embarked on with full fury </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Furthermore, the morale of the civilian population could be "subjected at the same time to heavy strain". (quotes from Ray, The Night Blitz.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">ot that I say that it was absolutely impossible that he said that, after all he might have held such views (with little consequence, I might add, as Jodl had little say into anything, as he did not run things) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

To quote from the judgement against Jodl:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">After a year in command of troops in August, 1939, he returned to become Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Although his immediate superior was defendant Keitel, he reported directly to Hitler on operational matters. In the strict military sense, Jodl was the actual planner of the war and responsible in large measure for the strategy and conduct of operations. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Or the Jewish virtual library's description of Jodl's position:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Jodl's most important office was that of Chief of the Operations Staff (Wehrmachtsfuehrungstab) in OKW. In this capacity he was directly subordinate to Keitel and equal in status to other departmental chiefs in OKW. However, insofar as the planning and conduct of military affairs are concerned, Jodl and his staff were more influential than the other departments. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">It's collateral damage. After all, it's been a month of heavy bombardment of aircraft factories, docks, warehouses etc. It's inevitable that some bombs fell aside and killed innocents, especially as aircraft factories, docks, warehouses are quite closely surrounded by housing, just a few meters apart. 1000 civillian deaths for month turns out to be about 32 deaths a day. Hardly points to an effort to all out terror bombing, such amount of people often die from a single suicide bomb attack, and obviously that is much less explosives involved than a single bomb that misses it's target and lands in the wrong place. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Collateral damage?

The Luftwaffe killed about 0.4 civilians per ton of bombs dropped in August 1940. Over the period of the BoB and Blitz, July 1940 - May 1941, they killed 41,000 civilians, at a rate of about 0.8 per ton of bombs.

The British and Americans dropped just over 1.2 million tons on Germany, and killed 0.48 Germans for every ton of bombs.

Even German "collateral damage" is uber, eh?

The truth of the matter is that up to early September, the Luftwaffe and the RAF were bombing the same sort of targets. Both were sending small numbers of bombers at night to attack what they thought were precise targets. (although the Luftwaffe was doing so on a greater scale)

That changed in early September, with the Luftwaffe switching to mass bombing raids on districts of London, using un-aimable incendiary canisters and parachute bombs.

You characterise this as "reprisals", buying in to the propaganda Jodl talked of, but how can it be reprisals for the small number of RAF raids on military objectives at night when the Luftwaffe was simultaneously attacking a larger number of military objectives at night?

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Well Liverpool is one of the largest, if not the largest seaport of the UK, so what's surprising about it's port facilities and large warehouses were being bombed at the same time the Luftwaffe bombed Channel shipping and other ports as well? The UK declared war on Germany, declined some very generous peace proposals twice, so it seemed it's going to stay in war, in that case it needed to be beaten, and as such, cutting of it's imports was a quite a logical way of conducting war, don't you agree? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, I agree. Like Hamburg was the largest armaments centre in Germany, Dresden was a communications hub for the eastern front, Berlin was the centre of the German war effort, etc, etc, etc.

The logic of bombing is clear, and applies to the Germans just as much as the allies.

What's silly is trying to say the Germans did it more cleanly, or only reacted to the allies. Both sides bombed cities, the only difference between them is that the Germans pioneered it, and did it for a much worse reason.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Well probably their means of finding their targets during the night was unequal. The Luftwaffe had no problems finding it's targets durin the night, and bomb them with the accuracy those days allowed. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

So the bombs that fell on central London on 25th August 1940 were aimed at central London? Funny, haven't you been arguing London was off limits to the Germans until the 7th of September?

