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View Full Version : Germany's Heavy bombers...



Bearcat99
10-14-2005, 08:03 PM
http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LRG/images/lrg0067.jpg
Me-264 (http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/2833/luftwaffe/bomber/me264/me264.html)


http://www.luftwaffepics.com/LCBW2/Ju390-V1-2.jpg
Ju-390 (http://users.belgacom.net/aircraft2/avion2/3944.html)

They never saw action but.......

Bearcat99
10-14-2005, 08:03 PM
http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LRG/images/lrg0067.jpg
Me-264 (http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/2833/luftwaffe/bomber/me264/me264.html)


http://www.luftwaffepics.com/LCBW2/Ju390-V1-2.jpg
Ju-390 (http://users.belgacom.net/aircraft2/avion2/3944.html)

They never saw action but.......

-HH-Dubbo
10-14-2005, 08:08 PM
Certainly an interesting what-if. I'm off to find more info if I can.

Bearcat99
10-14-2005, 08:11 PM
Just Google it... I was surprised at the amount of stuff... I found some stuff on the 263 also..

This (http://wp.scn.ru/en/ww2/f/460) site is pretty interesting.

jarink
10-14-2005, 08:25 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bearcat99:
They never saw action but....... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

....they're going to be included in a future patch? (to compliment the BF-109Z)
http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/784.gif

I never understood why Germany never was able to build a heavy bomber to use against Britain. The He-177 was as close as they got, and it was, frankly, horrible.

Xiolablu3
10-14-2005, 08:41 PM
That HE264 looks very much like the B29 from the front...


Hitler was much more interested in the ground war and wanted strategic Dive bombers and the like, I htink thats why a heavy bomber was such a LOW priority.

Edit :Sorry I missed out the LOW. Ooops

The role of the Luftwafee was supposed to be solely to assist the army on the ground.

p1ngu666
10-14-2005, 09:12 PM
britain is fairly close from bases in france. and the lw attacks over the UK went from being decent, to a amusing farce.

ElAurens
10-14-2005, 09:46 PM
The simple fact is that the German High Command were tactical thinkers, cavalry officers really, and strategic thinking was simply outside the scope of their training and experience.

Heavy bombers are stategic weapons.

Jungmann
10-14-2005, 09:58 PM
What El Aurens said. The German High Command always saw the Luftwaffe as a tactical air force, supporting the Heer. That's why it worked so well in France during the Blitz--the Stukas bombed bridges and roads in advance of the Panzer advance. It never occurred to the Germans they'd need to strike their enemies factories, oil and rails--they always envisioned victory as a result of their land forces.

I don't know for sure, but I suspect the same thinking applied to the Japanese.

Cheers,

hobnail
10-14-2005, 11:02 PM
Look no further than the engrossing Luft '46 (http://www.luft46.com) site.

The Me-264 (http://www.luft46.com/prototyp/me264.html).

p1ngu666
10-14-2005, 11:39 PM
iirec, the japanease bombers had extreme range, like the zero did

Ruy Horta
10-15-2005, 01:27 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by ElAurens:
The simple fact is that the German High Command were tactical thinkers, cavalry officers really, and strategic thinking was simply outside the scope of their training and experience.

Heavy bombers are stategic weapons. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is pure myth and it is a shame that it keeps being repeated. There are a number of good books available which cover the development of the Luftwaffe, like The Luftwaffe's Way of War or The Luftwaffe, Creating the Operational Air War.

Suggested reading if you really want to blanket statements about the Luftwaffe.

Things are not as simple as they might seem, certainly not as straightforward as suggested and not dictated by hindsight.

WTE_Ibis
10-15-2005, 04:19 AM
I believe it made the round trip to New York.
I'm positive I read that somwhere,sorry can't remember where.

Badsight.
10-15-2005, 06:06 AM
Ibis , the Me-264 ?

that was the plan , but willy messer over-claimed what his design could do to the RLM

the prototype didnt hit the range expectations even on an empty load IIRC

Low_Flyer_MkII
10-15-2005, 06:19 AM
Here's your Luftwaffe '46...... http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/784.gif


http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/Low_Flyer/sewing.jpg

F19_Olli72
10-15-2005, 07:27 AM
Wasnt it a Junkers 390 that reached the coast of USA?

LEBillfish
10-15-2005, 07:42 AM
Just speculating here not speaking from fact.....I wonder if maybe the lack of heavies was partially due to a different mindset/goal.

The Allies wanted to pound the Axis war machine to oblivion....It's end goal to win the war (disregarding land grabs after), In kind it didn't care less about "preserving historical/great structures" of man.....The Axis on the otherhand for the most part sought to "acquire land and possesions". If destroyed, all you gained was a wasteland. Places leveled from artillery/bombing due to resistance.

So I wonder if some degree the end goal did not contribute to the weapon choices at first.

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-indifferent.gif

p1ngu666
10-15-2005, 07:49 AM
in the blitz they attacked various historic places, and in other countries aswell.

there where german plans for a heavy bomber before the war, but goering halted them, prefering more medium bombers.

he thought the bombers wouldnt hit stuff from there massive altitude, and they would haveto fly in cloud alot (30,000ft or so)
he was almost certainly right about hitting anything..

ElAurens
10-15-2005, 08:06 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
iirec, the japanease bombers had extreme range, like the zero did </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes the G4M series had very long range, but the engineers at Mitsubishi sacrificed payload to achieve it.

The Japanese military at the start of WW2, like the Germans, can be best be described as a tactical force.

Ruy, My comments are not leveled at the Luftwaffe alone, but the entire WW2 German military. A strategic power does not totally disregard it's surface navy, for example, like the Germans did. Likewise a strategic power does not set out opon a war of the scope of WW2 with limited fuel reserves, like both Germany and Japan did.

Both Germany and Japan had brilliant tactical success at the start of hostilities, and both lost because of a complete lack of strategic understanding.

Capt.LoneRanger
10-15-2005, 08:23 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"> in the blitz they attacked various historic places, and in other countries aswell.

there where german plans for a heavy bomber before the war, but goering halted them, prefering more medium bombers.

he thought the bombers wouldnt hit stuff from there massive altitude, and they would haveto fly in cloud alot (30,000ft or so)
he was almost certainly right about hitting anything.. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually Goering never even considered the plan. It was Hitler (again) dooming the Luftwaffe, as he did with the Navy, too. Hitler made his experiences in WW1 and from that he never considered to implement new doctrines or technology. So the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe always had outdated stuff to work with. Infact for both branches Hitler only saw one function: Support infantry&armor attacks.

For that reason Germany mainly had small and medium bombers and put the strongest effort on StuKas and JaBos. In Hitlers Blitzkrieg there was no room for long range bombers or strategic strikes.

Aaron_GT
10-15-2005, 08:57 AM
Strategic bombers were considered to be a useful asset for the LW had the war started in 1942 as was originally envisaged. However the timescale for war was brought forward and since Bliztkrieg was working well into mid 1942 the need seemed to be for more tactical bombers instead. In the end the Bliztkrieg fizzled out in the East by which time it was a bit too late. The He177 could have managed some strategic role in terms of flying from Berlin to London and back, but the requirements in the East to attack dispersed Soviet industry would have been beyond the He177, or in fact anything apart from the B29, B36 and Lincoln.

Ruy Horta
10-15-2005, 10:47 AM
Never mind, my post was a little too serious.

Have a nice one all!

Capt.LoneRanger
10-15-2005, 11:07 AM
@Ruy Horta

I guess you are refering to the last sentence?

vocatx
10-15-2005, 11:46 AM
One little factoid that seems to be little know is that Hitler's military advisors wanted to wait until at least 1944 to begin the war. Hitler lost patience and began before they could build the German forces to the level they had desired. Had Hitler allowed his High Command to run the war, even had the results come out to be the same, the war would have been much longer, and much more costly for both sides.

Hitler seemed to have little grasp of fighting war on a strategic level. As stated earlier, he thought almost solely along tactical lines as WWI was fought, and didn't modify his military doctrine as the technolegy would have dictated.

Many of his advisors were brilliant military planners. We are very lucky Hitler was so unstable and such a control freak. I'm sure his drug abuse played a large role in all this, especially late in the war.

Low_Flyer_MkII
10-15-2005, 12:11 PM
What drug abuse was that then, Ted?

msalama
10-15-2005, 12:25 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">What drug abuse was that then, Ted? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

If memory serves, his personal Dr. (Morelli?) used to give him coke among other things...

Zyzbot
10-15-2005, 12:27 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkII:
What drug abuse was that then, Ted? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hitler was supposedly injected with methamphetamine according to some sources.

LEBillfish
10-15-2005, 12:47 PM
Funny thing though.......Notice how carpet bombing is considered for the most part obsolete now......Strategic precision the way to go?

p1ngu666
10-15-2005, 01:11 PM
carpet bombed in nam, malaysa and other places

smart bombs cost alot, so they dont use em on mass

Ruy Horta
10-15-2005, 02:20 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Capt.LoneRanger:
@Ruy Horta

I guess you are refering to the last sentence? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Which last sentence you mean, the one still here in the thread or the one in the post that I've deleted?

Capt.LoneRanger
10-15-2005, 02:26 PM
http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

The one before you deleted it. Then I'd agreed 100% with you, as the statement "Bad strategics" is more than superficial, as it was Hitler loosing the war, not his Generals tactics.

LEBillfish
10-15-2005, 02:32 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
carpet bombed in nam, malaysa and other places

smart bombs cost alot, so they dont use em on mass </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Vietnam was close 30-40 years ago beginning to end.....and yes they've used the method since, yet is out dated and a huge waste......

As to targeting historic structures re-read my post.....That was done by the Germans in retaliation to resistance....NOT as a we are just going to level an area from the get go.

So essentially though perhaps wanting the population gone in many cases, the intent was to keep the land as intact as possible and not waste ordinance covering an area when precision strikes would do the job.......A tactic/method we employ today....Or did someone start building B52's again?

In kind we have developed our weapons to be more precise. What 1,000's of Tons of bombs were used for to destroy 1 base in New Guinea, we'd now send just a handful of Hornets to do.

Granted, the technology advanced to allow it....Yet the intent and tactic the same.

p1ngu666
10-15-2005, 02:41 PM
the germans leveled several places at the start of the war.

Ruy Horta
10-15-2005, 02:45 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Capt.LoneRanger:
http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

The one before you deleted it. Then I'd agreed 100% with you, as the statement "Bad strategics" is more than superficial, as it was Hitler loosing the war, not his Generals tactics. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The way you put it is much better, my version was a little more acid. In the end it boils down to method. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif

Low_Flyer_MkII
10-15-2005, 02:47 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
the germans leveled several places at the start of the war. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

And V-bombs weren't exactly precision guided devices....

KGr.HH-Sunburst
10-15-2005, 03:26 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkII:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
the germans leveled several places at the start of the war. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

And V-bombs weren't exactly precision guided devices.... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You must understand that terror bombing and forcing a surrender (ie Rotterdam) is one thing, Strategic bombing is another

Germans didnt do strategic bombing day by day to win a war unlike the allies, although i think there are examples of the LW doing strategic bombing

Oh for those who say that the Germans didnt see how strategic bombing could be important and not being able to put up a good heavy bomber must remember that it was the not so wise Hitler calling the shots, not generals, LW or Whermacht

Bearcat99
10-15-2005, 04:52 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LEBillfish:
Funny thing though.......Notice how carpet bombing is considered for the most part obsolete now......Strategic precision the way to go? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thats mainly because the necessary technology for precision bombing has come into it's own. I am sure that even in WW2 if there were a way to be more precise... they would have.

One interesting thing is that at the outbreak of WW2 Germany like most nations was still stuck somewhat in the past.. even if the germans were at the forefront of the new way to wage war. They still had thier mindset in the past like El said..... Hitler had plans for a massive battleship.... bigger than anything afloat.... but no one was really thinking about carriers...

Aaron_GT
10-15-2005, 06:50 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">carpet bombed in nam, malaysa and other places </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Gulf War 1 too (of troop concentrations anyway). Precision bombing has only come into its own at a good pricehttp://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_razz.giferformance point with the advent of the JDAM.

p1ngu666
10-15-2005, 07:25 PM
btw aaron, czech your pms

ARCHIE_CALVERT
10-15-2005, 08:01 PM
http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-happy.gif

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v187/Secudus/Bombers03.jpg

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v187/Secudus/Bombers04.jpg

p1ngu666
10-15-2005, 10:24 PM
didnt the raf/commandos of some kind go and nick one of them?

jarink
10-15-2005, 11:01 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bearcat99:
Thats mainly because the necessary technology for precision bombing has come into it's own. I am sure that even in WW2 if there were a way to be more precise... they would have. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Eighth AF tried AZON (AZimuth ONly) bombing for a short time (only 13 missions) in the spring of '44 with mixed results. There were only 10 planes (B-24Hs from the 458th BG used. This system saw better success in the CBI theater. AZON was an add-on moveable fin package for a 1000-pound bomb, very similar to the way laser guidance packages are added to today's dumb bombs to create a GBU.

Don't forget the Germans used the Hs293 and "Fritz-X" radio guided bombs to good effect, but only as anti-shipping weapons. Once the Allies figured out the guidance, they were easily jammed, however.

The purpose of strategic bombing in WWII was somewhat different than it is today. Back then, it served the dual purposes of destroying infrastructure (factories and the factory workers) and terrorizing the population. Nowadays we try to only hit the inanimate objects.

Probably the most effective bombing of the entire war was performed in the Pacific. When LeMay switched B-29s from high altitude daylight "precision" bombing to low altitude nighttime fire bombing, they virtually wiped several major Japanese cities completely off the map; sometimes in only a single raid. This completely burned up many factories and also killed or dislocated hundreds of thousands of factory workers. It's horrible to think of now, but back then it was seen as the best way of winning the war.

Cajun76
10-16-2005, 01:39 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by ElAurens:
... Likewise a strategic power does not set out opon a war of the scope of WW2 with limited fuel reserves, like both Germany and Japan did.

Both Germany and Japan had brilliant tactical success at the start of hostilities, and both lost because of a complete lack of strategic understanding. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I would disagree, they lost because the they could make all the tactical successs translate into a strategic victory. Look at Russian forces at the end of the war. Totally tactical, and lots of it. Even US forces near the end were mostly tactical in nature, with even the bulk of the heavies' sorties against tac targets. Think about both countries (Germany and Japan) major invasions, and the the consequences of achieving them. Russia and China had loads of manpower, Russia also had huge resources, oil, lumber, coal, etc. There's a reason Germany was in N. Africa too. Japan had fewer options due to oil reserves available nearby to conquer, but slave labor factories churning out equipment for the war effort wouldn't have hurt, as well as conscripted troops.

Had the Russian campaign not bogged down and the Russians had been defeated, the long term strategic outlook looks very promising for Germany. They hoped to make a quick grab, beef up their position and consolidate, and then press on. Tactical objectives in service of a strategic plan. It's with 20/20 hindsight that we see what went wrong and how they might have done it better.

Aaron_GT
10-16-2005, 03:08 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Both Germany and Japan had brilliant tactical success at the start of hostilities, and both lost because of a complete lack of strategic understanding. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'd argue that Germany lost because of:

1. Lord Halifax not becoming PM in the UK
2. Some errors in strategic targets in the USSR leading to both a failure to knock out Moscow and/or oil reserves
3. Poor logistics making (2) much more likely.
4. Insufficient industrial production due to an assumption that the war would be short.
5. A failure to capitalise on the desire of Soviet republics to leave the USSR
6. Making life easy for FDR by declaring war.

luftluuver
10-16-2005, 05:34 AM
I can't believe no one mentioned LtGen Weaver who was pushing for German heavy bombers, like the Do 19 and Ju 89, until he was killed in a plane crash. This was before 1939.

LEBillfish
10-16-2005, 09:13 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bearcat99:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LEBillfish:
Funny thing though.......Notice how carpet bombing is considered for the most part obsolete now......Strategic precision the way to go? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thats mainly because the necessary technology for precision bombing has come into it's own. I am sure that even in WW2 if there were a way to be more precise... they would have.

One interesting thing is that at the outbreak of WW2 Germany like most nations was still stuck somewhat in the past.. even if the germans were at the forefront of the new way to wage war. They still had thier mindset in the past like El said..... Hitler had plans for a massive battleship.... bigger than anything afloat.... but no one was really thinking about carriers... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


I disagree based on the following......Stuka, HE111 (Blitz bomber which I understand was "originally" intended to be a low level fast precise attack plane for troop support)

...In fact, on second though I'm not even going to list them all.....I'll just ask a question.

In contrast ignoring range and engines what German bombers were designed primarily for high altitude work vs. direct precise attack of ground targets (realizing most LW planes were jack of all trades)?

Point being, though the technology was obviously not where it is today, the mindset IMLTHO was of precision strikes vs. covering a vast area.......Granted, resources partially insisted on it....However I still believe part of the logic in it was the intended utilization of conquered lands....

Can the logic of no heavy long range bombers be stated as a mistake on the part of the LW? Sure. Yet the bigger mistake was simply generating a need for them in the first place.

p1ngu666
10-16-2005, 09:50 AM
indeed

and heavier bomb loads on the lw planes hadtobe (not sure for all) carried externaly, causing drag, thus reducing range, and ingame more importantly- speed.

the bombers germany had where perfect for early war

Ruy Horta
10-16-2005, 12:23 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LEBillfish:
In Can the logic of no heavy long range bombers be stated as a mistake on the part of the LW? Sure. Yet the bigger mistake was simply generating a need for them in the first place. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

So for a bit of play, what was the B-17s intended role?

Zyzbot
10-16-2005, 01:26 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LEBillfish:
In Can the logic of no heavy long range bombers be stated as a mistake on the part of the LW? Sure. Yet the bigger mistake was simply generating a need for them in the first place. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

So for a bit of play, what was the B-17s intended role? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Wasn't it originally conceived as a maritime patrol and recon aircraft?

p1ngu666
10-16-2005, 01:34 PM
yep, and to bomb the ships. actully a total failure in the whole bombin ships role, didnt sink a thing, dunno if it damaged anything

Zyzbot
10-16-2005, 01:44 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
yep, and to bomb the ships. actully a total failure in the whole bombin ships role, didnt sink a thing, dunno if it damaged anything </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

According to this interrogation of a Japanes officer B-17s sunk a destroyer:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/IJO/IJO-60.html

Grendel-B
10-16-2005, 01:44 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:

and heavier bomb loads on the lw planes hadtobe (not sure for all) carried externaly, causing drag, thus reducing range, and ingame more importantly- speed.

the bombers germany had where perfect for early war </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Nope. Heinkel 177 carried its bombload in the fuselage bomb bay, as did Heinkel 111 of the heavier medium bombers. Do 217 and Ju88 had bomb bays but indeed carried their heaviest bombs in external bomb racks.

p1ngu666
10-16-2005, 02:22 PM
do u know what the max internal loads where?

zyzbot, first ive heard about it maybe true maybe a mistaken id.. *shrug*

Zyzbot
10-16-2005, 02:28 PM
The Japanese didn't think they could sink anything either!:


"On 24 August 1942, as the Japanese made their first major attempt to recapture Guadalcanal, Mutuski briefly bombarded U.S. Marine Corps' positions at Henderson Field. The next day, she went alongside the disabled transport Kinryu Maru to rescue that ship's crew and troops. While so immobilized, a formation of U.S. B-17 bombers appeared. Aware of the poor accuracy of high-level bombing, the destroyer's captain elected to continue his rescue efforts. However, in a rare event, the bombers scored well and Mutuski was sunk. Her captain, hauled from the water with his ship's other surviving crewmen, is said to have remarked "even the B-17s could make a hit once in a while!".
http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

jarink
10-16-2005, 03:38 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
and heavier bomb loads on the lw planes hadtobe (not sure for all) carried externaly, causing drag, thus reducing range, and ingame more importantly- speed. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Early B-17s (without "Tokyo tanks") sometimes carried a couple of 1000-pound bombs on underwing pylons inboard of the engines. The reason they did this was some longer missions required the use of a bomb-bay fuel tank. This severly reduced the bombload, so they carried the external bombs to make up for it.
http://home.grics.net/jrink/B-17F_external_bombs.jpg

p1ngu666
10-16-2005, 05:01 PM
http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-surprised.gif

Zyzbot
10-16-2005, 05:18 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
do u know what the max internal loads where?
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

He-177's maximum internal bombload was supposed to be 13,000 pounds according to several sourecs I looked at.

Kurfurst__
10-17-2005, 06:23 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
do u know what the max internal loads where?
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Internal/max

He 111 : 2000/2500-3000 kg (250 or maybe 500 kgers max iirc)
Ju 88 : 1400/2400-3000 kg (but only 70kgers!, others would be carried externally)
Do 217 : 2400/4000 kg
He 177 : 6000/7000 kg - that's 15400 lbs btw... Have to look it up with Griehl!

Basically, the above points out that German bomber force was in fact not much different from that of the RAF early in the war - it was made up almost exclusively by medium level bombers (Heinkels and Wellingtons), and there were light bombers around (Do17s, and even more Blenheims in the RAF) - and yes, it was built for operational/strategic role. The Ju 88 was a kind of special, it was a jack of all trades and very few of them were around initially. The major bulk was made up by He 111s, and these were classical level bombers like the B-17, just smaller.

And on the usually appearing 'only a tactical air force'. Yep, read Corum's excellent book Ruy has posted. The LW was somewhere between the RAF/USAAF (90% strategical, bomb the city/factory producing tanks) and the VVS (90% tactical, destroy that tank on the battlefield itself) : the LW was mostly suited to fight on operational level, ie. between strategical and tactical level(destroy that RR station that would unload supplies or tanks, destroy the bridge reinforcments would cross etc). They also did strategic bombing early in the war (BoB, but it was too short to yield effect), but they remained mostly operational since :

a, they overrun everyone so fast that there was no need/time for it
b, then the USSR was simply too vast and prevented it, and infrastructure so primitive that operational bombing made more sense - cut that RR line, and there's no other in 500 miles radius..
c, most things came from the US, and it was out of range

Besides, IF we can agree on the fact that the He 111 was a medium level bomber, and it was, it acted as such all the time - which is not something especially suited for tactical role - I think we can neglect the claim about the 'tactical bomber force' immiditately.

Just look at what made up the bulk in 1939... Stukas? Noooo. They got a lot of press, that's all. IIRC there were something like merely ca200 Stukas around, and around 1400-1500 level bombers, the vast majority of them He 111s, some leftover old Do 17s, and a few of the new Ju88s that becaem opertional just short before the war started. And that's it. 90% of the bombers are medium level bombers, and it becomes a tctical force? Nope.

Aaron_GT
10-17-2005, 07:52 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Besides, IF we can agree on the fact that the He 111 was a medium level bomber, and it was, it acted as such all the time - which is not something especially suited for tactical role </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The RAF and USAAF heavies and mediums were used in a tactical role to great effect in Normandy. It wasn't close support, due to margins of error from the sticks of bombs, but it was tactical. Prior to that the force was used 'operationally' striking railway yards, etc. in France. So there is no reason why the He-111 couldn't have been used in the tactical role.

I think there is a terminology confusion here. You seem to be equating tactical with close air support, whereas I would say the likes of the bombing of troop concentrations by the RAF and USAAF around Caen was tactical, but you might call it operational?

p1ngu666
10-17-2005, 09:16 AM
operation just means doing something with likely contact with the enemy?

i dont think it matters too much, but ops in france where often not worth a entire "op" credit
maybe 1/3rd or 1/2 http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-surprised.gif

tigertalon
10-17-2005, 09:35 AM
Holy cr@p, look at the Me264 range: http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_eek.gif

(note that circles represent penetration depth, which equals half a range)

http://www.luft46.com/prototyp/264-6.jpg

p1ngu666
10-17-2005, 10:13 AM
http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_eek.gif

Interminate
10-17-2005, 09:25 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkII:
Here's your Luftwaffe '46......


http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/Low_Flyer/sewing.jpg </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No shame in sewing. You look like you could probably use one.

English planes suck.

Interminate
10-17-2005, 09:26 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LEBillfish:
Just speculating here not speaking from fact.....I wonder if maybe the lack of heavies was partially due to a different mindset/goal.

The Allies wanted to pound the Axis war machine to oblivion....It's end goal to win the war (disregarding land grabs after), In kind it didn't care less about "preserving historical/great structures" of man.....The Axis on the otherhand for the most part sought to "acquire land and possesions". If destroyed, all you gained was a wasteland. Places leveled from artillery/bombing due to resistance.

So I wonder if some degree the end goal did not contribute to the weapon choices at first.

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-indifferent.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Possibly, but no, I think it was a matter of saving engines.

Interminate
10-17-2005, 09:30 PM
[QUOTE]Originally posted by vocatx:
One little factoid that seems to be little know is that Hitler's military advisors wanted to wait until at least 1944 to begin the war. Hitler lost patience and began before they could build the German forces to the level they had desired. Had Hitler allowed his High Command to run the war, even had the results come out to be the same, the war would have been much longer, and much more costly for both sides.

Hitler seemed to have little grasp of fighting war on a strategic level. QUOTE]


Not true. The Soviets were arming as well.

Oh and you have a better grasp of fighting on a stratgic level? HA!

p1ngu666
10-17-2005, 09:46 PM
they didnt have tons of spare engines, atleast untill 44, when they couldnt move stuff around much and the engines where mostly **** quality by then


and yes english planes suck, but luckily suffiecently good enuff to beat the germans. repeatidly infact http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif

the russian long range bomber fleet/organisation got hit hard in the purges, then thrown away in the early days of the war http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-sad.gif

Interminate
10-20-2005, 05:23 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:


and yes english planes suck, but luckily suffiecently good enuff to beat the germans. repeatidly infact http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif

</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The english didn't beat anything. The english had to beg their scavenging masters in Amerika for help.

p1ngu666
10-20-2005, 06:56 PM
beat them in BOB http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-tongue.gif

ofcourse the charitiable view was that it was a draw....

germans hadto stop anyways as they would have bleed themselves white

Low_Flyer_MkII
10-20-2005, 07:00 PM
http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

Porked the Bismark and the Tirpitz, too....and that's a capital 'E' in 'English' - show some respect. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif

Interminate
10-20-2005, 10:10 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
beat them in BOB http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-tongue.gif

ofcourse the charitiable view was that it was a draw....

germans hadto stop anyways as they would have bleed themselves white </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You can wave your bob flag till you are blue in the face, but you are still amerika's B--ch since the revolutionary war till the present.

Bismark was a crippled ship. Now the hood that's a ship that got porked...english.

Sew sew sew.

Gibbage1
10-20-2005, 10:49 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Interminate:
http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/Low_Flyer/sewing.jpg </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Old Willy looks a little.... Defeated. . Lol.

pourshot
10-20-2005, 11:07 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Interminate:

Bismark was a crippled ship.

. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It was after a bi-plane torped it. Just think about that a ship so uber it was doomed by a rag and wire bi-plane ROFLMAO

ploughman
10-21-2005, 02:36 AM
Leave the troll alone.

