PDA

View Full Version : Without the Spitfire would the British still won the Battle of Britain?



stalkervision
12-01-2009, 02:09 PM
What's you opinion?

thefruitbat
12-01-2009, 02:13 PM
The Whirlwind would have stepped up, an achieved the place in our hearts it so richly deserves instead of the spitfire. BoB would of been all over in 2 weeks, a crushing defeat for the luftwaffe, be sure.

stalkervision
12-01-2009, 02:19 PM
Originally posted by thefruitbat:
The Whirlwind would have stepped up, an achieved the place in our hearts it so richly deserves instead of the spitfire. BoB would of been all over in 2 weeks, a crushing defeat for the luftwaffe, be sure.

Damn whirlwind. i always forget that had that. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-sad.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif

Hope Oleg messes up it's f/m modeling! http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_mad.gif


http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif

Xiolablu3
12-01-2009, 02:21 PM
Hmmm, probably the British would still have held out with the Hurricane. As it was RADAR and tactics which won the day for the RAF.

However the Spitfire was a vital war winning weapon for the 6 years of war.

The Hurricane was just not enough of a match for the Bf109. And remember how the Spit V was mauled by the FW190? Think about the Hurricane MkII vs Fw190A http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_eek.gif

Losses for the RAF would have been a lot higher without the Spitfire. In the BOB where possible the Spitfire was sent against the fighters and the Hurris against the bombers.

Like Galland says, the Luftwaffe was engineered to support the army, not bomb Britain into submission. THAT was why it could not succeed in the BOB. It was trying to accomplish something which it was not designed for. It needed drop tanks and a heavy 4 engined bomber for a start before it could think about victory.

Even when the RAF and USAAF were bombing Germany with 10 times the power, still Germany wasnt made to surrender by bombing alone.

You need a ground campaign as well.

Daiichidoku
12-01-2009, 02:22 PM
Sidney Camm would have been kighted before 1953, be sure

horseback
12-01-2009, 02:30 PM
The Hurri would have moved up a spot, and the Mohawk would have been in second place (once they got all those French style throttles sorted out). Still, heavier RAF casualties would lead to an early replacement of the Hurricane.

The RAF would have insisted on a Merlin in the Mustang I from Day One, and would have refused to share it with the USAAF in more than driblets.

Mustangs armed with 4x 20mm Hispanos escorting Lancasters in daylight would undoubtedly have won the war...

cheers

horseback

stalkervision
12-01-2009, 02:44 PM
I believe the hurricane would have held the German's off given enough planes could have been produced and pilots trained but it would have been a much close run thing.

M_Gunz
12-01-2009, 02:46 PM
The Royal Navy would have saved the day in any case, I have read somewhere....

Whirlin_merlin
12-01-2009, 02:48 PM
During BOB hurricane pilots never went beyond 8 in order to not 'show up' the inferior spitfire. If there had been no spits they would have turned the hurris all the way up to 11.

Choctaw111
12-01-2009, 03:04 PM
I am not British, but from what I know of them, even without the Spitfire, they would have found a way.

BillSwagger
12-01-2009, 03:08 PM
The Spitfire made a difference but i have to think that the Germans were at a tactical disadvantage getting to Britain. The simple fact that water separated the two powers gave the British a tremendous defensive advantage that the French were not fortunate to have. There was no way for the Nazis to march straight into Britain. It had to be done by sea or air, neither of which the Germans had such a tremendous advantage over England at that time.

Not many of the German planes had the range to properly escort their bombers the length of the chanel and still be able to dogfight with sufficient resistance.

In fact, weren't 109 pilots given orders to not engage fighters unless they were a direct threat to the he-111s?

X32Wright
12-01-2009, 03:19 PM
Read Peter Townsend's 'DUEL OF EAGLES' and you will find out that 85% of the planes in BoB were Hurricanes and the germans would never admit to being shot down by a Hurricane and only by a Spitfire. Spitfire's real contribution to the war was after they were all modified to counter the first wave of Antons(FW-190s) in '42 which is after BoB.

Now if there was no Spitfire this would also mean no P-51 Mustang either well at least not as good due to the Allison engine only. The Packard Merlin engine changed the Mustang.

Gibbage1
12-01-2009, 03:41 PM
I think the Hurri was doing good. I think the vast majority of Luftwaffe kills was done using the Hurri anyways. The roal the Spit played overall during BoB was quite minimul and was more publicity.

gizmo60
12-01-2009, 03:49 PM
Captain Mainwaring, Sergeant Wilson and Lance Corporal Jones would have pushed any invading force back into the sea.

Cheers

Sillius_Sodus
12-01-2009, 04:14 PM
The Hurri would have won the day, but eventually they would have had to put .50's on it to deal with Tigers... http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif

ElAurens
12-01-2009, 04:25 PM
Don't be so fast to discount the Mustang I.

True it suffered at high altitude, but there was no aircraft anywhere in all of Europe that was faster from 15,000ft. down. Catching the 109s low, slow and nearly out of fuel returning to their home fields would have been good sport.

trashcanUK
12-01-2009, 04:41 PM
the answer to the original question is, yes of course. all those extra merlin engines would have meant more of the vastly superior hurricane http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

Dgirth
12-01-2009, 04:45 PM
The hurricane MK2b was a much underestimate and underated plane, In my opion it was better then the spit MK1 how ever the later Spit versions was much better then the Hurricane.

It was not the Spit that won the BOB it was Radar,Observer Corps,The very advanced communitcation system in place, And the channel.

Raf fighter sqds could scramble in 5 mins and intercetp enemy bombers in 15 mins.

Luffwuffa was never really geared up for the task of destroying the RAF, With Goering in charge they never would of been.

RegRag1977
12-01-2009, 04:56 PM
Originally posted by ElAurens:
Don't be so fast to discount the Mustang I.

True it suffered at high altitude, but there was no aircraft anywhere in all of Europe that was faster from 15,000ft. down. Catching the 109s low, slow and nearly out of fuel returning to their home fields would have been good sport.

I'm with you here, plus the early 'Stangs were really beautiful http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/heart.gif

That said Spitfires were excellent designs, and that gave the German Air Force something more to think about.

Saburo_0
12-01-2009, 10:25 PM
The Spitfire pilots had a higher rate of surviving combat. Considering how low the RAF was on pilots at times...with Hurris only the Germans would have been closer to winning. Might even have broken the RAF.

Waldo.Pepper
12-01-2009, 10:59 PM
The British did not win the Battle of Britain. The Germans failed to achieve their objectives. This is a subtle but important distinction.

BP_Tailspin
12-01-2009, 11:17 PM
ElAurens so magnificently said:
Don't be so fast to discount the Mustang I.

True it suffered at high altitude, but there was no aircraft anywhere in all of Europe that was faster from 15,000ft. down. Catching the 109s low, slow and nearly out of fuel returning to their home fields would have been good sport.


RegRag1977 humbly bows to the older and wiser ElAurens wisdom:
I'm with you here, plus the early 'Stangs were really beautiful http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/heart.gif


Let’s not forget the Hurricane actually shot down more enemy planes during Battle of Britain than the Spitfire.

Like Reg said …Stangs were really beautiful http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/heart.gif and there made in the USA

SeaFireLIV
12-01-2009, 11:23 PM
Even if the German airforce somehow won the airwar, the Royal navy would`ve won the battle anyway.

Cuirassier
12-02-2009, 02:25 AM
Germany could not have beat Britain without the occupation of England (even then the Government had plans to fight on from Canada), unless maybe the U-boat campaign was incredibly successful.

Germany could have won the actual air campaign however. The major bottleneck of the RAF was not airframes (Britain was out-producing Germany in fighters at least 2-1 iirc), but trained pilots. If Germany had mobilized their economy and sustained the attack on airfields, they could have effectively bled the RAF white in terms of pilots. As soon as they switched to bombing cities however, they had lost. And of course the Royal Navy and lack of amphibious forces was a whole other matter.

So Spitfires probably weren't decisive. They likely just marginally bettered the British to German exchange rate, though even that could be debated I suppose.

Low_Flyer_MkIX
12-02-2009, 04:13 AM
So what do we make of the humble Hurricane's kill ratio as opposed to the Spit, gentlemen? Are Battle of Britain campaigns in computer games a total waste of time as all the Lufties have to do is knock-out radar and keep bombing those airfields? Should Britain have had a stand-by drop-forge just in case the main one in Sheffield got hit? Were the Lufties the real bloody amatuers as opposed to the highly organised British home defence system? Did Galland wear too much mascara in those publicity photo's? Why did RAF fuel bowsers have '100' written on the side? Maybe it was a speed limit? Can we really change history by wishful thinking?

Xiolablu3
12-02-2009, 05:11 AM
Originally posted by gizmo60:
Captain Mainwaring, Sergeant Wilson and Lance Corporal Jones would have pushed any invading force back into the sea.

Cheers

I hate that show so much. Almost as bad as 'last of the summer wine'...'shudder'

More 'Blackadder' and 'the young ones' please !

orville07
12-02-2009, 08:21 AM
The British did not win the Battle of Britain. The Germans failed to achieve their objectives. This is a subtle but important distinction.

Yes....Just like Roger Federer did not "win" the Wimbledon 2009 Mens final. Andy Rod**** simply failed to achieve his objective....Of scoring more points and beating him. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

Sorry mate, but what you just wrote is effectively semantic diahorrea and meaningless in the real world http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif . The Luftwaffe failed in their stated objective to destroy the RAF and achieve air superiority....Because of tenacious defence and indefatigable spirit in the face of overwhelming odds.

I call that a Victory. There is a massive consensus between Historians that it was too, and a pivotal point of the War. You can call it what you want, it still stands. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

The Spitfire did not save Britain...Its people and Friends from all over the World and Commonwealth did. Moot point anyway as the Kriegmarine would have been anihillated by the Royal Navy, which was until 1943 (when overtaken by the US Navy) still de facto the most powerful Navy on the face of the Earth.

U boats in the shallows of the Channel which British Sailors knew like the backs of their hands would have been ineffective, and most would have been in the North Sea as diversionary measures anyway. All adds up to pretty much "mission impossible" for Adolf and his goons, thankfully.

RULE BRITANNIA http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_razz.gif

orville07
12-02-2009, 08:22 AM
Originally posted by orville07:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The British did not win the Battle of Britain. The Germans failed to achieve their objectives. This is a subtle but important distinction.

Yes....Just like Roger Federer did not "win" the Wimbledon 2009 Mens final. Andy Rod**** simply failed to achieve his objective....Of scoring more points and beating him. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

Sorry mate, but what you just wrote is effectively semantic diarrhea and meaningless in the real world http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif . The Luftwaffe failed in their stated objective to destroy the RAF and achieve air superiority....Because of tenacious defence and indefatigable spirit in the face of overwhelming odds.

I call that a Victory. There is a massive consensus between Historians that it was too, and a pivotal point of the War. You can call it what you want, it still stands. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

The Spitfire did not save Britain...Its people and Friends from all over the World and Commonwealth did. Moot point anyway as the Kriegmarine would have been anihillated by the Royal Navy, which was until 1943 (when overtaken by the US Navy) still de facto the most powerful Navy on the face of the Earth.

U boats in the shallows of the Channel which British Sailors knew like the backs of their hands would have been ineffective, and most would have been in the North Sea as diversionary measures anyway. All adds up to pretty much "mission impossible" for Adolf and his goons, thankfully.

RULE BRITANNIA http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_razz.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

orville07
12-02-2009, 08:24 AM
Originally posted by orville07:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by orville07:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The British did not win the Battle of Britain. The Germans failed to achieve their objectives. This is a subtle but important distinction.

Yes....Just like Roger Federer did not "win" the Wimbledon 2009 Mens final. Andy Rod**** simply failed to achieve his objective....Of scoring more points and beating him. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

Sorry mate, but what you just wrote is effectively semantic diarrhea and meaningless in the real world http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif . The Luftwaffe failed in their stated objective to destroy the RAF and achieve air superiority....Because of tenacious defence and indefatigable spirit in the face of overwhelming odds.

I call that a Victory. There is a massive consensus between Historians that it was too, and a pivotal point of the War. You can call it what you want, it still stands. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

The Spitfire did not save Britain...Its people and Friends from all over the World and Commonwealth did. Moot point anyway as the Kriegsmarine would have been anihillated by the Royal Navy, which was until 1943 (when overtaken by the US Navy) still de facto the most powerful Navy on the face of the Earth.

U boats in the shallows of the Channel which British Sailors knew like the backs of their hands would have been ineffective, and most would have been in the North Sea as diversionary measures anyway. All adds up to pretty much "mission impossible" for Adolf and his goons, thankfully.

RULE BRITANNIA http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_razz.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE> </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

BigC208
12-02-2009, 10:01 AM
I don't think it would have made a difference. Without the Spitfire the RAF would've had more fighters. It took a lot more time to built or repare a Spitfire than a Hurricane. True, a Spit has a higer airspeed and climbrate than a Hurricane but not all that much more. The 109's were on the defense as where they earlier in the blitzkrieg were on the offensive. Normally a 109 could pick a fight. Boom and zoom and go home. During the BoB they had to defend the Bombers taking their tactical advantages over the Hurricane away. If they started a prolonged turnfight (won by the better pilot, not airplane) with the first batch of Hurricanes the second group would be able to attack the unescorted bombers. About 70% of all the fighters in the BoB where Hurricanes, the forgotten workhorse. The Thoroughbread Spitfire got all the glory in the eyes of the people. Also from what I've read, the Hurricane was a more stable gunplatform and easier to master for a novice pilot. The RAF was more short on Pilots than aircraft so having only easier to fly Hurricanes would've been helpfull getting the depleted squadrons staffed faster.

As far as the Theory of the Germans could've never gotten across the channel, we'll never know. I like to entertain the thought that had they taken out the expedition army at Dunkirk, they could've had a chance. Defeat at Dunkirk would've been another psychological blow for the Brittish. Had they started the attacks on the RAF airfields in June and stuck with that strategy untill air superiority had been reached. There could have been a combined Airborne and Seaborne attack concentrated on a very small area of southern England. Oops. I forgot about the Royal Navy. Or did I? With German Air superiority the RN would not have stood a chance. The sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Walse showed that in 1941 when they were caught without aircover. That and the allready low morale after losing the 200.000 plus man at Dunkirk might have forced the Brits into a quick surrender. Germany would've been able to use the Empire's recources, plus the troops that they would not have to use to bail out Mussolini in Greece and Africa. Attack Russia in March of 41 and have the war over by September of that year. Home for Christmas! Thank god for the Brits, Churchill and the RAF!

Bremspropeller
12-02-2009, 10:52 AM
Even if the German airforce somehow won the airwar, the Royal navy would`ve won the battle anyway.

How? http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/59.gif

R_Target
12-02-2009, 10:58 AM
Things would have turned out more or less the same IMO.


Originally posted by X32Wright:
Now if there was no Spitfire this would also mean no P-51 Mustang either well at least not as good due to the Allison engine only. The Packard Merlin engine changed the Mustang.