The truth is night bombing at the time was very inaccurate. The Luftwaffe was not authorised to bomb London at night until the 7th September, but from Overy, The Battle, a list of some of the bombs that were hitting London in the days and weeks before that:

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">women.40 During the last half of August, as German bombers moved progressively further inland, bombs began to fall on the outskirts of London. On the night of 18/19 August bombs fell on Croydon, Wimbledon and the Maidens. On the night of 22/23 August the first bombs fell on central London in attacks described by observers as 'extensive' and for which no warning was given; on the night of 24/25 August bombs fell in Slough, Richmond Park and Dulwich. On the night the RAF first raided Berlin, bombs fell on Banstead, Croydon, Lewisham, Uxbridge, Harrow and Hayes. On the night of the next raid on Berlin, on 28/29 August, German aircraft bombed the following London areas: Finchley, St Pancras, Wembley, Wood Green, Southgate, Crayford, Old Kent Road, Mill Hill, Ilford, Hendon, Chigwell. London was under 'red' warning for seven hours and five minutes. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

And that was London, the biggest target in the world, close to the coast, and on a major river. Now imagine what it was like in the rest of Britain.

Here are the highlights of German bombing on a small British provincial town, Swansea:

8 separate attacks in June and July
8 in August
Attacks on 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th September (ie before the "reprisals" were started on 7th September)

The bombing was scattered over the entire town, hitting everything from the docks to farmland outside the town, a girls school and a church in the nearby village of Mumbles, the marshland of Crumlin Bog, and a lot falling into the bay.

Precision it ain't.
http://www.swansea-gower.co.uk/localhistory/swanseaairraidsofww2.htm

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Those attacks Göing ordered that day, and which you imply to be 'terror attacks' were of very small scale attacks which disrupted the enemy fighter defences, kept them uncertain about enemy targets and as a matter of fact attacked docks </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Of the 454 tons of HE dropped on Liverpool in August 1940, 360 tons was dropped in "grossenangriffen", attacks with over 100 tons dropped.

Philipscdrw
12-10-2006, 10:35 AM
Regarding terror bombings, what of the raid on the open city of Belgrade in early 1941, which killed 17,000 people?

As Hitler was preparing to invade Greece, he pressured Yugoslavia to join the Axis and provide an additional route for invasion. The Regent of Yugoslavia eventually agreed, then was overthrown by a coup of Serbian officers. The new regime were reluctant to accept British support, and didn't realise how angry Hitler was. Hitler issued, in March 1941, War Directive #25: "Yugoslavia, even if it makes initial professions of loyalty, must be regarded as an enemy and beaten down as quickly as possible.". The Luftwaffe was given the objective "As soon as sufficient forces are available and the weather allows, the ground installations of the Yugoslav air force and the city of Belgrade will be destroyed from the air by continual day and night attacks." [my italics].

600 aircraft were moved from within the Reich to support extension of the invasion of Greece to include Yugoslavia. The strategic plan specifically excluded bombing either industrial plants or the transportation network, but emphasised the aerial destruction of Belgrade.

That attack began in the morning with direct bombing of the ciry centre with 75% high explosives and 25% incendiaries, with the bombers returning in the afternoon with 40% HE and 60% incendiaries. Night bombing would then take place with 50% HE and 50% incendiaries, and further bombing takes place the next day. The operation was code-named "Punishment".

By the time the Germans had completed their attacks on a city that the Yugoslavs had declared open, 17,000 people had died.

And that was in March/April 1941.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

------------------------------------------------------------
PhilipsCDRw

PF_Tini's Simple Guide to Switching 4.04m, 4.05m, and 4.07m. (http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/7351046415)
Flying on Hyperlobby as EAF_T_Dozer

Sergio_101
12-10-2006, 11:09 AM
<span class="ev_code_WHITE"><BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__/Barbi/Isegrim:
The UK declared war on Germany, declined some very generous peace proposals twice </div></BLOCKQUOTE></span>

<span class="ev_code_RED">PEACE IN OUR TIME!</span> http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

<span class="ev_code_GREEN">A treaty with Hitler had already proven to be
a deal for surrender or worse.</span> http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/59.gif

<span class="ev_code_RED">Kurfurst is a blantant revisionist arguing the NAZI cause.</span> http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif

<span class="ev_code_RED">Sadly some in this message board take Barbi seriously.</span> http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif

<span class="ev_code_YELLOW">Sergio</span>

LStarosta
12-10-2006, 11:13 AM
http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/agreepost.gif<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

http://img109.imageshack.us/img109/1872/fe4ae1e074f2ea8e1878fa1kn2.gif (http://irwinnotguaranteed.ytmnd.com/)

Ratsack
12-10-2006, 03:04 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
...