Billy the Fish's idea's interesting but the Germans' did attempt to acheive strategic goals by bombing with their tactical air force. The London Blitz springs most immediately to mind. As for precision munitions...

http://www.armedforces.co.uk/navy/listings/navytridentb.jpg


This munition is very accurate.

pourshot
10-21-2005, 04:18 AM
Man that penguin gives me the creeps http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/blink.gif

stubby
10-21-2005, 05:23 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LEBillfish:
The Allies wanted to pound the Axis war machine to oblivion....It's end goal to win the war (disregarding land grabs after), In kind it didn't care less about "preserving historical/great structures" of man.....The Axis on the otherhand for the most part sought to "acquire land and possesions". If destroyed, all you gained was a wasteland. Places leveled from artillery/bombing due to resistance. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

What a crock of dung the above quote is. Go talk to some Londoners about the idiotic notion you put forth. Better yet, got to Russia and ask who was better at scortched earth policy. The 'noble' Axis as you say would have raised every building, structure, church, hospital and elementary school if they had the military might.

WOLFMondo
10-21-2005, 05:42 AM
At the Nuremburg trials the German officers and ministers left admitted Hitler ordered a scorched earth policy. Not only in the slavic areas but the German forces where ordered to destroy and level every thing as they retreated, that included German territory.

The allies did have questionable policies, for example the US 'accidentally' bombing the wrong targets in France to mislead the Germans killing thousands of French civilians, or Harris bomber offensive but they where not a shade on Hitler and the Nazi parties racial supremacy and purity policies. The allies cut the cancer out of Europe. The Nazi's where that cancer. With cancer you have to take risks to remove it and sometimes damage what your trying to save.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Interminate:

The english didn't beat anything. The english had to beg their scavenging masters in Amerika for help. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

First off, you need to go back to school and learn some Geography, then some history.

England is one state in the United Kingdom of Great Britain. Your right in one sense, England beat nothing but thats cause England is part of the UK. Same as Scotland (I assume you don't know where Scotland is) is part of the UK, as is Wales and Northern Ireland. Does that mean the Royal Navy is Scottish because they where predominantly based in Scapa Flow (thats in Scotland by the way)? No, because its part of Great Britain.

Sorry for point something out so blindingly obvious but It ticks me off.

The British, like every other nation imported goods. Do you think Germany would have done so well without its imports of metals from the Sweden? Do you think the USSR would have done so well if it didn't recieve millions of pairs of boots from the US? Do you think the US would have done so well if the British didn't share radar technology with them for instance?

Theres no shame in the lend/lease but you under estimate the British resolve and ability to do what they set out to acheive under there own steam. The British won North Africa, the Battle of Britain, sunk the Italian fleet at Taranto and the Royal Navy kept the commonwealth going in the first few years of the war. You clearly have little idea or knowledge about British history and what the British did in World War II with or without the help of our freinds over the pond.

Low_Flyer_MkII
10-21-2005, 05:50 AM
And it's Trafalgar day today - I repeat, show some respect, little boy. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/mockface.gif

MrBlueSky1960
10-21-2005, 06:21 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkII:
And it's Trafalgar day today - I repeat, show some respect, little boy. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/mockface.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

****... http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-surprised.gif So it is http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-happy.gif

Three Cheers for Nelson, and our gallant lads...

Hip, hip... Huzaar http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif
Hip, hip... Huzaar http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif
Hip, hip... Huzaar http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

Boo Suck to Old Boney and his dammed Frenchys... http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-tongue.gif

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-surprised.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

See Greenie, it's just like it was in the old days http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-happy.gif

HMS Victory stands today as the world's oldest commissioned warship. Still manned by Officers and Ratings of the Royal Navy, the Victory has seen over 200 years of almost continuous service.
With 100 Guns and a crew of over 800 men the Victory was one of the largest warships the Georgian Royal Navy sent into battle. Classed as a first rate ship of the line, Victory took six years to build and was launched on the 7th May 1765 at Chatham Dockyard.
At a Cost of âŁ63,175 (approx. âŁ50 million today), the Victory required approx. 6000 trees to build. Oak trees made up 90% of the wood used. Elm, Pine and Fir trees also supplied some of the timber used.

http://www.tallshipsadventure.org/lore/wallpaper/victory-800x600.jpg

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/6/6a/Battleship1.jpg

http://www.voodoo.cz/victory/trafalgar.html

ploughman
10-21-2005, 07:07 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by pourshot:
Man that penguin gives me the creeps </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Have you no feelings? The bird is sensitive you know. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

LStarosta
10-21-2005, 07:44 AM
That is one nifty looking boat. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/25.gif

stathem
10-21-2005, 08:29 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Interminate:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
beat them in BOB http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-tongue.gif

ofcourse the charitiable view was that it was a draw....

germans hadto stop anyways as they would have bleed themselves white </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You can wave your bob flag till you are blue in the face, but you are still amerika's B--ch since the revolutionary war till the present.

Bismark was a crippled ship. Now the hood that's a ship that got porked...english.

Sew sew sew. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You wanna knock off reading that Kafka, it can do funny things to your head.

Try some Geaorge Orwell instead, much more entertaining.

ploughman
10-21-2005, 09:00 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LStarosta:
That is one nifty looking boat. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/25.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's really something isn't it.

HMS Warrior is also in the historic dockyard at Portsmouth and that one'll make the hairs stand up on the back of your neck. On the outside it looks like a dandy piece of ship building, on the inside you realise you're standing on the gun-deck of a bonafide killer.

panther3485
10-21-2005, 09:10 AM
Hi there, AaronGT,

Quote:
*"I'd argue that Germany lost because of:

1. Lord Halifax not becoming PM in the UK
2. Some errors in strategic targets in the USSR leading to both a failure to knock out Moscow and/or oil reserves
3. Poor logistics making (2) much more likely.
4. Insufficient industrial production due to an assumption that the war would be short.
5. A failure to capitalise on the desire of Soviet republics to leave the USSR
6. Making life easy for FDR by declaring war."

[I must say I do agree but with your kind permission, I would like to insert the following in between 1 and 2:

Failure to either knock the British out of the War or to 'persuade' them to come to terms, before turning East. (Even though you might argue that if one follows the chain of events, this stemmed in part from point No. 1 - many readers might not think of it and I believe it was crucial to the eventual outcome).

Also, while point No. 6 is certainly a valid one, and it did make things 'easier' for Roosevelt, I would like to add that once the 'Pearl Harbor' card had been played, war between the USA and Germany was now pretty much inevitable. Hitler realized this and it is almost as if, by declaring war, he was saying, "Alright, you bastards, you can come out of the closet now - the gloves are off." This would have been good political posturing for him (Hitler was ever the showman), vis-a-vis the German people who were by then very much aware of how heavily the USA was favouring and aiding their enemies. Hitler calculated that he now had little to lose by throwing down the gauntlet.]

Nice to chat with you once again, Aaron. I always enjoy reading your posts.

Best regards,
panther3485

ploughman
10-21-2005, 09:32 AM
Viz the above, I think Hitler assesed that after the fall of France the British had a decision to make. They either keep their empire or they try and liberate Europe. He believed that they would not trade the empire for Europe and as such considered them peripheral. Of course had Hitler been less of a weeny he would have known that their have been two central themes to British foreign policy since the reign of good queen Bess (God bless 'er), that Britain's flanks be secure (Ireland, Scotland, and the Low Countries) and that no single hegemonic power be allowed to develop on continental Europe. As such the British were not trading their empire for Europe; they were trading their empire for their own continued freedom, which just happened to mean freeing Europe too.

panther3485
10-21-2005, 09:50 AM
Hi there, Ploughman,

Quote:
*"Viz the above, I think Hitler assesed that after the fall of France the British had a decision to make. They either keep their empire or they try and liberate Europe. He believed that they would not trade the empire for Europe and as such considered them peripheral. Of course had Hitler been less of a weeny he would have known that their have been two central themes to British foreign policy since the reign of good queen Bess (God bless 'er), that Britain's flanks be secure (Ireland, Scotland, and the Low Countries) and that no single hegemonic power be allowed to develop on continental Europe. As such the British were not trading their empire for Europe; they were trading their empire for their own continued freedom, which just happened to mean freeing Europe too."


[Yes, well said - a very insightful addition to my post.

From the Germans' strategic standpoint, Hitler's miscalculation only served to compound the error. By dismissing British stubbornness and continued defiance as 'business that could be dealt with later', quick success on the Eastern Front would become that much more critical. Failure to achieve this success within the projected timeframe (or somewhere near it)would doom Germany to a prolonged war on at least two fronts - the very same 'nightmare' scenario that the Fuhrer had formerly sworn to himself to avoid. It was a huge gamble and timing was everything.]

Best regards,
panther3485

darkhorizon11
10-21-2005, 10:09 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Interminate:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:


and yes english planes suck, but luckily suffiecently good enuff to beat the germans. repeatidly infact http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif

</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The english didn't beat anything. The english had to beg their scavenging masters in Amerika for help. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Wasn't there some battle in the summer of 1940 over southern England where the Luftwaffe fought against the RAF? The Germans won that conflict right?

Aaron_GT
10-21-2005, 11:18 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Failure to either knock the British out of the War or to 'persuade' them to come to terms, before turning East. (Even though you might argue that if one follows the chain of events, this stemmed in part from point No. 1 - many readers might not think of it and I believe it was crucial to the eventual outcome). </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think that knocking the UK out of the war by military conquest was unlikely, and that is why I suggested that knocking the UK out of the war politically depended on Halifax. And I agree with Ploughman - and this difference was the cruicial difference between Halifax and Churchill.

Aaron_GT
10-21-2005, 11:19 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Wasn't there some battle in the summer of 1940 over southern England where the Luftwaffe fought against the RAF? The Germans won that conflict right? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Tactically it was a draw, but that was a strategic victory for the UK.

Aaron_GT
10-21-2005, 11:23 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Also, while point No. 6 is certainly a valid one, and it did make things 'easier' for Roosevelt, I would like to add that once the 'Pearl Harbor' card had been played, war between the USA and Germany was now pretty much inevitable. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

FDR faced a lot of criticism for the policy of finishing the war in Europe first. Without a declaration of war by Germany in December 1941 I think that the pressure on FDR to conduct the war against Japan as the priority may have been insurmountable, and arguments for not getting involved in a shooting war in Europe at all might (i.e. not fighting on two fronts) might also have been strong. The level of aid to the USSR in particular might have been rather less in the critical year of 1942. It's a what if, but by opening his mouth and declaring war on the USA Hitler removed all doubt about his foolishness (and thank goodness).

Interminate
10-21-2005, 03:53 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Gibbage1:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Interminate:
http:/s/y231/Low_Flyer/sewing.jpg </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Old Willy looks a little.... Defeated. . Lol. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No he doesn't. You wish you were him.

Interminate
10-21-2005, 03:57 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stubby:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LEBillfish:
The Allies wanted to pound the Axis war machine to oblivion....It's end goal to win the war (disregarding land grabs after), In kind it didn't care less about "preserving historical/great structures" of man.....The Axis on the otherhand for the most part sought to "acquire land and possesions". If destroyed, all you gained was a wasteland. Places leveled from artillery/bombing due to resistance. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

What a crock of dung the above quote is. Go talk to some Londoners about the idiotic notion you put forth. Better yet, got to Russia and ask who was better at scortched earth policy. The 'noble' Axis as you say would have raised every building, structure, church, hospital and elementary school if they had the military might. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yeah but there is nothing worth saving in england or russia except thefted works from empire building. Germans are much more respectful of culture. I'm quite sure this would have been the case in Amerika if Germans had been the main impetus for colonisation of Amerika. Germans are not outright thieves unlike other colonial powers.

Interminate
10-21-2005, 04:06 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by WOLFMondo:
At the Nuremburg trials the German officers and ministers left admitted Hitler ordered a scorched earth policy. Not only in the slavic areas but the German forces where ordered to destroy and level every thing as they retreated, that included German territory.

The allies did have questionable policies, for example the US 'accidentally' bombing the wrong targets in France to mislead the Germans killing thousands of French civilians, or Harris bomber offensive but they where not a shade on Hitler and the Nazi parties racial supremacy and purity policies. The allies cut the cancer out of Europe. The Nazi's where that cancer. With cancer you have to take risks to remove it and sometimes damage what your trying to save.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Interminate:

The english didn't beat anything. The english had to beg their scavenging masters in Amerika for help. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

First off, you need to go back to school and learn some Geography, then some history.

England is one state in the United Kingdom of Great Britain. Your right in one sense, England beat nothing but thats cause England is part of the UK. Same as Scotland (I assume you don't know where Scotland is) is part of the UK, as is Wales and Northern Ireland. Does that mean the Royal Navy is Scottish because they where predominantly based in Scapa Flow (thats in Scotland by the way)? No, because its part of Great Britain.

Sorry for point something out so blindingly obvious but It ticks me off.

The British, like every other nation imported goods. Do you think Germany would have done so well without its imports of metals from the Sweden? Do you think the USSR would have done so well if it didn't recieve millions of pairs of boots from the US? Do you think the US would have done so well if the British didn't share radar technology with them for instance?

Theres no shame in the lend/lease but you under estimate the British resolve and ability to do what they set out to acheive under there own steam. The British won North Africa, the Battle of Britain, sunk the Italian fleet at Taranto and the Royal Navy kept the commonwealth going in the first few years of the war. You clearly have little idea or knowledge about British history and what the British did in World War II with or without the help of our freinds over the pond. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The first part of your response bears no relation to my comment so its not worth responding to simple semantics. I will say this, I'm quite sure my Gaelic brothers in Scot/Eire were more sympathetic to Germany than to their england- rest assured of that.

As to the 2nd part. Yes we all get supplies from somewhere. But its the nature with which you engage the enemy and a what particular point in history that solidifies your reputation or lack there of and I would say, the uk was in a rather whipped state as usual and would have eventually succumbed, this example even more pronounced in the first war. But eventually, the US, england's master, turned the tide for england. Without the US, england and russia would be finished, how good that would have been!

Interminate
10-21-2005, 04:15 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkII:
And it's Trafalgar day today - I repeat, show some respect, little boy. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/mockface.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Isn't that when nelson got porked.

Low_Flyer_MkII
10-21-2005, 04:43 PM
Like Sir John Moore at Corruna and Wolfe at Quebec - died leading his men in a great victory. It's the British way - plenty more great leaders where they came from.

Would have thought a jackboot-licker like you would be into all that glorious death in battle stuff.

panther3485
10-21-2005, 09:14 PM
Hello again, AaronGT,

Now we're getting into some good stuff - I'm enjoying this!

Quotes:

*"I think that knocking the UK out of the war by military conquest was unlikely, and that is why I suggested that knocking the UK out of the war politically depended on Halifax. And I agree with Ploughman - and this difference was the cruicial difference between Halifax and Churchill."

[Knocking the UK out of the war may well be considered to have been unlikely, if you believe that this could only have been achieved through a successful full-scale invasion. It is, however, possible to consider a different scenario if the Germans had gained the upper hand in the Battle of Britain. Failure of the RAF to successfully repel the Luftwaffe would have been a very heavy blow to British morale, with serious implications for the defence of the country. (Britain may have given the appearance of being totally resolute and on the surface, she was. Beneath the surface it was a rather different story.) The PERCEIVED THREAT of invasion, however we may view it today, seemed very real to the British people and indeed, to most of the World. This threat would have to have been taken much more seriously if the Luftwaffe had been able to establish clear air superiority over the English Channel and Southern England. Churchill would have been under enormous pressure, both from the public and from within the parliament. The more pacifist elements may well have been able to hold sway under these conditions. Halifax and others (Churchill's political enemies were many) would be back in the spotlight to denounce 'that War-mongering Churchill who is hell bent on taking us down the road to destruction'. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the successful defence of British airspace by RAF Fighter Command was not only pivotal to the War's eventual outcome - it was crucial in cementing Churchill's popularity with the British people and helped to assure his tenure as Prime Minister.]


*"Tactically it (the Battle of Britain) was a draw, but that was a strategic victory for the UK."

[No question that it was a strategic victory, not only for the British but for the whole Allied cause.
As for being a tactical draw, this is true if you base 'draw' on the fact that neither the RAF nor the Luftwaffe was destroyed and each was still a viable force by the end.
However, even the tactical outcome was still somewhat in favour of the RAF, when you consider that by 31 October 1940, Fighter Command was actually STRONGER than it had been when the battle began, whereas the Luftwaffe had not been able to replace its losses in anything like the same way. In fact, such was the mauling that the Luftwaffe had received in BoB that it began Operation Barbarossa (the invasion of Russia) - some eight months later - with not much more strength than it had in the summer of 1940.
The outcome of BoB also needs to be considered for its value as the first serious HIGHLY VISIBLE military setback suffered by the Germans. It provided a tremendous boost to British morale and it buoyed the hopes of victory for all the nations of the Commonwealth. It demonstrated that the hitherto 'invincible' German war machine could be stopped and given a bloody nose. In the eyes of the World just before BoB, Britain's chances of successfully resisting Hitler had been held to be very poor indeed (the Americans thought that Britian must surely go under). All of these perceptions had changed by the end of 1940 and attitudes in the US were already BEGINNING to soften in Britain's favour.]


*"FDR faced a lot of criticism for the policy of finishing the war in Europe first. Without a declaration of war by Germany in December 1941 I think that the pressure on FDR to conduct the war against Japan as the priority may have been insurmountable, and arguments for not getting involved in a shooting war in Europe at all might (i.e. not fighting on two fronts) might also have been strong. The level of aid to the USSR in particular might have been rather less in the critical year of 1942. It's a what if, but by opening his mouth and declaring war on the USA Hitler removed all doubt about his foolishness (and thank goodness)."

[FDR did indeed face criticism for this decision but IMHO he would have faced just as much, had he gone the other way. For every American who thought that 'Japan First' was the right way to go, there was at least one more who believed that FDR was right, seeing Nazi Germany as being by far the greater threat to World peace and freedom.
Whatever else you may believe about Adolf Hitler and Churchill, if they had one thing in common it's that they were both very astute, cunning politicians - arguably more so than FDR. In his memoirs, Churchill wrote that after he'd heard news of the attack on Pearl Harbor he 'slept his first decent night's sleep since the War began, secure in the knowledge that the Americans would now join the fight against the Nazis'.
So we have Hitler declaring war on the USA, confident that he had nothing to lose because his view of the situation was that war with the USA was now as good as inevitable and we have Churchill happy, now that he could count on the USA joining Britain and the Soviet Union against Hitler.
There had been many talks between Churchill and FDR on this very topic and FDR had already privately agreed that it needed to happen - it's just that it would have been political suicide if he tried to move the US in that direction before the time was right. I agree, Hitler definitely DID make it easier but IMHO it still would have happened and it still would have been 'Germany First'. No brainer. (We may simply have to 'agree to differ' on this?)]


Best regards and keep on keeping on,
panther3485

darkhorizon11
10-21-2005, 10:00 PM
This thread has gone from a cool German bomber WWII thread to nationalistic history lesson lets all be friends thread. I'm done.

Interminate
10-22-2005, 12:20 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkII:
Like Sir John Moore at Corruna and Wolfe at Quebec - died leading his men in a great victory. It's the British way - plenty more great leaders where they came from.

Would have thought a jackboot-licker like you would be into all that glorious death in battle stuff. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

He probably just fell overboard. The british way is, to cook badly, to exaggerate mediocre accomplishments and, worst of all, fail to remember long forsaken German roots. Rather pathetic.

"Jackboot-licker" is no insult even coming from a banger-licker like yourself. Bleached I might add.

Aaron_GT
10-22-2005, 01:51 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Knocking the UK out of the war may well be considered to have been unlikely, if you believe that this could only have been achieved through a successful full-scale invasion. It is, however, possible to consider a different scenario if the Germans had gained the upper hand in the Battle of Britain. Failure of the RAF to successfully repel the Luftwaffe would have been a very heavy blow to British morale, with serious implications for the defence of the country. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is what I meant, basically. The UK was unlikely to have succumbed to a successful invasion as it would have been too costly to mount. But losing the Battle of Britain would have been very damaging. With Halifax at the helm I think a peace deal would have been on the cards, but not with Churchill.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Britain may have given the appearance of being totally resolute and on the surface, she was. Beneath the surface it was a rather different story. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Indeed if you look at the results of Mass Observation and reports to the War Office there was serious concern that after bombing of London began civilian morale there was near breaking point.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"> Churchill would have been under enormous pressure, both from the public and from within the parliament. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think it Chuchill could have stuck it out, although perhaps that is coloured by seeing how resolute he was in the real rather than hypothetical situation and he could have been vulnerable to being deposed. After all Eden nearly did so in 1942.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">However, even the tactical outcome was still somewhat in favour of the RAF, when you consider that by 31 October 1940, Fighter Command was actually STRONGER than it had been when the battle began, whereas the Luftwaffe had not been able to replace its losses in anything like the same way. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Good point.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">FDR did indeed face criticism for this decision but IMHO he would have faced just as much, had he gone the other way. For every American who thought that 'Japan First' was the right way to go, there was at least one more who believed that FDR was right, seeing Nazi Germany as being by far the greater threat to World peace and freedom. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

From what I've read the public support was more on the side of going after Japan first, but there were crucial groups of voters that suported the alternative view.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"> if they had one thing in common it's that they were both very astute, cunning politicians - arguably more so than FDR. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

FDR was certainly cunning in terms of handling the US political machinery. In military matters he seems to have delegated much more. In terms of Stalin, FDR was far too trusting it seems, but Truman didn't trust Stalin at all.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"> In his memoirs, Churchill wrote </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You have to take his memoirs with a pinch of salt, though, as sometimes he seems to ascribe to himself thoughts and actions not supported by others (notably his doctor) which, however, do sound good in reterospect. Given his comments on the ability to put yourself in the best possible light in your own memoirs I'd reserve judgement about to what extent he thought the US joining the war in Europe was a certainty.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"> I agree, Hitler definitely DID make it easier but IMHO it still would have happened and it still would have been 'Germany First'. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It was inevitable, but I think without an explicit declaration the creeping policy would have continued (which was close to a war footing already) which might required an incident to occur between the two navies over a convoy to allow FDR to get the required Congressional support. That might have taken another 6 months or more. This would have meant no Operation Torch, or Sicily, and Italy still on the Axis side throughout 1943, and without changes in strategy, no invasion of Europe in 1944. This would have meant more troops to send East for Hitler. With a delay in anything much happening in Europe I think the pragmatists would have demanded Japan first. Of course once atomic weapons had been developed the die would have been cast.

Aaron_GT
10-22-2005, 01:52 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">He probably just fell overboard. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Why would he be on a ship when on land?

panther3485
10-22-2005, 10:48 AM
Hi AaronGT,

Thanks for the reply - I agree with most of what you have said.

While I am aware that reading too much into Churchill's memoirs is obviously risky, in this particular instance my interpretation would be that Churchill would have had good reason to feel relieved, not least on account of understandings already reached with FDR (not all of which would necessarily have been made public, by the way).

Further, I believe that if it wasn't going to happen immediately, it would IMHO certainly be happening soon (by 'soon', read within a few months at most; certainly not the '6 months or more' that you have put forward.)

There were two main factors in Hitler's thinking that made this pretty much inevitable:
(a) Hitler's view was that the stance of the USA was so obviously anti-German that the situation was intolerable to him. He felt that he might as well be on a war footing because the Americans were almost there anyway.
(b) In conjunction with this assessment, he also shrewdly calculated that from commencement of 'hostilities' it would be at least a year, possibly 18 months, before US military power could be effectively brought to bear against him anywhere in Europe. In Hitler's mind, this allowed sufficient time to finish off the Russians first.

Under these circumstances, the Japanese attack was all the encouragement that was required to push Hitler over the edge. His frame of mind was by now such that even if he had not declared war, he would almost certainly very soon have been taking such actions as to provide the USA with the neccessary 'justification'. In other words, with or without a declaration things would have very quickly reached flash point anyway.

Hitler's declaration, as we've both already agreed, made things easier for FDR as he did not have to wait for (or manufacture)a 'trigger' incident.

What I do not believe is that the overall effect of Hitler keeping his mouth shut would have been likely to be anywhere near as far reaching as you have suggested.

I think the issue of how significant Hitler's declaration of War was (in terms of its effect on US involvement), will remain something of a sticking point between us but like the thorough gentlemen we both truly are, we shall simply have to agree to differ here!

P.S. -
Yes - well said! While FDR was a remarkably able, even outstanding player in domestic politics he seems to have been considerably less capable when judging an international adversary or even an 'ally' (Stalin!)


Best regards once again,
panther3485

Aaron_GT
10-22-2005, 11:55 AM
I agree with 90% of your points. We'll just have to agree with the timescale of a US entry to the European war given the "What if" of Hitler not declaring war.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Yes - well said! While FDR was a remarkably able, even outstanding player in domestic politics he seems to have been considerably less capable when judging an international adversary or even an 'ally' (Stalin!) </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It seemed to be come quite a point of friction between FDR and Churchill, especially over Poland in the light of the Warsaw uprising. [OT: have you seen the death rates of those Polish and RAF pilots who flew the belated supply drops for the uprising - shocking]

panther3485
10-22-2005, 08:06 PM
Hi Aaron_GT,

Quotes:
*"I agree with 90% of your points. We'll just have to agree (to disagree?) with the timescale of a US entry to the European war given the "What if" of Hitler not declaring war."

[A fine gentleman's agreement - go in peace, my friend!]


*"OT: have you seen the death rates of those Polish and RAF pilots who flew the belated supply drops for the uprising - shocking."

[Actually, I don't recall having seen the figures but I've no doubt that it must have been a very dangerous job!]


Best regards,
panther3485

p1ngu666
10-22-2005, 08:31 PM
yep
flew over city with flaps and gear down at rooftop level iirec

Copperhead310th
10-22-2005, 11:11 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkII:
Here's your Luftwaffe '46...... http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/784.gif


http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/Low_Flyer/sewing.jpg </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

LMFAO! lol oh that's rich! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

luftluuver
10-23-2005, 01:59 AM
That pic of Willie M must have been taken after he got out of prison. Served 2-3 years for using slave labour.

SkyChimp
10-23-2005, 06:54 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by luftluuver:
That pic of Willie M must have been taken after he got out of prison. Served 2-3 years for using slave labour. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Willie was purportedly quite a gentleman, endeveavoring to build sewing machines, cars and pre-fabricated housing following the war. Unlike Kurt Tank, who was a hard-core, Jew-hating, card-carrying NAZI who fled to Argentina and who apparently didn't serve a day in prison.

Interminate
10-23-2005, 08:50 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by luftluuver:
That pic of Willie M must have been taken after he got out of prison. Served 2-3 years for using slave labour. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Since you brought up the subject of slave labor.

Using "slave" labor in an extreme situation such as war is no big deal frankly. The real big deal is a country like the US using slave labor just because, I don't know, just because they felt like it. And don't think it doesn't pervade the mindset of most americans and british even today. You still owe black people reparations Amerika.

NorrisMcWhirter
10-23-2005, 08:52 AM
Werner von Braun also was a card carrying Nazi who went on to further his "professional career" helping "someone" with their space programme.

Funny how selective memory can be.

Ta,
Norris

Interminate
10-23-2005, 08:56 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by SkyChimp:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by luftluuver:
That pic of Willie M must have been taken after he got out of prison. Served 2-3 years for using slave labour. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Willie was purportedly quite a gentleman, endeveavoring to build sewing machines, cars and pre-fabricated housing following the war. Unlike Kurt Tank, who was a hard-core, Jew-hating, card-carrying NAZI who fled to Argentina and who apparently didn't serve a day in prison. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Tank didn't "flee", he left. There's a difference.