I'm not following this. Are you saying that RR would not have developed 60-series Merlins if there was no Spitfire?

Buzzsaw-
12-02-2009, 11:24 AM
Originally posted by Waldo.Pepper:
The British did not win the Battle of Britain. The Germans failed to achieve their objectives. This is a subtle but important distinction.

The Luftwaffe set out to achieve air superiority over the south of England, destroy the RAF as an effective force, and invade and subdue England.

What was the result?

The British shot down more German aircraft, (1,023 RAF fighters lost against German losses of 873 fighters and 1,214 bombers) the RAF remained a powerful force in being, prevented the invasion of England, maintained air superiority over England, and very quickly thereafter achieved air superiority over the channel.

Every reputable historian who has dealt with the battle gives the victory to the British.

Only in the mind of revisionists desperate to show the infallability of the Luftwaffe can it be shown to be a draw.

Buzzsaw-
12-02-2009, 11:57 AM
Originally posted by Xiolablu3:
In the BOB where possible the Spitfire was sent against the fighters and the Hurris against the bombers.

This is a myth which has grown up about the battle.

In fact, air controllers made no differentiation between Hurricane and Spitfire Squadrons when plotting intercepts.

Germans also tended to confuse the two planes, and insist whenever they had a tough fight, that their opponents were Spitfires. Townsend mentioned this, and other Hurricane pilots who shot down 109's and later talked to the captured pilot were amused to find the German insisting that a Spitfire had shot them down.

Considering the very large numerical preponderance of Hurricanes in the RAF OOB, the facts show the Hurricane was capable of dealing with the 109's. (in any case, the targets were the bombers, interceptors did not stay around to fight the escorts, they made their attacks on the bombers, and went out of the fight)

Of the top 10 leading Aces in the BoB on the RAF side, 6 flew Hurricanes, including Josef František, the Czech who was the leading scorer with 17 kills during the two month battle.

In the Battle of France, the Hurricanes had a positive kill/death ratio versus the 109.

The only conclusion that can be drawn is that while the losses might have been slightly greater with only Hurricanes flying for the RAF, it is still more than likely the Luftwaffe would have still been defeated.

thefruitbat
12-02-2009, 12:17 PM
Originally posted by R_Target:
Things would have turned out more or less the same IMO.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by X32Wright:
Now if there was no Spitfire this would also mean no P-51 Mustang either well at least not as good due to the Allison engine only. The Packard Merlin engine changed the Mustang.

I'm not following this. Are you saying that RR would not have developed 60-series Merlins if there was no Spitfire? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

espescially since what was powering the hurricane, the same engine as the spitfire, lol!

Buzzsaw-
12-02-2009, 01:44 PM
Originally posted by thefruitbat:

espescially since what was powering the hurricane, the same engine as the spitfire, lol!

Although the Spit I and Hurri I used the same model of Merlin, (the II and III) the later versions of these aircraft diverged in what type of Merlin they used.

The Spit II used the Merlin XII, the Hurri II used the Merlin XX.

The Merlin XII was still a single stage supercharger equipped engine, the Merlin XX had a dual stage dual speed supercharger, this engine was longer and heavier, and the decision was made that it was not a good fit for the Spitfire. This trend continued with the Spitfire V, with its Merlin 45, 46, 47 and 50 engines, which were all single stage.

The Spitfires did not get a dual stage, dual speed supercharged engine till the Merlin 61, which continued with the Merlin 66 and 70, and the Packard Merlin 266.

By that time the Hurricanes were using the Merlin 24 or 27, they ended with the Merlin 28 and 29.

RegRag1977
12-02-2009, 01:51 PM
Originally posted by thefruitbat:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by R_Target:
Things would have turned out more or less the same IMO.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by X32Wright:
Now if there was no Spitfire this would also mean no P-51 Mustang either well at least not as good due to the Allison engine only. The Packard Merlin engine changed the Mustang.

I'm not following this. Are you saying that RR would not have developed 60-series Merlins if there was no Spitfire? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

espescially since what was powering the hurricane, the same engine as the spitfire, lol! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Which shows well that the engine is not everything.

GBrutus
12-02-2009, 01:58 PM
Originally posted by orville07:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The British did not win the Battle of Britain. The Germans failed to achieve their objectives. This is a subtle but important distinction.

Yes....Just like Roger Federer did not "win" the Wimbledon 2009 Mens final. Andy Rod**** simply failed to achieve his objective....Of scoring more points and beating him. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

LMAO http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif

stugumby
12-02-2009, 03:01 PM
The british would have lost their war once the germans had gained a foothold, any attempt by the royal navy to slaughter the hapless non amphibious germans would have been a stuka pilots dream and a u boat skippers rise to stardom.
can you imagine a Boulton Paul Defiant circling over landing barges in tight left hand circles just merrily blazing away with their manly .303 into the packed waves of dry shod goose stepping goons, followed by blistering low level atacks by handsome eton grads flying blenheims and battles.

That said going back to main topic, the hurricane would have been enhanced as time and resources allowed, and possibly evolved into.. hmm the 12 gun tyhpoon.

yuuppers
12-02-2009, 03:10 PM
Originally posted by stugumby:
The british would have lost their war once the germans had gained a foothold, any attempt by the royal navy to slaughter the hapless non amphibious germans would have been a stuka pilots dream and a u boat skippers rise to stardom.
can you imagine a Boulton Paul Defiant circling over landing barges in tight left hand circles just merrily blazing away with their manly .303 into the packed waves of dry shod goose stepping goons, followed by blistering low level atacks by handsome eton grads flying blenheims and battles.

That said going back to main topic, the hurricane would have been enhanced as time and resources allowed, and possibly evolved into.. hmm the 12 gun tyhpoon.

Can you image a flotilla of RN destroyers at flank speed racing though the masses of German river barges at night? The fishes and crabs would have a feast.

M_Gunz
12-02-2009, 03:39 PM
For some strange reason I do think that above 8,000 ft the BoB Spits were more capable vs the 109s than the BoB Hurries.
But between pilots and circumstances the difference is not so great. A rookie in either is still a rookie.

Bremspropeller
12-02-2009, 03:42 PM
Can you image a flotilla of RN destroyers at flank speed racing though the masses of German river barges at night? The fishes and crabs would have a feast.


Hardly, as most of the gloryful RN would have been at the bottom of the Atlantic/ Channel/ North Sea without any air-support by that time.

Kurfurst__
12-02-2009, 03:51 PM
Originally posted by Buzzsaw-:
Although the Spit I and Hurri I used the same model of Merlin, (the II and III) the later versions of these aircraft diverged in what type of Merlin they used.

The Spit II used the Merlin XII, the Hurri II used the Merlin XX.

The Merlin XII was still a single stage supercharger equipped engine, the Merlin XX had a dual stage dual speed supercharger, this engine was longer and heavier, and the decision was made that it was not a good fit for the Spitfire. This trend continued with the Spitfire V, with its Merlin 45, 46, 47 and 50 engines, which were all single stage.


Merlin XX had a single stage, two speed supercharger... the Merlin 45 series were essentially simplified Merlin XXs with a single speed supercharger.

Kurfurst__
12-02-2009, 03:57 PM
Originally posted by Saburo_0:
The Spitfire pilots had a higher rate of surviving combat. Considering how low the RAF was on pilots at times...with Hurris only the Germans would have been closer to winning. Might even have broken the RAF.

Personally I think the tactical effectiveness of the two British fighter types was only marginally different. Operational factors (ie. radar, state of the given squadron, tactical position) played a far greater role. True that the Spitfire Sqns had slightly better results, but it was still the numerous Hurricane units that actually fought most of the battle. Replace Spits with Hurris, and probably the results will be slightly worser for the RAF FC than they were, but I very much doubt anything would change substantially.

British losses will be a tad higher; German losses will be a tad lower, but thats it. Losses were not prohibitive to either side anyways - the air war above Europe showed that, you need far more than a couple of months to effectively crush an enemy air force, backed by a modern industry, without attempting decisive results on land.

Daiichidoku
12-02-2009, 04:04 PM
nothing matters without him

http://www.mediabistro.com/fishbowlny/original/screenshot_03-1.jpg

GBrutus
12-02-2009, 04:11 PM
Originally posted by Bremspropeller:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Can you image a flotilla of RN destroyers at flank speed racing though the masses of German river barges at night? The fishes and crabs would have a feast.


Hardly, as most of the gloryful RN would have been at the bottom of the Atlantic/ Channel/ North Sea without any air-support by that time. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yeah, especially after the Luftwaffe so easily sank that ragtag armada at Dunkirk, right? Oh wait...

M_Gunz
12-02-2009, 04:21 PM
Originally posted by Kurfurst__:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Saburo_0:
The Spitfire pilots had a higher rate of surviving combat. Considering how low the RAF was on pilots at times...with Hurris only the Germans would have been closer to winning. Might even have broken the RAF.

Personally I think the tactical effectiveness of the two British fighter types was only marginally different. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

At one point the RAF was pushed to the margin with all reserves committed. It might have gone differently.

Ba5tard5word
12-02-2009, 04:32 PM
The Spitfire really did not matter a whole lot. Bombers were by far the bigger threat, they had the range to hit pretty much anywhere in Britain while 109E's could only spend something like 10 or 20 minutes over London before having to zip back home.

Mainly it seems to me that in the BoB the Germans overestimated their strength and underestimated the RAF's strength.

Bremspropeller
12-02-2009, 04:36 PM
Yeah, especially after the Luftwaffe so easily sank that ragtag armada at Dunkirk, right? Oh wait...

The word "air-support" is hard to understand today, huh?

GBrutus
12-02-2009, 05:00 PM
Originally posted by Bremspropeller:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Yeah, especially after the Luftwaffe so easily sank that ragtag armada at Dunkirk, right? Oh wait...

The word "air-support" is hard to understand today, huh? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You're right, my reading comprehension just isn't up to scratch today. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_razz.gif

yuuppers
12-02-2009, 11:25 PM
Originally posted by Bremspropeller:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Can you image a flotilla of RN destroyers at flank speed racing though the masses of German river barges at night? The fishes and crabs would have a feast.


Hardly, as most of the gloryful RN would have been at the bottom of the Atlantic/ Channel/ North Sea without any air-support by that time. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I didn't know the Lw was that capable at night. Thanks.

barfo1983
12-03-2009, 08:08 AM
yuuppers is 100 percent correct

I'm working without my references books but as I recall, the barge conveys would take several days to assemble in ports all up and down the coast of Europe. Tugs and other powered craft would tow 5 to 10 each in line astern at less than 5 knots. Many of the trains would take several days to make the crossing, especially the ones from Holland. I believe the RN had over 50 destroyers available and they would be assembling at the same time, plus the rest of the RN. A 300 foot, 2000 ton destroyer steaming at 30 plus knots in the channel would sink a whole barge train with its wake alone without firing a shot. After the surviving barges reached England, they would have to unload their armor and , again, working from memory, 4500 horses in the first wave ( and another 50 THOUSAND horses in the follow on waves) . The horses that would be unloaded were the ones that had not broken any legs or otherwise gone nuts during the crossing. Most of this would be done over the sides with derricks in the open ocean or open beaches, which would be defended. THEN, the surviving barges would have to make their way back across the channel, again past the RN, reload and come back again. And again. One of the most startling things to me was the amount of hay to be planned during the resupply runs. Hundreds of thousands of tons of hay were planned.
Any surviving Germans would have been stranded on a foreign shore.

Low_Flyer_MkIX
12-03-2009, 08:19 AM
Ants. You forgot the ants.

Daiichidoku
12-03-2009, 08:21 AM
bear in mind the either side of whichever (wide or narrow path, KM and Heer had some rather heated discussions about this) way the landings would have come would have been very heavily mined

unlikely to have RN destroyers traipsing up and down the channel alongside the barges at will

horseback
12-03-2009, 08:35 AM
Re: the effectiveness of the LW against the RN in theevent of a cross Channel invasion, I have to question how much damage the Germans could really do at that point.

Two years later, the world's best anti-shipping bomber and torpedo pilots in the world (for the unititiated, that means the Imperial Japanese and US Navys' air arms) had a remarkably hard time taking out anything smaller than a carrier at Coral Sea and a month later at Midway, both in broad daylight.

While the LW's dive bomber and bomber corps were pretty good, they did not practice anti-shipping warfare to any great degree before 1940, certainly not at the levels the IJN and USN did. I cannot picture them being very effective against RN cruiser and smaller combatant ships, particularly during an early morning or night time engagement.

Now let's consider how hard a time the Allies had invading Normandy with an overwhelming advantage in ships, specialized landing craft, and air support. Hmm...a few more tanks here, a phone call there, and the Allies could have been thrown back into the sea with horrendous casualties.

Trying to get tens of thousands of men and their equipment across twenty miles of sea in small boats and barges would be an all night and all day operation; as long as the RN existed, most of the survivors of the first wave would be treading water or be in the tender care of the Home Guard...

cheers

horseback

Bremspropeller
12-03-2009, 08:37 AM
I didn't know the Lw was that capable at night. Thanks.


Didn't know the RN had ships that would only spawn up at night and hang around somewhere else at daytime.

barfo1983
12-03-2009, 08:50 AM
+1 for Horsebacks post.

And I wold add, while most of the allied troops for Normandy traveled 'only' 20 miles of open ocean, many of the Sealion barges would have passages of 100 miles or more (at less than 5 knots) due to the staging points in Holland. The Germans needed huge areas of water to assemble their barge trains and that meant they had to spread out the staging area all up and down the coast.

Kettenhunde
12-03-2009, 09:11 AM
The Luftwaffe had quite a bit of success in Anti-shipping strikes with a number of its Kampfgeschwaders including the destruction of the Polish Navy in 1939. Like the "tip and run raiders" the perception was very different from the reality.

I would agree that as almost land locked nation, Germany had little opportunity to develop anti-shipping specialization before the outbreak of the war. Certainly nothing on the level of an island nation or one with island territories in addition to several thousand miles of coast line.


For example, the Nazi leadership bitterly criticized the Luftwaffe for a perceived general unwillingness to support the Kriegsmarine, as well as the German Navy's own lack of emphasis upon using aircraft in conjunction with surface and submarine warfare forces, while, at the same time, German naval and commercial shipping suffered the depredations of the Royal Air Force's Coastal Command. Yet, at the same time, British naval authorities saw an opponent that seemingly artfully used long-range landplanes and seaplanes to furnish reconnaissance information, direct U-boat attacks, and directly attack merchant and naval shipping, with potentially devastating effects upon the Battle of the Atlantic and (in particular) the Russian convoys, even as the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force bickered over air support for naval operations and whether Coastal Command should be an Air Force or a Navy asset! In truth, then, the partnerships of both the Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine and the Royal Air Force-Royal Navy were at once more productive than each believed of itself, while less effective than their opponents believed.

http://www.airforcehistory.hq....remaritimejune96.htm (http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/EARS/Hallionpapers/airwarfaremaritimejune96.htm)

The Royal Navy certainly was a factor in the Battle but I would definitely stop short of it being the decisive factor.

http://www.airforcehistory.hq....remaritimejune96.htm (http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/EARS/Hallionpapers/airwarfaremaritimejune96.htm)

Interesting article on the development of some of the anti shipping measures:

http://www.ausairpower.net/WW2-PGMs.html

GBrutus
12-03-2009, 09:32 AM
Besides, even without the RAF for cover I'm sure the RN would have mustered up a couple of Sea Gladiators. Then it would have been game over for the Lufties.

horseback
12-03-2009, 09:33 AM
This argument is tied to a specific point in time. However effective the LW was in 1941 or 1942 against transAtlantic convoys of merchant ships, we still have to ask: How good were the LW against general shipping in 1940? Did they have the training & capability for delivering torpedoes in place in time for the fall 1940 cross Channel invasion?