Well Liverpool is one of the largest, if not the largest seaport of the UK, so what's surprising about it's port facilities and large warehouses were being bombed at the same time the Luftwaffe bombed Channel shipping and other ports as well? The UK declared war on Germany, declined some very generous peace proposals twice, so it seemed it's going to stay in war, in that case it needed to be beaten, and as such, cutting of it's imports was a quite a logical way of conducting war, don't you agree?

... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Each time I come back to this discussion I am more apalled at what I've found scrawled in here over night.

I hope this thread gets locked, now.


Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

JG14_Josf: 'Gravity, among may other things, is not known...' http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

LStarosta
12-10-2006, 03:05 PM
All the Nazi sympathizing in this thread is making me nauseous.. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/sadeyes.gif<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

http://img109.imageshack.us/img109/1872/fe4ae1e074f2ea8e1878fa1kn2.gif (http://irwinnotguaranteed.ytmnd.com/)

LStarosta
12-10-2006, 03:23 PM
C'mon... Next thing we know it was the Poles who attacked Germany first and the Jews benefited from everything because they're Jews, and the Gypsies spread malaria and AIDS to the Aryans through homosexual blacks sent by the Bolsheviks who were under the thumb of the Polish inteligentsia and then the Jews gave Jesse Owens steroids in '36 did which pissed Hitler off, so in reality Germany really was only defending itself by retaliating against Poland and killing 12 million people.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

http://img109.imageshack.us/img109/1872/fe4ae1e074f2ea8e1878fa1kn2.gif (http://irwinnotguaranteed.ytmnd.com/)

Sergio_101
12-10-2006, 04:46 PM
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/061128-F-1234S-026.jpg

Ok, lets forget Barbi and his Neo NAZI's.
More superbombers that did not see action.
XB-36 was slowed to nearly a halt during the war
after the survival of Britian was assured.
it first flew in 1946, it easilt could have
struck anywhere in Germany from a base in
Maine or Newfoundland.

http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/060530-F-1234S-001.jpg
Another superbomber.
The B-19A was slow, and under powered, but had the
range to hit Germany as well, but it's bomb load
at that distance was small, too small to carry a nuke.

http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/050406-F-1234P-053.jpg

Another superbomber from the US!
The XB-15 was a early design, design
and construction beginning before the Boeing 299(B-17)
and having it's first flight after.
A wonderful plane for 1936. More powerful engines
would have made it a viable weapon.
It's wing design was used in the Boeing Clipper
flying boats with different engines, CW R-2600s
for the Clippers and P&W R-1830 for the B-15!
Badly underpowered, but the Americans were thinking BIG!

http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/060713-F-1234S-011.jpg

No shortage of superbombers in the US.
Similar in bomb load, range and perhaps a
bit faster, the Convair/Consolidated B-32 "Dominator".
Lacked any modern features such as pressurising
or remote control turrets
it was also a bit dated in it's airframe design.
Wonderful machine, and it did see action
over Japan. Yep, it shot down Japanese planes. dropped bombs and at least one got shot up.

5 bonafied super bombers, 4 flew before WWII
was over. One could have if required. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif

You should see some of the huge flying boats..... http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

Bewolf
12-11-2006, 12:37 AM
All the Nazi sympathizing in this thread is making me nauseous.. Sad Eyes

This hardly is about Nazi Sympathizing, but putting facts straight. It was war, and I don't blame the allies at all for anything they did in the war. In fact I am very thankful we lost, as I seriously wouldn't want to live under such a regime.
But to make it all white and black, good allies, evil germans, german terror bombings and nice allied picknick flights, germans started it "all", is ridiculous. This view was appropriate 60 years ago when psychology was half the war, but nowadays, with people able to look at the facts without personal emotions or demonizing, such mindsets are simply backwards.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

Bewolf

Never discuss with stupid people.
They'll drag you down to their level and beat you with experience.