And not that I really am against any position, plus I like him, but do you have any subtantiation of these claims.

Oh, and by the way. You say that as if he should have gone to prison- for what? Designing planes?! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif

Interminate
10-23-2005, 08:58 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by NorrisMcWhirter:
Werner von Braun also was a card carrying Nazi who went on to further his "professional career" helping "someone" with their space programme.

Funny how selective memory can be.

Ta,
Norris </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree. I'll even state further. Who cares if he was ACCN?

NorrisMcWhirter
10-23-2005, 10:28 AM
Makes no difference to me whatsoever.

Oskar Schindler was a member of the Nazi party, too.

Some people had to be a member it seems, whether they were a Nazi or not.

Ta,
Norris

SkyChimp
10-23-2005, 05:23 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Interminate:
Tank didn't "flee", he left. There's a difference.

And not that I really am against any position, plus I like him, but do you have any subtantiation of these claims.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, Interminate, he fled. Or more precisely, he "escaped."

"After the war Professor Dr.-Ing. E. H. Kurt W. Tank and many of his colleagues found a new home in Argentina. In late 1947 Tank had managed to escape to South America in a rather adventurous manner. At the time, the Argentinians had ingenious methods for helping numerous engineers flee occupied Germany." (Source: The History of German Aviation - Kurt Tank: Focke-Wulf's Designer and Test Pilot, Wolfgang Wagner, proofed by Kurt Tank himself.)

He fled. He fled to avoid justice, and to be with his NAZI cohorts. An ingenious designer, no doubt, who's designs transcend ideology. But he was a NAZI. You make "like" him. But NAZIs have never been among my heros.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
Oh, and by the way. You say that as if he should have gone to prison- for what? Designing planes?! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/35.gif
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes. He should have gone to jail for his implicitness with the NAZI regime and his willing use of slave labor. But that may be difficult to believe for someone who thinks "Using 'slave' labor in an extreme situation such as war is no big deal."

SkyChimp
10-23-2005, 05:28 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by NorrisMcWhirter:
Werner von Braun also was a card carrying Nazi who went on to further his "professional career" helping "someone" with their space programme.

Funny how selective memory can be.

Ta,
Norris </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

von Braun didn't flee to Argentina to reside with NAZIs and carry on his NAZI associations.

SkyChimp
10-23-2005, 05:32 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Interminate:
Since you brought up the subject of slave labor.

Using "slave" labor in an extreme situation such as war is no big deal frankly. The real big deal is a country like the US using slave labor just because, I don't know, just because they felt like it. And don't think it doesn't pervade the mindset of most americans and british even today. You still owe black people reparations Amerika. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

There is not a black person alive today that was a slave in America, nor a white person who enslaved them.

Not so with Germany. Many former slaves of the NAZIs, and many NAZI slave masters, are still alive today. It seems "Amerika" learned a lesson nearly 8O years before the Germans.

BTW, you tread periously close to showing a sympathy for NAZIs and their activities. Is that your intention?

Zyzbot
10-23-2005, 05:36 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by NorrisMcWhirter:
Werner von Braun also was a card carrying Nazi who went on to further his "professional career" helping "someone" with their space programme.

Funny how selective memory can be.

Ta,
Norris </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Your country had the same selective memory. For example...look into nerve gas development and see who pops up. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

Bearcat99
10-23-2005, 05:41 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Interminate:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by luftluuver:
That pic of Willie M must have been taken after he got out of prison. Served 2-3 years for using slave labour. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Since you brought up the subject of slave labor.

Using "slave" labor in an extreme situation such as war is no big deal frankly. The real big deal is a country like the US using slave labor just because, I don't know, just because they felt like it. And don't think it doesn't pervade the mindset of most americans and british even today. You still owe black people reparations Amerika. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Lets not go there. Keep this thread on topic... relatively at least. The whole U.S. slave trade reparations issue does not I repeat NOT belong on this forum at all. If you want to show sympathy for the Nazis as a personal choice.. then dont try to cloak it with this other stuff.

Keep it near topic at least.....


On that note...... there was a German general with foresight who saw the need for a long range bomber.... I forgot his name.. he was killed in a freak accident and the other side got thier way.. and tactical bombers like the Ju-87s and such won out. Think of how different the BoB might have been if Germany had long range bombers and could have sent in waves of bobmbers from short, medium and long range continuously.

SkyChimp
10-23-2005, 05:50 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Copperhead310th:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkII:
Here's your Luftwaffe '46...... http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/784.gif


http://i6.photobucket.com/albums/y231/Low_Flyer/sewing.jpg </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

LMFAO! lol oh that's rich! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

While you are laughing your *** off, reflect on some other post war work of Messerschmitt:

http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LRG/images/tornado-1.jpg

Low_Flyer_MkII
10-23-2005, 06:04 PM
http://www.tornado-data.com/History/history.htm

SkyChimp
10-23-2005, 06:15 PM
Copperhead probably doesn't know that Messerschmitt built a lot of these:

http://www.anft.net/f-14/photo-f104-01l.jpg

And significant portions of these:

http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/gallery/images/f4/c12-2445-12.jpg

SkyChimp
10-23-2005, 06:21 PM
He might be interested in knowing that mighty Grumman built a lot of these:

http://www.buyastepvan.com/home.jpg

He may have unknowingly bought ice-cream from one of them when he was a kid.

Or maybe he caught his first fish on the Hellcat's lesser-known sibling:

http://www.iboats.com/sites/marineland/site_page_2531/images/l_main3.jpg

luftluuver
10-23-2005, 07:39 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bearcat99:
On that note...... there was a German general with foresight who saw the need for a long range bomber.... I forgot his name.. he was killed in a freak accident and the other side got thier way.. and tactical bombers like the Ju-87s and such won out. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

His name was <span class="ev_code_YELLOW">Weaver</span>. I posted his name in a post earlier in this thread.

Bearcat99
10-23-2005, 07:54 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by luftluuver:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bearcat99:
On that note...... there was a German general with foresight who saw the need for a long range bomber.... I forgot his name.. he was killed in a freak accident and the other side got thier way.. and tactical bombers like the Ju-87s and such won out. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

His name was <span class="ev_code_YELLOW">Weaver</span>. I posted his name in a post earlier in this thread. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Right!! Do you remember his first name..

luftluuver
10-23-2005, 08:19 PM
Oops, should be Lt.Gen. Walther Wever , no 'a'.

He was LW Chief of Staff.

blakduk
10-23-2005, 08:51 PM
The main reason the Germans didnt have a strategic bomber fleet was they didnt have the need initially- they designed their armed forces to win the land battle. Their original objective was victory of Western europe and they designed their tactics to win WW1! Once they had defeated France they were stuck- they had no way of taking their blitzkrieg across the channel. Remember these guys had been nursing their bitterness since 1918- the battle cry of WW1 was 'On to Paris'. After Dunkirk in 1940 it was 'Now what?'
This gave Goering his opportunity to display his LW as a strategic weapon which of course it couldnt be.
Later the allies developed their strategic bomber fleets- requiring a huge manufacturing commitment, long development time, as well as training crews etc. They had the need for it because they had no other way of effectively taking the fight to Germany. Strategic bombing was still considered capable of winning the war at that time- it was only much later after the end of the war that objective analysis of the impact of the airwar of europe led to serious questions being raised about its value.
Given the experience of the allies it was probably the right call for the Germans to not make a huge commitment to developing a strategic bomber fleet.
However, if Dornitz had gotten his way and been given the fleet of U-boats he'd originally asked for.....

BTW- i dont think its a wise idea to reply to any posts by Trink or Interminate (or whatever he calls himself for the moment). Anyone who defends the use of slave labour in Hitler's reich and then claims moral superiority over the Western allies for the use of slavery over a century ago is just an oxygen thief!
Go bang both your neurons together and give yourself a headache

jarink
10-23-2005, 10:29 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bearcat99:
Think of how different the BoB might have been if Germany had long range bombers and could have sent in waves of bobmbers from short, medium and long range continuously. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Perhaps, but the real failure of the LW was it failed to destroy Fighter Command, not London. The whole reason for the BoB was the LW's mission of gaining air superiority over southern England as a prelude to invasion.

That's an operational mission, not a strategic one.

Even so, having a decent sized fleet of heavy bombers would not have rectified the main technical problem the LW faced in BoB - the BF-109 did not posess sufficient range to properly escort the bombers anywhere beyond London. Fighter Command was therefore able to concentrate it's squadrons in a very small area, maximizing their effect. The Germans, smartly, didn't try to fly their bombers unescorted during the day. They knew they would have been chewed to pieces without escort.

Another LW problem was poor escort doctrine, especially after Goering tied the fighters to the bombers. The RAF and USAAC amazingly enough used the same 'close escort' ideas early on, even though they knew (or should have known) that the tactic was flawed. Once the escort fighters were allowed to roam about and seek out enemy fighters, the LW was doomed in the skies over western Europe.

p1ngu666
10-23-2005, 10:46 PM
tuskegee escorted bombers where never shot down by enemy fighters.

tuskegee's did close escort.

truth is u need need fighters everywhere pretty much.

to use bombers as bait, is very expensive if u lose the bait...

Bearcat99
10-23-2005, 10:57 PM
Yeah I guess you are right there.. even if they had escorts.. nothin had much in the way of legs.. even the 109s from what I understand had @ 15 minutes of fuel once the reached Britain... is that correct?

Kocur_
10-23-2005, 11:29 PM
Walther Wever http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif Author of "Ural bomber" program., which produced Do-19 and Ju-89. He studied Mein Kampf and concluded LW needed bomber to be able to strike targets as far as in Ural in inevitable was agaist SU. Died in crash of He-70 he piloted himself on 3 june 1936 and soon after program was cancelled. It was still 1936/37 and Hitler et consortes saw LW mainly as tool of political pressure. 300 He-111 "looked" better than 100 Ju-89, for "300 bombers" is more scary than "100 bombers"...Another program "Bomber A" soon started, which produced He-177V1 in 1939. It might have been operational eralier if some staff genius didnt require He177 to have ability to do...dive bombing!

panther3485
10-24-2005, 12:47 AM
Hi, p1ngu666 and Bearcat99,

Part way through BoB, Goerings edict to the German fighters (which effectively 'tied them to the bombers'), when combined with other factors, turned out to be a disaster for the Luftwaffe. The 109's had until then fairly consistently enjoyed the advantages of height, the ability to generally dictate the terms of the engagements and to regularly 'bounce' the British fighters who were often still climbing (or had only just climbed) to the intercept.

This had been a major factor in the attrition rate of the British fighters being relatively high in the early to middle stages of BoB. Had it continued much longer, it might well have resulted in a critical fall-off of Fighter Command's effectiveness. Fortunately for the defenders, among the errors made by the Germans came two crucial ones around this time:

(a) Georing's change to fighter escort tactics, as mentioned above.

(b) Turning the main effort of the bombing on London.

The result of (a) was that from now on, when the 109's engaged the Hurricanes and Spitfires, they would be doing so on terms that were generally much less favourable than they had been before. This effect was magnified further by the relative characteristics of the different fighter types (strong points of the 109 having been more to the fore previously but now those of the Hurricane and Spitfire were more frequently able to be exploited).

One major consequence of (b) was the fact that the Luftwaffe was now having to penetrate further into British airspace on a regular basis, forcing the 109's to the extreme limit of their viable range. Different factors could vary the equation but in general, they might now have only 10 minutes in action before having to turn for home (compared with perhaps 20 to 30 mins previously, depending on destination). It was often difficult to disengage from combat in time and no small number ran out of fuel and were forced either to 'emergency land' or, worse still, ditch in the English Channel.

Aggravating the situation still further for the Luftwaffe, deeper penetration of British airspace gave the defenders more time to assemble and co-ordinate larger formations for the intercept. For the first time in the battle, something approaching 'Big Wing' interceptions was now possible on a regular basis.

As a consequence of the above, RAF fighter losses began to fall off (relatively speaking) and Luftwaffe losses increased. This was a marked turning point in BoB.

As for the 'what if' of German heavy bombers, these could have been very useful - with a heavier bomb load and a longer range, they could have inflicted a lot more damage and been able to reach any part of the UK with ease BUT for daylight attacks, without an effective long-range fighter escort, they too would have been cut to ribbons.


Best regards,
panther3485

hop2002
10-24-2005, 12:58 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Even so, having a decent sized fleet of heavy bombers would not have rectified the main technical problem the LW faced in BoB - the BF-109 did not posess sufficient range to properly escort the bombers anywhere beyond London. Fighter Command was therefore able to concentrate it's squadrons in a very small area, maximizing their effect. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually FC did not concentrate their fighters. They maintained a front line fighter force throughout the country.

The RAF on 1st September, for example, had 10 fighter squadrons in 10 group, which covered the west, 23 in 11 group, which covered the southeast and did most of the fighting, 15 in 12 group, which covered from North London to northern England, and only got involved on a large scale once the Luftwaffe began attacking London, and 10 squadrons in 13 group, which covered northern England and Scotland, and only got involved in the daylight battle once, when the Luftwaffe sent some unescorted raids against the NE on 15th August (iirc).

However, the Luftwaffe were concentrated against 11 Group in the SE. More range, and attacking targets further inland, would of course reduce their concentration on the SE (and longer sorties would mean fewer sorties, and more wear and tear)

If the Luftwaffe couldn't win concentrating their forces against 11 Group, dispersing their forces against the whole RAF is going to make things worse for them, not better.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Another LW problem was poor escort doctrine, especially after Goering tied the fighters to the bombers. The RAF and USAAC amazingly enough used the same 'close escort' ideas early on, even though they knew (or should have known) that the tactic was flawed. Once the escort fighters were allowed to roam about and seek out enemy fighters, the LW was doomed in the skies over western Europe.

</div></BLOCKQUOTE>Another LW problem was poor escort doctrine, especially after Goering tied the fighters to the bombers. The RAF and USAAC amazingly enough used the same 'close escort' ideas early on, even though they knew (or should have known) that the tactic was flawed. Once the escort fighters were allowed to roam about and seek out enemy fighters, the LW was doomed in the skies over western Europe.[/quote]

Throughout August, the critical month of the battle, Goering ordered maximum flexibility in fighter escort, with the fighter commanders deciding how they should operate, and maximum strength in frei jagd missions. It was a disaster, and the Luftwaffe largely lost the battle in August.

It was only because losses were so high during July and August, when the fighters had their freedom, that more restrictive escort practices were ordered late in the battle.

ploughman
10-24-2005, 02:04 AM
And lest we forget.

http://www.avonhill.com/thumbnails/microcar/1955_Messerschmitt1.jpeg

Aaron_GT
10-24-2005, 02:24 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">von Braun didn't flee to Argentina to reside with NAZIs and carry on his NAZI associations. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Partly this was because Von Braun wasn't an ardent Nazi, it was that you needed to be a party member to get funding for his first love - space exploration. Partly it was also because the Wester n Allies let it be known that Von Braun was going to be treated very well (as part of the US rocket team) if he surrendered himself.

NorrisMcWhirter
10-24-2005, 02:29 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by SkyChimp:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by NorrisMcWhirter:
Werner von Braun also was a card carrying Nazi who went on to further his "professional career" helping "someone" with their space programme.

Funny how selective memory can be.

Ta,
Norris </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

von Braun didn't flee to Argentina to reside with NAZIs and carry on his NAZI associations. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You're quite right. Instead, the former SS man was embraced by the US government while others like him were being executed for their 'crimes.'

Which brings me to slave labour: von Braun signed some documents sanctioning the use of slave labour/visited V2 factories where slave labour was being used (and where they were dying a rate of ~1 per day) so he knew all about it. This was conveniently overlooked, of course.

Selective memory again.

Ta,
Norris

Aaron_GT
10-24-2005, 02:30 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">even the 109s from what I understand had @ 15 minutes of fuel once the reached Britain... is that correct? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, it was thath they were limited to 15 minutes of full combat power due to fuel restrictions.

With regard to the RAF's concentration or otherwise in the South, the relative lack of raids against other areas did allow Fighter Command to rotate out squadrons to other Groups to rest them somewhat, and reform them given the losses they were taking. This was an important factor, I feel.

NorrisMcWhirter
10-24-2005, 02:45 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Zyzbot:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by NorrisMcWhirter:
Werner von Braun also was a card carrying Nazi who went on to further his "professional career" helping "someone" with their space programme.

Funny how selective memory can be.

Ta,
Norris </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Your country had the same selective memory. For example...look into nerve gas development and see who pops up. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You think that comes as a surprise? It doesn't. You see, I understand that people, Nazis or otherwise, were taken in by the victors to further their 'work' while others, less useful, were dealt with in different manners. Hypocrisy isn't the reserved for just a few nations.

My overall point regarded Mr Tank; it was insinuated that he must be a Nazi if he carried a card. They two items don't necessarily tally....

Ta,
Norris

WOLFMondo
10-24-2005, 02:58 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Aaron_GT:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">von Braun didn't flee to Argentina to reside with NAZIs and carry on his NAZI associations. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Partly this was because Von Braun wasn't an ardent Nazi, it was that you needed to be a party member to get funding for his first love - space exploration. Partly it was also because the Wester n Allies let it be known that Von Braun was going to be treated very well (as part of the US rocket team) if he surrendered himself. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

He did use slave labour though and he hand picked them himself. He should have been on trial at Nuremburg along with all the Nazi's.

Ruy Horta
10-24-2005, 04:03 AM
1. Name a fighter that was in full production in 1939-40 that had the legs to provide long range escort AND at the same time had the performance to stand up to classic interceptor-type fighters.

2. Name a bomber that was in full production in 1939-40 that combined long range, bomb load and defensive capability.

3. Name an area of the British isles that couldn't be covered by Luftwaffe bombers?

In some cases hind sight tends to blind us.

The Germans made many mistakes, but choosing "300" two engined bombers instead of "100" four engined ones back in 1938-39 wasn't one of them.

Forget hind sight, forget Barbarossa, forget the Mighty Eighth. Think 1938-41.

In 1939-40 Germany had the right mix, they won their western campaign and their "numbers" kept the western allies from interfering when the situation was best - while the Wehrmacht was engaged in Poland.

Problem with the Nazis is that they started to believe their own bluff.

They had the tools for a war in Europe, they did not have the means for a WORLD WAR.

Hind sight blinds us to the piss poor situation of Britain in 1940-41, fully dependant on getting the US into to European conflict.

Hitler may have needed a strategic bomber in 1942/43 to hit Soviet industry, but without Barbarossa the same does not go for the German war machine.

Gradual shift of resources from the Army to the Navy and Air force would have been sufficient to keep the pressure on Britain.

One real mistake is that the Kriegsmarine didn't opt for the same trick as the Luftwaffe, choosing capital ships over U-boots.

(The latter was regarded by some contemporaries as having been neutralized in 1918 by convoy tactics and new technology, so here's my hind sight actually dictating the answer to the solution).

Aaron_GT
10-24-2005, 05:29 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">He did use slave labour though and he hand picked them himself. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh, he undoubtedly did immoral things due to the required expediencies of war, but that doesn't mean that he bought into the underlying ideology of the Nazi party.

Aaron_GT
10-24-2005, 05:32 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Hind sight blinds us to the piss poor situation of Britain in 1940-41, fully dependant on getting the US into to European conflict. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The UK in 1940-1 was capable of defending its own home island. What is wasn't capable of doing without Lend Lease was defending colonial outposts (e.g. Egypt) or otherwise taking the fight to the Axis forces.

Kurfurst__
10-24-2005, 06:32 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by panther3485:
[Knocking the UK out of the war may well be considered to have been unlikely, if you believe that this could only have been achieved through a successful full-scale invasion. It is, however, possible to consider a different scenario if the Germans had gained the upper hand in the Battle of Britain. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hmm, there was hardly any strategical need for Germans to knock out Britain from the war. Hitler didn't want Britain, or her Empire for some part because of his aryan theories, and also because of the Realpolitik : had he crush the Brits, he foreseen that it would only lead to the real rivals, the US and the USSR feeding on the corpse a getting fat. The Empire would serve as a buffer zone, Churchill was - quite righlty - seen as a chauvinistic idealist, a typical aristocrat that still thought it's still Queen Victoria's reign, and could not understand the change of times.

They only needed to neutralize the British Empire so that it would be no longer fo any threat to German expansion in Europe; and sorry that they already achieved before BoB. The Battle of Britain, regardless how it's celebrated and exaggrevated in Britain, was hardly of more importance to the German that they had a little more costly bombing campaign as usual, they lost just as many planes in the Battle of France in a shorter period. It was a setback, and bit of disappointment, but they didn't felt defeated but that it was a draw.

And the outcome of the battle didn't change much : Britain was no longer in position to change ANYTHING about the status quo in Europe, not ever since Dunkerque, it simply couldn't challange the German position after the fall of France. It was France that could provide the battleground and the armies for the BE's 'balance of powers' policy, and sorry - it was not there anymore. The Reich crushed France and with it, Britain's all hope to have a real say in the events. All that was left for Britain after that is to witness the decline of British power, the crash of the economy, and lend a hand to the US troops and Air Force on the West (and the Soviets on the East) that made the real difference in the course of history. The BoB was perhaps the only battle where Britian could show up success; the next one, El Alamein, that was - barely a victory over a much smaller force - , was achieved with American supply, American tanks, American trucks and American airplanes. The other British Empire try a few months before, Dieppe, was a bloody fiasco.


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">As for being a tactical draw, this is true if you base 'draw' on the fact that neither the RAF nor the Luftwaffe was destroyed and each was still a viable force by the end.
However, even the tactical outcome was still somewhat in favour of the RAF, when you consider that by 31 October 1940, Fighter Command was actually STRONGER than it had been when the battle began, whereas the Luftwaffe had not been able to replace its losses in anything like the same way. In fact, such was the mauling that the Luftwaffe had received in BoB that it began Operation Barbarossa (the invasion of Russia) - some eight months later - with not much more strength than it had in the summer of 1940. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think you are wishing for something that wasn't there. Firstly the German loses in the BoB were not proportionally higher as in the previous campaign; secondly to believe that BOB would somehow inflict damaged on the LW that it couldn't bear and weakened it before the Russian campaign is just clearly wishful thinking, in view that the LW shot down around as much aircraft on a single day on the 22nd June 1942 than the whole RAF in the months of the Battle; it's hardly disputable either that the LW enjoyed air superiority on the EF for a good 2 years even after that. As for the how the numbers of the RAF and LW differed, it has to be do a lot with the mobilization of these countries rather than the battles. German was winning in the first years and pretty much run on peace time standards, being on offense, concentrating on bombers. Britain got a series of serious defeats until 1942, as a result it egared up the economy for 'total war' early on in 1940, and produced cheap fighters during the bob rather than time-costly bombers, so hardly there a wonder they produced more when the other guy was not yet pulling his second hand from behind his back...

Kurfurst__
10-24-2005, 06:47 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by hop2002:
Throughout August, the critical month of the battle, Goering ordered maximum flexibility in fighter escort, with the fighter commanders deciding how they should operate, and maximum strength in frei jagd missions. It was a disaster, and the Luftwaffe largely lost the battle in August.

It was only because losses were so high during July and August, when the fighters had their freedom, that more restrictive escort practices were ordered late in the battle. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


That's a pretty 'original' story about the events of the Battle of Britain, I dare to say a revisionist one.

Ie., in July the British lost 77 destroyed, 43 damaged fighters and 67 killed, 23 wounded pilots.
The Germans lost 48 destroyed, 14 damaged Bf 109s and 17 killed, 14 missing, 13 wounded pilots.

In August, when in Hop's story the Luftwaffe lost the battle, the RAF lost 344 destroyed, 98 damaged fighters, 139 killed, 7 missing, 110 wounded pilots. The LW lost 217 destroyed, 45 damaged Bf 109s, and 54 killed, 91 missing, 39 wounded pilots.

Figures from "The Battle of Britain" by Peter G. Cooksley.

German fighter losses were only 2/3s of the British, figher pilot losses were only 70% of the British fighter losses. Losses in RAF men were in fact so severe that Dowding had to grab embryo pilots from schools - they didn't even finished the already shortened course and had only 7-10 hours of flight time, some never even fired the guns just once, and they had troubles with just taking off... A week after August Keith Park said that Fighter Command 'needs a miracle to happen' for survival.


Number of immediately available fighters
RAF 21 August 615 326

30 August 580 287

8 September 530 275

15 September 472 256

On 21 August, the RAF had 941 fighters immidiately available.
4-5 weeks later, on 15 September, it had 728 - a decreace by 30%.

So Hop is half right in that August was disasterous, but appearantly, not as much for the LW as it was for the RAF FC.

ploughman
10-24-2005, 07:03 AM
You really need to lose those quotes in your sig Kurfy, they're not 'normal' if you know what I mean.

Great bait though.

luftluuver
10-24-2005, 08:01 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Hmm, there was hardly any strategical need for Germans to knock out Britain from the war. </div></BLOCKQUOTE> Made for a mighty good staging area to launch attacks from later in the war.

Kurfurst, why do you only state the 109 losses? The RAF was tasked with intercepting and shooting down LW bombers besides the 109s escorts.

Care to give us your numbers for the German losses for <span class="ev_code_YELLOW">ALL</span> LW a/c.

Deighton says the German Quartermaster Generals report states the Germans lost 403 a/c from Aug 8 to Aug 23. That is for just 2 weeks of Aug.

RAF fighters were spread the length and breadth on GB. Not all of these could participate in the air battles over southern England.

Aug 13
Strength Summary
Number Type Strength Svcble
42 1/3 Kampfgruppen 1482 1008
9 Stukagruppen 365 286
1 Schlachtgruppe 39 31
26 Jagdgruppen 976 853
9 Zerstrergruppen 244 189
3 Nachtjagdgruppen 91 59
14 Seefliegerstaffeln 240 125

Sept 7
Strength Summary
Number Type Strength Svcble
43 Kampfgruppen 1291 798
4 Stukagruppen 174 133
2 Schlachtgruppe 59 44
27 Jagdgruppen 831 658
8 Zerstörergruppen 206 112
18 Fernaufklärungsstaffeln 191 123
6 Seefliegerstaffeln 52 33

So, between Aug 13 and Sept 7 the LW strength went from 3437 a/c to 2613 a/c, for a reduction of strength of 824 a/c or a -24% reduction.

I wunder how those lost aircrew, with battle experience, would have aided on the Eastern Front?

RAF Fighter Command Weekly Aircraft Readiness
August 23, 1940
Spitfire 19 sqd, 328 on hand, 150 reserve
Hurricane 31 sqd, 634 on hand, 181 reserve

September 6, 1940
Spitfire 19 sqd, 304 on hand, 41 reserve
Hurricane 32 sqd, 512 on hand, 183 reserve

September 13, 1940
Spitfire 19 sqd, 304, on hand, 54 reserve
Hurricane 33 sqd, 528 on hand, 120 reserve

'The Battle of Britain' by Richard Townshend Bickers

That is only a reduction of 18% compared to the LW's reduction of 24%.

hop2002
10-24-2005, 10:42 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">That's a pretty 'original' story about the events of the Battle of Britain, I dare to say a revisionist one.

Ie., in July the British lost 77 destroyed, 43 damaged fighters and 67 killed, 23 wounded pilots.
The Germans lost 48 destroyed, 14 damaged Bf 109s and 17 killed, 14 missing, 13 wounded pilots.