How does that translate when operating against cruisers and destroyers not tied to a bunch of 10 knot or less merchies? Especially when said cruisers and destroyers are weaving through friendly forces who will be annihilated by near misses, never mind the inevitable slop over?

Engaging fast moving, heavily armed, pre-warned (radar, remember) warships with bombs or torpedoes is a different kettle of fish from popping out of the clouds and nailing a merchantman doing 8 knots in the middle of the Atlantic or the North Sea. A veteran of the Pacific war described it as trying to hit a mouse scurrying around on the floor with a dropped marble.

Day or night, the advantage goes to the warships.

cheers

horseback

GBrutus
12-03-2009, 09:56 AM
Originally posted by Low_Flyer_MkIX:
Ants. You forgot the ants.

Giant mutant ants or just the regular variety?

Kettenhunde
12-03-2009, 10:15 AM
How good were the LW against general shipping in 1940? Did they have the training & capability for delivering torpedoes in place in time for the fall 1940 cross Channel invasion?

I would say they were good enough to be a very credible threat.

It is obvious that the Royal Navy did not take the threat lightly at all.


Day or night, the advantage goes to the warships.

I think not only would Mitchell disagree but the Worlds Navies as well. The importance of air power and its dominance over the surface fleet is evidenced by the Carrier Task Force having replaced the Battleship.


The time will come, when thou shalt lift thine eyes
To watch a long-drawn battle in the skies.
While aged peasants, too amazed for words,
Stare at the flying fleets of wondrous birds.

England, so long mistress of the sea,
Where winds and waves confess her sovereignty,
Her ancient triumphs yet on high shall bear
And reign the sovereign of the conquered air.

— Thomas Gray, 1737


That idea is so damned nonsensical and impossible that I'm willing to stand on the bridge of a battleship while that nitwit tries to hit if from the air.

— Newton D. Baker, U.S. Secretary of War, regards Billy Mitchell's idea of airplanes sinking a battleship. In July 1921 Mitchell got his experiment and sunk the captured German battleship Ostfreisland. Newton was not on the bridge. 1921.

horseback
12-03-2009, 10:41 AM
Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"> How good were the LW against general shipping in 1940? Did they have the training & capability for delivering torpedoes in place in time for the fall 1940 cross Channel invasion?

I would say they were good enough to be a very credible threat.

It is obvious that the Royal Navy did not take the threat lightly at all. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>Of course they took the possibility of losing ships and personnel seriously. They had to plan on the basis of a worst case scenario, and in 1940 all the data were not in.

That is not the same as saying that they would have been deterred from sortying out every available surface combatant in the event of an attempted cross-Channel invasion, and with the advantage of hindsight, I would contend that a pre-dawn surface engagement of those barges and ships the Germans planned on using would have resulted in the Germans coming off far worse than the Royal Navy, even if the battle extended throughout the day.

The LW's potential anti-shipping force was primarliy dive bombing oriented; I doubt that the transition from hitting crossroads and fixed fortified positions on the ground would translate well to hitting ships twisting about at 30+ knots and spitting out tons of AAA. The limited (if any) torpedo capable aircraft would have had an even tougher time not hitting friendly craft instead of the enemy in those crowded waters.

I simply cannot bring myself to suspect, much less believe, that even the Stuka corps in 1940 could approach the effectiveness of the IJN's Vals and Kates in that kind of fight, and the IJN had a relatively poor record against the smaller surface combatants that would be doing the greatest harm to Hitler's ambitions.

The LW's leadership, particularly in the obese person of Herman Goerring, consistantly overestimated their abilities at crucial moments. This would have been just one more.

It would undoubtedly be a bloodbath, but the RN would be merely decimated, while the German invasion force would be annihilated. That would have left Germany feeling quite vulnerable to the Soviets in the spring of 1941, don't you think?

cheers

horseback

GBrutus
12-03-2009, 10:42 AM
quote:
That idea is so damned nonsensical and impossible that I'm willing to stand on the bridge of a battleship while that nitwit tries to hit if from the air.

— Newton D. Baker, U.S. Secretary of War, regards Billy Mitchell's idea of airplanes sinking a battleship. In July 1921 Mitchell got his experiment and sunk the captured German battleship Ostfreisland. Newton was not on the bridge. 1921.

Interesting. I bet the Ostfriesland wasn't shooting back though.

Bremspropeller
12-03-2009, 10:43 AM
"U-Boot" is such a nice word to throw in now...

ElAurens
12-03-2009, 10:48 AM
As is ASDIC.

The U-Boat is poorly suited to operations in The Channel.

ElAurens
12-03-2009, 10:52 AM
And why are we even discussing this?

The National Socialist pigs lost the war, massively, regardless of their purported superiority in technology.

They had zero ability to carry out a successful invasion of southern England.

Move along, nothing more to see here.

Kettenhunde
12-03-2009, 10:56 AM
I bet the Ostfriesland wasn't shooting back though.

No but the United States Navy sure was shooting back and stacking the deck against the demonstration of air power.


The navy did not support the demonstrations because it felt that success would weaken its position in the upcoming World Naval Disarmament Conference. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels volunteered to stand bareheaded on the deck of any ship Mitchell was going to bomb. Once it was decided the tests would be performed under navy rules, it set strict guidelines that it felt would ensure failure for Mitchell. One was that the bombings be conducted slowly, stopping often to permit inspections of the damage by construction inspectors. This would allow a scientific appraisal of the capacity of different types of ships to withstand aerial attack. Also, the number and size of the bombs were to be limited. The navy also ordered that there be a news blackout during preparations and that only official reports of the tests be allowed afterward. They were aware that Mitchell knew how to manipulate the press and they wanted to ensure that his story was not the one told to the public.

http://www.century-of-flight.n...Billy%20Mitchell.htm (http://www.century-of-flight.net/Aviation%20history/coming%20of%20age/Billy%20Mitchell.htm)

Plus I bet by 1940, things had evolved over the 1919 biplanes and bomb sights Mitchell used.

Kettenhunde
12-03-2009, 11:09 AM
The LW's potential anti-shipping force was primarliy dive bombing oriented; I doubt that the transition from hitting crossroads and fixed fortified positions on the ground would translate well to hitting ships twisting about at 30+ knots and spitting out tons of AAA.

Every Naval Airpower in existence used dive bombers during WWII, Horseback.

Look at Torpedo 8 at midway.

What aircraft destroyed the Japanese carriers at midway and conducted the attack that marks the turning point of the war in the Pacific?

A Douglas SBD Dive bomber.....

The Japanese included dive bombers in their Naval inventory throughout the war as well. In fact, only the British who AFAIK, invented the idea did not adopt it with zeal.

I don't think an argument can be made that dive bombing was not effective against ships nor can the argument be made that the Luftwaffe was not well versed in dive bombing.

Kettenhunde
12-03-2009, 11:55 AM
That would have left Germany feeling quite vulnerable to the Soviets in the spring of 1941, don't you think?

Interesting can of worms.....

It all depends on if you think a credible threat of Soviet invasion west existed at the time.

Do you?

horseback
12-03-2009, 12:01 PM
My point is that hitting a fast moving, dodging and turning ship requires skills (and luck) orders of magnitude greater than that required to hit a static target. With years of practice and a clear understanding of the tactical issues from both sides of the equation, the IJN and USN had a very tough time every time they engaged cruisers and destroyers with dive bombers (and it takes a very well placed bomb to take out a destroyer).

Take a look at the resources expended on sinking the Mogami at Midway; her sister ship got away almost untouched, and she still took several attacks to sink her, crippled and leaking like a sieve. I'll point out here that postwar studies indicate the IJN damage control was found to be much worse than RN or USN norms too; a US or RN cruiser might well have survived under similar circumstances.

You can never convince me that the LW could have approached US or Japanese air-to-warship abilities in 1940 against tougher radar warned opposition.

I spent three years on a destroyer of very similar technology and capability to the ones that fought in WWII; I was shocked at quickly we could stop and go to or from top speed or change directions on short notice. Hitting a moving target less than 50 ft wide and 500 ft long with an iron bomb is just too damned hard to contemplate (most WWII destroyers were considerably smaller).

It would take dozens of aircraft per ship (and there would be dozens of British ships) to have any hope of success. In the meantime, most of the bombs dropped would kill more Germans than Brits.

Not a happy equation.

cheers

horseback

orville07
12-03-2009, 12:31 PM
Yep, there is no debate Horseback, it would have been an absolute, unmitigated disaster. In the extremely unlikely event of any Germans in the first wave surviving and getting onto the beach they would be greeted with something like Dantes seventh circle of Hell, with no credible support. Concentrated heavy artillery fire, Mustard gas and Paris Green/Chlorine are not nice things *cough, splutter*, and it is known fact it was to be used by low flying crop sprayers, and basically anything that could fly. They would have wished they had drowned at sea, instead of in their own lungs.

But don't take it from me, over to you Grossadmiral Karl Dönitz "We possessed neither control of the air or the sea; nor were we in any position to gain it".

Straight from the Horses mouth.

Who do you think you are kidding Mister Hitler, if you think Old England's done? Even 95 year old Grandma's would have gotten involved and fought, hurling Kendal Mint Cake sticky bombs at the terrified Hun. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

hop2002
12-03-2009, 01:45 PM
At one point the RAF was pushed to the margin with all reserves committed.

There was never a point when all of Fighter Command was committed to battle.


Didn't know the RN had ships that would only spawn up at night and hang around somewhere else at daytime.

They certainly operated cruisers and destroyers in the channel at night in September 1940, chiefly scouting German invasion preparations. They even sent a destroyer in to the inner harbour at Calais.

M_Gunz
12-03-2009, 01:50 PM
Originally posted by hop2002:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">At one point the RAF was pushed to the margin with all reserves committed.

There was never a point when all of Fighter Command was committed to battle.

</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

All that could be brought to bear. NO reserves available to meet a new threat which fortunately did not occur.
Please tell that the RAF was not stretched near breaking just before the LW switched to targeting London.

Bremspropeller
12-03-2009, 02:24 PM
The U-Boat is poorly suited to operations in The Channel.

Depends on the Boot-Type.

stalkervision
12-03-2009, 03:02 PM
Originally posted by Bremspropeller:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The U-Boat is poorly suited to operations in The Channel.

Depends on the Boot-Type. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

true. there were smaller boats that were designed for these very kind of waters.

yuuppers
12-03-2009, 03:28 PM
How many Stuka attacks on RN destroyers in the Channel and how many sunk?

hop2002
12-03-2009, 03:35 PM
All that could be brought to bear. NO reserves available to meet a new threat which fortunately did not occur.

As far as I am aware the only time 11 Group had all their squadrons committed was on 15 September. By that point Park knew German strength, he knew that they were fully engaged and no new threat could occur.

Even then, 10 and 12 Group still had uncommitted squadrons ready.


Please tell that the RAF was not stretched near breaking just before the LW switched to targeting London.

The RAF was stretched less than the Luftwaffe.

stalkervision
12-03-2009, 03:50 PM
Adolph Galland said the Hurricane was a very nice plane...

to shot down. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

thefruitbat
12-03-2009, 03:53 PM
Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bremspropeller:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The U-Boat is poorly suited to operations in The Channel.

Depends on the Boot-Type. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

true. there were smaller boats that were designed for these very kind of waters. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

In 1940?

stalkervision
12-03-2009, 04:01 PM
Originally posted by thefruitbat:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Bremspropeller:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The U-Boat is poorly suited to operations in The Channel.

Depends on the Boot-Type. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

true. there were smaller boats that were designed for these very kind of waters. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

In 1940? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yup..most of the early german boats were very small coastal patrol designs called "dugouts"

IMO the S/E-boats were just as if not more dangerous to the Royal navy thou. They were truly wonderful designs.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v...bl24&feature=related (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1iCm9h0bl24&feature=related)

Kettenhunde
12-03-2009, 04:10 PM
How many Stuka attacks on RN destroyers in the Channel and how many sunk?



I think around four were sunk by Junkers 87's. I don't know if they were in the channel or not.

Quite a few more than incidents of the Royal Navy capital ships steaming into the Channel or German harbors en-mass in 1940....

yuuppers
12-03-2009, 04:11 PM
Originally posted by stalkervision:
Yup..most of the early german boats were very small coastal patrol designs called "dugouts"

Would that be the Type II of which 50 were built?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Type_II_submarine

stalkervision
12-03-2009, 04:15 PM
Originally posted by yuuppers:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stalkervision:
Yup..most of the early german boats were very small coastal patrol designs called "dugouts"

Would that be the Type II of which 50 were built?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Type_II_submarine </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

ya that's the one. good link.

nice example..

U-137 or Unterseeboot 137 was a German Type IID submarine of the Kriegsmarine during World War II. Her keel was laid down 16 November 1939 by Deutsche Werke in Kiel. She was launched 18 May 1940 and commissioned on 15 June 1940 with Oberleutnant zur See Herbert Wohlfarth in command.

U-137 conducted four patrols, sinking six ships totalling 15,469 tons and damaging two others displacing 15,469 tons. On November 17, 1940, She sank the 1-ton British merchant ship Saint Germain and the 1.3-ton Swedish steamer Veronica, both of the convoy HG-46. Upon Germany's surrender, she was scuttled on 2 May 1945 in the Raederschleuse at Wilhelmshaven. U-137 never suffered any casualties to her crew.

Cuirassier
12-03-2009, 04:24 PM
It's all moot point anyway, considering the war was lost on the Eastern Front. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-tongue.gif

Waldo.Pepper
12-03-2009, 04:34 PM
Spitfire Mark 1's climb to 20000 feet was 13 minutes. For the contemporary Hurricane it was 17 minutes. This was a vital difference that I don't has been mentioned before.

This would have allowed a lot more Luftwaffe raiders to hit their targets and escape unmolested. Who knows how many more RAF planes would have been downed while they were clawing for altitude.

As vital as it was to climb rapidly, I don't think that this would have changed the campaign.

Kettenhunde
12-03-2009, 04:36 PM
In Operation Dynamo, the British committed 693 vessels to the evacuation, 226 were sunk, and 56 of them were Royal Navy Destroyers.

Of the 41 original destroyers dispatched for the operation, only 9 survived the battle.