Foo.bar
12-11-2006, 01:29 AM
@Bewolf: http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/11.gif<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://img463.imageshack.us/img463/4436/gutelandungtr9.jpg
Watch my SoW dedicated railway efforts (http://forums-de.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/3751020023/m/2181080123/p/1)

Sergio_101
12-11-2006, 03:22 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:
All the Nazi sympathizing in this thread is making me nauseous.. Sad Eyes

This hardly is about Nazi Sympathizing, but putting facts straight. It was war, and I don't blame the allies at all for anything they did in the war. In fact I am very thankful we lost, as I seriously wouldn't want to live under such a regime.
But to make it all white and black, good allies, evil germans, german terror bombings and nice allied picknick flights, germans started it "all", is ridiculous. This view was appropriate 60 years ago when psychology was half the war, but nowadays, with people able to look at the facts without personal emotions or demonizing, such mindsets are simply backwards. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

<span class="ev_code_GREEN">Obviously Barbi/Kurfurst does NOT share yout sentiments. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif
The effort has been made to get back to the superbomber
subject. However I feel a lock is coming. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif
Hey, the mods locked my thread about the Luftwaffe getting
it's but handed to it for a lot less.</span> http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/bigtears.gif

<span class="ev_code_RED">"This hardly is about Nazi Sympathizing"
Kurfurst/ Isegrim/ Barbi is all about "Nazi Sympathizing".</span> http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

fighter_966
12-11-2006, 04:06 AM
What about russians attacking to Poland and Finland 1939?? or have you ever heard place called Katyn?(Place in Poland)thats also good example how to hide truth .In fact I have also heard that same thing about Britain mineing Norway waters etc but Id like to see more evidence, Sources please. Both sides made their share of bloodshed.. Personally Iam not sure that everything has been told about that war. Still I dont see Nazi symph.. specify please.

woofiedog
12-11-2006, 04:20 AM
It's been Very interesting reading the comments and thoughts posted in this thread sofar.

Sergio_101... Mint photo's and posts.

Ratsack... Excellent reading in some of your posts in this thread.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v438/woofiedog/WOOFIEDOG.jpg

Hunter 82's PC component shop
http://www.magnum-pc.com/
https://usm.channelonline.com/magnumpc/storesite/Search/External/

Kurfurst__
12-11-2006, 05:28 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:
All the Nazi sympathizing in this thread is making me nauseous.. Sad Eyes

This hardly is about Nazi Sympathizing, but putting facts straight. It was war, and I don't blame the allies at all for anything they did in the war. In fact I am very thankful we lost, as I seriously wouldn't want to live under such a regime.
But to make it all white and black, good allies, evil germans, german terror bombings and nice allied picknick flights, germans started it "all", is ridiculous. This view was appropriate 60 years ago when psychology was half the war, but nowadays, with people able to look at the facts without personal emotions or demonizing, such mindsets are simply backwards. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed 100%. Though the 'nowadays people able to look at the facts without personal emotions or demonizing', I am not sure you've read all posts in this thread. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

Frankly, those who prefer demonizing and distorting via selective qouting etc. have their own little agenda. It's all about crimes of their own country, which their nations hadn't faced yet as it was (is being) done examplary in Germany, so they stuck at excuses like 'Just war', or 'they started it' or 'everybody did it'.

On the other hand, their case is extremely unconvincing because of the lack of evidence. Who'd seriously think that if there were orders to terror attacks, those wouldn't be available and cited in thousend sources? Much worse doings of the Nazis are throughly documented, which leave exactly no doubt, but not 'terror bombings'... in contrast, if one digs into the details finds orders saying something entirely different.

More on the details later.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42333000/jpg/_42333631_puskasbudapest_ap203b.jpg
In memoriam Puskás Ferenc,2 April 1927 - 17 November 2006.
Nyugodjon Békében - May he rest in Peace.

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/
Kurfürst - Your Resource for Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance!

"The Me 109 was exceptional in turning combat. If there is a fighter plane built for turning combat , it has to be the Messer! Speedy, maneuverable (especially in the vertical) and extremely dynamic."
- Major Kozhemyako, Soviet fighter pilot of the VVS

Ignored Posters : AKA_Tagert, Wurkeri, Gibbage, LStarosta, Sergio_101.

ploughman
12-11-2006, 05:56 AM
Russel Crowe is the split of Puskás Ferenc and the B-36 is one beautiful looking bomber.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">


Dum spiro, spero

RocketDog
12-11-2006, 08:56 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:
In fact I am very thankful we lost, as I seriously wouldn't want to live under such a regime. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually mate, if you're a modern German you didn't lose. What lost was an intolerant and violent ideology. What won (at least in the West) was a committment to democracy. The post-war Germans played a major role in strengthening this democracy in Europe and I'm proud to have you as neighbours.