In August, when in Hop's story the Luftwaffe lost the battle, the RAF lost 344 destroyed, 98 damaged fighters, 139 killed, 7 missing, 110 wounded pilots. The LW lost 217 destroyed, 45 damaged Bf 109s, and 54 killed, 91 missing, 39 wounded pilots.

Figures from "The Battle of Britain" by Peter G. Cooksley. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Isegrim, we are talking about the effectiveness of Luftwaffe escort tactics. Ignoring bomber losses in your comaprison doesn't really tell us much.

I suspect the Jagdwaffe had too much of the same fixation on "score" that you've just displayed.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">In August, when in Hop's story the Luftwaffe lost the battle, the RAF lost 344 destroyed, 98 damaged fighters, 139 killed, 7 missing, 110 wounded pilots. The LW lost 217 destroyed, 45 damaged Bf 109s, and 54 killed, 91 missing, 39 wounded pilots. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

As we are talking about the escort tactics of the Luftwaffe, here are the complete figures from Agust, according to Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat:

<pre class="ip-ubbcode-code-pre">
WrittenOff Dead POW Injur. Uninjur. Miss.
Me109 229 57 3 41 47 84
Me110 123 48 2 6 19 48
Do17 75 22 2 14 10 26
He111 98 36 1 9 15 34
Ju88 104 33 4 5 17 44
Ju87 62 20 1 5 9 28
</pre>

I think perhaps the 330+ bomber losses might tell us more about Luftwaffe escort tactics than the 109 losses.

(and by my calculations, that actually makes more Luftwaffe fighters destroyed than RAF fighters, as well)

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">German fighter losses were only 2/3s of the British, figher pilot losses were only 70% of the British fighter losses. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, see above. The 110 was a fighter as well. (and some Ju 88 fighters too, iirc, but we'll ignore them)

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Losses in RAF men were in fact so severe that Dowding had to grab embryo pilots from schools - they didn't even finished the already shortened course and had only 7-10 hours of flight time, </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Source for preposterous claim?

It's true that pilots were going to squadrons with only 7 - 10 hours on type, but that's equally true of the Luftwaffe. From Most Dangerous Enemy:

"On 20 August, Erhard Milch began a five day tour of the airforce he had created, with a view to checking morale, identifying and remedying equipment deficiencies and making reccommendations about the new wave of promotions Goering was contemplating. He wrote his report on the 26th. In it he comments on the inadequate experience of the new pilots being rushed to the front from the training schools, whom he found to be of "very variable" quality. The fighter Geschwader were complaining they were getting boys who had only done 10 landings in a Bf 109, and no firing training with cannon. Milch made a particular point of noting that green pilots were being sent as replacements to Erprobungsgruppe 210, which he thought, in view of the unit's special role, particulary abberant"

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">A week after August Keith Park said that Fighter Command 'needs a miracle to happen' for survival.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Did he? Source for this claim, please.

Park on the 6th September:

"I've been looking at these casualty figures, and I've come to the conclusion at our present rate of losses we can just afford it. And I'm ****ed certain the Boche can't. If we can hang on as we're going, I'm sure we shall win in the end."

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Number of immediately available fighters
RAF 21 August 615 326

30 August 580 287

8 September 530 275

15 September 472 256

On 21 August, the RAF had 941 fighters immidiately available.
4-5 weeks later, on 15 September, it had 728 - a decreace by 30%. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Source for these preposterous figures?

From the RAF campaign diary:

Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 21st August 1940
* Blenheim - 58
* Spitire - 239
* Hurricane - 400
* Defiant - 25
* Gladiator - 7
* Total - 729

Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 30th August 1940
* Blenheim - 52
* Spitfire - 234
* Hurricane - 410
* Defiant - 14
* Gladiator - 7
* Total - 717

Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 8th September 1940
* Blenheim - 50
* Spitfire - 197
* Hurricane - 381
* Defiant - 23
* Gladiator - 8
* Total - 697

Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 15th September 1940
* Blenheim - 47
* Spitfire - 192
* Hurricane - 389
* Defiant - 24
* Gladiator - 8
* Total - 660

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">So Hop is half right in that August was disasterous, but appearantly, not as much for the LW as it was for the RAF FC. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, as well as the bomber losses you want to ignore, Richard Overy, The Battle, gives figures for the number of operational 109 pilots.

1st July - 906
1st August 869
1st Sept - 735

stathem
10-24-2005, 12:03 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
1. Name a fighter that was in full production in 1939-40 that had the legs to provide long range escort AND at the same time had the performance to stand up to classic interceptor-type fighters.

2. Name a bomber that was in full production in 1939-40 that combined long range, bomb load and defensive capability.

</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

1. Zero

2. Betty?

panther3485
10-24-2005, 12:03 PM
Kurfurst_

At first, I was taken aback by the obvious inanity of your reply and came to the initial conclusion that you MUST be trolling. I didn't believe that you could POSSIBLY be serious.

But then, a little doubt began to creep in.....

I thought it might be worth just ONE MORE try. "If it doesn't work", I thought to myself, "At least I can go to sleep tonight with a clear conscience."
On the other hand, if I'm just being sucked in by a troll, then so be it - my shoulders are broad enough.

So, here goes -

Originally posted by panther3485:
"Knocking the UK out of the war may well be considered to have been unlikely, if you believe that this could only have been achieved through a successful full-scale invasion. It is, however, possible to consider a different scenario if the Germans had gained the upper hand in the Battle of Britain."

Now for your precious gems:

Quote 1:
*"Hmm, there was hardly any strategical need for Germans to knock out Britain from the war."

[What!!!!! Right, so that's why Hitler tried:
(a) To persuade Britain (to give up the fight)
(b) To destroy British ability to defend their country against air attack so they could be bombed at will and made to fear imminent invasion (so they'd give up the fight)
(c) To bomb British cities by night attacks (so they'd give up the fight)
(d) To starve Britain into submission with the U-boat campaign (so they'd give up the fight)
And as a result of the failure of (a), (b), (c) and (d).... How about the combined British and US Strategic air offensive that was waged from bases in the UK from 1943 right up until the bitter end in May 1945? What about the 'Second Front'? From where else would it feasibly have been launched? Would the US have even become involved in Europe at all during these years, had it not been for Britain's successful defiance and refusal to come to terms?]


Quote 2:
*"The Battle of Britain, regardless how it's celebrated and exaggrevated in Britain, was hardly of more importance to the German that they had a little more costly bombing campaign as usual, they lost just as many planes in the Battle of France.....(etc)."

[First, the Germans WON the 1940 campaign in the West with such dazzling speed and decisiveness that the World held its breath. This was a huge strategic gain and a great victory, which arguably made their aircraft/aircrew and other losses 'worthwhile'. It's a very different matter when you suffer serious losses, leave the opposing side stronger but yourself weaker and have VIRTUALLY NOTHING to show for it. But even though the overall BoB loss ratio by 31 October 1940 was significantly to the DISADVANTAGE of the Luftwaffe, let's not dwell on that. The true importance of the outcome of BoB was not fully appreciated by Hitler (his mistake) or by most Germans, for that matter. The fact that it WAS ultimately highly significant (and the reasons why) have been highlighted by myself and others on this board but if this is not sufficient, it is also widely recognized by historians around the World. You are of course entitled to believe what you like, including a 'flat Earth', 'no moon landing' and 'Elvis is still alive', if you wish.

Quote 3:
*"And the outcome of the battle didn't change much.."

[It didn't APPEAR to change much when seen from the viewpoint of Hitler and many Germans. But some other Germans, including a number of military leaders, were very uneasy about the probable effects of the outcome, which left Britain still a viable enemy in the West when Hitler began his 'Eastern adventure'. Their unease would prove to be well founded.]


Quote 4:
*"All that was left for Britain after that is to.... ....lend a hand to the US troops and Air Force on the West (and the Soviets on the East) that made the real difference in the course of history."

[Of course, if you maintain that it was the combination of the Allied effort on TWO major fronts that made the 'real difference', then you have to accept that Britain staying in the war and providing, among other things, the 'springboard' for the Second Front (when she could have dropped out), was what made this 'real difference' possible. The outcome of BoB was instrumental in helping to keep Britain in the War.


Originally posted by panther3485:
"As for being a tactical draw, this is true if you base 'draw' on the fact that neither the RAF nor the Luftwaffe was destroyed and each was still a viable force by the end.
However, even the tactical outcome was still somewhat in favour of the RAF, when you consider that by 31 October 1940, Fighter Command was actually STRONGER than it had been when the battle began, whereas the Luftwaffe had not been able to replace its losses in anything like the same way. In fact, such was the mauling that the Luftwaffe had received in BoB that it began Operation Barbarossa (the invasion of Russia) - some eight months later - with not much more strength than it had in the summer of 1940."

And now for some more of your gems:

Quote 5:
*"I think you are wishing for something that wasn't there. Firstly the German loses in the BoB were not proportionally higher as in the previous campaign...."

[I don't WISH anything! Nothing I have stated in any of my posts is 'wishing'. I always take care to differentiate between fact and opinion and when I use opinion, it is well supported and it's reasonable.
I NEVER SAID that German losses in BoB were 'proportionally higher' than BoF. In any case, it was the OUTCOME that was ultimately of greatest importance.

Quote 6:
*"....secondly to believe that BOB would somehow inflict damaged on the LW that it couldn't bear and weakened it before the Russian campaign is just clearly wishful thinking...."

[What I stated was not exactly as you have said but even if I had stated is this way it would still have been substantially TRUE. The Luftwaffe COULDN'T bear the losses in BoB, which is why it abandoned large scale daylight attacks in favour of a night-time bombing offensive. As you have already pointed out, Luftwaffe losses in the Battle of France were heavy and these, followed by FURTHER high losses in the Battle of Britain, left it seriously weakened. This unquestionably DID carry over as a deficit to the Luftwaffe's first line strength at the commencement of Operation Barbarossa. The eight months between October 1940 and June 1941 were NOT ENOUGH TIME to properly compensate AND allow the projected increase in strength that some German planners thought to be required (added to which were more losses in the Balkans/Greece/Crete).]

Quote 7:
*"....in view that the LW shot down around as much aircraft on a single day on the 22nd June 1942 than the whole RAF in the months of the Battle; it's hardly disputable either that the LW enjoyed air superiority on the EF for a good 2 years even after that."

[The fact that the Luftwaffe performed so well against the Soviet air force DOES NOT CHANGE THE FACT that it was seriously weakened by late 1940 and was not fully recovered my mid 1941.]

Quote 8:
*"As for the how the numbers of the RAF and LW differed, it has to be do a lot with the mobilization of these countries rather than the battles."

[Here at least, you are half right. The Luftwaffe lost far more planes and aircrew in BoB than the RAF. This was entirely a result of the BATTLE and had NOTHING TO DO with 'mobilization'. As for replacement of those losses, it is true that in some areas, Germany was not as fully mobilized as Britain at this time.]


Now, the possibilities here are:

(a) You were trolling all along. If so, then call me a sucker 'cos you've hooked me but I'd sooner be a sucker than a number of other things.

(b) You really were serious. I could go on but what for? Anyone else reading this can see.


I feel regret. I prefer to stay friendly and courteous but occasionally I encounter an individual who sorely tests my patience. Maybe I'm just getting irritable in my old age.

My apologies if anyone else has been offended by the 'tone' of my post.


panther3485

p1ngu666
10-24-2005, 01:00 PM
i did read a interesting thing, that alot of german ppl blamed the luftwaffe for losing the war..

cos the army fought very well, great victories etc, but the luftwaffe lost the BOB, then later on couldnt stop the bombing offensive (germans hyped up the "terror flyiers". and in mid to late war the protection of troops was rope often...

hm for ruy horta, guess fighters you haveto look to the japanease.and maybe 110

bomber, theres the wellington, ju88, japeanse ones. b17?

Interminate
10-24-2005, 05:25 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by WOLFMondo:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Aaron_GT:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">von Braun didn't flee to Argentina to reside with NAZIs and carry on his NAZI associations. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Partly this was because Von Braun wasn't an ardent Nazi, it was that you needed to be a party member to get funding for his first love - space exploration. Partly it was also because the Wester n Allies let it be known that Von Braun was going to be treated very well (as part of the US rocket team) if he surrendered himself. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

He did use slave labour though and he hand picked them himself. He should have been on trial at Nuremburg along with all the Nazi's. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Slave labor under extraordinary circumstances like war is acceptable. Slave labor as was practiced by the US and USSR is unacceptable.

SkyChimp
10-24-2005, 06:14 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by NorrisMcWhirter:
Instead, the former SS man ...
Norris </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Honorary SS

ImpStarDuece
10-24-2005, 06:22 PM
No.

Slavery is unacceptable at al times and under all circumstances.

Period. End of point. End of discussion.

Slavery, whether chattel slavery (where the slave has no rights and can be 'owned') or unfree labour (such as indentured servitude), is a fundamental violation of the basic rights and needs of a human being.

European slavery has typically been based around fallacious ideas of racialism, orientalism and imperial destiny. Ideas which most of us have long since discarded as harmful to mankind. Most of the Western world realised slavery, in any form, was unacceptable by the 1850s. It shows how backward the totalitarian regiemes (National Socialist or Communist) of the 1930s really were, when they decided to renew its practice.

Slavery in the second world war was even worse. It was slavery used as an alternate means of killing off racial, social, political or cultural groups that the ruling caste were prejudiced against. Slavery during WW2 was far more akin to murder than any previous form of it.

p1ngu666
10-24-2005, 06:23 PM
http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

apart from the axis mistreated there slaves horribly, huge numbers died... vast amount of illtreatement, that is horribly wrong..

blakduk
10-24-2005, 06:40 PM
Chill guys, he's trolling.
The best way to deal with him is to either ignore him or goad him into writing about how much he LOVES the Nazis and how desperately he wishes they had won. He'll eventually write how he reckons the holocaust was a good idea and get himself banned again.

panther3485
10-24-2005, 07:12 PM
Hello there, ImpStarDuece

Quote:

"No.
Slavery is unacceptable at al times and under all circumstances.
Period. End of point. End of discussion.
Slavery, whether chattel slavery (where the slave has no rights and can be 'owned') or unfree labour (such as indentured servitude), is a fundamental violation of the basic rights and needs of a human being."

Top post - couldn't have said it better myself!


Best regards,
panther3485

panther3485
10-24-2005, 07:33 PM
Hello blakduk,

Quote:

*"Chill guys, he's trolling.
The best way to deal with him is to either ignore him or goad him into writing about how much he LOVES the Nazis and how desperately he wishes they had won. He'll eventually write how he reckons the holocaust was a good idea and get himself banned again."

You're right, of course.

When he and others of his ilk post their 'stuff', I am usually able to ignore it. But just occasionally, when I'm in a certain mood, I have a go. When it's a choice between being too serious or not being serious enough, I have a weakness for the former option.

Best regards,
panther3485

blakduk
10-24-2005, 07:51 PM
No worries Panther, they occassionally get under my skin and i respond before i gather my temper.

Your earlier post was quite interesting re the efforts that Hitler put into knocking Britain out of the war. It certainly wasnt a half-hearted effort and they lost a lot of manpower/material trying- resources they desperately needed later on.

panther3485
10-24-2005, 08:44 PM
Hello Kurfurst_

First, sorry about my rudeness in the previous post to you. (My content was sincerely meant but there was no call for the rudeness).

To be fair, you deserve support for the following (In reply to hop2002):

Originally posted by hop2002:
"Throughout August, the critical month of the battle, Goering ordered maximum flexibility in fighter escort, with the fighter commanders deciding how they should operate, and maximum strength in frei jagd missions. It was a disaster, and the Luftwaffe largely lost the battle in August.
It was only because losses were so high during July and August, when the fighters had their freedom, that more restrictive escort practices were ordered late in the battle."

Your reply:

"That's a pretty 'original' story about the events of the Battle of Britain, I dare to say a revisionist one."


I'd agree with you completely, and would like to add:

hop2002 Quote 1:

*"Throughout August, the critical month of the battle, Goering ordered maximum flexibility in fighter escort, with the fighter commanders deciding how they should operate, and maximum strength in frei jagd missions."

[From my extensive reading on BoB, I do not recall having seen any reliable reference to such an order from Goering. I believe it may have been more a case of Goering having ALLOWED these tactics because up until this point at least, he trusted his fighter commanders to get on with the job. I'd be happy to amend my position on this if hop2002 can produce a reliable reference.]

hop2002 Quote 2:

*"It was a disaster, and the Luftwaffe largely lost the battle in August."

[Bollocks. This is ALMOST THE EXACT OPPOSITE of what happened. The Luftwaffe fighter tactics were in fact working well and they were clearly getting the better of the RAF during August and arguably into early September. Fighter Command reached the closest it was ever going to come to defeat at this time.]

hop2002 Quote 3:

*"It was only because losses were so high during July and August, when the fighters had their freedom, that more restrictive escort practices were ordered late in the battle."

[Bollocks again. German bomber losses were heavier than expected pretty much throughout the battle and by the end of August this had begun to sap the morale of the crews. Goering's 'restrictive escort practices' were ordered mainly to provide a psychological boost for the bomber crews, who felt reassured when they could see their 'little friends' staying close by. Although this gave some emotional comfort (PERCEIVED protection) it compromised the German Fighters' ability to effectively deal with their opposition (as I have previously posted here).
The only hope for truly protecting German bombers was for such losses to be inflicted on the defending fighter force that it could no longer intercept in worthwhile numbers. This, if achieveable, was going to take time. The Lufwaffe had been making SOME progress towards that goal but lost the 'war of nerves' at a critical point. Fighter Command was bleeding heavily but for a number of reasons (not least, the exceptional way the British managed the battle), the Germans were unable to see a satisfactory result quickly enough.
Thanks mainly to Georing and Hitler, any chance of the Luftwaffe winning the battle was thrown away by mid September.]


Best regards,
panther3485

blakduk
10-24-2005, 09:23 PM
To add to the above, the German fighters had been claiming highly inflated numbers of kills throughout the BOB. In a case of 'happy coincidence', in mid-September 1940 at the moment the Germans were taking the plunge and going all out for the final offensive to finish off the RAF and destroy London, circumstances allowed Leigh-Mallory to get his way and employ his 'big wing'. The big wing was unwieldly and not very effective, but used at that moment it disheartened the Germans to see large formations of what was supposedly a remnant force coming to meet them.
It demonstrated to the LW that despite their efforts they had not achieved their aim- air superiority.

p1ngu666
10-24-2005, 10:19 PM
yes, the german intelligance kept saying to the crews that the RAF was down to its last 50 spitfires, ofcourse to bomber crews espcialy, every raf plane was a spitfire http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif so ofcourse when u where continualy attacked by fighters, u quickly releasied there was more than 50 of them.

and while there not scarily armed to use onwhine dog fighters, imagine a head on from one.
8 303's, 20x8 =160. now u, sat in your german bomber, trying to win the war http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif what your sat, something resembling a greenhouse http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif

and iirec goering didnt order a close escort, the fighter squadrons just chose todo that.

incidently, the bombers where surposed to win the war, not the fighters. if the bombers where getting hacked down to much (which they where) then ull run out of bombers. still send the 109s across if u want, raf could either evade them, not takeoff (dont wanna do any of that smelly ground attack, where heros of teh luftwaffe!) or bounce them at a opertune moment.

fighters are secondary aircraft, bombers and recon are primary aircraft.

/me awaits the "YOU IS WRONG OMG FFS TEH WARCLOUDS. DO U NOT FLY ON THERE? THAT IS WHY U SAY FIGHTERS ARE SECONDARY!!. YOU KNOW NOOOTTHIINGG FFS." replies

hop2002
10-24-2005, 11:26 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">hop2002 Quote 1:

*"Throughout August, the critical month of the battle, Goering ordered maximum flexibility in fighter escort, with the fighter commanders deciding how they should operate, and maximum strength in frei jagd missions."

[From my extensive reading on BoB, I do not recall having seen any reliable reference to such an order from Goering. I believe it may have been more a case of Goering having ALLOWED these tactics because up until this point at least, he trusted his fighter commanders to get on with the job. I'd be happy to amend my position on this if hop2002 can produce a reliable reference.]
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

From Goering's directive issued 19th August:

"We must as far as possible avoid a state of ajfairs in which our aircrews are kept in constant readiness for operations, as this must inevitably fatigue our units. In the actual conduct of operations, commanders of fighter units must be given as free a hand as possible. Only part of the fighters are to be employed as direct escorts to our bombers. The aim must be to employ the strongest possible fighter forces on free-lance operations, in which they can indirectly protect the bombers, and at the same time come to grips under favourable conditions with the enemy fighters. No rigid plan can be laid down for such operations, as their conduct must depend on the changing nature of enemy tactics, and on weather conditions."
http://www.battleofbritain.net/0029.html

From The Most Dangerous Enemy, by tephen Bungay, discussing Goering's conference on 19th August:

"Fighting methods are largely a question of leadership. Unit commanders are to be given as much freedom of action as possible"

and:

"Goering stressed that as many fighters as possible were to be left free for sweeps, albeit that these should be co-ordinated with bomber raids"

Like the German generals never made a mistake, and all bad decisions were taken by Hitler, so too no Luftwaffe leader made a mistake, apart from Goering. Or so you would think from the various biographies published after the war.

The truth is it wasn't until early/mid September that Goering really started to remove the freedom of action of his fighter commanders, until that time he had trusted them, and believed in the frei jagd. Experience, not preconcieved ideas, taught him otherwise.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">hop2002 Quote 2:

*"It was a disaster, and the Luftwaffe largely lost the battle in August."

[Bollocks. This is ALMOST THE EXACT OPPOSITE of what happened. The Luftwaffe fighter tactics were in fact working well and they were clearly getting the better of the RAF during August and arguably into early September. Fighter Command reached the closest it was ever going to come to defeat at this time.] </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No. Fighter Command suffered in August. The Luftwaffe suffered more.

For a start, the pressure on Fighter Command in late August and early September put even more intolerable pressure on the Luftwaffe. Their losses were astronomical, their stregth withered away.

From Strategy for Defeat by Williamson Murray:

"What has not been so clear is that these air battles placed a comparable, if not
greater, strain on the Luftwaffe's resources . For the week beginning with "Eagle
Day" on August 13 and ending on August 19, the Germans wrote off approximately
284 aircraft, or 7 percent of their total force structure, or approximately 10 percent
of all aircraft deployed in the three air fleets facing Britain as of July 20. For
August, aircraft losses were 774 from all causes, or 18.5 percent of all combat
aircraft available at the beginning of the month

The figures in Tables VII and VIII only hint at the problem. Not only had the
Germans lost many of their most experienced combat crews but by September
1940, the percentage of operational ready crews against authorized aircraft had
dropped to an unacceptable level. On September 14, Luftwaffe Bf 109 squadrons
possessed only 67 percent operational ready crews against authorized aircraft. For
Bf 110 squadrons, the figure was 46 percent ; and for bombers, it was 59 percent .
One week later, the figures were 64 percent, 52 percent, and 52 percent,
respectively. 101
Conversely, aircraft losses for July through September give the impression that
the Germans were running out of aircraft as well as aircrews!
Table x indicates the cumulative effect of losses from May through September .
These losses indicate the Luftwaffe's heavy commitment for the period .
The impact of losses over southern England combined with inclinations already
present in Luftwaffe doctrine to induce a change in German air strategy early in
September. Attacks on Britain's air defense system through September 6 had given
no indication that Fighter Command was weakening . As a result, Goring-at
Kesselring's urging and with Hitler's support-turned to a massive assault on the
British capital. This all-out effort, directed at London's East End and the Thames
docks, accorded well with Douhet's theories and the German's own belief that
ruthlessness could pay extra dividends."

This from an article by the RAF historical branch, showing the production balance (the ratio of replacements to losses). Note how the RAF only suffers a negative ballance for a short period, whereas the Luftwaffe is in negative territory for most of the battle:
http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/282_1125929695_bob6.jpg

Here's the fighter sortie figures, from the same RAF article:
http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/282_1125929641_bob4.jpg

In mid August the Luftwaffe launched their all-out attack to destroy the RAF. It was supposed to take 4 days.

It didn't work, and the next week saw a much reduced sortie rate. In the last week of August, the Luftwaffe launched an even more intense assault, but the sortie rate was already declining by early September. How long do you think the Luftwaffe could keep up such an effort?

The serviceability rates suggest not very long:
http://www.onpoi.net/ah/pics/users/282_1125929578_bob2.jpg
Note the sharp decline that begins in mid August, and only levels out with the switch to London and reduction in Luftwaffe effort.

The Luftwaffe was suffering from a lack of planes, lack of pilots, and lack of spares. Read again the passage from Strategy for defeat above:

"Not only had the
Germans lost many of their most experienced combat crews but by September
1940, the percentage of operational ready crews against authorized aircraft had
dropped to an unacceptable level. On September 14, Luftwaffe Bf 109 squadrons
possessed only 67 percent operational ready crews against authorized aircraft. For
Bf 110 squadrons, the figure was 46 percent ; and for bombers, it was 59 percent"

In contrast, from the Fighter Command conference on the morning of 7th September, the day the Luftwaffe switched to attacking London (the conference was in the morning, before the change in Luftwaffe tactics was known):

"Evill pointed out that at current rates the OTUs were turning out 280 Hurricane and Spitfire pilots a month, and that losses in the previous four weeks had been 348."

"The discussion turned to the fighting. Park doubted that the enemy could keep up its pressure for more than three weeks. Dowding said that it could go on much longer - it depended on politics, Goring's personal ascendancy and other factors. Given recent appraisals of German air strength, one should reckon on a long campaign. It was agreed, after some arguing about the figures, that the supply of aircraft would not be a problem, or a constraint on expanâ¬sion."

"Knowing that their enemy was preparing to 'go down hill' would have been cold comfort to the Luftwaffe. They assumed the enemy had been doing that for some time. In fact they believed he ought to be at his last gasp. General Stapf had reported to Haider on 30 August that the British had lost 800 Hurricanes and Spitfires since 8 August out of a front-line strength of 915. Given Schmid's estimate of their production capacity of 200-300 a month, the British could therefore only have 3-400 left at the outside. After another week of pounding in September, they must indeed be down to their last 200 machines.
In fact, on the evening of 6 September, Fighter Command had over 750 serviceable fighters and 1,381 pilots available to it, about 950 of whom flew Spitfires or Hurricanes. It needed 1,588 pilots to be at full establishment, which is of course what Dowding wanted, so from his point of view he was 200 short.20 From the Luftwaffe's point of view, he had almost 200 more pilots and 150 more planes than he had had at the beginning of July when they set out to destroy him."

All from The Most Dangerous Enemy by Bungay. He goes on:

"There are many who believe that Fighter Command was on its knees after the attacks on the airfields. It was a strange way of kneeling. Given Evill's calâ¬culations, and taking the worst scenario of no increase in output from the training units, if the Luftwaffe had continued its attacks on the airfields and continued to destroy aircraft in the air at the most favourable rate it ever achieved, there would still have been about 725 Hurricanes and Spitfires ready to take to the air in the third week of September."

Note that Spitfire and Hurricane pilot figure. 950 on 6th September. In contrast, the Luftwaffe 109 pilot figures, from Overy:

1 June 906
1 August 869
1 September 735
1 November 673

By the begining of September, the Jagdwaffe was smaller than FC, with less pilots, less fighters, and a slower rate of resupply for both.