The Luftwaffe inflicted the majority of casualties including 31 ships in one day.

http://books.google.com/books?...v=onepage&q=&f=false (http://books.google.com/books?id=aJX6QetX2d8C&pg=PA35&lpg=PA35&dq=Stuka+attack+royal+navy+destroyers&source=bl&ots=ugI0-hXzon&sig=SxxTuCazkflisWuLX6SzGc_ua4w&hl=en&ei=VEwYS67CIs2ZlAfd3ITuAg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CBMQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=&f=false)

yuuppers
12-03-2009, 04:46 PM
Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
In Operation Dynamo, the British committed 693 vessels to the evacuation, 226 were sunk, and 56 of them were Royal Navy Destroyers.

Of the 41 original destroyers dispatched for the operation, only 9 survived the battle.

The Luftwaffe inflicted the majority of casualties including 31 ships in one day.

http://books.google.com/books?...v=onepage&q=&f=false (http://books.google.com/books?id=aJX6QetX2d8C&pg=PA35&lpg=PA35&dq=Stuka+attack+royal+navy+destroyers&source=bl&ots=ugI0-hXzon&sig=SxxTuCazkflisWuLX6SzGc_ua4w&hl=en&ei=VEwYS67CIs2ZlAfd3ITuAg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CBMQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=&f=false)

Six British and three French destroyers were sunk, along with nine large boats. In addition, 19 destroyers were damaged.

Major ships lost

The Royal Navy's most significant losses in the operation were six destroyers:

* Grafton, sunk by U-62 on 29 May;
* Grenade, sunk by air attack off the east pier at Dunkirk on 29 May;
* Wakeful, sunk by a torpedo from the Schnellboot (E-boat) S-30 on 29 May;
* Basilisk, Havant, and Keith, sunk by air attack off the beaches on 1 June.

The French Navy lost three destroyers:

* Bourrasque, mined off Nieuport on 30 May;
* Sirocco, sunk by the Schnellboote S-23 and S-26 on 31 May;
* Le Foudroyant, sunk by air attack off the beaches on 1 June.

edit: Havant was severely damaged and had to be scuttled by minesweeper HMS Saltash.

GBrutus
12-03-2009, 04:50 PM
56 RN destroyers sunk? Where on earth did you read this?

horseback
12-03-2009, 05:01 PM
56 destroyers sunk, in shallow water, moving slowly to protect the troops' withdrawal. Sounds a lot like shooting fish in a barrel. Or hitting a crossroads.

Not remotely similar to trying to hit one engaged in all out offensive operations in deep water; the majority of destroyers (of any side) sunk by dive bombers were caught alone, tied up trying to rescue survivors of an earlier sinking or in restricted waters, and the overwhelming majority of them still required multiple attacks to sink them.

Trying to take out 50+ destroyers and cruisers charging about at top speed without a care in the world if they run over or capsize any of the smaller craft around them is a very different equation for the LW trying to protect a fleet of slow, barely seaworthy craft full of soldiers, munitions, and ...horses?

We're still talking about a last-ditch defense of their homeland, so the Brits would have nothing to lose and as I pointed out, Stalin was certainly lurking in the east. I have no doubt that Hitler would have made that part of his claculations.

cheers

horseback

orville07
12-03-2009, 05:18 PM
Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by yuuppers:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stalkervision:
Yup..most of the early german boats were very small coastal patrol designs called "dugouts"

Would that be the Type II of which 50 were built?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Type_II_submarine </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

ya that's the one. good link.

nice example..

U-137 or Unterseeboot 137 was a German Type IID submarine of the Kriegsmarine during World War II. Her keel was laid down 16 November 1939 by Deutsche Werke in Kiel. She was launched 18 May 1940 and commissioned on 15 June 1940 with Oberleutnant zur See Herbert Wohlfarth in command.

U-137 conducted four patrols, sinking six ships totalling 15,469 tons and damaging two others displacing 15,469 tons. On November 17, 1940, She sank the 1-ton British merchant ship Saint Germain and the 1.3-ton Swedish steamer Veronica, both of the convoy HG-46. Upon Germany's surrender, she was scuttled on 2 May 1945 in the Raederschleuse at Wilhelmshaven. U-137 never suffered any casualties to her crew. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Interesting info stalker mate, but U-boats were not effective in the English Channel. The smaller models you mention would have been very vulnerable against well prepared English coastal defences. In the open ocean of the Atlantic, different story...They were indeed devastating against Merchant shipping.

The English Channel is littered with U-boat ship wrecks, there was a reason the channel was actively avoided by them. The small matter of the fear of massive mine fields at key strategic points, which in the shallows was extremely effective in restricting their movements. In the relatively confined space of the channel once a U-boat fired it has nowhere to hide, its direction was easily detectable by the torpedo wake.

U-boat torpedoes were also till at least mid 1940 very unreliable, in 30 U boat attacks in 1940 made when a direct hit had been claimed only one ship was sunk. The torpedo tech was of course later improved vastly.

Additionaly, U-boat production was very slow, production strategy was on the assumption that the war would be over swiftly (oops). 60 were launched in the whole of 1940, that represents a little over 1 per week.

Merchantmans worst nightmare? Yes. An Effective force in the English Channel? Most certainly not.

The plan was to use them as a diversion in the Atlantic to tie up the RN at any rate.

stalkervision
12-03-2009, 05:23 PM
Originally posted by orville07:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by yuuppers:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stalkervision:
Yup..most of the early german boats were very small coastal patrol designs called "dugouts"

Would that be the Type II of which 50 were built?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Type_II_submarine </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

ya that's the one. good link.

nice example..

U-137 or Unterseeboot 137 was a German Type IID submarine of the Kriegsmarine during World War II. Her keel was laid down 16 November 1939 by Deutsche Werke in Kiel. She was launched 18 May 1940 and commissioned on 15 June 1940 with Oberleutnant zur See Herbert Wohlfarth in command.

U-137 conducted four patrols, sinking six ships totalling 15,469 tons and damaging two others displacing 15,469 tons. On November 17, 1940, She sank the 1-ton British merchant ship Saint Germain and the 1.3-ton Swedish steamer Veronica, both of the convoy HG-46. Upon Germany's surrender, she was scuttled on 2 May 1945 in the Raederschleuse at Wilhelmshaven. U-137 never suffered any casualties to her crew. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Interesting info stalker mate, but U-boats were not effective in the English Channel. The smaller models you mention would have been very vulnerable against well prepared English coastal defences. In the open ocean of the Atlantic, different story...They were indeed devastating against Merchant shipping.

The English Channel is littered with U-boat ship wrecks, there was a reason the channel was actively avoided by them. The small matter of the fear of massive mine fields at key strategic points, which in the shallows was extremely effective in restricting their movements. In the relatively confined space of the channel once a U-boat fired it has nowhere to hide, its direction was easily detectable by the torpedo wake.

U-boat torpedoes were also till at least mid 1940 very unreliable, in 30 U boat attacks in 1940 made when a direct hit had been claimed only one ship was sunk. The torpedo tech was of course later improved vastly.

Additionaly, U-boat production was very slow, production strategy was on the assumption that the war would be over swiftly (oops). 60 were launched in the whole of 1940, that represents a little over 1 per week.

Merchantmans worst nightmare? Yes. An Effective force in the English Channel? Most certainly not.

The plan was to use them as a diversion in the Atlantic to tie up the RN at any rate. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

not so in the early part of the war. later on it certainly was indeed. Torpedos leaving wakes? Yes the old steam driven ones did. Used at night mostly. The electric ones were wake less.

Do you realize what germany did with fifty long range U-boats in the early war? Makes you wonder if they had just fifty more.

Kettenhunde
12-03-2009, 05:29 PM
56 destroyers sunk, in shallow water, moving slowly to protect the troops' withdrawal. Sounds a lot like shooting fish in a barrel. Or hitting a crossroads.


I think that is all the Germans were hoping to secure in order to invade, was the channel.

The information comes from this book:

http://books.google.com/books?...ource=gbs_navlinks_s (http://books.google.com/books?id=aJX6QetX2d8C&dq=Stuka+attack+royal+navy+destroyers&source=gbs_navlinks_s)

6 or 56....Quite a few more than incidents of Royal Navy capital ships steaming into the Channel or German harbors en-mass in 1940....


Stalin was certainly lurking in the east.

Then you want to proceed with the assumption Hitler was correct and Stalin did plan to invade the west?

yuuppers
12-03-2009, 05:37 PM
Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
6 or 56....Quite a few more than incidents of Royal Navy capital ships steaming into the Channel or German harbors en-mass in 1940....

There is a BIG difference between 6 and 56.

Why would RN capital ships be in the Channel? What threat was there?

Why would the RN send masses of ships into German occupied harbors?

orville07
12-03-2009, 06:24 PM
Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by orville07:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by yuuppers:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stalkervision:
Yup..most of the early german boats were very small coastal patrol designs called "dugouts"

Would that be the Type II of which 50 were built?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Type_II_submarine </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

ya that's the one. good link.

nice example..

U-137 or Unterseeboot 137 was a German Type IID submarine of the Kriegsmarine during World War II. Her keel was laid down 16 November 1939 by Deutsche Werke in Kiel. She was launched 18 May 1940 and commissioned on 15 June 1940 with Oberleutnant zur See Herbert Wohlfarth in command.

U-137 conducted four patrols, sinking six ships totalling 15,469 tons and damaging two others displacing 15,469 tons. On November 17, 1940, She sank the 1-ton British merchant ship Saint Germain and the 1.3-ton Swedish steamer Veronica, both of the convoy HG-46. Upon Germany's surrender, she was scuttled on 2 May 1945 in the Raederschleuse at Wilhelmshaven. U-137 never suffered any casualties to her crew. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Interesting info stalker mate, but U-boats were not effective in the English Channel. The smaller models you mention would have been very vulnerable against well prepared English coastal defences. In the open ocean of the Atlantic, different story...They were indeed devastating against Merchant shipping.

The English Channel is littered with U-boat ship wrecks, there was a reason the channel was actively avoided by them. The small matter of the fear of massive mine fields at key strategic points, which in the shallows was extremely effective in restricting their movements. In the relatively confined space of the channel once a U-boat fired it has nowhere to hide, its direction was easily detectable by the torpedo wake.

U-boat torpedoes were also till at least mid 1940 very unreliable, in 30 U boat attacks in 1940 made when a direct hit had been claimed only one ship was sunk. The torpedo tech was of course later improved vastly.

Additionaly, U-boat production was very slow, production strategy was on the assumption that the war would be over swiftly (oops). 60 were launched in the whole of 1940, that represents a little over 1 per week.

Merchantmans worst nightmare? Yes. An Effective force in the English Channel? Most certainly not.

The plan was to use them as a diversion in the Atlantic to tie up the RN at any rate. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

not so in the early part of the war. later on it certainly was indeed. Torpedos leaving wakes? Yes the old steam driven ones did. Used at night mostly. The electric ones were wake less.

Do you realize what germany did with fifty long range U-boats in the early war? Makes you wonder if they had just fifty more. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

"not so in the early part of the war. later on it certainly was indeed." Yes stalker my mistake RE Atlantic I meant to say the North Sea (very tired and having other debates on other forums, think I'll call it a night http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif). This was the case at the time.

RE: Torpedos, yes I made the point they improved with time in the original post, but the discussion is about effectivess mid 1940.

"Do you realize what germany did with fifty long range U-boats in the early war?"

Yes I do, and do not dispute their effectivess, as well as their early impact on morale. But they were not as effective operationally in the Channel. That is the topic of discussion. This is a matter of fact.

I suppose Doenitz's considered opinion and word is not good enough for some people, but what to do? Interesting stuff anyway, "what ifs" are always fun.

Kettenhunde, 56 destroyed??!! I might buy that book just so I can wipe my arse with it lol http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

Anyways off to kip peeps, laters.

Waldo.Pepper
12-03-2009, 07:53 PM
Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
In Operation Dynamo, the British committed 693 vessels to the evacuation, 226 were sunk, and 56 of them were Royal Navy Destroyers.

Of the 41 original destroyers dispatched for the operation, only 9 survived the battle.
http://books.google.com/books?...v=onepage&q=&f=false (http://books.google.com/books?id=aJX6QetX2d8C&pg=PA35&lpg=PA35&dq=Stuka+attack+royal+navy+destroyers&source=bl&ots=ugI0-hXzon&sig=SxxTuCazkflisWuLX6SzGc_ua4w&hl=en&ei=VEwYS67CIs2ZlAfd3ITuAg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CBMQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=&f=false)

You quoted the book wrong. It states quite clearly ...

Of the 693 British ships committed, 226 had been sunk, 56 of them destroyers, minesweepers and personnel vessels."

Kettenhunde
12-03-2009, 09:12 PM
You quoted the book wrong. It states quite clearly ...


You are correct. Thanks for pointing that out.

Brings us right back too, 6 or 56....Quite a few more than incidents of Royal Navy capital ships steaming into the Channel or German harbors en-mass in 1940....

M_Gunz
12-03-2009, 10:12 PM
Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
Then you want to proceed with the assumption Hitler was correct and Stalin did plan to invade the west?

The original Plans were aimed at a 1950 kick off that would have featured tanks more advanced than the T-34.
Hitler jumped right after Stalin purged his military and before he could start to build a cadre to meet
his desires, unquestioningly loyal since the rest are dead. Just a matter of time lines IMO.

Kurfurst__
12-04-2009, 02:37 AM
Originally posted by horseback:
This argument is tied to a specific point in time. However effective the LW was in 1941 or 1942 against transAtlantic convoys of merchant ships, we still have to ask: How good were the LW against general shipping in 1940? Did they have the training & capability for delivering torpedoes in place in time for the fall 1940 cross Channel invasion?

They did have airborne torpedo capacity in 1940, on a limited scale, though the major tools against enemy warships would be still the Stukas: the Ju 87 and Ju 88.



How does that translate when operating against cruisers and destroyers not tied to a bunch of 10 knot or less merchies? Especially when said cruisers and destroyers are weaving through friendly forces who will be annihilated by near misses, never mind the inevitable slop over?

Actual battle experience for this exists - look up the number of DDs and other ships sank by the Luftwaffe during Norway, during the Sitzkrieg and the Battle of France (not limited to Dunkerque). They had considerable success, even though the focus was on ground operations of course. Perhaps the best example of anti-shipping would be during the Battle of Crete.

Kurfurst__
12-04-2009, 02:41 AM
Originally posted by horseback:
We're still talking about a last-ditch defense of their homeland, so the Brits would have nothing to lose and as I pointed out, Stalin was certainly lurking in the east. I have no doubt that Hitler would have made that part of his claculations.

cheers

horseback

He in fact did - the Germans were already considering calling the whole thing off in July 1940, and delaying it to 1941 due to political developments in the East.

jasonbirder
12-04-2009, 04:08 AM
Are there any/many examples of the Luftwaffe/Kriegsmarine combined stopping the RN achieving its objectives in a major operation?

For all the talk of losses inflicted...Dunkirk and Crete are excellent examples...the RN had a mission...the Luftwaffe and/or attempted to stop them achieving it...the RN achieved it...