Cheers,

RD.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v402/RocketDog/rocketdog.jpg

ploughman
12-11-2006, 08:58 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by RocketDog:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:
In fact I am very thankful we lost, as I seriously wouldn't want to live under such a regime. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually mate, if you're a modern German you didn't lose. What lost was an intolerant and violent ideology. What won (at least in the West) was a committment to democracy. The post-war Germans played a major role in strengthening this democracy in Europe and I'm proud to have you as neighbours.

Cheers,

RD. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/agreepost.gif

P.S. Nice sunset.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">


Dum spiro, spero

Kurfurst__
12-11-2006, 02:53 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ploughman:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by RocketDog:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:
In fact I am very thankful we lost, as I seriously wouldn't want to live under such a regime. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually mate, if you're a modern German you didn't lose. What lost was an intolerant and violent ideology. What won (at least in the West) was a committment to democracy. The post-war Germans played a major role in strengthening this democracy in Europe and I'm proud to have you as neighbours.

Cheers,

RD. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/agreepost.gif

P.S. Nice sunset. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


Hmm, now that I think of it, perhaps World War II was something neccesary, even if painful to have. Let's face it, after Versailles, Europe as a whole was scr*wed up beyond hope, and had pretty much a dead-end as a future. If WW2 would not happen, and send every major European power to the floor, in one way or another, and force them to re-think their future, what would we have now...? The same stuff as for hundreds of years, coalition against coalition, re-fighting the same old issues in just another different set-up of allies and enemies? Remnants of colonialism, again a defunct leftover from an era hundreds of years ago, and no longer of source of prosperity and advancement?

Perhaps a completely new deal was neccesary. I bit like when the late Roman Empire, also a historical dead end, and needed a completely new deal to move on with history. It was painful, but something new rose from it, something that eventually become the European civilisation and thinking.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42333000/jpg/_42333631_puskasbudapest_ap203b.jpg
In memoriam Puskás Ferenc,2 April 1927 - 17 November 2006.
Nyugodjon Békében - May he rest in Peace.

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/
Kurfürst - Your Resource for Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance!

"The Me 109 was exceptional in turning combat. If there is a fighter plane built for turning combat , it has to be the Messer! Speedy, maneuverable (especially in the vertical) and extremely dynamic."
- Major Kozhemyako, Soviet fighter pilot of the VVS

Ignored Posters : AKA_Tagert, Wurkeri, Gibbage, LStarosta, Sergio_101.

Blutarski2004
12-11-2006, 07:20 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"> Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
Let's face it, after Versailles, Europe as a whole was scr*wed up beyond hope. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


..... Too true. the Treaty of Versailles was not a treaty of peace. It was a treaty of revenge, some of it dating back to the Franco-Prussian War. The day that treaty was signed, the clock for WW2 started ticking.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

BLUTARSKI

Bewolf
12-11-2006, 11:42 PM
It reached even further back then the franco prussian war, really. I think the 30 years war what really set the stage for all that happend afterwards. It was the 30 years war that really saw the raise of "nationalism" and real national identities. Before that Europe was much comparable to the modern EU in terms of travel and possibilities (not in terms of trade and taxes) then later. Also, shortly before that war Elsace Lohrraine was taken by France and remains so to this very day, quite a factor in the Fraco German relations during the last 300 years prior to World War II and of the real initial starting point of the franco german "hereditary enemy" line of thinking, which brought Europe so much suffering.