On the 7th September, Fighter Command felt it was losing. It began, for the first time in the batle, to "go downhill". In other words, to begin reducing front line strength. But the Luftwaffe had been suffering a reduction in front line strength almost from the start of the battle, they had far fewer operational planes and pilots in the first week of September than they'd had in the first week of July. FC had more planes and more pilots.

From the RAF's point of view, they were losing the battle. For the first time, strength was declining, and if that had continued for another few months, they would have lost.

But they held that view because they overestimated the strength of the Luftwaffe. They thought it had more planes and pilots than it did, much larger reserves, and they thought production and training were much higher.

The Luftwaffe thought they were winning. Their losses were unsustainably high, but they thought the RAF's were higher. They underestimated the size and reserves of the RAF, they underestimated British production and training.

Richard Overy sums up the attitudes of the two forces:

"The British fought the battle as if it were a last ditch struggle against an overwhelming enemy; the German side fought against a force persistently misrepresented as technically and tactically inept, short of aircraft, pilots and bases."

By the end of August, the Luftwaffe had already lost the battle, although neither side knew it. The Luftwaffe had gone from numerical superiority to inferiority, and by early September they were smaller than FC.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">*"It was only because losses were so high during July and August, when the fighters had their freedom, that more restrictive escort practices were ordered late in the battle."

[Bollocks again. German bomber losses were heavier than expected pretty much throughout the battle and by the end of August this had begun to sap the morale of the crews. Goering's 'restrictive escort practices' were ordered mainly to provide a psychological boost for the bomber crews, who felt reassured when they could see their 'little friends' staying close by. Although this gave some emotional comfort (PERCEIVED protection) it compromised the German Fighters' ability to effectively deal with their opposition (as I have previously posted here). </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh, I'm not arguing the change in escort tactics was successfull, or would have worked better if tried in August. FWIW, it's hard to judge the effectiveness of the change in escort tactics because it largely co-incided with a change in German targets and strategy.

But to blame Goerings escort tactics for losing the BoB, when they weren't implemented until after the BoB was lost, is strange.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The only hope for truly protecting German bombers was for such losses to be inflicted on the defending fighter force that it could no longer intercept in worthwhile numbers. This, if achieveable, was going to take time. The Lufwaffe had been making SOME progress towards that goal but lost the 'war of nerves' at a critical point. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No, the Luftwaffe had, with an all out effort, begun to reduce the strength of the RAF. They had achieved that at a cost of a drastic reduction in their own strength.

The RAF were starting to bleed, the Luftwaffe were bleeding badly.

You can't judge who's going to win a boxing match by looking for cuts on the face of one boxer.

Ruy Horta
10-25-2005, 02:23 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stathem:
1. Zero
2. Betty? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Wrong on both counts.

They both fail on date of production and the latter also on protection (part of defensive capability).

NorrisMcWhirter
10-25-2005, 02:34 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by SkyChimp:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by NorrisMcWhirter:
Instead, the former SS man ...
Norris </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Honorary SS </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Bit poor trying to deflect the argument in such a manner http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

Ta,
Norris

stathem
10-25-2005, 03:00 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stathem:
1. Zero
2. Betty? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Wrong on both counts.

They both fail on date of production and the latter also on protection (part of defensive capability). </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Zero was in production, by the END of 1940..

Oh, all right Ruy, you got me. It was a tongue in cheek post.

Does beg an interesting question though. If the luftwaffe had been using Zeros instead of 109's, would it have won the BoB?

That endurance, climb rate, turning ability. Would the RAF have had the time to adapt it's doctrine to counter them quick enough?

Ruy Horta
10-25-2005, 05:09 AM
Okay if we forget that the Zero was entering the operational test phase by the time the Luftwaffe needed to be ready for the Battle of Britain it becomes an interesting hypothetical subject.

Personally I am inclined to think that the Jagdwaffe would have had more difficulties accepting the Zero than RAF FC would have had to combat them.

Although I love the Zero as a design, it is soo compromised as a weapon. Most of its success was based on numerical superiority and inexperienced Allies flying obsolescent types.

Early encounters with more experienced pilots flying good equipment with proper tactics doesn't show great superiority on the side of the Zero.

The only clear advantage remaining is range.

Would more range really have put RAF FC under more pressure? Would more range really have made it easier to attain air superiority over Southern Britain?

Personally I am more inclined to think that half as many 109s (with drop tanks) would have been more effective...

The goal is not destroying the RAF FC, but getting air superiority over the invasion beaches.

LEXX_Luthor
10-25-2005, 07:28 AM
Great post last page hop2002, most different. Thanks.

panther3485
10-25-2005, 07:41 AM
Hello hop2002,

First my apologies for referring to your post via another board member - I should have addressed you directly. (That's two apologies in 24 hours! This could become a habit!)

And now, many thanks for your last post, which I found a fascinating read and you have presented your arguments, together with data and references, very well indeed. I'm genuinely impressed. You have prompted me to re-examine this whole question!

Although I have obtained my own information from a considerable variety of sources over the years, at least one of yours is not familiar to me. Details of some items would appear to be at variance from what I have read elsewhere but that's not a bad thing. It could even be a good thing if it leads to me updating and improving my knowledge. (Doesn't matter how much you know, you must always keep an open mind to learning more, I believe!)

It is in this spirit of keeping an open mind that later this evening (when it's quiet in my household and I've got the time), I will read your post again more slowly and carefully, check back over all my stuff and get back to you with a better, more detailed response.

Until then, thanks again for the considerable effort in your presentation - I really did enjoy it!

Best regards,
panther3485

panther3485
10-25-2005, 10:52 AM
Hello p1ngu666,

Thanks for your input, which was helpful and I think it was all OK except:

Quote:
*"....and iirec Goering didn't order a close escort, the fighter squadrons just chose to do that."

Er, not too sure what 'iirec' means but sorry, no, the fighter squadrons would never have chosen that and yes, Goering did order it in the end.

The issue of what were the best escort tactics was a cause of some disagreement within the Luftwaffe. As the battle wore on, there was increasing pressure from the bomber commanders to keep the fighter escorts closer. For their part, the fighter commanders wanted the maximum tactical flexibility they could only get with complete freedom of movement around their zones of responsibility.

In my re-reading over the last few hours, for which we should thank hop2002, I have found that Goering issued a number of orders on this (not just one, as I had previously thought). At first, Goering gave the fighter commanders something fairly close to what they wanted but gradually the orders became more restrictive, so that by mid September the German escorts were pretty much 'tied to the bombers'.
(This should come up in my reply to hop2002, which is where I'm going next.)

Best regards,
panther3485

panther3485
10-25-2005, 04:55 PM
Hello hop2002,

Your thoughtfully considered and well presented post deserves a proper reply. Don't know if I'll get through all of this tonight but if not, I'll continue tomorrow.

To begin -

First, your original quote (Quote 1):
"Throughout August, the critical month of the battle, Goering ordered maximum flexibility in fighter escort...(etc)."

And my initial reply:
"From my extensive reading on BoB, I do not recall having seen any reliable reference to such an order from Goering...(etc).... I'd be happy to amend my position on this if hop2002 can produce a reliable reference."

Then, your response (Quote 2):
(From Goering's directive issued 19th August.)
"....In the actual conduct of operations, commanders of fighter units must be given as free a hand as possible. Only part of the fighters are to be employed as direct escorts to our bombers. The aim must be to employ the strongest possible fighter forces on free-lance operations....(etc)"
"Goering stressed that as many fighters as possible were to be left free for sweeps, albeit that these should be co-ordinated with bomber raids"

[Ironically, I feel somewhat foolish to admit that I did find similar references to this in my OWN books but I had forgotten them! In light of this and your references provided above, consider my position suitably amended! At least we seem to have already agreed that the German Fighters enjoyed their highest level of tactical flexibility, and more of Georing's trust, at this time. I believe this is the important point.]


And moving on....

Quote 3:
*"Like the German generals never made a mistake, and all bad decisions were taken by Hitler, so too no Luftwaffe leader made a mistake, apart from Goering. Or so you would think from the various biographies published after the war."

[Speaking in general, you may indeed get that impression from many biographies. However, in the case of the Battle of Britain at least, key errors that are widely recognized by historians as having ensured a German loss are correctly attributed to Hitler and Goering.]


Quote 4:
*"The truth is it wasn't until early/mid September that Goering really started to remove the freedom of action of his fighter commanders...."

[Goering did this in stages, issuing a number of orders between mid August and mid September. Yes, you're right - it didn't really become restrictive until early/mid September but effectively, THAT'S WHAT I ALREADY SAID in a previous post:

"Part way through BoB, Goerings edict to the German fighters (which effectively 'tied them to the bombers'), WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER FACTORS, turned out to be a disaster for the Luftwaffe....among the errors made by the Germans came two crucial ones around this time."
The 'around this time' I referred to was - guess when - early/mid September!!!!!!]


Quote 5:
*"....until that time he had trusted them, and believed in the frei jagd. Experience, not preconcieved ideas, taught him otherwise."

[Yes, Goerings trust for his Fighters did diminish, but mainly because he began to irrationally blame them for much of what was going wrong, including the alarmingly high bomber losses. As for 'experience teaching him', he drew some wrong conclusions from what was happening and sought to focus blame wherever he could, as long as it wasn't on himself!]


Your next original quote (Quote 6):
"It was a disaster, and the Luftwaffe largely lost the battle in August."

And my original reply to that:
"Bollocks. This is ALMOST THE EXACT OPPOSITE of what happened. The Luftwaffe fighter tactics were in fact working well and they were clearly getting the better of the RAF during August and arguably into early September. Fighter Command reached the closest it was ever going to come to defeat at this time."

And your response, Quote 7:
*"No. Fighter Command suffered in August. The Luftwaffe suffered more."

[I still say BOLLOCKS. What you've said here adds nothing of value to the discussion; it's a bit like saying 'Trees are made of wood this week.' OF COURSE Fighter command suffered in August - it suffered THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE. And OF COURSE the Luftwaffe suffered more than Fighter Command in August - it suffered more FOR MOST OF THE BATTLE.]


Quote 8:
*"For a start, the pressure on Fighter Command in late August and early September put even more intolerable pressure on the Luftwaffe."

[Yes, but this is another no-brainer. As stated before, the pressure was worse for the Luftwaffe for most, if not all, of the battle and certainly for the whole period from Adler Tag to the end of large scale daylight attacks. That's why they gave up!]


Quote 9:
*"Their losses were astronomical, their stregth withered away."

[Something of an exaggeration here. Yes, the Luftwaffe's losses were both serious and debilitating; significantly more so than those of the RAF. But although their effective strength had diminished somewhat by October 1940, it had not been reduced to the point where they were literally incapable of going on. The Germans just weren't WILLING to take the casualties any more. Quite apart from issues of morale, they could see that if they continued at the present unsustainable rate of attrition, the Luftwaffe would literally bleed to death and cease to be a viable force, so they stopped well before it reached that point.]


Quote 10:
(From Strategy for Defeat by Williamson Murray)
*"What has not been so clear is that these air battles placed a comparable, if not
greater, strain on the Luftwaffe's resources. For the week beginning with "Eagle
Day" on August 13 and ending on August 19, the Germans wrote off approximately
284 aircraft...(etc)"

[These figures help to underline points already made and addressed above. Thank you for providing them.]


Quote 11:
*"The impact of losses over southern England combined with inclinations already
present in Luftwaffe doctrine to induce a change in German air strategy early in
September. Attacks on Britain's air defense system through September 6 had given
no indication that Fighter Command was weakening."

[True, there was little or no indication visible to the Germans that Fighter Command was weakening. BUT from mid August to early September, the attacks on airfields, sector stations, communications/infrastructure etc, and the stress of the efforts to defend these, were hurting Fighter Command MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE the Germans did before or after.]


Quote 12:
*"As a result, Goring-at
Kesselring's urging and with Hitler's support-turned to a massive assault on the
British capital."

[Please say if I've misunderstood this, but you appear to be suggesting that the idea of turning on London was cooked up between Kesselring and Goering, who then gained Hitler's approval and went ahead with it???? And to think that all this time, I've believed it was at HITLER'S instigation that this happened???? Where did I get that idea from?]


Quote 13:
(This from an article by the RAF historical branch, showing the production balance (the ratio of replacements to losses)
*"Note how the RAF only suffers a negative ballance for a short period, whereas the Luftwaffe is in negative territory for most of the battle"

[Exactly. And the time when the RAF 'suffered the negative balance'? During the period from mid August to early September - when the Luftwaffe was hurting Fighter Command the most, as mentioned before.]


Quote 14:
*"Here's the fighter sortie figures, from the same RAF article:
In mid August the Luftwaffe launched their all-out attack to destroy the RAF. It was supposed to take 4 days.
It didn't work, and the next week saw a much reduced sortie rate. In the last week of August, the Luftwaffe launched an even more intense assault, but the sortie rate was already declining by early September. How long do you think the Luftwaffe could keep up such an effort?"

[If it wanted to preserve itself as a viable fighting force, not very long. Thanks for providing this info - again, it underscores what we've both said already.]


Quote 15:
*"The serviceability rates suggest not very long:
Note the sharp decline that begins in mid August, and only levels out with the switch to London and reduction in Luftwaffe effort."

[Looking at this chart, the RAF serviceability rate appears to have dropped slightly overall, from perhaps 92 percent to 89 or 90 (average say, 91) by the end of October. The Luftwaffe by nearly the same, from perhaps 78 down to 76 (average 77) over the same time. There is more variation in the Luftwaffe's rate but for the period of BoB, it does not appear to go above 82 or below 75 percent. There is hardly what I would call a 'sharp decline' anywhere, but I do get your point. Interesting, though, that the Luftwaffe's serviceability rate as shown here hits its lowest point halfway through December, a good number of weeks AFTER they ceased carrying out large scale daylight attacks. This leads me to suspect that other factors may be at work here, so I think it's dangerous to make assumptions based on such small fluctuations. Perhaps the most significant thing shown is that the RAF had a CONSISTENTLY HIGHER rate of serviceability. I wonder how this would compare for the rest of the War?]


Quote 16:
*"The Luftwaffe was suffering from a lack of planes, lack of pilots, and lack of spares....
....In contrast, from the Fighter Command conference on the morning of 7th September, the day the Luftwaffe switched to attacking London (the conference was in the morning, before the change in Luftwaffe tactics was known):
Evill pointed out that at current rates the OTUs were turning out 280 Hurricane and Spitfire pilots a month, and that losses in the previous four weeks had been 348.
The discussion turned to the fighting. Park doubted that the enemy could keep up its pressure for more than three weeks. Dowding said that it could go on much longer - it depended on politics, Goring's personal ascendancy and other factors. Given recent appraisals of German air strength, one should reckon on a long campaign. It was agreed, after some arguing about the figures, that the supply of aircraft would not be a problem, or a constraint on expansion.
Knowing that their enemy was preparing to 'go down hill' would have been cold comfort to the Luftwaffe. They assumed the enemy had been doing that for some time. In fact they believed he ought to be at his last gasp....(etc)."

[Again, all of this merely underlines what we know already - that the Luftwaffe was losing far more planes and aircrew, that the British reached their lowest ebb late August/early September but managed to recover and ended up stronger and that the Germans couldn't reconcile their estimates of RAF losses with the continued resistance they were encountering.]


Quote 17:
(All from The Most Dangerous Enemy by Bungay)
*"He goes on:
There are many who believe that Fighter Command was on its knees after the attacks on the airfields. It was a strange way of kneeling. Given Evill's calculations, and taking the worst scenario of no increase in output from the training units, if the Luftwaffe had continued its attacks on the airfields and continued to destroy aircraft in the air at the most favourable rate it ever achieved, there would still have been about 725 Hurricanes and Spitfires ready to take to the air in the third week of September."

[True, some historians have 'dramatized' about Fighter Command being 'on its knees' at this time and this is clearly an exaggeration. BUT the fact remains it was being hurt more at this stage of the battle than any other. If the Luftwaffe couldn't win by continuing with (or intensifying) these tactics, it most certainly couldn't do so by switching to London, which EASED the stress on Fighter Command.]


Quote 18:
*"Note that Spitfire and Hurricane pilot figure. 950 on 6th September. In contrast, the Luftwaffe 109 pilot figures, from Overy:
1 June 906
1 August 869
1 September 735
1 November 673
By the begining of September, the Jagdwaffe was smaller than FC, with less pilots, less fighters, and a slower rate of resupply for both."

[Yet they persisted for the rest of September and into October as well, with their strength continuing to decline while that of the RAF recovered and increased. Stout fellows, those Germans!]


Quote 19:
*"On the 7th September, Fighter Command felt it was losing. It began, for the first time in the batle, to "go downhill". In other words, to begin reducing front line strength. But the Luftwaffe had been suffering a reduction in front line strength almost from the start of the battle, they had far fewer operational planes and pilots in the first week of September than they'd had in the first week of July. FC had more planes and more pilots."

[Fighter Command knew they were inflicting heavy losses but the Luftwaffe was still attacking in great strength. This, combined with the beginning of what looked like a trend towards unsustainable pilot losses, in a prolonged struggle, was the reason they began to fear they might lose the battle.]


Quote 20:
*"But they held that view because they overestimated the strength of the Luftwaffe. They thought it had more planes and pilots than it did, much larger reserves, and they thought production and training were much higher."

[Correct, in conjunction with the other factors I've mentioned above.]


Quote 21:
*"The Luftwaffe thought they were winning. Their losses were unsustainably high, but they thought the RAF's were higher. They underestimated the size and reserves of the RAF, they underestimated British production and training."

[Again, correct. Or at least, the Luftwaffe thought they SHOULD be winning! And they certainly did underestimate their enemy!]


Quote 22:
*"Richard Overy sums up the attitudes of the two forces:
The British fought the battle as if it were a last ditch struggle against an overwhelming enemy; the German side fought against a force persistently misrepresented as technically and tactically inept, short of aircraft, pilots and bases."

[Absolutely true!]


Quote 23:
*"By the end of August, the Luftwaffe had already lost the battle, although neither side knew it."

[Possibly, but if you're going to stick to 31 August and not budge, then by no means all historians would agree. However, you'd only have to add another 7 days to get the agreement of most of the remainder!]


Quote 24:
*"The Luftwaffe had gone from numerical superiority to inferiority, and by early September they were smaller than FC.

[They were definitely smaller if you look at the opposing fighter forces by September.]


And now, moving on again:

Your original quote (Quote 25):
*"It was only because losses were so high during July and August, when the fighters had their freedom, that more restrictive escort practices were ordered late in the battle."

And my original reply:
"Bollocks again. German bomber losses were heavier than expected pretty much throughout the battle and by the end of August this had begun to sap the morale of the crews. Goering's 'restrictive escort practices' were ordered mainly to provide a psychological boost for the bomber crews, who felt reassured when they could see their 'little friends' staying close by. Although this gave some emotional comfort (PERCEIVED protection) it compromised the German Fighters' ability to effectively deal with their opposition."

And your response (Quote 26):
*"Oh, I'm not arguing the change in escort tactics was successfull, or would have worked better if tried in August. FWIW, it's hard to judge the effectiveness of the change in escort tactics because it largely co-incided with a change in German targets and strategy."

[My apologies here - I shouldn't have said 'Bollocks' to that. (That makes three apologies in 48 hours). Your original statement (quote 25) was correct in the sense you must have intended - I just got the wrong impression when I read it.]


Quote 27:
*"But to blame Goerings escort tactics for losing the BoB, when they weren't implemented until after the BoB was lost, is strange."

[It's kind of misleading to say I "blamed Goering's escort tactics for losing BoB". What I said was:
"Part way through BoB, Goerings edict to the German fighters (which effectively 'tied them to the bombers'), WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER FACTORS, turned out to be a disaster for the Luftwaffe. The 109's had until then fairly consistently enjoyed the advantages of height, the ability to generally dictate the terms of the engagements and to regularly 'bounce' the British fighters...."
And as for 'being implemented after the BoB was lost', there is some difference of opinion as to precisely when this was, as I have already pointed out. Apart from the fact that the restrictions were increased more gradually than I originally thought, you could argue that they became a problem for the German fighters AROUND THE SAME TIME of the battle's turning point. In any case, given all the other problems they suffered by then, it only made matters worse and hastened their demise while at the same time it didn't improve matters at all for the German bomber crews (except perhaps psychologically).]


And now:

My original statement:
"The only hope for truly protecting German bombers was for such losses to be inflicted on the defending fighter force that it could no longer intercept in worthwhile numbers. This, IF ACHIEVEABLE, was going to take time. The Lufwaffe had been making SOME progress towards that goal but lost the 'war of nerves' at a critical point."


And your reply (Quote 28):
"No, the Luftwaffe had, with an all out effort, begun to reduce the strength of the RAF. They had achieved that at a cost of a drastic reduction in their own strength.
The RAF were starting to bleed, the Luftwaffe were bleeding badly.
You can't judge who's going to win a boxing match by looking for cuts on the face of one boxer."

[There was really nothing wrong with my statement and yours too was mostly correct. I HAVE been looking at both sides and as stated before, if what the Luftwaffe was doing to Fighter Command from mid August to early September, continued at maximum effort, wasn't going to work, then switching to London surely wasn't either. The Germans unquestionably 'lost their bottle' and depending on your opinion, the switch to London was either going from 'might still win' to 'definitely lose' or 'definitely lose' to 'even more definitely lose'.]


I have enjoyed your post and as promised, it prompted me to re-evaluate many issues relating to BoB. But like the Luftwaffe, the effort has exhausted me!


Best regards and thanks for the valuable input,
panther3485

blakduk
10-25-2005, 05:00 PM
Hop2002- excellent post http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/25.gif
I've not seen that information before but it does make a lot of sense. I particularly like this part:
"Like the German generals never made a mistake, and all bad decisions were taken by Hitler, so too no Luftwaffe leader made a mistake, apart from Goering. Or so you would think from the various biographies published after the war."

I think the other factor is the very different ways the commanders directly influenced the battles over Britain in 1940.
FC tightly controlled their fighters using radar and a centralised command- they could give their aircraft tactical advice and instruction in real time.
The LW however were pretty much restricted to giving the pilots preflight instructions and leaving the battle largely up to unit commanders. I think Goerings response, as you posted, was largely an effort to regain some control over the plan of battle- the losses were unsustainable and changes had to be made. What he didnt have at that time was the infrastructure to achieve it.

Another part of popular mythology was the belief that the RAF were all public school 'flyboys' who were ill-disciplined, swaggering louts. This was especially reinforced post-war by British films of BOB that had actors who all sounded like they had endured years of rogering at Eton.
On the other hand, propoganda from WW2 (mostly on the allies side and they won so their views prevailed) always displayed the LW pilots as hard nosed, dispassionate professionals. Popular culture still often portrays WW2 German soldiers as little more than automatons.
The facts give a very different story- the RAF pilots were very disciplined and tended to follow instructions more tightly, while the LW fighter pilots were much more interested in kill counts and the numerous awards they would receive once they reached a certain score.
As i heard a commentator recently say, 'the RAF in the BOB were far more teutonic than the Germans'.
Personally i believe its also revealed in the different uniforms- the LW fighter pilots uniform was pretty cool while the RAF one was quite drab.

Interminate
10-25-2005, 05:36 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by NorrisMcWhirter:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by SkyChimp:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by NorrisMcWhirter:
Instead, the former SS man ...
Norris </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Honorary SS </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Bit poor trying to deflect the argument in such a manner http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

Ta,
Norris </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Why should he even have to deflect?

SkyChimp
10-25-2005, 05:43 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stathem:
1. Zero
2. Betty? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Wrong on both counts.

They both fail on date of production and the latter also on protection (part of defensive capability). </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Zero was deployed in China in July 1940.

The G6M heavy fighter version of the Betty went into production in 1939.

Both seem to qualify.

The Zero would have put a good fighter over Britain - longer, which would have meant more pressure on FC. I'm not sure that fighter tactics had evolved much beyond the dogfight phase by the time of the BoB, and the Zero would have excelled at that type of fight.

Bearcat99
10-25-2005, 06:03 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kocur_:
Walther Wever http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif Author of "Ural bomber" program., which produced Do-19 and Ju-89. He studied Mein Kampf and concluded LW needed bomber to be able to strike targets as far as in Ural in inevitable was agaist SU. Died in crash of He-70 he piloted himself on 3 june 1936 and soon after program was cancelled. It was still 1936/37 and Hitler et consortes saw LW mainly as tool of political pressure. 300 He-111 "looked" better than 100 Ju-89, for "300 bombers" is more scary than "100 bombers"...Another program "Bomber A" soon started, which produced He-177V1 in 1939. It might have been operational eralier if some staff genius didnt require He177 to have ability to do...dive bombing! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

It is interesting that the Soviets moved thier factories east ... to keep them out of the range of German bombers. if the Germans had along range bomber who knows....

p1ngu666
10-25-2005, 09:44 PM
they didnt do a great job of knocking out british factories, and there not miles away....

skychimp, dogfighting is fine if both/all aircraft are of similer abililty http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif

u can turn fight p47s,p51s vs 190s if u want (and the other way) u just end up with big circles http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

but if one is way better at turning, u dont turn... like 190 vs ki43 for example http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-happy.gif

all about relitivity

panther3485
10-26-2005, 01:10 AM
Hi there, blakduk,

Excellent post! (And I agree with you; a lot of hop2002's post was also good and made sense - he certainly made me have a re-think on some points!)

As for yours, I particularly liked your point about the way British and German pilots have been stereotyped in many movies.

Just one little thing I would like to add, if I may:

Quote:
*"I think Goerings response, as you posted, was largely an effort to regain some control over the plan of battle - the losses were unsustainable and changes had to be made. What he didnt have at that time was the infrastructure to achieve it."

[Yes, very true, Goering was becoming desperate and unfortunately (for the Luftwaffe), some of his response - including increasingly severe restrictions on the tactical flexibility of his fighters - did little or nothing to really help and ultimately, in conjunction with other factors, only made matters worse for the Luftwaffe. This was in no small part because Goering was drawing some incorrect conclusions as to why they had been unable to significantly impact the interceptions by Fighter Command. It was relatively easy for him to 'blame' his fighters but very hard for him to properly appreciate what was really happening.]


Best regards,
panther3485

Ruy Horta
10-26-2005, 01:37 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by SkyChimp:
The Zero was deployed in China in July 1940.

The G6M heavy fighter version of the Betty went into production in 1939. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No they do not qualify, they need to be in full production in 1939 to be available for the Luftwaffe at the time of the war's start and in sufficient numbers in the summer of 1940 to have any influence.

Why does the G4M suddenly appear to be a substitute for what we now consider to be WW2 efficient strategic bombers? Anyway, production was authorized in 1940 (first prototype in Sep. 1939).

The G4M had range and a nice stinger, otherwise it was a flying lighter... Would have had a hard time in European style conflict, even in 1940.

The Zero was operationally tested in mid 1940, hardly the time to be fully deployed.

The quote Bueschel: "Hand made, radically new and each one literally a research project, the dozen or so aircraft left for Hankow..."

Expect better from you Chimp...

As for Hop, although slightly subjective (no account of RAF bomber losses during the same battle) it must be understood that RAF FC was in a good position to start with (tactical, quality and numbers) and the Jagdwaffe stretched to win air superiority. In Hop's terms the battle was even lost earlier when the Jagdwaffe failed to shoot down enough FC fighters to attain a higher positive ratio.