The Germans simply didn't have even a fraction of the shipping or the reuired doctrine/expertise to either carry out a major amphibious operation...or to interfere seriously with the RN mission to interdict it.

Bremspropeller
12-04-2009, 05:55 AM
The Germans simply didn't have even a fraction of the shipping or the reuired doctrine/expertise to either carry out a major amphibious operation...or to interfere seriously with the RN mission to interdict it.


1) True.

2) False.


Let's get back to the initail scenario:
The RAF has been beat (for the sake of argument).
This frees a lot of fighter(-bomber) and bomber capacity to go out and hunt ships.

stalkervision
12-04-2009, 06:37 AM
ever see what the Japanese did to the British navy in early ww 2 when the RAF didn't have air superiority? http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/icon_twisted.gif

CUJO_1970
12-04-2009, 06:46 AM
Stalin was most definitely not going to attack Germany in 1940, nor anytime soon. This is a man that had to be pulled from under his bedsheets by the central committee days after the the German army had already stormed across the Russian frontier and the Luftwaffe had bombed their frontline airfields into rubble.


As far as the Royal Navy is concerned, it is certainly no guarantee that they will win the day simply by showing up, and there is actually historical precedent for it, even when they did have quite a large airforcr defending.

During the Channel Dash, the German Navy sent ~56 warships through the English channel in broad daylight, right under the noses of England, the Royal Navy and the RAF. Not a single German ship was even touched...not by the RAF or the Royal Navy. British MTBs and destroyers were completely ineffective. The whole day was one tactical blunder after another for the Brits.

So, if it's possible for Germany to control the English Channel for a period of time, as they showed they were more than capable of doing - even with the RAF fully intact - why wouldn't they be able to do it with the RAF taken out of the equation?

DKoor
12-04-2009, 06:53 AM
Facts:

1.Hurri owns German bombers big time, mostly owns 110 too as it is too clumsy in maneuvers to fight Hurri only expert pilot could counter that disadvantage
2.Hurri stood its ground during previous engagements, it is a fair assumption that giving the right tactics they could hold its own vs 109's (more so because they could stay and fight and 109 on the contrary couldn't do that)
3.Germans employed better fighter tactics, fighter pilots on both sides were brave, but I'd say that all things considered RAF actually had an slight upper hand - only because of the fact that they fought over friendly territory
4.Luftwaffe made a huge mistake and switched to cities at one point while they could be putting all efforts in crushing RAF, and this fact is one of the biggest factors why they failed

This is not about fighters, it is about tactics. But then again, that was being obvious even without this thread.

Low_Flyer_MkIX
12-04-2009, 06:54 AM
Well said, Mr DKoor.

Poor Lufties. It's like watching England fans harp on about Maradona. And not a handball in sight.

Xiolablu3
12-04-2009, 06:58 AM
I think one of the most important factors between two simarlily equipped modern armies, at that time, is if they were fighting over their own territory or not.

In the BOB the Luftwaffe lost more resources.

In 1941-42 RAF attacks on France, the RAF lost more resources.

One simple hit of a .303 or 7.92mm on the radiator, pilot or vital part over enemy territory for either side meant game over, capture or death and a lost aircraft.

If they were over their own, then they could land or belly in and be up fighting the same day, and the aircraft recovered.

This makes a large impact on loss rates for both sides through 1940-43, whichever was the attacking force.

BTW very interesting read guys, ty.

jasonbirder
12-04-2009, 08:14 AM
As far as the Royal Navy is concerned, it is certainly no guarantee that they will win the day simply by showing up, and there is actually historical precedent for it, even when they did have quite a large airforcr defending.

During the Channel Dash, the German Navy sent ~56 warships through the English channel in broad daylight, right under the noses of England, the Royal Navy and the RAF. Not a single German ship was even touched...not by the RAF or the Royal Navy. British MTBs and destroyers were completely ineffective. The whole day was one tactical blunder after another for the Brits.

So, if it's possible for Germany to control the English Channel for a period of time, as they showed they were more than capable of doing - even with the RAF fully intact - why wouldn't they be able to do it with the RAF taken out of the equation?

Is Operation Cerberus really a good demonstration of German naval prowess?
It was a withdrawal...Even if it had gone flawlessly the result would have been a victory for the RN - in that it removed a significant strategic threat...
But ultimately, the Scharnhorst was so badly damaged it was out of action for over a year...The Gneisenau was damaged and never left port again before being broken up...
And that was three of the Kreigsmarines most advanced and powerful vessels moving swiftly with complete surprise...

jamesblonde1979
12-04-2009, 08:20 AM
Originally posted by Waldo.Pepper:
The British did not win the Battle of Britain. The Germans failed to achieve their objectives. This is a subtle but important distinction.

Let's not let anything as sensible as the truth spoil the discussion Waldo.

http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

yuuppers
12-04-2009, 08:38 AM
Originally posted by CUJO_1970:
During the Channel Dash, the German Navy sent ~56 warships through the English channel in broad daylight, right under the noses of England, the Royal Navy and the RAF. Not a single German ship was even touched...not by the RAF or the Royal Navy. British MTBs and destroyers were completely ineffective. The whole day was one tactical blunder after another for the Brits.

So, if it's possible for Germany to control the English Channel for a period of time, as they showed they were more than capable of doing - even with the RAF fully intact - why wouldn't they be able to do it with the RAF taken out of the equation?

2 battlecruisers
1 heavy cruiser
6 destroyers
14 torpedo boats
26 E-boats

That would 9 warships and 40 warboats.

Not exactly a bright sunny day with unlimited visibility.

Yes the Brits messed up royally.

psykopatsak
12-04-2009, 08:42 AM
im not going to read the whole six pages, but i know that the stuka bombers were good enoght to hit near a russian tank moving at full speed that it flipped over, so that the wingman could hit it spot on. for your information a ship is much larger, not faster, and heavier to manouvre. and a destroyer is also vilnerable to near misses.

and while the navy was in port, i belive they would be badly mauled by bombers.

GBrutus
12-04-2009, 09:34 AM
Why read the whole 6 pages when some on here won't even read a whole book before misquoting statistics from it? http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

hop2002
12-04-2009, 09:45 AM
So, if it's possible for Germany to control the English Channel for a period of time, as they showed they were more than capable of doing - even with the RAF fully intact - why wouldn't they be able to do it with the RAF taken out of the equation?

They didn't "control" the channel. It's known as the channel dash for a reason.

The circumstances are totally unlike. The British thought the Germans might try to retreat through the channel, and it would provide them an opportunity for a crack at the German ships. But a German retreat hardly warranted as much attention as a German invasion of the UK.

And of course the Germans chose the worst possible weather conditions for that retreat. Heavy fog, middle of winter, some airfields in the UK snowed in. Ideal weather for sending some warships through the channel without being observed, not the sort of weather you want to mount an invasion in.

The problem with a German invasion is it wouldn't be a dash. It would be a slow meander across the channel, a day or two anchored off the beaches unloading, a meander back to France, then the whole thing repeated for weeks on end. Oh, and it would be in good summer weather.

barfo1983
12-04-2009, 12:06 PM
Slapton Sands x 1000

psykopatsak
12-04-2009, 12:20 PM
It would be a slow meander across the channel, a day or two anchored off the beaches unloading, a meander back to France, then the whole thing repeated for weeks on end.

i dont think the _Landing_ would take a day or two. these were still when the germans were blitzkrieg, most likeley a dump off and then go back for more. the wehrmacht were very good at organising crossings of rivers and the like, i dont believe this would be much different.

thefruitbat
12-04-2009, 12:29 PM
Originally posted by psykopatsak:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">It would be a slow meander across the channel, a day or two anchored off the beaches unloading, a meander back to France, then the whole thing repeated for weeks on end.

i dont think the _Landing_ would take a day or two. these were still when the germans were blitzkrieg, most likeley a dump off and then go back for more. the wehrmacht were very good at organising crossings of rivers and the like, i dont believe this would be much different. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, crossing the channel is just like a river, hahahaha http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif

barfo1983
12-04-2009, 12:31 PM
They didn't have the ability to 'dump' any thing. They have to anchor their 1/2 mile long barge trains off the beaches and unload the equipment by hoisting it onto rafts with cranes, as only a few of barges had been modified with ramps.

Imagine the first barge in a 5 barge train being destroyed or swamped mid channel. Now you have four barges adrift. After the fiacso of unloading, they'd have to untangle and stage the remaining barges with the remaining tugs and try to head slowly back across the channel

psykopatsak
12-04-2009, 02:00 PM
oh, well then no, it would be hard. and another thing - if the forward airbases got derstroyed, RAF could build some new ones further inland, beyond the reach of the Me109, so i dont think that the luftwaffe could have destroyed the RAF.

Scolar
12-04-2009, 02:04 PM
Would the Germans have been able to beat France and the Expeditionary force if they did not have Panzers and the blitzkrieg tactic?

Would the Germans have been able to put up a good fight at the battle of britain without 109s?

yuuppers
12-04-2009, 03:00 PM
Originally posted by psykopatsak:
i dont think the _Landing_ would take a day or two. these were still when the germans were blitzkrieg, most likeley a dump off and then go back for more. the wehrmacht were very good at organising crossings of rivers and the like, i dont believe this would be much different.

For your reading pleasure
http://web.archive.org/web/200...uk/althist/seal1.htm (http://web.archive.org/web/20070504034219/http://www.flin.demon.co.uk/althist/seal1.htm)

Viper2005_
12-04-2009, 03:02 PM
What these discussions tend to forget is that for every design which was put into production there were several which didn't quite make it.

In the absence of the Spitfire, the chances are that the RAF would have had Martin-Baker MB2s or Miles M20s, which would have of course received a great deal more development assistance from the Government in the absence of the Spitfire competing for resources.

Likewise, the absence of the Bf-109, the chances are that Heinkel would have stepped in to fill the void, probably with considerable success...

GBrutus
12-04-2009, 03:51 PM
Very good point, Viper.

psykopatsak
12-04-2009, 04:54 PM
interesting read. also, it might explain how they eventually lost the war...

Kettenhunde
12-04-2009, 04:58 PM
They didn't "control" the channel.

Sure they did....

The Royal Navy knew the Germans were going to move their capital ships and were actively trying to prevent it.

It did not work. The Germans stopped all British attacks and did in fact control the channel.

MM-Zorin
12-04-2009, 05:29 PM
Wait a second. Given air superiority for the Luftwaffe:

1. Royal Navy harbours would be prime targets.
2. RN ships on the move, not always steaming wild at 30kn, would be threatened by bombers, Stukas and u-boats. With the harbours and storages for coal, diesel and what have you being destroyed by the bombers saving on resources would be the main goal. IMO, the RN would have most likely taken refuge in US waters.
3. Air superiority would also mean no supplies would reach Great Britain. As the Kriegsmarine would have made sure in the North Atlantic along with the U-boat flotillas in the rest of the Atlantic.
4. This leaves use with a Great Britain being bled out, therefor no one would need to rush an invasion. Of course, this would have given Germany good terms to negotiate a surrender of the British Islands on.

stalkervision
12-04-2009, 05:30 PM
I envision massive low altitude combined german early morning and night time parachute drops in the invasion zones and on strategic airfields,control centers and landing areas allowing the Germans to bring in gliders with heavier equipment. At the same time s boats , u-boats and the Luftwaffe would run cover for towed in military barges by german destroyers. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

Gumtree
12-04-2009, 06:51 PM
I think the point of the royal navy fighting without air cover is misleading.
As I see it the ships would withdraw out of range of the German fighters to where the RAF could deploy the already stated cover away from the german fighters, thus if the Germans chased them they would be an unescorted group deep in RAF territory.

At night the same fast ships would sail in and slaughter the invasion barges. Before light the navy would withdraw again and if the Germans follow would be pounced on by the British fighters.

The total air superiority over Kent is only the beginning, the RAF would withdraw to their fields out of German fighter range and thus still be a force to recon with.

The general consensus I get from reading biographies from the war is that there was little support from the navy and even many army commanders for the venture.

It is easy to hypothesize after the fact but in my opinion if the Germans tried to cross they would have been slaughtered.

Have a look at D Day and just think for a moment what resources where used by the allies at Normandy.

After initial hardship where the invasion attempt was stopped. The biggest issue facing the British would have been where to put all the POW camps, not to mention the overworked search and rescue units.

Kettenhunde
12-04-2009, 06:58 PM
Stalin was most definitely not going to attack Germany in 1940, nor anytime soon.

I definitely agree that the notion was pretty far fetched and Stalin was in no position to take any real offensive military action in the west.

Remember, we have the benefit of hindsight. It is interesting to consider the views of the Nazi’s and the influence on their strategic policy.


Hitler jumped right after Stalin purged his military and before he could start to build a cadre to meet his desires, unquestioningly loyal since the rest are dead. Just a matter of time lines IMO.



Stalin was certainly lurking in the east. I have no doubt that Hitler would have made that part of his claculations.


He in fact did - the Germans were already considering calling the whole thing off in July 1940, and delaying it to 1941 due to political developments in the East.


Absolutely. The Soviet threat of invasion was very real to the Nazi's. They did a very good job in passing this paranoia onto the German military and society as a whole.

Many of the Luftwaffe veterans we have interviewed to this day feel like Germany saved the West in their preemptive invasion of the Soviet Union.

That is there take on it.

I think Hitler really felt like England and Germany would negotiate for peace especially after Dunkirk.

The whole Phony war with England and France and equally surprising to the Germans success in the Battle of France/Invasion west were a side show/distraction from the real goal of "stopping" the Soviets and Jews. This is clearly outlined in Mein Kampf were Hitler reveals a "Jewish and Communist" allegiance to take over the world. Yeah the guy was off his rocker, but in his mind it existed.

I think the "invasion" of England was a credible threat in as much as it needed to be to achieve that negotiated peace. Certainly Germany would have conquered England given the chance but I don't think Hitler ever felt that would be necessary and in his mind, the English would eventually come to the table or suffer defeat whether he invaded in 1940 or not. There was no pressing action that needed to be taken west. The RAF was in no position to launch raids of any consequence and England simply did not have the power to cause any real damage or do anything about Occupied Europe. The English were marginalized by the Channel in 1940 as much as they were saved by it. It is an obstacle without political allegiance.

Given time, I think Hitler felt England would grow weary and at worst a negotiated peace could be reached.

From the Nazi point of view, the imminent danger lay to the East with the "Jewish and Communist" allegiance planning to strike west.


The volume has recently been reprinted in paperback by William Morrow & Co. Years later he modified his views on this matter, remarking that Hitler's "decision was woven of several threads." He said that General Blumentritt, Rundstedt's ex-Chief-of-Staff, had told him that "the 'halt' had been called for more than military reasons, and that it was part of a political scheme to make peace easier to reach. If the BEF had been captured at Dunkirk, the British might have felt that their honor had suffered a stain which they must wipe out. By letting it escape Hitler hoped to conciliate them." B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970) pp74-5, 77, 80-3.