At Rocketdog:
Yeah, I tend to agree. Though Germany had democratic traditions dating back to the Napoloeonic times and especially the 1848/49 revolutions, much was lost during the Kaiser times and Weimar was never really accepted. In thus the german post war developments were a huge success. What was achieved is astonishing, and something I would risk my life for to preserve. Nevertheless it is very painful, to look at the maps or Europe nowadays and see their homes lost especially for older generations. But that is the price that had to be paid. What we got in return is so much more worth. Nowadays everybody takes it as granted, freedom, democracy, style of living, hardly anybody remembers the ppl that died to achieve this during the centuries, in revolutions, in wars, local and foreign ppl, soldiers and activists. When I hear ppl talking about communism or fashism beeing more effective or more rightful, I get the creeps.

Still, you know, I had a lot of talks with my grandfather. He was commanding a Flak Quad 20mm battery squad first in France, later in Siciliy and Africa. He also was on Monte Cassino, later escaped from beeing send to the eastern front. And whenever the talks came to Hitler he stopped right in his tracks, went all red, lowered his head and said "that old *******", while shaking his head. One could see the hate. That was a changing point here, as I was as much on that demononizing all germans trip as well, (which is true to most modern germans btw, demonizing that time and the people) especially as my other grandfather appearantly was a hardcore Nazi. He died before I was born, so I could never talk to him. Which is a pity, cuz I really would have liked to know his motives.

Anyways, this really teached me to take a closer and more differentiated look at the events and ppl back then. And when I hear ppl like Sergio with their all or nothing good or bad stances I can't but shake my head.

Thanks gents, that has become a much more interesting thread then I would have thought.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

Bewolf

Never discuss with stupid people.
They'll drag you down to their level and beat you with experience.

Sergio_101
12-12-2006, 04:03 AM
Truthfully Bewolf, what you say makes sense.
I am not "all or nothing good or bad".
I have had exposure to Neo Nazis and KKK growing
up. I feel I understand the hatred those people
feel for others.
I also have more experiance with apologist
ranting as I grew up with a few old NAZIs
and a few Neo NAZIs. They can't let go.
They used the same cheap excuses that Kurfurst repeats.
Poland and Russia did cause the European war in their minds.
Versailles is the crutch. Reminding them that
the Soviets also invaded Poland co-oparating with
Germany just results in more excuses.

Fact is that Hitler was bent on revenge.
Danzig and the Polish corridor infuriated him.
Versailles was only an aggravation.
Read Mein Kamph. It is clear that Hitler saw the slavic
lands as living space for his ideal of a greater Germany.
Everything makes sense, it was an agressive war of
revenge and expansion.
Stalin should have read Mein Kamph. he would have known the truth.
Hitler was bent on the extermination of all things Slavic and or Communist.
as for the Jews of Europe? We need not go there, the results bear the truth.

Kurfurst/Barbi tries to gove the impression that only military
and industrial targets were planned in German air raids.
A sort of Teutonic kinder and gentler war...... http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif
The truth is far different, Warsaw, Rotterdam, name the city, civillians
were bombed.
On the ground, massive civillian casualties, Russians murdered in the millions,
Jews, Gypsies and other "un desireables" exterminated in death camps
in the millions.

Historical facts may explain why the conflict ignighted in the first place.
Good things may have been born in the aftermath.

We are slapping Kurfurst/Barbi up side ofhis head for a good reason.
He has taken the job as Lawyer for the NAZIs.
His propaganda needs to be exposed.

Sergio<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

P-51s may not have won the war, but they did not loose it.
Loosing the war was left to the Bf-109s and Fw-190s. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

Ratsack
12-12-2006, 07:24 AM
Sergio,

I agree with your sentiment, but I disagree with some of the particulars. However, this forum is not the place to get into a complex discussion of something like the Kershaw thesis. I therefore recommend to you two books on Hitler and his thinking (such as it was).

They are:

Hitler: 1889-1936 Hubris

and

Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis


Both by Ian Kershaw. A quick blurb on Kershaw from Wiki:
Professor Sir Ian Kershaw (born April 29, 1943 in Oldham, Lancashire, England) is a British historian, noted for his biographies of Adolf Hitler. Educated at St Bede's College, Manchester, Liverpool and Oxford Universities, he was originally trained as a medievalist but turned to the study of German history in the 1970s. He is a professor at the University of Sheffield where his wife Dame Betty Kershaw also works and is the leading disciple of the late West German historian Martin Broszat. He teaches the courses on the Nazi State and another module entitled 'Germans against Hitler'.