Adding Kampfwaffe losses adds to the confusion, as does leaving out Bomber and Coastal Command losses add to a false total.

But regardless the Luftwaffe lost the Battle of Britain - period.

Ruy Horta
10-26-2005, 05:00 AM
Those with a serious interest in the Battle of Britain, even if they lack any German language skills, need to get:

Die Jagdfliegerverbände der deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 Bis 1945 Teil 4 Teilband I
Einsatz am Kanal und ĂĽber England 26.06.1940 - 21.06.1941

There are many good histories on the Battle of Britain (and bad ones), it is probably the most described air campaign ever, but the above is probably the best single reference for detailed Jagdwaffe figures.

To give a surprising example in terms of German losses.

Daylight (ops / losses)

August
Fighters 12606 / 2.5%
Bombers 3334 / 7.4%

total 3.5%

September
Fighters 13970 / 2.25%
Bombers 3093 / 4.75%

total 2.7%

October
Fighters 7407 / 1.9%
Bombers 4081 / 2.0% (incl. Jabo)

total 2.0%

Night

August 2593 / 1.7%
September 6363 / 1.6%
October 7008 / 1.8%

hop2002
10-26-2005, 05:15 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Speaking in general, you may indeed get that impression from many biographies. However, in the case of the Battle of Britain at least, key errors that are widely recognized by historians as having ensured a German loss are correctly attributed to Hitler and Goering. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh yes, Hitler and Goering certainly made more than their share of mistakes. But post war many German commanders blamed them for everything, including their own failings. Hard to blame them, but the accounts of German generals post war don't give a completely true picture of what went on.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Goering did this in stages, issuing a number of orders between mid August and mid September. Yes, you're right - it didn't really become restrictive until early/mid September but effectively, THAT'S WHAT I ALREADY SAID in a previous post </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Fair enough. My problem is that I've argued the BoB so often, and on so many boards, with so many people, that I tend to generalise people's arguments. And the usual argument is that close escort tactics throughout the battle, and then the switch to London, cost the Luftwaffe the BoB. I don't think either is true. Close escort didn't come in until later, and whilst it might have cost the Luftwaffe extra losses towards the end, it didn't affect the outcome. By mid Spetember I think the Luftwaffe had already lost any chance to win the BoB (and I think they only had a slim one to begin with)

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Yes, Goerings trust for his Fighters did diminish, but mainly because he began to irrationally blame them for much of what was going wrong, including the alarmingly high bomber losses. As for 'experience teaching him', he drew some wrong conclusions from what was happening and sought to focus blame wherever he could, as long as it wasn't on himself! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Certainly. Goering was probably wrong to change tactics, but on the other hand Germany was not winning the BoB, and carrying on with the same failing plan wasn't really a good option either.

And I think the Jagdwaffe were at least partially to blame. Too many of them were concerned with score rather than protecting bombers.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">I still say BOLLOCKS. What you've said here adds nothing of value to the discussion; it's a bit like saying 'Trees are made of wood this week.' OF COURSE Fighter command suffered in August - it suffered THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Fighter Command, whilst it suffered losses throughout the battle, actually grew stronger during the battle, which is a rare thing. It was only for a brief period in late August that Fighter Command actually began to get weaker.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">And OF COURSE the Luftwaffe suffered more than Fighter Command in August - it suffered more FOR MOST OF THE BATTLE </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

That's the point. For nearly the entire battle, the Luftwaffe was getting weaker. For most of it, FC was getting stronger.

For a period in August Fighter Command was getting weaker, but that achievement for the Luftwaffe was bought at the cost of a much greater percentage of their strength.

The Luftwaffe lost the battlle in August because when August was over, the Luftwaffe was much weaker than when it began, FC a bit stronger than when it began, and the balance between the two forces had changed, with FC emerging from August stronger than the Jagdwaffe.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Yes, but this is another no-brainer. As stated before, the pressure was worse for the Luftwaffe for most, if not all, of the battle and certainly for the whole period from Adler Tag to the end of large scale daylight attacks. That's why they gave up! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Exactly. That's why they lost. Starting from being stronger than FC, they ended up weaker. If that's not losing the battle, I don't know what is.

And it happened in August. The Luftwaffe was still strong in September, but it was weaker than FC. And if they couldn't beat FC in August, when they started with more planes and pilots, what chance did they had in September, which they started with less planes and pilots?

The Jagdwaffe needed to destroy fighter command aircraft at better than 2:1 in August. They actually achieved a rate of almost exactly 1:1. (whilst FC also brought down a large number of Luftwaffe bombers). They actually improved the ratio later in the battle, I think, but by then it was too little, too late.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Something of an exaggeration here. Yes, the Luftwaffe's losses were both serious and debilitating; significantly more so than those of the RAF. But although their effective strength had diminished somewhat by October 1940, it had not been reduced to the point where they were literally incapable of going on. The Germans just weren't WILLING to take the casualties any more. Quite apart from issues of morale, they could see that if they continued at the present unsustainable rate of attrition, the Luftwaffe would literally bleed to death and cease to be a viable force, so they stopped well before it reached that point. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The point is that Luftwaffe stregth withered in comparison to the RAF. From being stronger, they declined to a much inferior position. If they couldn't win when stronger, what chance when they were weaker?

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">True, there was little or no indication visible to the Germans that Fighter Command was weakening. BUT from mid August to early September, the attacks on airfields, sector stations, communications/infrastructure etc, and the stress of the efforts to defend these, were hurting Fighter Command MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE the Germans did before or after. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, but again the point is they were bought at a cost that also hurt the Luftwaffe more than anything they did before or after.

According to Richard Townshend Bickers, The Battle of Britain, Luftwaffe losses 13 August - 6 September were 629 aircraft. That's not something the Luftwaffe could sustain.

Even during this "successful" period for the Luftwaffe, they were still getting weaker relative to the RAF. The RAF was still "winning".

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Please say if I've misunderstood this, but you appear to be suggesting that the idea of turning on London was cooked up between Kesselring and Goering, who then gained Hitler's approval and went ahead with it???? And to think that all this time, I've believed it was at HITLER'S instigation that this happened???? Where did I get that idea from? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

The popular press.

Hitler had set out one of the target priorities for the Luftwaffe as "ports and food depots" as early as 1st August. From Directive 17 (conduct of air and naval warfare against England):

"Once temporary or local air superiority is achieved, operations will continue against ports, particularly against installations for the storage of food, and against food storage installations farther inland."

London was the largest port and largest city in Europe, and it's docks and warehouses supplied food for it's own population (about 8 million) and millions in surrounding areas.

From The Most Dangerous Enemy by Bungay:

"The differences between Sperrle and Kesselring were still unreconciled, but Kesselring now had the chance to get what he wanted, and urged an all-out attack on London. He argued that Fighter Command was concentrating its forces in the northern airfields now that Biggin Hill was wrecked. He feared they might withdraw to them completely, which would pose him a real problem because of the Bf 109's range. In fact, he could not really understand why they had not already done so, unless it was just a question of not being seen to abandon territory. From the loss reports he and his staff believed he had more or less established air superiority, and the key thing was to attack something within the Bf 109's range that the British would have to come up and defend. They could abandon airfields - they had lots of them. They could not abandon London.
Sperrle disagreed. He was sceptical about the loss reports. He had seen all that before in Spain. Fighter Command was far from its last gasp, and the attacks on its infrastructure should continue.
Kesselring insisted. There was no point in trying to attack British aircraft on the ground, because they were not there. Hardly any fighters had been caught on the airfields. The only place to get them was in the air, and the only issue the perennial one of how to force them up so that Galland, Molders, Oesau or Balthasar could then shoot them down. The Luftwaffe was not getting any stronger. It should concentrate the forces it had, argued Kesselring, and launch massed attacks on a single target. London was the only candidate.
Kesselring was now pushing at an open door. Goring's view was political and his concern, as Dowding observed with insight on the 7th, was his personal standing. He had infamously claimed in public that, if enemy bombs were ever to fall on Berlin, people could call him 'Meyer'. The jokes were already doing the rounds. His relationship with Hitler was no joke. He had said Berlin was safe from attack, yet it had no air defences at all. The British could come and go as they pleased. People were shocked. They had believed themselves to be immune, and suddenly they were vulnerable. Furthermore, the Fiihrer did not believe that the Luftwaffe was clearing the skies over England, and said so on the 30th. Goring was in trouble.
Bombing Berlin was a political act requiring a political response. Hitler was going to give that response to the German people, and it needed to be acted upon. For very different reasons, Goring agreed with Kesselring that they
had to attack London. There was no alternative.
There was by now a strong groundswell of opinion within the German military hierarchy that this step was overdue. It had been Hitler's sacred cow for too long. Jodl had always been in favour of trying it. At a meeting with Hitler which took place on Eagle Day itself, he had strongly recommended a ruthless air attack on London the day before the invasion. A mass exodus of the population would result in a stream of refugees comparable to that which had clogged the roads of France a few weeks earlier and made movement impossible for the Allied armies.
In any case, it did not really matter too much if the Luftwaffe could not knock out the RAF and Sealion had to be postponed. There was more than one way to defeat England. An attack on London could be the beginning of extended economic warfare and a U-boat siege. Then Gibraltar and Egypt could be taken from her. As the cost of prosecuting the war grew, England would come round. The key thing was to break her will to resist by the Spring of 1941, when it would be Russia's turn. Invasion was not the only, nor even the best, way"

From Richard Overy, The Battle:

"t the height of this dour campaign of attrition came an intervention from Hitler which is always said to have saved Fighter Command and turned the battle. In a speech on 4 September Hitler announced that the German Air Force was to switch the main weight of attack on to British cities. London was singled out as the chief target and from 7 September, when the first mass daylight raid was launched on the capital, the German effort was concentrated on bombing the city by day and night. The respite afforded Fighter Command, so it is argued, allowed it to revive and to inflict insupportable losses on the German air fleets. The reason usually given for the sharp change in air strategy is the attack on Berlin by Bomber Command on the night of 25/26 August. Hitler was said to be so incensed by violation of the German capital that he suspended the attack on the RAF in order to unleash annihilating retaliatory blows against London; vengeance attacks made little strategic sense, and German strategy thereafter was doomed to failure.
The issues that led to the third phase of the battle were more complex than this. The central problem for Hitler and the military leadership was still to find a way to bring Britain quickly to the point where invasion could be carried out with a reasonable prospect of success. Barring invasion, there remained the hope that air attacks would prove so unendurable that the British government would at last bow to public pressure and accept the peace refused earlier in the summer. The disappointing results of the early wave of attacks in mid-August had already prompted Hitler to take stock. 'The collapse of England in the year 1940,' he told staff at his headquarters on 20 August, 'is under present circumstances no longer to be reckoned on.'30 Nevertheless he did not cancel Sealion, nor rein back the air assault, in the hope that the situation might suddenly improve. Instead the air force moved on to the next stage of the campaign planned in July.
By late August the German Air Force commanders assumed from the intelligence they were fed that Fighter Command was a spent force. Their instructions were now to bring the rest of the country progressively under attack, starting with industrial, military and transport targets in and around major urban centres in preparation for the invasion. Heavy bomb attacks on Bristol, Liverpool, Birmingham and other Midland cities at night preceded the attacks on London. On 2 September Goering ordered the systematic destruction of selected targets in London in line with the wider aim to reduce military capability and the will to resist. On 5 September Hitler directed the air fleets to begin a general campaign against urban targets and enemy morale, including London. With this directive, according to a lecture given in Berlin later in the war, 'economic war from the air could be embarked upon with full fury, and the morale of the civilian population subjected at the same time to heavy strain"

From The Night Blitz by John Ray:

"Consequently, according to Deichmann, several days before the opening of the daylight and night raids on the British capital, 'Feldmarschall Kesselring asked me if the RAF fighter forces were by now sufficiently weakened for us to mass-attack the most important targets in London without too great a risk to our bomber-formations.' In this way, Kesselring and his commander-in-chief hoped to attract the bulk of the RAF's remaining fighter force to the defence of the city. There, German aircraft would have the best chance of destroying them and achieving final victory. After that would come the overwhelming of other units of the RAF, preparing the way for a seaborne invasion. In Goering's opinion, if total success were achieved by the Luftwaffe, there well might be no need for landings, as the British Government would be compelled to seek peace.
Basic faults in Luftwaffe strategy and tactics thus far had led to failure to win the daylight battle. Fighter Command, not needing to win the battle, only not to lose it, had held on. In spite of the determination of German bomber crews in launching raids against airfields or aircraft factories, or in being used as bait to attract British fighters into contest with Bf 109s, the outcome had not been resolved by the early days of September. The RAF, fighting with equal determination and great courage within a carefully planned defensive system, had proved to be the biggest and most efficient air force ever engaged by the Luftwaffe. There would be no more easy successes comparable with those gained in Poland, Norway, the Low Countries and France.
These factors were exacerbated by poor German Intelligence. A survey of British fighter strength on 17 August estimated that only 300 fighters were left at Dowding's disposal, a number reckoned to have been severely reduced over the following three weeks of unrelenting assault. This handful of machines was the force which the Luftwaffe was about to demolish. It is small wonder that Goering invested such faith in the great afternoon raid on 7 September, followed by the opening of the Night Blitz.

Here was to be the final crushing of Dowding's forces, which explains why Deichmann claimed that the change of strategy was 'necessary for military reasons if a decisive victory was to be won'. He stated that // Fliegcrkorps and Luftflotte II wanted mass attacks 'even if air superiority had not been achieved', because of'the general situation of the war in the air'.
There was, however, a more pressing need for the Germans to change the bulk of their campaign from day to night raids. This was the extent of their bomber losses from mid-July to the end of August. According to the Quarter-Master General's Department of the German Air Ministry, by 30 September Luftwaffe bombers had suffered a 69 per cent casualty rate during daylight raids. This total comprised 621 aircraft destroyed and 334 damaged; when this number is added to the 724 bombers destroyed or damaged during May and June, the rate of attrition suffered by aircrews is obvious. 'The losses suffered by our bomber units must be terrible,' wrote a German pilot stationed in Denmark on 25 August, a comment supported by several factors. The first was the peril of the double crossing of the Channel, especially the return flight. The second was that men shot down over Britain, if escaping with their lives, inevitably became prisoners-of-war, with no chance of return. The third was the weak defensive armament of bombers confronted by eight-gun Hurricanes and Spitfires. Interviewed in 1945, WernerJunck, who commanded Luftflotte IIFs fighters during the battle, claimed to have advocated 'at an early date in the Battle of Britain that night attack be substituted for day attacks. This was finally done because of the severe losses in daylight
raids.' He called the battle 'a sort of air-Verdun, in which the Germans were at a disadvantage'."

"Two other important aims underscored the Luftwaffe's change to attacks on London, especially by night. They were explained by Bechtle, Operations Officer of KG 2, to a German Air Force General Staff conference in 1944.
'Incomparably greater success than hitherto could be anticipated from this policy,' he stated, adding that 'economic war from the air could be embarked on with full fury.' Furthermore, he claimed, the morale of the civilian population could be 'subjected at the same time to heavy strain'. Similar thoughts were expressed by Kesselring in his memoirs. Between 6 September 1940 and June 1941 'our main assignments now were the disturbance of production and incoming supplies with their underlying purpose of slowing down British armament production, and initiating a full-scale economic war'. The matter of civilian morale was covered by the statement that 'the "reprisal raids" were also started'.
Regarding the effects on civilians, by the summer of 1940 there was always the German hope that aerial bombardment would lead to a breakdown in everyday life, with pressure brought on the government to make peace in order to avert anarchy. The Official Narrative refers to the German belief that 'the exertion of sufficient pressure on morale, together with a sufficient measure of destruction, would demonstrate the futility of further resistance and bring offers of submission'. This aspiration had been declared by General Jodl on 30 June 1940: 'In conjunction with propaganda and terror raids from time to timeâ€"ťannounced as "reprisals" - a cumulative depletion of Britain's food stocks will paralyse the will of the people to resist, and then break it altogether, forcing the capitulation of their government."

"To summarise, the Germans had a variety of motives for turning to attacks on London and opening the main Night Blitz against Bntain. They were thereby able to take pressure off the Luftwaffe, especially bomber crews, by changing the main assault from the RAF to economic and civilian targets. Also, they made much of the claim that they were doing no more than retaliating for RAF raids on German civilians. Whatever the truth or exaggeration of that, German leaders were not slow to use it as a justification for the Night Blitz"

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Exactly. And the time when the RAF 'suffered the negative balance'? During the period from mid August to early September - when the Luftwaffe was hurting Fighter Command the most, as mentioned before </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, and also the time when the Germans suffered their worst production balance. The Germans were hurting the RAF most in August and early September, but that's not the same as saying it was their most successful time, because they were hurting themselves even more. Forcing high casualties on the enemy is no use if it costs you even higher, and less sustainable, casualties.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Looking at this chart, the RAF serviceability rate appears to have dropped slightly overall, from perhaps 92 percent to 89 or 90 (average say, 91) by the end of October. The Luftwaffe by nearly the same, from perhaps 78 down to 76 (average 77) over the same time. There is more variation in the Luftwaffe's rate but for the period of BoB, it does not appear to go above 82 or below 75 percent. There is hardly what I would call a 'sharp decline' anywhere, but I do get your point. Interesting, though, that the Luftwaffe's serviceability rate as shown here hits its lowest point halfway through December, a good number of weeks AFTER they ceased carrying out large scale daylight attacks. This leads me to suspect that other factors may be at work here, so I think it's dangerous to make assumptions based on such small fluctuations. Perhaps the most significant thing shown is that the RAF had a CONSISTENTLY HIGHER rate of serviceability. I wonder how this would compare for the rest of the War? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think December is a special case. Firstly, the need for fighters in December was low, the daylight battle was over, weather probably poor. I suspect a lot of routine maintenance and overhauls were done in December.

Secondly, the introduction of the 109 F was underway, and I suspect that contributed to the poor serviceability.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">True, some historians have 'dramatized' about Fighter Command being 'on its knees' at this time and this is clearly an exaggeration. BUT the fact remains it was being hurt more at this stage of the battle than any other. If the Luftwaffe couldn't win by continuing with (or intensifying) these tactics, it most certainly couldn't do so by switching to London, which EASED the stress on Fighter Command. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

But also eased the stress on the Luftwaffe.

The point is the Luftwaffe was incapable of carrying on the same intensity of attacks throughout September, they had to change strategy somehow. A simple reduction in the scale of operations would have done, but flying less missions would hardly have swung the battle in their favour. An attack on London at least had a chance of doing so.

Of course, it didn't work, but simply trying to carry on as they had before wouldn't have worked either.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Yet they persisted for the rest of September and into October as well, with their strength continuing to decline while that of the RAF recovered and increased. Stout fellows, those Germans! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, they persisted, but at a much lower rate. Look how the fighter sorties trail off after mid September. From nearly 4,000 a week at the peak to about a thousand a week for the second half of September (and October, I think)

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Possibly, but if you're going to stick to 31 August and not budge, then by no means all historians would agree. However, you'd only have to add another 7 days to get the agreement of most of the remainder! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, the date is flexible, of course, because it was a grtadual process, not a single event, that won the battle. But the problem with putting the point the Luftwaffe lost at 7th September is it implies they lost because they switched to attacking London, and to some extent that's mixing cause and effect.

Just before the switch to London, the Luftwaffe were in a much worse position than they'd been before they started the battle, the RAF a better position. The Luftwaffe would require some radical improvement in methods or tactics to win, not simply a continuation of their previous policies. I've never seen any realistic idea put forward that would win the battle for the Luftwaffe from that point.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">It's kind of misleading to say I "blamed Goering's escort tactics for losing BoB". What I said was: </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Apologies there. As I said earlier, I tend to make assumptions about peoples arguments. Rather like skiming a passage of text when you think you know what the author's saying, and ending up with the wrong impression.

And thanks for an interesting and well argued reply. I don't think our positions are that far apart.

hop2002
10-26-2005, 06:28 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">As for Hop, although slightly subjective (no account of RAF bomber losses during the same battle) it must be understood that RAF FC was in a good position to start with (tactical, quality and numbers) and the Jagdwaffe stretched to win air superiority. In Hop's terms the battle was even lost earlier when the Jagdwaffe failed to shoot down enough FC fighters to attain a higher positive ratio. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, you could argue the battle was lost before it was begun because German production and training were so low.

The Germans were facing a tall order from the start. It only got more difficult as the battle went on.

I don't think the Luftwaffe performed particulary badly by not winning the BoB, doing so in the position they were in would have been a fantastic achievement. I do think they could have done better.

Somebody in an Amazon review of Most Dangerous Enemy sums the position up quite nicely:

" The English myth of the Battle of Britain is similar to stories about Sir Francis Drake and the Spanish Armada in 1588, when Drake preferred to finish a game of bowls before sailing out to rout the Spanish. In 1940, the myth created by Churchill is that "Never before has so much been owed by so many to so few." Like Dunkirk, the image was one of luck, pluck and mucking through the confusion, ineptness and amateurism. Bungay shows the triumph of British planning and readiness.

The German image, reinforced by quick and easy defeats of Poland and France, was that of an impregnable military machine guided by highly experienced professionals using superior technology with the rigorous discipline of well trained and effective troops. In contrast, the British were thought to be slightly dowdy country squires lucky enough to deny victory to the superb German military."

" Reality is quite different. Bungay explains the British victory was based on a superb plan of operations and aircraft development that began in earnest in 1936 and was rigorously carried out in 1940. The basic idea was developed in 1922. Instead of being unprepared and underarmed, Britain was perhaps the world's best prepared and best armed nation in terms of air defense in the 1940s. The result was a decisive British victory which left the Luftwaffe crippled.

To summarize, the British fought the Battle of Britain with a Teutonic thoroughness for organization, planning, discipline and effort; they left little to chance, planned for the worst cases and didn't rely on luck. In short, the British behaved like Germans at their best, though these qualities were tempered and restrained by the civility of traditional English life. The Germans fought with a British thoroughness for bickering, personal petty disputes and trusting in an ability to muddle through; it is hardly an accident that two of the top German commanders committed suicide as a result of the internal wrangling and bitterness within the Luftwaffe high command."

I don't agree with all that, but it does make the essential point. Britain was well prepared, with a good strategy, and they carried it out well. The Germans were poorly prepared, didn't have a clear idea of what they were trying to do, and didn't carry out their ever-changing plan well.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">To give a surprising example in terms of German losses.

Daylight (ops / losses)

August
Fighters 12606 / 2.5%
Bombers 3334 / 7.4%

total 3.5%

September
Fighters 13970 / 2.25%
Bombers 3093 / 4.75%

total 2.7%

October
Fighters 7407 / 1.9%
Bombers 4081 / 2.0% (incl. Jabo)
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Although they don't appear it, those are actually pretty high losses.

USAAF figures for early 1944:

Feb
Fighters 10,679 / 1%
Bombers 9,884 / 2.7%

March
Fighters 16,261 / 1.2%
Bombers 11,590 / 3%

April
Fighters 21,554 / 1.3%
Bombers 14,464 / 2.9%

The August bomber losses illustrate why Goering felt he had to make changes.

darkhorizon11
10-26-2005, 10:34 AM
I can't believe how this is being transferred into a LW won the BoB thread.

First of all, the numbers being thrown out showing the RAF lost more planes are all numbers of fighters...how many bombers did the Luftwaffe lose during this time period?

Answer, a lot more than the British did fighters...

Also, if you look at the day by day records of air combat over GB during the battle and the results, you'll see that theres only about 2 days in the entire conflict were the RAF lost more planes than the Germans did.

-Now the Germans sure as heck did a lot of damage to the British and they were on the verge of collapse when the blitz began, but trust me, the Germans were FARRRR from victorious.

telsono
10-26-2005, 11:35 AM
There was another heavy bomber that the Germans could have invested into and probably have gotten into production earlier. The only problem, it wasn't a German aircraft, but an Italian one. This was the Piaggio P.108

Piaggio P.108
(Italy)
This was a four-engined bomber, the only Italian WWII aircraft in this category. Only 163 were built and their operational use was even more restricted by teething troubles and bad organization; its combat use was limited to a number of attacks by small numbers of aircraft. The P.108A was fitted with a 102mm gun, fitted in the nose with a slight depression. The P.108C and P.108T were transport aircraft.
Type: P.108B
Function: bomber
Year: 1941 Crew: 7 Engines: 4 * 1500hp Piaggio P.XII RC35
Wing Span: 32.00m Length: 22.30m Height: 6.00m Wing Area: 135m2
Empty Weight: 17325kg Max.Weight: 29885kg
Speed: 430km/h Ceiling: 6000m Range: 4000km
Armament: 8*mg12.7mm 3500kg



http://www.comandosupremo.com/P108.html



http://i11.photobucket.com/albums/a168/telsono/Piaggio108.jpg

Albert Speer stated after the war that two errors that Germany made during the war were:
a) not going on to a full wartime production until 1942. Consumer good production was still at a peacetime production rate up to that time.

and
b) not utilizing their female population in the war industries like the USA. The female workers would have been more motivated and therefore produced a higher quality of product then the slave labor that German depended on.

panther3485
10-26-2005, 04:18 PM
Hello again hop2002,

I'm beginning to like you, mate! That last post was even better than the one before. As far as I'm concerned, there are only a few points of contention left and those are mostly minor ones:

My quote:
"Speaking in general, you may indeed get that impression from many biographies. However, in the case of the Battle of Britain...."

Your reply:
*"Oh yes, Hitler and Goering certainly made more than their share of mistakes. But post war many German commanders blamed them for everything, including their own failings. Hard to blame them, but the accounts of German generals post war don't give a completely true picture of what went on."

[Agreed completely!]


My quote:
"Goering did this in stages, issuing a number of orders between mid August and mid September. Yes, you're right - it didn't really become restrictive until early/mid September but effectively, THAT'S WHAT I ALREADY SAID in a previous post."


Your reply:
*"Fair enough. My problem is that I've argued the BoB so often, and on so many boards, with so many people, that I tend to generalise people's arguments."

[No worries, mate! I initially misunderstood/misread a few of your points too, for reasons not completely unlike yours!]

Continuing with your reply:
*"....the usual argument is that close escort tactics throughout the battle, and then the switch to London, cost the Luftwaffe the BoB. I don't think either is true...."

[Agreed that considered on its own, restrictive close escort could not have cost the Luftwaffe the battle. What it did do, during the daylight attacks on London, was make life more difficult and miserable for the German fighter pilots, who were already trying to do an almost impossible job under the circumstances. It added to their extreme stress and caused them some extra casualties, without gaining any real benefit for the bombers. It was 'one more nail in the coffin', so to speak.]

And:
*"By mid Spetember I think the Luftwaffe had already lost any chance to win the BoB (and I think they only had a slim one to begin with)."

[Agreed completely!]


My quote:
"Yes, Goerings trust for his Fighters did diminish, but mainly because he began to irrationally blame them for much of what was going wrong, including the alarmingly high bomber losses...."

Your reply:
*"Certainly. Goering was probably wrong to change tactics, but on the other hand Germany was not winning the BoB, and carrying on with the same failing plan wasn't really a good option either."