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v02/v02p375_Lutton.html

Buzzsaw-
12-04-2009, 08:01 PM
Salute

I notice the usual bafflegab from the Axis partisans, replete with misinformation and supposition. Crumpp's '...56 Destroyers sunk at Dunkirk' is particularly funny.

The British Military College at Sandhurst, as do most professional military institutes, conducts regular 'Wargame' exercises to determine the feasibility of military plans. They do with the best experts in the field and with access to all the details involved in moving large formations, supply, combat etc.

In 1974, they invited many of the original participants from both sides of the BoB, to an exercise to determine if a German invasion would have succeeded.

Following is a short form of the results of the Wargame.

>>>

Operation Sealion - summary of an exercise held at the
Staff College, Sandhurst in 1974.

The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox. The scenario
is based on the known plans of each side, plus previously
unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940.
Each side (played by British and German officers respectively)
was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted
on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School
of Infantry. The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland,
Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher
Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz
Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.

The main problem the Germans face is that are a) the
Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible
invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides
(for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until
late September to assemble the necessary shipping.

22nd September - morning
The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches
at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between
Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton).
In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield.

The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during
the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one
CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged,
whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings
which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations
were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions
in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three
were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on
the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised
brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were
identified.

Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200
fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF
even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs,
but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their
short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible
into the Pas de Calais.

22nd - 23rd September
The Germans had still not captured a major port, although
they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading
on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing
raids and then further losses at their ports in France.

The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost
contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with
supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to
run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats
and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However
a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was
completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs
inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the
Channel. German shipping losses on the first day
amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially
the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.

23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs.
The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and
70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such
that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large
forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a
German buildup in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to
the South West.

The German Navy were despondant about their losses,
especially as the loss of barges was seriously
dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce
commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for
the transfer of the next echelon continued along with
the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses
of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters
and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides
overestimated losses inflicted by 50%.

The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although
long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind
commando group interdicted the runways. The first British
counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured
brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings.
7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive
anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with sticky
bombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken
Newhaven (the only German port), however the New Zealand
Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the
rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on
Dover having lost 35% casualties.

Sep 23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs
Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort,
with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF
persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of
this effort was directed for ground support and air
resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover
over the Channel. The Home Fleet had pulled out of air
range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs
and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little
surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs
entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats,
they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German
flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at
dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing
all their DDs and 7 E-Boats.

The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many
cases these were incomplete and waiting for their
second echelon to arrive that night. The weather
was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision
to sail was referred up the chain of command.

23rd Sep 1900 - Sep 24th dawn
The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter
inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second
echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the
weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat
rendered the Channel indefensible without air support.
Goring countered this by saying it could only be done
by stopped the terror bombing of London, which in turn
Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by.

The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only
440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and
once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in
early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost
another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides
overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for
inflated figures.

On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover
and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses
around Newhaven when the 45th Div and Australians
attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave,
but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By
the time the order reached the ports, the second wave
could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th
divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not
be reinforced at all.

Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th
The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats,
E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th
destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off
the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn
committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded
with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two
CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The
faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone,
but the port had been so badly damaged that they could
only unload two at a time.

The failure on the crossing meant that the German
situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient
ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without
extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead.
Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland
and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as
further British arracks hemmed them in tighter. Fast
steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation
via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed
on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest
were killed or captured.

Kettenhunde
12-04-2009, 08:11 PM
I notice the usual bafflegab


Obviously you are incapable of having anything resembling an adult conversation about this period of history.

At least read what people write. You won't look so stupid if you do that. If you have questions, just ask.


Following is a short form of the results of the Wargame.

Key phrase.....


the Wargame.

The results of which very much supports what I wrote....


Crumpp says:
I think the "invasion" of England was a credible threat in as much as it needed to be to achieve that negotiated peace.

Think real hard on the difference between a successful invasion outcome of unconditional surrender and a negotiated peace.

Can you do that?


Crumpp says:
The English were marginalized by the Channel in 1940 as much as they were saved by it. It is an obstacle without political allegiance.

I will go back to ignoring you.

Buzzsaw-
12-04-2009, 08:32 PM
Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">I notice the usual bafflegab


Obviously you are incapable of having anything resembling an adult conversation about this period of history.

I will go back to ignoring you. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Feel free to ignore me, I will feel free to correct your errors.

When people put forward clearly false information, and make claims which are not substantiated by any of the facts, any thinking person will tend to regard the source of that 'information' and those 'claims' with some levity. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif

For example:

The claim that the Germans were not really serious about invading England does not stand up to the facts.

The Germans moved a substantial military force to the Channel, (why would they do that if they were so concerned about the Soviets?) diverted much of their river barge resources, (which meant a loss of economic output in the Rhine basin), engaged their military in heavy invasion training regimes, built invasion specific tank types, drew up plans for the administration of Britain, (which included plans for special 'Einzatzgruppen' units to arrest and execute large numbers of Britain's population)

Below is a link to a .pdf which has the invasion planning order of battle with details of the tasks to be carried out by each unit as well as the resources available.

http://www.kretsen.nu/bytebatt...ts/SEALION%20OOB.pdf (http://www.kretsen.nu/bytebattler/documents/SEALION%20OOB.pdf)

By the way, your attempt to undermine the credibility of the Sandhurst Exercise by pointing to the fact it was a 'wargame' just underlines your ignorance of affairs military.

If you think your poorly informed speculation on this thread should even be considered on the same level as the detailed analysis of the trained staff of one of the world's leading military colleges, not to mentione those military officers of both sides who were there in 1940, and who participated in this wargame, then your level of arrogance is really quite stunning.

Kettenhunde
12-04-2009, 08:38 PM
The claim that the Germans were not really serious about invading England does not stand up to the facts.

I never said that....




Crumpp says:
I think the "invasion" of England was a credible threat in as much as it needed to be to achieve that negotiated peace.


Crumpp says:
Certainly Germany would have conquered England given the chance but I don't think Hitler ever felt that would be necessary and in his mind, the English would eventually come to the table or suffer defeat whether he invaded in 1940 or not.


Maybe you should read what people write instead of reacting emotionally?

This is why you get ignored most of the time.

Buzzsaw-
12-04-2009, 08:45 PM
Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The claim that the Germans were not really serious about invading England does not stand up to the facts.

I never said that....
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Is that right?


Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"> the Germans were already considering calling the whole thing off in July 1940, and delaying it to 1941 due to political developments in the East.


Absolutely. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

You clearly agree with the comment that the Germans were not serious about invading.

In fact, the plans for invasion were going ahead with all possible speed in July 1940.

Kettenhunde
12-04-2009, 08:49 PM
You clearly imply the Germans were not serious about invading.


It is a fact the Germans were considering calling it off. They considered quite a few options including going ahead with it.

Just like England, they planned for all contingencies.

What I said was...


Crumpp says:
I think the "invasion" of England was a credible threat in as much as it needed to be to achieve that negotiated peace. Certainly Germany would have conquered England given the chance but I don't think Hitler ever felt that would be necessary and in his mind, the English would eventually come to the table or suffer defeat whether he invaded in 1940 or not.

Next, let's not selectively quote things out of context in order to make them fit your agenda, buzzsaw.




<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">IN REPLY TO THREE QUOTES FROM OTHER THREAD PARTICIPANTS AGREEING THAT THE SOVIET THREAT WAS VERY REAL TO THE GERMANS


Crumpp says:

Absolutely. The Soviet threat of invasion was very real to the Nazi's. They did a very good job in passing this paranoia onto the German military and society as a whole. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


just underlines your ignorance of affairs military.

You do know I was Career Military and now retired?

Wargames are just that, buzzsaw,.....games.

They are just "what if's" based on certain assumptions. Actual conflict is where those assumptions are confirmed or denied, not a peacetime MAPEX.

History is full of peace time assumptions formed during wargames that turn out to be just plain wrong in actual conflict.

What is your next excuse for reacting with childish emotions and not understanding anything but simple direct thoughts?

Buzzsaw-
12-04-2009, 11:15 PM
Originally posted by Kettenhunde:

It is a fact the Germans were considering calling it off. They considered quite a few options including going ahead with it.

You really keep digging yourself a hole don't you Crumpp? http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif

The German Armed Forces may have considered any number of options, BUT when Hitler issued his directives, they ACTED.

June 13th 1940, after Dunkirk, and as the remainder of France is overrun and her government perpares to sign the June 22nd armistice, Hitler convened a conference at the Berghof and ordered the Wehrmacht to prepare invasion plans for Britain.

On June 16th 1940 he issues Hitler Directive #16 entitled: ON PREPARATIONS FOR AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST ENGLAND, and codenamed Seelöwe (Sealion)


Since Britain still shows no sign of willingness to come to an agreement in spite of her hopeless military situation, I have decided to prepare and if necessary carry out an amphibious operation against England.

The purpose of this operation will be to eliminate the English mother country as a base for continuation of the war against Germany and, if it should become necessary, to occupy the entire island.

To this end I order as follows:

1. The amphibious operation must be carried out as a surprise crossing on a broad front extending approximately from Ramsgate to the region of the Isle of Wight, with Luftwaffe elements assuming the role of artillery, and naval units assuming the role of engineers.

Each individual branch of the Wehrmacht will examine from its own viewpoint whether it appears practicable to carry out subsidiary operations, for example to occupy the Isle of Wight or Cornwall County, prior to the general crossing, and will report its findings to me. I reserve the decision to myself.

Preparations for the overall operations must be completed by mid-August.

2. These preparations will include the creation of conditions which will make a landing in England possible:

1. The British air force must be so far neutralized, both actually and in morale, that it will offer no appreciable resistance to the German crossing operation;

2. Lanes must be cleared of mines;

3. Both outlets of the Straits of Dover, and the west entrance to the English Channel in a line approximately from Alderney to Portland, must be sealed off by a dense belt of mines;

4. The coastal areas must be commanded and covered by the fire of heavy coastal artillery;

5. It is desirable that all British naval forces should be tied down in action, both in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean - here by the Italians - shortly before the crossing; efforts must be made now already by means of air and torpedo attacks to weaken as far as possible the British naval forces presently in those waters.

3. Organization of Command and Preparations. Under my command and in accordance with my general directives the commanders in chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht will direct the operations of their forces employed in the operation.

From 1 August on, the operations staffs of the commanders in chief of the Army, the Navy, and the Luftwaffe must be within the area with a maximum radius of 30 miles from my headquarters at Ziegenberg.

To me it appears advisable for the most vital elements of the operations staffs of the commanders in chief of the Army and the Navy to occupy mutual premises in Giessen.

The commander in chief of the Army will thus have to establish an army group headquarters to conduct the operations of the landing armies.


General Franz Halder, who was Chief of the German Defence Staff, noted in his diary that he took the directive as an order for immediate preparations and began such.

At that point, Hitler still had some hopes the British might surrender of their own accord. In support of that, Hitler made a 'Peace Offer' during a speech at the Reichstag on July 19th. He also extended diplomatic feelers through Switzerland.

But his demands included the surrender of a large proportion of the British fleet, and reduction in their airforce, and the offers were not even replied to by the British government.

All of the above clearly proves your claim that the threat of invasion was just a ploy to force a negotiated peace is clearly false.


Crumpp says:
I think the "invasion" of England was a credible threat in as much as it needed to be to achieve that negotiated peace.

In fact there was absolutely no chance of negotiations, the British had not even replied to the diplomatic notes sent.

Instead of Hitler's hoped for crack in British solidarity, the opposite happened. All British political parties joined together in a Unity government, and determined to fight on whatever the odds, as Churchill's famous '...we shall never surrender..." speech made clear:



...we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.


Hitler's response was move ahead with the invasion. The assault divisions, (40 in total) and their support and Corps HQ had already been ordered to the Channel coast by Field-Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, senior general on the West Front, the Army was placed under the tactical command of General Gerd Von Rundstedt.

On July 21st, after the British rejection, Hitler convened a conference of the commanders of the German armed forces. During the conference, Admiral Erich Raeder, the commander of the German navy said the Kriegsmarine could not guarantee the invasion on its own, and would require the Luftwaffe to secure Air Superiority prior to any invasion attempt. Goering, the head of the Luftwaffe stated he could provide air superiority, and agreed to undertake that.

On that basis, on August 1st, Hitler issued an order to OKW, (OberKommandoWest, the Headquarters for the German Army in the West) Directive #17, entitled: ON THE CONDUCT OF AIR AND NAVAL WARFARE AGAINST ENGLAND, which stated:



For the purpose of creating conditions for the final defeat of Britain, I intend continuing air and naval warfare against the English motherland in a more severe form than hitherto.

For this purpose I order as follows:

1. The Luftwaffe will employ all forces available to eliminate the British air force as soon as possible. In the initial stages, attacks will be directed primarily against the hostile air forces and their ground service organization and supply installations, and against air armament industries, including factories producing AAA equipment.

2. Once temporary or local air superiority is achieved, operations will continue against ports, particularly against installations for the storage of food, and against food storage installations farther inland. In view of intended future German operations, attacks against ports on the south coast of England will be restricted to a minimum.

3. Air operations against hostile naval and merchant ships will be considered a secondary mission during this phase unless particularly lucrative fleeting opportunities offer or unless such action will achieve increased effects in the operations prescribed under Item 2, above, or in the case of operations serving to train aircraft crews for the continued conduct of air warfare.

4. The intensified air offensive will be so conducted that adequately strong air forces can be made available whenever required to support naval operations against favourable fleeting targets. In addition, the Luftwaffe will remain prepared to render effective support for Operation Sea Lion.

5. Terrorization attacks as retaliatory measures will be carried out only on orders from me.

6. Intensified air warfare can commence at any time from 5 August on. The Luftwaffe will itself determine the deadline after completion of its preparations and in accordance with weather conditions.


The whole enormous apparatus of the German Army, Navy and Airforce had been set in motion, with the objective being the invasion and conquest of Britain.

But with the failure and defeat of the Luftwaffe attempt to achieve air superiority over the landing grounds and the elimination of the RAF as a fighting force, Hitler was forced to call off the invasion.

On to another one of Crumpp's errors:


Crumpp says:

Wargames are just that, buzzsaw,.....games.

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif

For someone who says he was career military, you sure lack the basics.

Military Wargames are systematic attempts to reseach and analysis real military situations from the perspective of confirmed knowledge.

For example, using another invasion planning scenario:

In December of 1943, Montgomery was appointed to command the Allied Army which would invade France. (Eisenhower was the overall commander, Montgomery was the tactical commander and drew up all plans for the invasion)

The previous COSSAC Staff which had been planning the invasion of France had decided on Normandy, and had drawn up a plan for an invasion of three divisions, supported by one parachute division.

The first thing Montgomery did was commission a wargame using the original COSSAC plan. He felt the invasion frontage was too small, and the chances of the Germans being able to isolate and confine the Allies in the beachhhead was too great. The Allies would not be able to land divisions as fast as the Germans could reinforce the line.

The result of the wargame, was exactly that, the Allied beachhead was confined and isolated.