Kershaw is a serious academic historian, as opposed to those who write ?popular? history. His stuff is very well researched, and his arguments are well supported. However, he desperately needs an editor in my view. Some of his stuff is simply turgid to read.

That said, he explores Hitler the political animal and as the product of WWI, and how that meshed with the NSDAP and the established bureaucracy when he came to power. It also explores the essentially opportunistic nature of Nazi rule. It?s well worth the effort of trudging through these two volumes.


cheers,
Ratsack<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

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Kurfurst__
12-12-2006, 07:54 AM
I haven't read the two Kershaw books/volumes, simply no time for a 1000-1500 page book... http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_frown.gif
I just peeked into it in a bookshop, but it seems to be an excellent work, well written and objective analysis.

There's another Kershaw btw, Rober J Kershaw, who's 'Bridgehead' is quite simply the best analitical account of the Arnheim battles. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/25.gif<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

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Nyugodjon Békében - May he rest in Peace.

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bazzaah2
12-12-2006, 08:13 AM
the Kershaw books are both very good.

For another take on Hitler I would recommend that people read the psychoanalytical profile written on Hitler during the war. A quick Google should unearth it.

It's fascinating stuff, both historically and as a telling portrait of an appalling individual.

It may or may not be accurate (we'll never know) but that study of him gets under his skin in a way that conventional biographies don't.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

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Thanatos833
12-12-2006, 12:29 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ploughman:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by RocketDog:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:
In fact I am very thankful we lost, as I seriously wouldn't want to live under such a regime. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually mate, if you're a modern German you didn't lose. What lost was an intolerant and violent ideology. What won (at least in the West) was a committment to democracy. The post-war Germans played a major role in strengthening this democracy in Europe and I'm proud to have you as neighbours.

Cheers,

RD. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/agreepost.gif

P.S. Nice sunset. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


Hmm, now that I think of it, perhaps World War II was something neccesary, even if painful to have. Let's face it, after Versailles, Europe as a whole was scr*wed up beyond hope, and had pretty much a dead-end as a future. If WW2 would not happen, and send every major European power to the floor, in one way or another, and force them to re-think their future, what would we have now...? The same stuff as for hundreds of years, coalition against coalition, re-fighting the same old issues in just another different set-up of allies and enemies? Remnants of colonialism, again a defunct leftover from an era hundreds of years ago, and no longer of source of prosperity and advancement?

Perhaps a completely new deal was neccesary. I bit like when the late Roman Empire, also a historical dead end, and needed a completely new deal to move on with history. It was painful, but something new rose from it, something that eventually become the European civilisation and thinking. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>You may be right, a lot of countries like mine gained freedom due to the European colonial powers being weakened after WW2.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

http://img88.imageshack.us/img88/9285/do17in9.jpg

The Dornier Do-17, another brilliant example of German engineering, a ?Schnellbomber" which could just outrun all fighters, this plane led to the German victory in the Battle of Britain and indeed, the Second World War.

Bearcat99
12-13-2006, 06:42 AM
Sergio check your PTs. Personal attacks will not be tolerated..... this will be the only warning you will get. Calling another forum member a Nazi is a personal attack.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

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SheerLuckHolmes
12-13-2006, 06:48 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bearcat99:
Sergio check youer PTs. Personal attacks will not be tolerated..... this will be the only warning you will get. Calling another forum member a Nazi is a personal attack. </div></BLOCKQUOTE> http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/agreepost.gif

LStarosta
12-13-2006, 12:14 PM
What about calling someone a... "poop-head", if you will?<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

_____________________________

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Blutarski2004
12-13-2006, 02:45 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bewolf:
Though Germany had democratic traditions dating back to the Napoloeonic times and especially the 1848/49 revolutions, much was lost during the Kaiser times ... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

.....I think it was Niall Ferguson in his book, THE PITY OF WAR, that he mentioned that the German state under the chancellorship of Bismarck provided one of the most liberal union labor rights environments in Europe.

Considering the ability with which Bismarck maintained Euorpean political stability, his dismissal by Wilhelm was perhaps the worst mistake made in his rule.<div class="ev_tpc_signature">

BLUTARSKI