[In substance, we seem to agree here as well. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that Goering replaced one failing plan with another that was even more sure to fail. But of course, he didn't know that at the time and he was desperate. 'Switching the emphasis', in his view, might just have done the trick.]

You also added:
*"And I think the Jagdwaffe were at least partially to blame. Too many of them were concerned with score rather than protecting bombers."

[I think it was more that case that the Jagdwaffe's 'concern with score' led the bomber commanders and Goering to suspect that fighter pilots might be tempted to 'neglect their duty of protection' to the bombers and go off on a 'wild goose chase' to hunt down British fighters. But Goering was already starting to address this concern in his August directives. For example -
(from 'The Battle of Britain', by Richard Townshend Bickers):
"A bomber wing had always to be supported by three fighter wings, he instructed, one of which would fly ahead and clear the target area, while the second and third carried out the duties of close escort and high escort respectively. But only part of the fighter arm was to be employed as escort to the bombers. the remainder were to fly free-lance operations so that they would engage British fighters on favourable terms and indirectly protect the bombers."
Goering repeatedly amended these tactics over the next several weeks, incrementally removing his fighters' freedom of action, until it reached the ridiculously restrictive situation that prevailed by mid September over London.
From this, it seems that throughout the crucial stages of the battle, Goering had quite detailed instructions for his fighter arm and was well and truly controlling them. I feel that the responsibility for the outcome - be it good or bad - had to be his.]


My quote:
"I still say BOLLOCKS.... OF COURSE Fighter command suffered in August - it suffered THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE."

Your reply:
*"Fighter Command, whilst it suffered losses throughout the battle, actually grew stronger during the battle, which is a rare thing. It was only for a brief period in late August that Fighter Command actually began to get weaker."

[I would have preferred to say, "Fighter command had become stronger by the end of the battle, which is a rare thing." Or perhaps, "Fighter command began to weaken in late August, but recovered and was stronger by the end of the battle." OK, I think this is another case of the two of us really agreeing but we say things in different ways.]


My quote:
"And OF COURSE the Luftwaffe suffered more than Fighter Command in August - it suffered more FOR MOST OF THE BATTLE."

Your reply:
*"That's the point. For nearly the entire battle, the Luftwaffe was getting weaker. For most of it, FC was getting stronger."

[In my opinion for Fighter command, I think it was more a case of:
Up to late August - holding steady and successfully maintaining their strength (while that of the Luftwaffe declined)
Late August to very early September - suffering some decline in pilot strength but still managing to hold on (while Luftwaffe strength deteriorated still further)
Early September to end October - Fighter Command recovers and increases its strength (while that of the Luftwaffe continues to decline, albeit now at a slower rate)
For this reason, I'd still feel safer with "Fighter Command was stronger by the end of the battle, whereas the Luftwaffe was significantly weaker.", but once again we do substantially agree here and it looks like we are just taking different roads to get to the same destination!]


You continue:
*"For a period in August Fighter Command was getting weaker, but that achievement for the Luftwaffe was bought at the cost of a much greater percentage of their strength."

[True. I was really just trying to point out that it was their ONLY successful achievement in relation to effectively weakening Fighter Command. The fact that they could not have continued to do it indefinitely is not in dispute. But at the time, both sides believed (for a while at least) that if it continued much longer the RAF would crack. With the benefit of what we know today, we can see that it would probably have been the Luftwaffe that cracked first.]

You go on to say:
*"The Luftwaffe lost the battle in August because when August was over, the Luftwaffe was much weaker than when it began, FC a bit stronger than when it began, and the balance between the two forces had changed, with FC emerging from August stronger than the Jagdwaffe."

[Your assertion that the Luftwaffe had already lost the battle by the end of August has been well supported by evidence and the opinions of some historians. Therefore, I cannot disagree as such but I have already mentioned that other historians' opinions shift this into early September. This is only a few days difference, though.
Also, I'm not sure that Fighter Command's overall position on 31 August was better in any significant way than it had been at the beginning but, as you said, we can see that the loss ratio was still greatly to the detriment of the Luftwaffe, which lost much more heavily, so that's the important point.]


My next quote:
"Yes, but this is another no-brainer. As stated before, the pressure was worse for the Luftwaffe for most, if not all, of the battle and certainly for the whole period from Adler Tag to the end of large scale daylight attacks. That's why they gave up!"

Your reply:
*"Exactly. That's why they lost. Starting from being stronger than FC, they ended up weaker. If that's not losing the battle, I don't know what is."

[We agree again (don't see how we could do anything else!)]


Then you added:
*"And it happened in August. The Luftwaffe was still strong in September, but it was weaker than FC. And if they couldn't beat FC in August, when they started with more planes and pilots, what chance did they had in September, which they started with less planes and pilots?"

[Truly very, very little chance indeed, which they then converted to 'certifiable as absolutely no chance at all' when the emphasis was shifted to daylight attacks on London.]


And you continued:
*"The Jagdwaffe needed to destroy fighter command aircraft at better than 2:1 in August. They actually achieved a rate of almost exactly 1:1. (whilst FC also brought down a large number of Luftwaffe bombers)."

[The fighter-to-fighter kill/loss ratio was very close to 1:1 as you say, just a tad in 'favour' of the Jagdwaffe. It was nowhere near the required ratio for Luftwaffe victory and I would even argue that they would have needed closer to 3:1, if you reckon on the number of RAF pilots that survived being shot down over their own territiory and could be flying again within a very short time.]

And then you say:
"They actually improved the ratio later in the battle, I think, but by then it was too little, too late."

[Of course, we are talking about averages, which 'smooth out' the spikes and troughs and there seem to have been a few occasions when this happened after August. Nevertheless, the overall trend for percentage loss of German fighters from all causes was not going to improve and could be expected to become even worse for the Germans, considering the following after September 7:
(a) Emphasis shifted to London stretched 109's closer to the absolute limit of their range
(b) Deeper penetration of British airspace on a regular basis resulted in -
1. More time for Fighter Command to assemble larger formations and intercept en masse.
2. More time for Figher Command to repeat and/or continue interceptions
3. FC 12 Group can more easily play an active part - more RAF Squadrons can participate in each action
4. For the Germans, proportionally longer exposure to enemy contact and prolonged requirement to defend the bombers, but drastically smaller fuel allowance for combat. More risk and more ditchings!
(c) By mid September, Goering's ridiculously restrictive 'close escort' practises, further disadvantaging his fighters.
Considering all the above and their losses to date, the Jagdwaffe's achievement in continuing to provide a substantial escort and still shooting down fair numbers of RAF fighters was remarkable.]


My quote:
"Something of an exaggeration here. Yes, the Luftwaffe's losses were both serious and debilitating; significantly more so than those of the RAF. But although their effective strength had diminished somewhat by October 1940, it had not been reduced to the point where they were literally incapable of going on. The Germans just weren't WILLING to take the casualties any more....(etc)"

Your reply:
*"The point is that Luftwaffe strength withered in comparison to the RAF. From being stronger, they declined to a much inferior position....(etc)"

[Put that way, agreed!]


My quote:
"True, there was little or no indication visible to the Germans that Fighter Command was weakening. BUT from mid August to early September, the attacks on airfields, sector stations, communications/infrastructure etc, and the stress of the efforts to defend these, were hurting Fighter Command MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE the Germans did before or after."

Your response:
*"Yes, but again the point is they were bought at a cost that also hurt the Luftwaffe more than anything they did before or after."

[Kinda covered this before - no argument with your response but I just wanted to highlight that this was their ONLY significant success - however expensive it may have been!]


My quote:
"Please say if I've misunderstood this, but you appear to be suggesting that the idea of turning on London was cooked up between Kesselring and Goering, who then gained Hitler's approval and went ahead with it???? And to think that all this time, I've believed it was at HITLER'S instigation that this happened???? Where did I get that idea from?"

Your answer:
*"The popular press."

[And some other supposedly reputable sources, that implicate Hitler in this context but fail to mention Kesselring and Goering?]


You continue with:
*"Hitler had set out one of the target priorities for the Luftwaffe as "ports and food depots" as early as 1st August.....(etc, continuing through to):
Bombing Berlin was a political act requiring a political response. Hitler was going to give that response to the German people, and it needed to be acted upon. For very different reasons, Goring agreed with Kesselring that they had to attack London....(etc)"

[OK, so it wasn't just Hitler!]


My quote:
"Exactly. And the time when the RAF 'suffered the negative balance'? During the period from mid August to early September - when the Luftwaffe was hurting Fighter Command the most, as mentioned before."

Your response:
*"Yes, and also the time when the Germans suffered their worst production balance. The Germans were hurting the RAF most in August and early September, but that's not the same as saying it was their most successful time, because they were hurting themselves even more. Forcing high casualties on the enemy is no use if it costs you even higher, and less sustainable, casualties."

[No it wasn't their 'most successful time' in the sense you have highlighted, but it WAS the ONLY TIME THEY SUCCEEDED in doing significant damage to Fighter Command, as I've already covered above. Each of us is correct in the way he meant it.]


My quote:
"Looking at this (serviceability rate) chart...."

Your response:
"I think December is a special case. Firstly, the need for fighters in December was low, the daylight battle was over, weather probably poor. I suspect a lot of routine maintenance and overhauls were done in December.
Secondly, the introduction of the 109 F was underway, and I suspect that contributed to the poor serviceability."

[Hmmmm, that would certainly make sense!]


My quote:
"True, some historians have 'dramatized' about Fighter Command being 'on its knees' at this time and this is clearly an exaggeration. BUT the fact remains it was being hurt more at this stage of the battle than any other. If the Luftwaffe couldn't win by continuing with (or intensifying) these tactics, it most certainly couldn't do so by switching to London, which EASED the stress on Fighter Command."


Your reply:
*"But also eased the stress on the Luftwaffe.
The point is the Luftwaffe was incapable of carrying on the same intensity of attacks throughout September, they had to change strategy somehow. A simple reduction in the scale of operations would have done, but flying less missions would hardly have swung the battle in their favour."

[With the benefit of 20:20 hindsight, quitting large scale daylight attacks by the end of August, in favour of night bombing, and cutting their losses, would seem to have been much less costly and might have done more damage to the British.]

And this one of yours:
*"An attack on London at least had a chance of doing so (swinging the battle in the Luftwaffe's favour).

[NO NO NO!!!!! The daylight attacks on London had ABSOLUTELY NO SUCH F@CKING CHANCE WHATSOEVER!!!!]


My quote:
"Yet they persisted for the rest of September and into October as well, with their strength continuing to decline while that of the RAF recovered and increased. Stout fellows, those Germans!"

Your reply:
*"Yes, they persisted, but at a much lower rate. Look how the fighter sorties trail off after mid September. From nearly 4,000 a week at the peak to about a thousand a week for the second half of September (and October, I think)"

[Fair enough. What about September 7 - 15, and were bomber sorties dropped by the same amount?]


My quote:
"....if you're going to stick to 31 August and not budge, then by no means all historians would agree. However, you'd only have to add another 7 days to get the agreement of most of the remainder!"

Your reply:
*"Well, the date is flexible, of course, because it was a gradual process, not a single event, that won the battle. But the problem with putting the point the Luftwaffe lost at 7th September is it implies they lost because they switched to attacking London, and to some extent that's mixing cause and effect."

[Glad you said 'to some extent'. Agreed then.]

You also say:
*"Just before the switch to London, the Luftwaffe were in a much worse position than they'd been before they started the battle, the RAF a better position."

[I agree about the Luftwaffe actually being in a much worse position. The RAF, I believe, about the same as at the beginning but THINKING that their position was worse.]


You continue:
*"The Luftwaffe would require some radical improvement in methods or tactics to win, not simply a continuation of their previous policies."

[Agreed completely.]

And you add:
*"I've never seen any realistic idea put forward that would win the battle for the Luftwaffe from that point."

[That's because there isn't one!]


My quote:
*"It's kind of misleading to say I "blamed Goering's escort tactics for losing BoB". What I said was...."

Your response:
*"Apologies there. As I said earlier, I tend to make assumptions about peoples arguments. Rather like skiming a passage of text when you think you know what the author's saying, and ending up with the wrong impression."

[No worries, mate!]

Your final statement:
*"And thanks for an interesting and well argued reply. I don't think our positions are that far apart."


[Not a problem. You have helped me to gain some further insights and I have amended my views in one or two areas, so it's been good. And you're right - our positions are much closer than my original impressions suggested to me. There were many instances where it was a case of differences in the way we express ourselves, rather than any substantial difference of opinion. Your grasp of the subject is much better than average.]


Best regards,
panther3485

p1ngu666
10-26-2005, 05:42 PM
7.4% loss rate = a average of 13ops before u bought it http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-surprised.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-indifferent.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-sad.gif

bomber command lost more men in the BOB period than fighter command, probably the entire war aswell, flying bombers was *really* dangerous... only teh mossie was even vaguly safe.

bc was doing the other BOB, battle of the barges, plus the useal attacks on germany and the occupied countries.

SkyChimp
10-26-2005, 06:11 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by SkyChimp:
The Zero was deployed in China in July 1940.

The G6M heavy fighter version of the Betty went into production in 1939. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

No they do not qualify, they need to be in full production in 1939 to be available for the Luftwaffe at the time of the war's start and in sufficient numbers in the summer of 1940 to have any influence.

Why does the G4M suddenly appear to be a substitute for what we now consider to be WW2 efficient strategic bombers? Anyway, production was authorized in 1940 (first prototype in Sep. 1939).

The G4M had range and a nice stinger, otherwise it was a flying lighter... Would have had a hard time in European style conflict, even in 1940.

The Zero was operationally tested in mid 1940, hardly the time to be fully deployed.

The quote Bueschel: "Hand made, radically new and each one literally a research project, the dozen or so aircraft left for Hankow..."

Expect better from you Chimp...

</div></BLOCKQUOTE>


2. Name a bomber that was in full production in 1939-40 that combined long range, bomb load and defensive capability.

OK,

The G4M could have gone into production in very early 1940 according to Francillon but was delayed in favor of the heavy fighter version. So, the Betty could have been available for the majority of the BoB.

But if you want to keep it out of the running, then consider the Mitsubishi Ki-21. NOT the zippo the Betty was, long ranged, with a heavier bomb load. In service in 1938, with 143 delivered by 1939, and 263 by 1940.

What about the Mitsubishi G3M? Good enough to sink British capital ships.

Why not the Fiat BR20, flown by the Japanese in China in the mid-30s.

I'm not sure why the obvious didn't dawn on you, B-17B deliveries began in July 1939.

And those just off the top of my head.


1. Name a fighter that was in full production in 1939-40 that had the legs to provide long range escort AND at the same time had the performance to stand up to classic interceptor-type fighters.

P-36? Easily capable of taking on the Bf-109E. Good range, too.

blakduk
10-26-2005, 08:21 PM
Panther and Hop-
this is one of those threads that keeps me interested. Good work guys.

I've seen most texts refer to the switch of targets to London as being chosen in a fit of anger by Hitler. This was good for newsreels and to confirm quick conclusions that Hitler was an idiot who held total sway over the Germans by charm alone. In reality it seems much more likely he was a clever and ruthless b@stard.

Regarding this discussion:
*"An attack on London at least had a chance of doing so (swinging the battle in the Luftwaffe's favour).

[NO NO NO!!!!! The daylight attacks on London had ABSOLUTELY NO SUCH F@CKING CHANCE WHATSOEVER!!!!]'

I think you must remember that bombing of cities was assumed at that time to be capable of paralysing an industrial nation. Prior to the war popular media, in such films as 'Things that are to come', depicted utter ruination for civilisations that were attacked by aircraft.
'Bomber' Harris was able to convince the allied high command that he could achieve what Goering couldnt- he didnt, even though he had vastly larger resources than his counterpart.

It wasnt until the advent of nuclear weapons that the required payload was achieved.

panther3485
10-26-2005, 11:16 PM
Hello blakduk,

Quote 1:
*"Panther and Hop-
this is one of those threads that keeps me interested. Good work guys."

[Thanks for that! Nice to have one's efforts appreciated.]


Quote 2:
*"I've seen most texts refer to the switch of targets to London as being chosen in a fit of anger by Hitler."

[That had been pretty much my impression as well. Although there is no doubt that Hitler was very angry about the bombs dropped on Berlin, and this goaded him to sanction the bombing of London (which he'd previously opposed), I now see that the situation was not this simple. Some quite senior German leaders obviously wanted to unleash the bombers on London before any of this happened and they had not been shy about saying so (at least, among themselves). I must credit hop2002 for bringing this to my attention!]


Quote 3:
*"This was good for newsreels and to confirm quick conclusions that Hitler was an idiot who held total sway over the Germans by charm alone."

[This had certainly been a widely held perception of Hitler, especially during the war and for the first decade or two afterwards.]

Quote 4:
*"In reality it seems much more likely he was a clever and ruthless b@stard."

[No argument from me on that one!]

Quote 5:
*"Regarding this discussion:
"An attack on London at least had a chance of doing so (swinging the battle in the Luftwaffe's favour).
[NO NO NO!!!!! The daylight attacks on London had ABSOLUTELY NO SUCH F@CKING CHANCE WHATSOEVER!!!!]'
I think you must remember that bombing of cities was assumed at that time to be capable of paralysing an industrial nation. Prior to the war popular media, in such films as 'Things that are to come', depicted utter ruination for civilisations that were attacked by aircraft."

[No need to remind me of that, I have always been well aware of it. My answer to hop2002 was based on a realistic assessment of the Lufwaffe's predicament vis-a-vis Fighter Command, during the large scale daylight attacks on London. At that time, under those conditions, it COULDN'T POSSIBLY HAVE SUCCEEDED and only served to put the seal on their already largely inevitable defeat.]

Quote 6:
*"'Bomber' Harris was able to convince the allied high command that he could achieve what Goering couldnt- he didnt, even though he had vastly larger resources than his counterpart."

[In general, I agree with you here but this is a pretty involved subject in its own right. Not to mention controversial! Since I'm up to my neck in the Battle of Britain at the moment, I'll leave it be for now!]


Thanks for your input - I have enoyed all of your posts so far.


Best regards,
panther3485

panther3485
10-26-2005, 11:25 PM
oooops! typo in my last post:

I meant ENJOYED all of your posts (missed the 'j')


Best regards again,
panther3485

Ruy Horta
10-27-2005, 02:58 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by SkyChimp:

The G4M could have gone into production in very early 1940 according to Francillon but was delayed in favor of the heavy fighter version. So, the Betty could have been available for the majority of the BoB.

But if you want to keep it out of the running, then consider the Mitsubishi Ki-21. NOT the zippo the Betty was, long ranged, with a heavier bomb load. In service in 1938, with 143 delivered by 1939, and 263 by 1940.

What about the Mitsubishi G3M? Good enough to sink British capital ships.

Why not the Fiat BR20, flown by the Japanese in China in the mid-30s.

I'm not sure why the obvious didn't dawn on you, B-17B deliveries began in July 1939.

And those just off the top of my head.


1. Name a fighter that was in full production in 1939-40 that had the legs to provide long range escort AND at the same time had the performance to stand up to classic interceptor-type fighters.

P-36? Easily capable of taking on the Bf-109E. Good range, too. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

How could I have been so blind to the obvious!!

Of course your candidates would have tipped the balance in favor of the Germans.

Just imagine.

A mix of G3Ms, Ki-21 and BR.20s with a small number of B-17Bs escorted by P-36s would have been able to crush FC.

All bombers which were able to defend themselves and a superb fighter that would have been able to cover them over Southern Britain and attain their superiority over defending Spits and Hurricanes. By virtue of their superior performance alone, compared to what the Germans put up themselves in reality.

To think that the Germans could at least have had these Italian BR.20s and a fair share of Hawk-75s from French stocks, what a missed opportunity!

Skychimp, yet again I bow to your superior intellect!

p1ngu666
10-27-2005, 04:08 AM
bombing cities and towns worked in some places http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-indifferent.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-sad.gif

JG53Frankyboy
10-27-2005, 05:23 AM
the FIAT Br.20 actually took part in the BoB !
it was the bomber of the italian Regia Aeronautica units that fought there from the end of 1940

http://www.dalnet.se/~surfcity/falco_bob.htm

http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

but this plane can hardly considered to be a better bomber than the He111 ore Ju88 http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif (sry to our italian friends here http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif )

SkyChimp
10-27-2005, 07:49 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:

How could I have been so blind to the obvious!!

Of course your candidates would have tipped the balance in favor of the Germans.

Just imagine.

A mix of G3Ms, Ki-21 and BR.20s with a small number of B-17Bs escorted by P-36s would have been able to crush FC.

All bombers which were able to defend themselves and a superb fighter that would have been able to cover them over Southern Britain and attain their superiority over defending Spits and Hurricanes. By virtue of their superior performance alone, compared to what the Germans put up themselves in reality.

To think that the Germans could at least have had these Italian BR.20s and a fair share of Hawk-75s from French stocks, what a missed opportunity!

Skychimp, yet again I bow to your superior intellect! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

That wasn't your question, or your challenge, now was it? I like the way you ask a question, get a response, then act as if you asked a different question. Is there any wonder why I have so little respect for you?

LEXX_Luthor
10-27-2005, 08:20 PM
Rhorta and SkyChimp. You two...again?

When I first got the FB and came to the UBI, the only two (2) SiGs that stood out from the rest and I enjoyed so much I remember them from 2003 -- Pilot Chimp and Rhorta Stalingrad. Rhorta bring back your SiG that you let SkyChimp make you take down. All the "other" 2003 ubi SiGs I have long Forgotten.

ploughman
10-28-2005, 02:01 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Ruy Horta said..."They had the tools for a war in Europe, they did not have the means for a WORLD WAR." </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Conducting a war of conquest in Europe, where you are attempting to become the hegemonic power on the continent, will inevitably bring you into conflict with the British. If you do not have the means to subdue the British you do not have the means to conduct a war in Europe.

Ruy Horta
10-28-2005, 02:49 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by SkyChimp: </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">That wasn't your question, or your challenge, now was it? I like the way you ask a question, get a response, then act as if you asked a different question. Is there any wonder why I have so little respect for you? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I was reacting within the context of a previous post. You always assume that I think of German superiority. That's your problem.

Although I could have made a clear case, I am disinclined to make an effort when you are involved.

Again I do not wish to enter another tit for tat debacle on your behalf. Respect doesn't come into the picture. In my case it is simple open dislike.

Happy Christmas Chimp!

Ruy Horta
10-28-2005, 03:37 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ploughman:
Conducting a war of conquest in Europe, where you are attempting to become the hegemonic power on the continent, will inevitably bring you into conflict with the British. If you do not have the means to subdue the British you do not have the means to conduct a war in Europe. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Fact is that Nazi germany was ready to fight a small war against Poland in 1939 and somewhat ready to hold the Anglo-French in 1940 (or more a case of these countries being less ready than Germany). Skill and a set of special circumstances (not all of German making) won them a relatively fast victory in the West.

But it shows the nature of Nazi Germany. They might have had great operational plans for the the war against France, they had idea no how to make use of their position politically. They did not want a war with Britain, but they had one... (must have been deja vu for many Germans).

I am inclined to agree with you, as it is hard to come up with counter arguments without entering too far into hypothetical territory, but I do not believe that the argument is rock solid - as in no possible other outcome.

Compared to Napoleontic times and WW1 Britain's position had changed. More dependant on imports like oil, a relatively weaker Navy and the upcoming of Nationalism in part of the colonies and protectorates. Add to this new technologies coming to full effect like the aircraft.

Certainly Germany had not the (sufficient) tools to wage what was essentially a strategic (naval) war against Britain, but even in our real world they did come close in endangering the vital imports of essential raw materials.

The problem with the British Empire is the same as the French Empire. Although there is Empire, the mother country is still a (smallish)European country and vulnerable in European war. The essential difference is the channel, making a war against Britain a Naval war and not a continental one. (This had been the essential joker since all other European powers had to invest more in comperatively larger land armies, resulting in relatively weaker navies).

When France fell it took its Empire out of the war. Does anyone remember the Dutch Empire, spanning from South America and the Carribean to the East Indies? After the mother country fell, its role in the European war ended.

As the British were stubborn as a true super power and I will not assume that they would have surrendered, although the fall of Great Britain would probably have hit the British Nation in a way they cannot even now imagine - psychologically speaking.

New powerbases
- Canada
- Egypt
- India

With the mother country out I can see scenarios where Egyptian and Indian nationalists feelings develop more strongly. Leaves Canada as the main power base against Europe. IIRC the Royals would have been evacuated to Canada, so based on this I am assuming that this would have been the seat of government as well (assumption).

But the means for Britain to conduct war in or against Europe would have been seriously hampered.

Enough MyStory since this will be seen by some as a story to convince that Germany could have won the war because of their "superiority". Actually I am just trying to break a rigid outcome of events and sketch some of the difficulties faced of warfare without the mother country (or main power base). I try to learn from historical examples like France and the Netherlands, to fill in the gaps.

Now some might argue the psychogical superiority of the British, that's another argument.

Long borish answer, but in short I agree with Ploughman as long as you don't adhere to a single possible outcome of such a conflict.

Ruy Horta
10-28-2005, 03:43 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by LEXX_Luthor:When I first got the FB and came to the UBI, the only two (2) SiGs that stood out from the rest and I enjoyed so much I remember them from 2003 -- Pilot Chimp and Rhorta Stalingrad. Rhorta bring back your SiG that you let SkyChimp make you take down. All the "other" 2003 ubi SiGs I have long Forgotten. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well I was tired of being called a Nazi sympathiser by Chimp and his fanboys.

Ironically Chimpy didn't even have the balls to apologize when he falsely accused me of posting under different names.

Big Ape, but not when he's plain wrong.

Ruy Horta
10-28-2005, 06:14 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by hop2002:

Yes, you could argue the battle was lost before it was begun because German production and training were so low.

The Germans were facing a tall order from the start. It only got more difficult as the battle went on.

SNIP

I don't agree with all that, but it does make the essential point. Britain was well prepared, with a good strategy, and they carried it out well. The Germans were poorly prepared, didn't have a clear idea of what they were trying to do, and didn't carry out their ever-changing plan well. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You make a strong case in terms of the Battle of Britain myth, your positive approach makes it much more acceptable.

The end result wasn't a foregone conclusion, but Britain held very strong cards or arguably the best cards.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">To give a surprising example in terms of German losses.

Daylight (ops / losses)

August
Fighters 12606 / 2.5%
Bombers 3334 / 7.4%

total 3.5%

September
Fighters 13970 / 2.25%
Bombers 3093 / 4.75%

total 2.7%

October
Fighters 7407 / 1.9%
Bombers 4081 / 2.0% (incl. Jabo)
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Although they don't appear it, those are actually pretty high losses.

USAAF figures for early 1944:

Feb
Fighters 10,679 / 1%
Bombers 9,884 / 2.7%

March
Fighters 16,261 / 1.2%
Bombers 11,590 / 3%

April
Fighters 21,554 / 1.3%
Bombers 14,464 / 2.9%

The August bomber losses illustrate why Goering felt he had to make changes. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Again I can only agree, but arguably your choice of numbers is too narrow, for one could just as well take early, mid or late 1943 as your sample or even the average for 1943. In terms of comperative strength I would personally be tempted to use 1943 as my comparison.

- relative strengths are similar
- same escort problems

1943 also seems to illustrate the huge difference of production and training and its impact on the strategic campaign.

But I am nitpicking, since I generally agree.