In response, Montgomery expanded the number of Allied Assault divisions to 5, increased the number of Parachute divisions to three, expanded the coastal area where the initial landings would occur, and expanded hugely the inland area the Para divisions would seize, in order to expand the overall size of the initial beachhead.

He felt it was crucially important for the initial lodgement area to be big enough to allow the follow up troops to be brought ashore, along with all the supporting artillery etc.

And he was proven correct, the expanded invasion area proved JUST big enough, the Germans initially were able to reinforce their Normandy lines faster than the Allies could land divisions and for quite a while the Allies were confined to a very small space before they finally broke out. If the original plan had been adherred to, the invasion would likely have been a failure.

All of this clearly proves that wargames have a basis in fact, they are valuable tools to allow a better forecast of the results of a particular planned operation.

The fact that you don't grasp this is mystifying. Someone who claims to be career military, and who then turns around and debunks the type of planning and testing military institutes and staffs do on a routine basis, indicates real failure in basic military understanding.

K_Freddie
12-05-2009, 12:11 AM
With regard to and Axis landing, the Brits, AFAIR did not have much in the way of decent weaponery left, after Dunkirk. An Axis invasion within weeks of Dunkirk would have had the allies reeling. Focussed Blitzkrieg, if the Germans 'stayed on target', would have won the day, not without caualties, but definitely gained a strong foothold, enough for a breakout invasion.

Also remember on the political front in England, many were in 'support' of Hitler (down here in SA there was about 41% support for Hitler), and this would have reared it's ugly head, stabbing Churchill and others in the rear. Confusion at the helm defense might have led to chaos in the defending forces. I think the Wargames were not a real representation of would could have happened.
http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_cool.gif

Buzzsaw-
12-05-2009, 12:15 AM
Salute

Some of the 'bluff' preparations for the invasion:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/de/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101II-MW-5675-29%2C_Unternehmen_Seel%C3%B6we_%2C_umgebauer_Pz._K pfw._III.jpg

The Germans converted nearly 200 tanks to the amphibious role specifically for the invasion.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/01/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101II-MW-5674-39%2C_Unternehmen_Seel%C3%B6we.jpg

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101II-MW-5674-43%2C_%C3%9Cbungen_mit_Panzer_III_f%C3%BCr_Unterne hmen_Seel%C3%B6we.jpg

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f3/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101II-MN-1369-10A%2C_Wilhelmshaven%2C_Prahme_f%C3%BCr_%22Unterne hmen_Seel%C3%B6we%22.jpg

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/50/Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1970-084-11%2C_Fecamp%2C_%C3%9Cbung_zum_Unternehmen_%22Seel %C3%B6we%22.jpg

By the way, the British night bombing campaign destroyed between 20-30% of the barges which had been brought to the French ports from the Rhine.

Von_Rat
12-05-2009, 12:59 AM
Originally posted by Gumtree:
I think the point of the royal navy fighting without air cover is misleading.
As I see it the ships would withdraw out of range of the German fighters to where the RAF could deploy the already stated cover away from the german fighters, thus if the Germans chased them they would be an unescorted group deep in RAF territory.

At night the same fast ships would sail in and slaughter the invasion barges. Before light the navy would withdraw again and if the Germans follow would be pounced on by the British fighters.

The total air superiority over Kent is only the beginning, the RAF would withdraw to their fields out of German fighter range and thus still be a force to recon with.

The general consensus I get from reading biographies from the war is that there was little support from the navy and even many army commanders for the venture.

It is easy to hypothesize after the fact but in my opinion if the Germans tried to cross they would have been slaughtered.

Have a look at D Day and just think for a moment what resources where used by the allies at Normandy.



bingo

the germans would NEVER have had total air control over the channel during an invasion.

IN REAL LIFE the raf had plans to withdraw out of the 109s range if losses reached a certain point. it would then be recomitted in the event of an invasion.

true southern england would of took a pounding if the raf was forced to pull back. but im sure the brits would of stood up to the pounding.

the combination of the RN plus the recomitted raf would of slaughtered any german invasion attempt.

Xiolablu3
12-05-2009, 03:44 AM
Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"> They didn't "control" the channel.

Sure they did....

The Royal Navy knew the Germans were going to move their capital ships and were actively trying to prevent it.

It did not work. The Germans stopped all British attacks and did in fact control the channel. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Only for a very short time. Also 'controlling the channel' suggests they could sit there at will and have military superiority - this is definitely not the case.

Its seen as a victory because the small German Navy managed to 'escape' the powerful Royal Navy and RAF. They managed local superiority around the ships only and it was RAF and Navy blunders and bad weather which helped them get through.

The 'victory' was that a German force managed to 'escape' through the channel. A bit like Dunkirk was a victory for the British by escaping across the channel.

orville07
12-05-2009, 03:45 AM
Originally posted by Buzzsaw-:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kettenhunde:

It is a fact the Germans were considering calling it off. They considered quite a few options including going ahead with it.

You really keep digging yourself a hole don't you Crumpp? http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif

The German Armed Forces may have considered any number of options, BUT when Hitler issued his directives, they ACTED.

June 13th 1940, after Dunkirk, and as the remainder of France is overrun and her government perpares to sign the June 22nd armistice, Hitler convened a conference at the Berghof and ordered the Wehrmacht to prepare invasion plans for Britain.

On June 16th 1940 he issues Hitler Directive #16 entitled: ON PREPARATIONS FOR AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST ENGLAND, and codenamed Seelöwe (Sealion)


Since Britain still shows no sign of willingness to come to an agreement in spite of her hopeless military situation, I have decided to prepare and if necessary carry out an amphibious operation against England.

The purpose of this operation will be to eliminate the English mother country as a base for continuation of the war against Germany and, if it should become necessary, to occupy the entire island.

To this end I order as follows:

1. The amphibious operation must be carried out as a surprise crossing on a broad front extending approximately from Ramsgate to the region of the Isle of Wight, with Luftwaffe elements assuming the role of artillery, and naval units assuming the role of engineers.

Each individual branch of the Wehrmacht will examine from its own viewpoint whether it appears practicable to carry out subsidiary operations, for example to occupy the Isle of Wight or Cornwall County, prior to the general crossing, and will report its findings to me. I reserve the decision to myself.

Preparations for the overall operations must be completed by mid-August.

2. These preparations will include the creation of conditions which will make a landing in England possible:

1. The British air force must be so far neutralized, both actually and in morale, that it will offer no appreciable resistance to the German crossing operation;

2. Lanes must be cleared of mines;

3. Both outlets of the Straits of Dover, and the west entrance to the English Channel in a line approximately from Alderney to Portland, must be sealed off by a dense belt of mines;

4. The coastal areas must be commanded and covered by the fire of heavy coastal artillery;

5. It is desirable that all British naval forces should be tied down in action, both in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean - here by the Italians - shortly before the crossing; efforts must be made now already by means of air and torpedo attacks to weaken as far as possible the British naval forces presently in those waters.

3. Organization of Command and Preparations. Under my command and in accordance with my general directives the commanders in chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht will direct the operations of their forces employed in the operation.

From 1 August on, the operations staffs of the commanders in chief of the Army, the Navy, and the Luftwaffe must be within the area with a maximum radius of 30 miles from my headquarters at Ziegenberg.

To me it appears advisable for the most vital elements of the operations staffs of the commanders in chief of the Army and the Navy to occupy mutual premises in Giessen.

The commander in chief of the Army will thus have to establish an army group headquarters to conduct the operations of the landing armies.


General Franz Halder, who was Chief of the German Defence Staff, noted in his diary that he took the directive as an order for immediate preparations and began such.

At that point, Hitler still had some hopes the British might surrender of their own accord. In support of that, Hitler made a 'Peace Offer' during a speech at the Reichstag on July 19th. He also extended diplomatic feelers through Switzerland.

But his demands included the surrender of a large proportion of the British fleet, and reduction in their airforce, and the offers were not even replied to by the British government.

All of the above clearly proves your claim that the threat of invasion was just a ploy to force a negotiated peace is clearly false.


Crumpp says:
I think the "invasion" of England was a credible threat in as much as it needed to be to achieve that negotiated peace.

In fact there was absolutely no chance of negotiations, the British had not even replied to the diplomatic notes sent.

Instead of Hitler's hoped for crack in British solidarity, the opposite happened. All British political parties joined together in a Unity government, and determined to fight on whatever the odds, as Churchill's famous '...we shall never surrender..." speech made clear:



...we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.


Hitler's response was move ahead with the invasion. The assault divisions, (40 in total) and their support and Corps HQ had already been ordered to the Channel coast by Field-Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, senior general on the West Front, the Army was placed under the tactical command of General Gerd Von Rundstedt.

On July 21st, after the British rejection, Hitler convened a conference of the commanders of the German armed forces. During the conference, Admiral Erich Raeder, the commander of the German navy said the Kriegsmarine could not guarantee the invasion on its own, and would require the Luftwaffe to secure Air Superiority prior to any invasion attempt. Goering, the head of the Luftwaffe stated he could provide air superiority, and agreed to undertake that.

On that basis, on August 1st, Hitler issued an order to OKW, (OberKommandoWest, the Headquarters for the German Army in the West) Directive #17, entitled: ON THE CONDUCT OF AIR AND NAVAL WARFARE AGAINST ENGLAND, which stated:



For the purpose of creating conditions for the final defeat of Britain, I intend continuing air and naval warfare against the English motherland in a more severe form than hitherto.

For this purpose I order as follows:

1. The Luftwaffe will employ all forces available to eliminate the British air force as soon as possible. In the initial stages, attacks will be directed primarily against the hostile air forces and their ground service organization and supply installations, and against air armament industries, including factories producing AAA equipment.

2. Once temporary or local air superiority is achieved, operations will continue against ports, particularly against installations for the storage of food, and against food storage installations farther inland. In view of intended future German operations, attacks against ports on the south coast of England will be restricted to a minimum.

3. Air operations against hostile naval and merchant ships will be considered a secondary mission during this phase unless particularly lucrative fleeting opportunities offer or unless such action will achieve increased effects in the operations prescribed under Item 2, above, or in the case of operations serving to train aircraft crews for the continued conduct of air warfare.

4. The intensified air offensive will be so conducted that adequately strong air forces can be made available whenever required to support naval operations against favourable fleeting targets. In addition, the Luftwaffe will remain prepared to render effective support for Operation Sea Lion.

5. Terrorization attacks as retaliatory measures will be carried out only on orders from me.

6. Intensified air warfare can commence at any time from 5 August on. The Luftwaffe will itself determine the deadline after completion of its preparations and in accordance with weather conditions.


The whole enormous apparatus of the German Army, Navy and Airforce had been set in motion, with the objective being the invasion and conquest of Britain.

But with the failure and defeat of the Luftwaffe attempt to achieve air superiority over the landing grounds and the elimination of the RAF as a fighting force, Hitler was forced to call off the invasion.

On to another one of Crumpp's errors:


Crumpp says:

Wargames are just that, buzzsaw,.....games.

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif

For someone who says he was career military, you sure lack the basics.

Military Wargames are systematic attempts to reseach and analysis real military situations from the perspective of confirmed knowledge.

For example, using another invasion planning scenario:

In December of 1943, Montgomery was appointed to command the Allied Army which would invade France. (Eisenhower was the overall commander, Montgomery was the tactical commander and drew up all plans for the invasion)

The previous COSSAC Staff which had been planning the invasion of France had decided on Normandy, and had drawn up a plan for an invasion of three divisions, supported by one parachute division.

The first thing Montgomery did was commission a wargame using the original COSSAC plan. He felt the invasion frontage was too small, and the chances of the Germans being able to isolate and confine the Allies in the beachhhead was too great. The Allies would not be able to land divisions as fast as the Germans could reinforce the line.

The result of the wargame, was exactly that, the Allied beachhead was confined and isolated.

In response, Montgomery expanded the number of Allied Assault divisions to 5, increased the number of Parachute divisions to three, expanded the coastal area where the initial landings would occur, and expanded hugely the inland area the Para divisions would seize, in order to expand the overall size of the initial beachhead.

He felt it was crucially important for the initial lodgement area to be big enough to allow the follow up troops to be brought ashore, along with all the supporting artillery etc.

And he was proven correct, the expanded invasion area proved JUST big enough, the Germans initially were able to reinforce their Normandy lines faster than the Allies could land divisions and for quite a while the Allies were confined to a very small space before they finally broke out. If the original plan had been adherred to, the invasion would likely have been a failure.

All of this clearly proves that wargames have a basis in fact, they are valuable tools to allow a better forecast of the results of a particular planned operation.

The fact that you don't grasp this is mystifying. Someone who claims to be career military, and who then turns around and debunks the type of planning and testing military institutes and staffs do on a routine basis, indicates real failure in basic military understanding. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Bravo, Buzzsaw http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/clap.gif. Congratulations on a comprehensive annihilation and debunking of the erroneous "The Germans were not really serious" about Sealion speculation. I was about to make some of these points myself, but you beat me to it....Excellent job.

I too am mystified as to why some people seem to think they know better than Armed forces members of both sides who were actually there. There is a reason it is well documented that the Wehrmacht were "less than enthusiastic" about the idea. It is because they knew they could not succeed. When the ludicrously mustachiod one and resident maniac Herr Hitler said "Jump" however, they all had to fall in line with his ineffable Diktats and say "how high?"

The term "Wargame" is almost an oxymoron, and belies the utmost seriousness and gravity of their purpose....They are in fact an exercise in determining a likely outcome based on available knowledge, prior experience and evidence. An exercise which is of extreme utility in preparations, as shown by your D-Day example.

The "evidence" that a sucessful invasion of Southern England would be possible does not bear up to close scrutiny, in fact the argument that it could be accomplished at that time falls apart at the seams.


I'll repeat this quote from Grossadmiral Dönitz for posterity, in case some missed it.

"We possessed neither control of the air or the sea; nor were we in any position to gain it".

- Karl Dönitz

A succint and damning observation as to the plans inevitably disastrous consequences, a Grossadmirals first hand, expert analysis. Case rests. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/partyhat.gif

Xiolablu3
12-05-2009, 03:52 AM
Orville lets keep this mature pls, theres no need for the personal remarks.

Crumpp has a different opinion, and if we all agreed there'd be nothing to debate.

orville07
12-05-2009, 04:50 AM
Originally posted by Xiolablu3:
Orville lets keep this mature pls, theres no need for the personal remarks.

Crumpp has a different opinion, and if we all agreed there'd be nothing to debate.

Ok Xiolablu, fair play....But please note I did not refer to anyone "personally", it was a very generic statement. I stand by the assertion that those who were involved do indeed "know better" however, and I see nothing offensive in pointing this fact out, and believe me nor was any intended. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif Yes, opinions are what its all about....and long may they continue, can't argue with that mate. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

orville07
12-05-2009, 05:11 AM
Originally posted by orville07:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Xiolablu3:
Orville lets keep this mature pls, theres no need for the personal remarks.

Crumpp has a different opinion, and if we all agreed there'd be nothing to debate.