SkyChimp
10-28-2005, 05:05 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
You always assume that I think of German superiority. That's your problem.

Although I could have made a clear case, I am disinclined to make an effort when you are involved.

Again I do not wish to enter another tit for tat debacle on your behalf. Respect doesn't come into the picture. In my case it is simple open dislike.

Happy Christmas Chimp! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Can't you ask a simple question, without one of your ever-so-clever traps? You asked a question. I answered it. Shoulda been the end, but your "open dislike" led you to more inanity. I shoulda seen it coming, it's your nature.

SkyChimp
10-28-2005, 05:15 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
Well I was tired of being called a Nazi sympathiser by Chimp and his fanboys.

Ironically Chimpy didn't even have the balls to apologize when he falsely accused me of posting under different names.

Big Ape, but not when he's plain wrong. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Called a NAZI sympathiser? Who said that? I just wondered, along with others, what led you to take the Germans on as your heros. Instead of answering, you took down your picture and whined that I made you take it down. I didn't. I hope you did it out of shame, but I don't think you have any.

And as far as posting under a different name: "whoever" did that certainly had your mannerisms and grammatical skill. Moreover, they seemed to appear only, and ONLY, after you had to defend something stupid you said. Then they disappeared until your next faux pas.

BTW, the mysterious poster disappeared for good when suspicions were noted. Funny how all that worked.

LEXX_Luthor
10-28-2005, 07:23 PM
Rhorta:: <BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Well I was tired of being called a Nazi sympathiser by Chimp and his fanboys. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
Except serial moderators, who cares who calls what especially at *this* computer gamer webboard?

SkyChimp:: <BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">I just wondered, along with others, what led you to take the Germans on as your heros. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
Rhorta, as one of the very few independent thinkers here (less than 10 total http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif), I never saw your SiG as hero worship, but rather offering a part of Hristory in an intense and visually striking manner. That was Awsum SiG, and only the Chimp SiG -- even before being colourized -- could equal Rhorta Stalingrad in provoking deep thought, and your SiG was about Eastern Front, and Eastern Front is the only reason I bother wasting my time at this arcade webboard.

I once had my Red TeleTubbie as my avatar, but with a white "4" added to the cap and chest to represent Captain Stanley Tweedle (my personal Hero) in his red security guard class four jumpsuit. The more Flak and AA shot my way about my Tweedle Tubbie, the more I loved it. I-16 its Tubbie too!

Oh...the other SiG I recall from the Olde Days... the "Gene" dude on the popular Fitness shows -- forgot his name. Somebody had a SiG with Gene saying "Don't forget, check your six fellas!" lol that was FUNNY

...btw SkyChimp, I prefer the old larger non-colourized Chimp SiG in a picture frame as it offered more Hristorical imagery. Put your old SiG back too please.

p1ngu666
10-28-2005, 09:15 PM
i made a pilot skin of that teletubby, which looked scary http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-indifferent.gif

Aaron_GT
10-29-2005, 03:02 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">New powerbases
- Canada
- Egypt
- India

With the mother country out I can see scenarios where Egyptian and Indian nationalists feelings develop more strongly. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Don't forget Iraq which was under British control, but lost briefly due a German inspired nationalist revolt that was quashed. Iraq was important even then as a source of oil for the UK, and could not be allowed to fall into German hands. It tool relatively small UK forces to hold it, but had the UK been knocked out of the war in one form or another the oil deposits might have required less emphasis on caputuring the Caucasian fields, and an avoidance of Stalingrad.

Ruy Horta
10-29-2005, 03:13 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by SkyChimp:

Called a NAZI sympathiser? Who said that? I just wondered, along with others, what led you to take the Germans on as your heros. Instead of answering, you took down your picture and whined that I made you take it down. I didn't. I hope you did it out of shame, but I don't think you have any.

And as far as posting under a different name: "whoever" did that certainly had your mannerisms and grammatical skill. Moreover, they seemed to appear only, and ONLY, after you had to defend something stupid you said. Then they disappeared until your next faux pas.

BTW, the mysterious poster disappeared for good when suspicions were noted. Funny how all
that worked. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You are a true hypocrite.

Yes, you did accuse me of Nazi sympathy, on numerous occasions. It is one of your standard methods, you even come close to accusing someone in this thread.

As much as my word is worth anything, I could swear in a court of law that I did never post anything on under a false name, a different name or guise on this forum. All posting has been done under my own name rhorta/ruy horta since I joined the Ubi forum. Although I can attimes be full of ****, I do not find the need to hide under an alias (uh, SkyChimp).

Yet you cannot be man enough to accept that explanation, indeed you need to affirm your accusational tone.

Germans are not my heroes, period. That signature wasn't all the story, any thread I was envolved in you had to rub my nose into "Nazi" hero worship.

I grew tired of it and it was simply not worth the energy.

As for twisting words, you are not so bad yourself.

You make your assumptions, I make mine.

Now why don't you go on fishing or hunting bigger game and leave me be?

LEXX_Luthor
10-29-2005, 04:21 AM
Aiye, this is a loaded accusation, perhaps used in desperation or frustration...

SkyChimp:: <BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">I just wondered, along with others, what led you to take the Germans on as your heros. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I can disagree with Ruy on some things, and even agree with "I was (choke) wrong" SkyChimp on others. But our SiGs may have personal meaning not obvious to others, like my old Tavatar. Put your SiG back Ruy - this is at core an Eastern Front webboard.

pingus, where do we get free webspace for my Tavatar, if possible?

arcadeace
10-29-2005, 04:30 AM
Ruy I don’t remember Chimp ever calling you a Nazi sympathizer and I either directly participated or kept up reading the threads. Actually I may have been one of the closest to accuse you tho still not directly. As I recall a few members wondered where you stood. I’m not implying any suspicion has proven true, just clarifying the atmosphere at that time. When you say it’s a standard method of Chimp and give the example earlier in this thread, you need to better understand the implications of the poster he was responding to tho he did not directly accuse him.

Ruy Horta
10-29-2005, 05:06 AM
LEXX,

Forget about the signature, it is in fact meaningless. It was a picture I had already online and looked fitting within the context of the forum. The composition was strong and it reminded me of more modern war photographs. It may be naive of me, but I never expected people to see it as Nazi Hero worship.

It has become too loaded. Not a matter of caving in to bullies, like SkyChimp, but simply not worth the continued effort to counter the bias it was generating.

Unfortunately some people seem to have difficulties separating interest and personal stance. Since I have more than a casual interest in the German war machine I must thus have a sympathy for the regime and ethos it represented.

Add to this the fact that at times I have had a critical position on certain issues involving the US, both historic and more modern and you have the ingredients for a personal grudge. To top it all, I am even European...

The single(?) thread SkyChimp is mentioning, was one that I avoided like the plague only to find out to my complete surprise that someone posting there stood accused of being me! The guys was as surprised as I was, but that didn't matter. SkyChimp made up his mind (based on assumption) and still doesn't admit he might have been simply wrong.

If the accusations weren't so strong it would just be silly.

There are times when I fumble a discussion and continue while being wrong. Yet, I am not a Nazi, not a German sympathizer and never did I post under an alias or a false name.

PERIOD.

Here's a scan from German Infantry in Action, by Squadron/Signal ISBN 0-89747-052-4. The picture can also be found in other publications, but this happened to be ready at hand.

http://www.xs4all.nl/~rhorta/TEMP/squadron_signal_3002_p38.jpg

If you like it here's an opportunity to save it on your HDD.

Lets close the Sig issue.

I'll be honest and admit that Skychimp offended me deeply on those counts and that I took his accusations very personal. That is giving him far more credit than he deserves, but it is the truth.

So frankly, yes Lexx, there is frustration involved.

LEXX_Luthor
10-29-2005, 05:28 AM
Thanks Ruy, I got the pic!! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/25.gif Scary, frightening, warlike and very Eastern Front.

Now, back to BoB And Beyond

DmdSeeker
10-29-2005, 06:21 AM
Sounds like somebody needs a long walk on the beach here....

Ruy Horta
10-29-2005, 07:24 AM
Good tip, it is a bit chilly but nice and sunny.
--------
An attempt to get back on topic.

Hop has mentioned Strategy for Defeat a number of times and here are some more 8th AF figures for the 1943 campaign.

Loss rate as Percent of Credit Sorties.

Bombers / Fighters

1942
Aug 0.0% 0.9%
Sep 1.9% 0.0%
Oct 4.5% 0.5%
Nov 2.9% 0.5%
Dec 5.8% 0.0%
=============
Avr 3.5% 0.5%

1943
Jan 7.5% 1.7%
Feb 8.1% 1.1%
Mar 3.2% 0.8%
Apr 7.8% 1.2%
May 5.4% 0.6%
Jun 6.4% 0.5%
Jul 5.5% 0.6%
Aug 6.0% 0.5%
Sep 3.9% 0.5%
Oct 9.2% 0.5%
Nov 3.9% 1.6%
Dec 3.6% 0.8%
=============
Avr 5.1% 0.8%

1944
Jan 3.8% 1.1%
Feb 3.5% 1.1%
Mar 3.3% 1.6%
Apr 3.6% 1.3%
May 2.2% 1.4%
Jun 1.1% 1.0%
Jul 1.5% 0.9%
Aug 1.5% 1.5%
Sep 2.2% 1.9%
Oct 1.1% 1.0%
Nov 2.2% 1.8%
Dec 1.2% 1.2%
=============
Avr 1.9% 1.3%

From the following book Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe I've taken a couple of figures that can also be found in the online USAF statistical digest(IIRC).

Oct 1943
ETO total number losses of Heavies 215 (186 combat)
ETO total number of Heavies 1138
ETO total number of BG 20 1/3
ETO total number of effective sorties 2117
ETO total tonnage dropped by heavies 5133

Apr 1944
ETO total number losses of Heavies 469 (420 combat)
ETO total number of Heavies 2647
ETO total number of BG 39
ETO total number of effective sorties 9945
ETO total tonnage dropped by heavies 27576

Although October 1943 saw a very bad episode in terms of relative losses, for which it established a blank page in history, April 1944 was a far worse month in absolute terms, yet hardly remembered as such because of its lessened relative impact.

The extremely low US fighter losses are also interesting, only rising as they change their tactics which brings them into the range of light and medium Flak.

It would be interesting to learn if the low 1943 figures are based on lack of contact, or superior aircraft and tactics.

The above is no critique, although some might be tempted to see it as such, but the Jagdwaffe would have tried to avoid escorting fighters as best as they could, waiting for them to return before attacking the heavy bombers.

Of course these same tables can be used to build a statistical picture of the fighters and subsequently be matched with the shifting tactical situation.

p1ngu666
10-29-2005, 08:39 AM
lw did hold off attackin the bombers till unescorted, much better time than when escorted, whatever is escorting them..

luthor, ill host your sig/avatar, just email me them to pingu666 @gmail.com http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif

Ruy Horta
10-29-2005, 09:40 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
lw did hold off attackin the bombers till unescorted, much better time than when escorted, whatever is escorting them. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

True, and represented without German fighter losses these figures are without proper context.

p1ngu666
10-29-2005, 09:47 AM
true
still, those bomber losses http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-sad.gif

Ruy Horta
10-29-2005, 10:59 AM
The human tragedy is even worse, although I cannot get the right figures.

Total Battle Casualties ETO

Oct 1943

Killed 670
Wounded 163
Missing 1185
=========
total 2018

Apr 1944

Killed 1213
Wounded 519
Missing 3096
=========
total 4828

In absolute numbers April 1944 was the bloodiest month.

Note that these figures incl. other branches of the AAF (medium bombers and fighters), but are still indicative of the heavy fighting.

The following figure is more relevant, yet the format is not handy.

Heavy bomber crew losses.

Oct. 1943

Combat & Accidents 186
Retirement 19
Other 6
====================
total 211

Apr. 1944

Combat & Accidents 371
Retirement 167
Other 124
====================
total 662

At the same time ETO claims were as follows:

Oct. 1943
870 e/a (fighters air = 76)

Apr. 1944
1291 e/a (fighters air = 418 / fighters ground = 527)

Again April 1944 seems to be a highlight, since it is the highest monthly figure when looking at the totals, yet the picture is different when looking at fighter claims alone.

That is not counting the complete slaughter on Apr. 1945, with 454 air claims, but an astounding 3703 ground claims, making for a total of 4157.

The air claims av. 409 (!) per month (1944+1945 - 5602+1362/17).

Offset against ETO fighter losses attributed to e/a

1944 total 1293
1945 total 227

av. 89 per month

jarink
10-29-2005, 11:40 AM
RH, what are the "Retirement" and "Other" categories? Since both are significantly higher in '44 it seems one of them should include crews that were rotated back after completing their tours, but then what would the other be? http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/blink.gif

One other thing to consider on the human side of things is the effect the losses had on morale. While the '43 losses may not have been numerically as high as '44, the higher percentage caused sometimes critical psychological problems. (If you've never seen 12 o'Clock High, it's one of the better movies that deals with this issue and is based on some real-life events). Crews just felt doomed and many lost hope of surviving the war. This further reduced the combat effectiveness of the bomb groups due to refusals to fly, "sick" crewmen and mission aborts for less-than-adequate reasons.

My gradfather was shot down on a mission to Duren on Oct 20th, 43 after having flown the Schweinfurt raid the week before. While his group (385th BG) lost only one plane on Black Thursday, they all knew about the dozens of others that didn't make it back. He once told me it was extremely hard to get back into that plane after Schweinfurt.

Ruy Horta
10-29-2005, 11:51 AM
12 o'clock high! is one of my favorite movies, managed to get a DVD copy only a few months ago. Very good movie, great depth especially considering the production date.

Yes I agree, those losses (reflected by the relatively high ratio) must have been terrible for morale.

As for the retirment figures, you (must be) correct, since they outgrow the operational losses as the years progress.

Jun. 1944
combat & acidents 239
retirement 257

to

Apr. 1945
combat & acidents 150
retirement 690

June '44 is the first time when retirements outnumber combat & accidental losses.

Spring of 1944 saw bloody fighting, but also a clear shift towards the Allies.

These types of figures can be found at the following links:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_list_of_tables.html

and also

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/numbered_studies/studiesintro.php

Although I took mine from a handy copy of Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe.

SkyChimp
10-29-2005, 12:37 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:

You are a true hypocrite.

...

You make your assumptions, I make mine.

Now why don't you go on fishing or hunting bigger game and leave me be?
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Perhaps a REREAD of this thread would do you well. YOU asked a question. I answered it meaningfully, in a civil tone. YOU then felt compelled to attack me. Why? Is it truly your nature? You had the opportunity to reply, as well, in a civil manner, yet you attacked me.

One thing I've suggested of you in the past, that apparently holds true to this day, is that YOU start an argument, then play the victim. In a most childlike manner, you hit and run.

YOU, my snide little friend, are the quintessential hypocrite.

Ruy Horta
10-29-2005, 02:30 PM
Yeah yeah, you play the saint again.

You win.

joeap
10-29-2005, 04:25 PM
I'm confused. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/354.gif

SkyChimp
10-29-2005, 06:03 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
Yeah yeah, you play the saint again.

You win. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Of course I do. That's because as soon as you attacked me, you lost. Have a nice day.

LEXX_Luthor
10-29-2005, 08:03 PM
Actually, I kinda agree with both Ruy's and Chimp's reasoning the last few pages, before I butted in and made things Nasty for you all (sorry).

The Brits had a bad time when their Spit first met Zero, and got mauled like everybody else did back then, although they learned how to Deal with it. Assuming A6M2 over all of Britain, the ability for escort to stay for hours would help keep down Luftwaffe bomber losses compared to what happened, as well as allow escorted bombing of all RAF airfields within bomber range -- assuming Zero but the same -17, -88, and -111. The Zero dates do need consideration however, as well as quick learning in British tactics against Zero.

To win BoB, the Germans would have needed He-100D the ultimate Dora of ALL TIME. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_redface.gif

p1ngu666
10-29-2005, 08:17 PM
nah needed better bombers and recon imo

jarink
10-29-2005, 08:38 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by p1ngu666:
nah needed better bombers and recon imo </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

What they really could have used (and which was within their ability) was better bomb damage assessment and intel on Fighter Command's a/c and pilot strengths. They assumed far too much that tagets bombed were 'destroyed' and confirmed kill totals were 100% accurate. (The Eighth AF fell into the same "we hit it, so, it's dead, dead, dead" trap later on.) Most analyses I've read about BoB agree that if the LW had not constantly switched targeting priorities, they could certainly have won the battle as loss of any one portion of FC's infrastruture (especially radar sites and airfields) would have rendered the remainder nearly useless.

LEXX_Luthor
10-29-2005, 08:58 PM
jarink is (choke) right. Intel is half the battle.


Ouch, not THAT Intel ~&gt; http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=17393

Nor this one ~&gt; http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=13891

p1ngu666
10-29-2005, 09:06 PM
accordin to luftwaffe info, fighter command had minus planes http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

without the radar sites, they would rely more on the observer core

Ruy Horta
10-30-2005, 02:52 AM
Lexx,

Don't be silly, you cannot possibly make it nasty for us, we can perfectly well do that ourselves.

Although the limited combat range did influence Jagdwaffe effectiveness, I think this effect is overrated (just like Hop's assessment on Goering's effect).

IMHO there were simply too few 109s to start with, given RAF strength, and as can be seen in Hop's figures too few replacements as the campaign went on.

The time scale was also, with hind sight, totally unrealistic. The speed of the Polish and the Western campaigns proofed to be counter productive. The Germans were starting to believe their own myth.

Arguably there could have been a situation of local air superior on the southern beaches of England, if the campaign had been focussed. But that would only have been the first step.

How successful could a German 1940 seaborne invasion have been, given the strength of the Royal Navy and limited local air superiority of the Jagdwaffe.

What about logistics AFTER putting these initial divisions on the ground?

Compared to D-day or even earlier Allied landings it all appears to be extremely iffy.

But lets forget all that.

The situation where the Zero earned its fame was very different to the Battle of Britain.

Unfamiliarity, tactical surprise, numbers, inexprienced allies, obsolescent adversaries being deciding factors. If we take look at the USN their record was good from the word go.

If the USN could manage flying F4Fs, the RAF could have managed flying Hurricanes and Spitfires.

Personally I still find it difficult to accept that Luftwaffe pilots would have accepted anything like the Zero. The Germans had learned their lessons in WW1, just evaluate the Dr.I and D.VII respectivly.

Given the circumstances I believe that Bf 109E's with droptanks would have been the real answer, at least to the point of extending their range(!)

As was pointed out above I did not explain my point

The Curtiss P-36 was indeed (just) good enough, but not superior. Yes, it would have had longer range to provide escort, but not superior combat performance. All things being equal it would not have been enough to tip the scale.

As for bombers, I am faced with the same general situation. Of course there were plenty of types, that was never my contention. However the point that I was trying to make was comperative to the Luftwaffe types, I do not think there were types that could have done a better general job all things being equal.

The only type that really does stand out is the early B-17B and C. If we forget the fact that using these would probably have meant fewer instead of more bombers, we are still left with overal combat performance.

The RAF regarded the Fortress I as vulnerable, how effective would it have been penetrating strong British defenses? How would 8x.303 DeWilde have acted upon these early heavies? I do not now.

But given the prime goal, local air superiority over southern England and its invasion beaches, would these heavies really made it any easier?

With hind sight it appears to me that B-17s were only effective once they were deployed in large numbers against city sized targets. Their losses only acceptable once they were escorted all the way to and from these targets.

But would bombing London and other cities really have brought the defeat of RAF Fighter Command?

Granted, heavies can be used to bomb air fields and their infrastructure.

In the end I cannot help myself thinking that the Battle of Britain is essentially a fighter vs fighter battle, that bombers were either bait or best used against the enemy air force. This was the essence of getting the right situation for invasion. The Battle of Britain would have been best waged tactically and not grown into a full strategic campaign (given the available tools and numbers).

To make a jump, I also think it was wrong to focus on heavy bombers during the Battle of Germany. Yes, these were the main targets, and these were bombing cities and industry, but the main enemy was flying escort fighters. By their focus on heavy bombers the Jagdwaffe gave away their initiative to the escorts, who were able to gain experience and fight with a free hand.

Again, just compare US ETO fighter losses to those of the Jagdwaffe over Britain.

Ruy Horta
10-30-2005, 03:03 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Arcadeace:
Ruy I don’t remember Chimp ever calling you a Nazi sympathizer and I either directly participated or kept up reading the threads. Actually I may have been one of the closest to accuse you tho still not directly. As I recall a few members wondered where you stood. I’m not implying any suspicion has proven true, just clarifying the atmosphere at that time. When you say it’s a standard method of Chimp and give the example earlier in this thread, you need to better understand the implications of the poster he was responding to tho he did not directly accuse him. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You deserve an answer, although I rather not start another argument.

IMHO I really think that extreme care should be taken in this type of accusation.

IMHO I don't think there is much difference between calling someone something, or hinting at it in various degrees.

IMHO our forum doesn't need this kind of policing by its members. There are moderators who should act once people really exhibit extremist thought (of any kind).

Personally I experienced the whole episode as couple of you guys teaming up against me, based on a number of discussions ranging from WW2 to modern politics. Not even mentioning the bizar situation when I was alleged to be writing all kind of stuff under a false guise.

The hints were always present...

Unfortunately I am the type who can forgive, but never forgets.

I don't wish to bore the forum community with my personal gripes anymore.

Thank you for your honesty, I respect that.

arcadeace
10-30-2005, 04:22 AM
I don’t know why you think I deserve an answer.

You and I have not gotten along. As far as me calling you a Nazi I don’t remember specifically stating it but I do remember sarcastically implying it. There was a difference to me but apparently not you. I wouldn’t do it now, I have changed from those days.

I don’t agree with you about not policing members. I wouldn’t define it that way. We all have values; we can all judge one another, and sometimes it becomes uncomfortable. Its that simple and fact. It would be pathetic if we left it strictly to the Mods.

The only reason I posted here was because of your judgments toward Chimp. I think you were wrong about his comments toward you and his inclination to use the N word. If you want to hold true and expect others not to use it, you shouldn’t erroneously judge others with a predisposition to use it. I’ve got no comment about the misunderstood identity.

You’re very sensitive and as I told you long ago in PM I can’t help to wonder why you come here to post in some of the discussions. Its your choice of course. You need to confront yourself with the impressions you can make and at the very least expect a 2-way street if things have a chance to work out with other members. As a suggestion, learn to take it to PM at the very beginning.

I’ve got nothing personal against you. Good luck.

Ruy Horta
10-30-2005, 04:44 AM
CORRECTION.

In the above post I wrote that B-17s were really effective against city sized targets, that is of course wrong, I meant to write large industrial areas.

There are different examples like carpet bombing over Normandy etc, but they appear to be the exception.

All IMHO...

Ruy Horta
10-30-2005, 10:48 AM
Messerschmitt vs Tank

There are a few differences which were ignored.

Although both were Chief designers, Willy Messerschmitt was also a major stockholder of Messerschmitt AG, owning 35% of the company, Chairman of the Managing Commitee and General Director.

In most references Messerschmitt was held for interogations, but it looks like he was not himself accused.

Tank was chief designer, but appearantly not as involved in Focke-Wulf's management, certainly not up to the level of Messerschmitt.

So on that basic count, apart from arguably a moral standpoint, the two are not equally responsible for the use of slave labour. Messerschmitt was an industrial and as such directly responsible if the company made use of slave labor. Messerschmitt AG was privately owned and with 35% of stock Willy was personally profiting from that slave labour.

There is also another significant difference, which is nicely covered in Jagdwaffe 5/1, since Kurt Tank personally flew operations as part and leader of Focke-Wulfs's ISS (factory protection unit).

To quote Manfred Griehl in Jet Planes of the Third Reich - The Secret Project Volume 1 on p. 44

In the autumn of 1945, Kurt Tank was out of work and uncertain about his future. Out of curiosity he met with Col. Lukianov of the Soviet Military Intelligence (GPU) and Col. Tulpanov, of the Soviet propaganda Office, who were eagely hoping to recruit Prof. Tank. Hut highly distrustful of the Russians and their agenda, Tank declined to enter into any kind of contract.

So Kurt Tank, unemployed a/c designer who cannot work in his own country has only a few options. Work for one of the victors or a third party (with good pay).

Argentina was seen as a way out of Germany's ruins and restrictions. A large German population certainly made it very attractive. Incidentally Emile Dewoitine was also working for the Argentinians.

However as a (VIP) German he's not exactly allowed free travel. So leaving the country will certainly require some level of subterfuge.

As for Nazi party membership.

Messerschmitt was certainly a party member, and I believe that holds true for Tank as well, so not much to choose between the two on that count.

jarink
10-31-2005, 12:06 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
As for bombers, I am faced with the same general situation. Of course there were plenty of types, that was never my contention. However the point that I was trying to make was comperative to the Luftwaffe types, I do not think there were types that could have done a better general job all things being equal.

The only type that really does stand out is the early B-17B and C. If we forget the fact that using these would probably have meant fewer instead of more bombers, we are still left with overal combat performance. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Far be it for me to disparage the B-17 http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif, but the early C and D models did not carry a much heavier bombload than the He-111 or Ju-88. Their rated bombload was only 4,800 pounds compared to the F and G models' 8000 pound load (which sacrificed a good deal of speed to do so). I don't think B-17Cs or Ds would have made much, if any difference in BoB; the bombers main effect was to force the RAF to commit to battle. Ironically, the RAF (and later USAAC) used this same tactic with the "Circus" missions over France. The LW could afford to ignore fighter sweeps, but had to react to bombers, no matter how few in number.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Ruy Horta:
With hind sight it appears to me that B-17s were only effective once they were deployed in large numbers against city sized targets. Their losses only acceptable once they were escorted all the way to and from these targets. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think B-17s really didn't have any great advantages over other contemporary bombers (B-24, Halifax, Lacaster, etc.). The bombload was only fair and they flew fairly slow. Their biggest PR advantage was their heavy gun armament and ability to take damage. However, the guns didn't confer on the B-17 the ability to fly without escorts (or else the YB-40 would have gone into regular production). Only when flying in a tight combat box were the bombers able to discourage (not prevent) fighter attacks. Their ability to 'take it' was also something that was equaled by other bombers.

They also were not truly effective as a strategic weapon until after the advent of radar bombing using H2S and later H2X (both British developments). These radars finally allowed them to bomb on a persistent schedule and not spend long periods of time waiting for clear skies so they could see their targets.

ploughman
10-31-2005, 01:00 PM
The later B-17s' very large vertical stabiliser allowed it to keep very close station with its kin which was central to maintaining a good defence against Nazi fighters. The UK heavies were much less able to hold such tight formations (not that such a formation was really part of their M.O.), as far as I know.

Aaron_GT
10-31-2005, 03:10 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The later B-17s' very large vertical stabiliser allowed it to keep very close station with its kin which was central to maintaining a good defence against Nazi fighters. The UK heavies were much less able to hold such tight formations (not that such a formation was really part of their M.O.), as far as I know. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Apart from the odd mark here and there which were a bit unstable (e.g. Merlin Halifaxes) British heavies were able to hold in formation too, and did so in daylight at the end of the war. They weren't normally employed like this as attacks were normally done at night, except when used as tactical/operational bombers, for example in Normandy. Obviously there wasn't much scope for close formation keeping at night.