Ok Xiolablu, fair play....But please note I did not refer to anyone "personally", it was a very generic statement. I stand by the assertion that those who were involved do indeed "know better" however, and I see nothing offensive in pointing this fact out, and believe me nor was any intended. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif Yes, opinions are what its all about....and long may they continue, can't argue with that mate. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

PS I'll do an edit, it might have come across as a bit cheeky, but no malice aforethought.

Xiolablu3
12-05-2009, 05:15 AM
Originally posted by orville07:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Xiolablu3:
Orville lets keep this mature pls, theres no need for the personal remarks.

Crumpp has a different opinion, and if we all agreed there'd be nothing to debate.

Ok Xiolablu, fair play....But please note I did not refer to anyone "personally", it was a very generic statement. I stand by the assertion that those who were involved do indeed "know better" however, and I see nothing offensive in pointing this fact out, and believe me nor was any intended. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif Yes, opinions are what its all about....and long may they continue, can't argue with that mate. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sorry Orville, I read the thread backwards (starting at the back) stupidly. I notice that it deteriorated long before your post.

Buzzsaw is the one I should have been addressing, not you. The thread went downhill as soon as he posted. Apologies.

orville07
12-05-2009, 05:39 AM
No worries Xiolablu, Cheers. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

psykopatsak
12-05-2009, 05:57 AM
i find the wargame result very convincing. however, the only thing it doesent factor in is the political issues. what if the british would have sued for peace?

Kettenhunde
12-05-2009, 07:13 AM
I'll repeat this quote from Grossadmiral Dönitz for posterity, in case some missed it.

"We possessed neither control of the air or the sea; nor were we in any position to gain it".

- Karl Dönitz

A succint and damning observation as to the plans inevitably disastrous consequences, a Grossadmirals first hand, expert analysis. Case rests.

Quite a bit of writing but lets get down to the meat and potatoes.

To sum it up, the argument is the Germans knew they couldn't invade across the channel so therefore the Germans were serious about actually invading across the channel.

That does not make any sense.

In fact your quotation of Donitz agrees with what I wrote...


Crumpp says:
I think the "invasion" of England was a credible threat in as much as it needed to be to achieve that negotiated peace. Certainly Germany would have conquered England given the chance but I don't think Hitler ever felt that would be necessary and in his mind, the English would eventually come to the table or suffer defeat whether he invaded in 1940 or not.

Once more, it has to be taken in context.



Absolutely. The Soviet threat of invasion was very real to the Nazi's. They did a very good job in passing this paranoia onto the German military and society as a whole.

Many of the Luftwaffe veterans we have interviewed to this day feel like Germany saved the West in their preemptive invasion of the Soviet Union.

That is there take on it.

I think Hitler really felt like England and Germany would negotiate for peace especially after Dunkirk.

The whole Phony war with England and France and equally surprising to the Germans success in the Battle of France/Invasion west were a side show/distraction from the real goal of "stopping" the Soviets and Jews. This is clearly outlined in Mein Kampf were Hitler reveals a "Jewish and Communist" allegiance to take over the world. Yeah the guy was off his rocker, but in his mind it existed.

I think the "invasion" of England was a credible threat in as much as it needed to be to achieve that negotiated peace. Certainly Germany would have conquered England given the chance but I don't think Hitler ever felt that would be necessary and in his mind, the English would eventually come to the table or suffer defeat whether he invaded in 1940 or not. There was no pressing action that needed to be taken west. The RAF was in no position to launch raids of any consequence and England simply did not have the power to cause any real damage or do anything about Occupied Europe. The English were marginalized by the Channel in 1940 as much as they were saved by it. It is an obstacle without political allegiance.

Given time, I think Hitler felt England would grow weary and at worst a negotiated peace could be reached.

From the Nazi point of view, the imminent danger lay to the East with the "Jewish and Communist" allegiance planning to strike west.



Only for a very short time. Also 'controlling the channel' suggests they could sit there at will and have military superiority - this is definitely not the case.

Yes Xio, the Germans did control the channel for as long they needed too.

The Germans couldn't do it "at will" and neither could the English. So that part of your point escapes me as to the significance.


Crumpp says:
The English were marginalized by the Channel in 1940 as much as they were saved by it. It is an obstacle without political allegiance.




The 'victory' was that a German force managed to 'escape' through the channel. A bit like Dunkirk was a victory for the British by escaping across the channel.


No, Dunkirk was a defeat turned into a moral victory and the English Armed Forces did not hold the initiative. Events beyond the English Military control conspired to form the basis for their success at the evacuation. It was heroic effort but it was not a brilliant military action.

Now the British did exibit a sustained effort to destroy the German ships in Brest but the Germans had some formibable defenses. They managed to fight off ~1800 RAF attacks with damage to only one vessel. Brest was far from ideal but the Germans could have easily moved their Ships south farther away from British aircraft. They did control the entire French coastline and made good use of those harbors during the war.

The Germans were concerned about the security of Norway and convoy routes to Russia. They wanted their capital ships available to the North.

In the Channel Dash, the German forces using a very well executed combined arms effort held the initiative and used it to successfully control the channel for safe passage.

The blunder on the German Navies part was they used their brilliant tactical success to do what the Royal Navy had been unable to do...bottle the German fleet in harbor.

Pinker15
12-05-2009, 07:21 AM
I don't think that Spitfire made big difference. I remember that best BOB scoring sqn flew Hurricanes not Spitfires.

yuuppers
12-05-2009, 07:33 AM
The Black Book was the post-war name given to the Sonderfahndungsliste G.B. (literally translated as the Special Search List G.B), the list of prominent Britons to be arrested in the case of a successful invasion of Britain by Nazi Germany in World War II.

It was a product of the SS Einsatzgruppen and contained the names of 2,820 persons, British subjects and European exiles, who were living in Britain and who were to be immediately arrested if Operation Sealion, the invasion of Britain, had succeeded. It was compiled by Walter Schellenberg. Many of the people on the list had already died, as in the case of Sigmund Freud, or had fled, as had Paul Robeson. Of the 20,000 original copies of this book, only two are known to survive. One is currently at the Imperial War Museum, London.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Black_Book

Kettenhunde
12-05-2009, 07:42 AM
I remember that best BOB scoring sqn flew Hurricanes not Spitfires.

I agree. Airplane performance is extremely minor in reality. It is way overblown on gaming websites with people devoting thousands of man-hours arguing over top speed or climb differences.

If you look at Shaw's book, the performance differences required to be noticeable in the air are outlined in it.

World War II design contemporary fighters with rare exception ever fall outside of the performance required to be dissimilar combatants.

orville07
12-05-2009, 08:20 AM
To sum it up, the argument is the Germans knew they couldn't invade across the channel so therefore the Germans were serious about actually invading across the channel.

That does not make any sense.

"To sum it up, the argument is the Germans knew they couldn't invade across the channel so therefore the Germans were serious about actually invading across the channel.

That does not make any sense."

Agreed Kettenhunde, your incorrect summary and erroneous misrepresentation of what I actually wrote makes no sense http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif . There is no logical or causal relationship, the word "therefore" is yours, not mine, and misplaced. "Meaning is use", Kettenhunde...Don't make me go Wittgenstein on you http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

What I actually said was that Hitlers staff had grave misgivings about the operation, Hitler himself did not. Hitler was not exactly renowned for making sense, and made a series of catastrophic overrulings of the better judgement of his Chief Staff as we all know. Hitlers directives were of course final.

Your agreement however that the Wehrmachts predicament and position was nonsenscial RE: Sealion is noted. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

RE: Donitz, no it is not in agreement with what you have said. You were suggesting that the Kreigmarine were capable of "controlling" the Channel. They never had de facto control they could maintain. One swallow does not a summer make. As Xio pointed out, it was a freak and unlikely conflagration of circumstance and blunder, unlikely to have happened again. Much trumpeted by the Germans, but no more a "Victory" than Dunkirk was, useful only for propoganda purposes. Can you remind us of the catastrophic damage it caused? Yep, none but temporary embarrassment and loss of face.

Donitz said they did not control the sea and had no means to do so. It was an admission of Military failure, not related to political manoeuvres. It is not in agreement with what you said. He makes no mention of non existant negotiations or 'political intrigue'.

Cheers.

Bremspropeller
12-05-2009, 08:30 AM
What I actually said was that Hitlers staff had grave misgivings about the operation, Hitler himself did not.

Close that book and never open it again. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/88.gif

orville07
12-05-2009, 08:37 AM
No doubts so compelling that stopped him making the plans at the time. He was in fact extremely confident that the RAF would be smashed, along with his drug addled Porkmeister Goering. Dictators do have a predilection to overconfidence, and he massively underestimated British capability and resolve.

The rest as they say, is History http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

mmitch10
12-05-2009, 08:52 AM
Wow. Just seen this thread. It seems to have drifted away from the OP's question. Where's Odin when you need him?

M_Gunz
12-05-2009, 08:55 AM
He needed a win to keep building his political power. Always more and people expecting it.

barfo1983
12-05-2009, 09:36 AM
A previous poster mentioned that Hitler did not have grave misgivings about Sealion, but that isn't correct. He told the general staff after Dunkirk:

"On land I am a lion but with water I don't know where to begin."

Kettenhunde
12-05-2009, 09:49 AM
What I actually said was that Hitlers staff had grave misgivings about the operation, Hitler himself did not.

You do a very poor job of conveying your meaning to the point you must be trolling.


Orville says:
Agreed Kettenhunde, your incorrect summary and erroneous misrepresentation of what I actually wrote makes no sense Smile . There is no logical or causal relationship, the word "therefore" is yours, not mine, and misplaced. "Meaning is use", Kettenhunde...Don't make me go Wittgenstein on you Wink

You seem more interested in making me look bad than anything else. In fact you and buzzsaw go in circles arguing at whatever perceived side I am not on.

First Buzzsaw post's no position just the fact a wargame was conducted and Germany's invasion was unsuccessful. That is fine and in perfect agreement to what I wrote.

http://forums.ubi.com/eve/foru...971003018#4971003018 (http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/1761062908?r=4971003018#4971003018)

Then buzzsaw outlines a position the Germans were going to invade given the chance.


Buzzsaw says:
The claim that the Germans were not really serious about invading England does not stand up to the facts.

http://forums.ubi.com/eve/foru...491003018#1491003018 (http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/1761062908?r=1491003018#1491003018)

Which once again I agree with in my original post. By this point obvious that he did not bother to read what I wrote before opposing it.


Certainly Germany would have conquered England given the chance but I don't think Hitler ever felt that would be necessary and in his mind, the English would eventually come to the table or suffer defeat whether he invaded in 1940 or not.

There is no narrow view of either the invasion goes or does not go in my post. The invasion is not the topic of my post.

The topic of my post is the fact Hitler seemed to feel England in 1940 was not the largest threat facing Germany.

From the Military situation in 1940 it is easy to see that:


Crumpp says:
The English were marginalized by the Channel in 1940 as much as they were saved by it. It is an obstacle without political allegiance.

Then you make an entrance as a cheerleader trying to lend credence to buzzsaw. The funny part is Buzzsaw was not even arguing against any real point I made, he was just arguing against ME. You jump on that bandwagon as well.


Orville says:
Bravo, Buzzsaw Clap. Congratulations on a comprehensive annihilation and debunking of the erroneous "The Germans were not really serious" about Sealion speculation. I was about to make some of these points myself, but you beat me to it....Excellent job.

http://forums.ubi.com/eve/foru...761063018#9761063018 (http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/1761062908?r=9761063018#9761063018)


Donitz, no it is not in agreement with what you have said.

Certainly he is agreement with what I wrote. He states it quite clearly. Donitz knew a successful invasion was not very likely.

You do understand that the Allies knew a successful invasion across the channel was not the only outcome in June of 1944! It was a huge gamble that fortunately paid off for all of us. Eisenhower also planned for contingencies to include a prepared statement accepting responsibility for the Allied defeat on the morning of June 6th.


At the time, though, to those who crossed the English Channel and to the commanders responsible for setting the invasion plan into motion, the outcome was uncertain.


Later that same afternoon, he scribbled a note intended for release, accepting responsibility for the decision to launch the invasion and full blame should the effort to create a beachhead on the Normandy coast fail.

http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/d-day-memo/

If we try to argue that the Germans both knew an invasion had little chance of success and that they saw invasion as the only course of action available to them, we can only assume the Germans are stupid. Unlike the events of June 1944, there was no declaration of unconditional surrender as the only acceptable outcome for either side.

That is probably not the case that the Germans were stupid. The Germans are as rational as anyone else and made rational decisions based on their perception of events.

Hence my comment to be taken in the context of Hitlers belief that the main threat was to the east:


Crumpp says:

I think the "invasion" of England was a credible threat in as much as it needed to be to achieve that negotiated peace. Certainly Germany would have conquered England given the chance but I don't think Hitler ever felt that would be necessary and in his mind, the English would eventually come to the table or suffer defeat whether he invaded in 1940 or not.

Next topic on The Channel Dash....


You were suggesting that the Kreigmarine were capable of "controlling" the Channel. They never had de facto control they could maintain.

No, I said the Kreigsmarine DID control the channel during Operation Cerberus. That is a fact. It is therefore self evident that they were capable of controlling it tactically.

You take a very narrow view that my statement is a blanket declaration the German Navy had strategic control of the channel.

Nobody had strategic control of the Channel in 1940.


Crumpp says:
The English were marginalized by the Channel in 1940 as much as they were saved by it. It is an obstacle without political allegiance.

All the best,

Crumpp

orville07
12-05-2009, 10:25 AM
Ok Kettenhunde, now that you have resorted to implying I am "trolling", a "Cheerleader" or a "Bandwagon" jumper for no good reason, this discussion is now at an end. I have called you nothing. Bit too old at 33 for that, and the inevitable silly back and forth. Readers can draw their own conclusions on what has been said, as I'm sure they will.

Anyways, have a nice day. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

stalkervision
12-05-2009, 10:45 AM
I believe any battle to be successful needs control of the air. Going from areas that are the closest distance to England I believe the Luftwaffe would have had the strength to do this through attrition. IMO the hurricane would have done as well or better then the spitfire in low level engagements over the landing areas thou. I don't believe Hitler's heart was in the whole thing to put that much effort in. He was eying Russia and wanted to keep his strength up for that.

To me BOB was a half hearted attempt to get Britain to submit.

Kettenhunde
12-05-2009, 01:22 PM
Readers can draw their own conclusions on what has been said, as I'm sure they will.


I am sure they can draw their own conclusions if they take a minute to read.

Buzzsaw had no idea what my post was even about and proceeded to argue positions that I agreed with in in the first place.


Ok Kettenhunde, now that you have resorted to implying I am "trolling", a "Cheerleader" or a "Bandwagon" jumper for no good reason, this discussion is now at an end. I have called you nothing.

What would you call it when you pick up an irrational argument based on a false pretense:


Orville says:
Bravo, Buzzsaw Clap. Congratulations on a comprehensive annihilation and debunking of the erroneous "The Germans were not really serious" about Sealion speculation.

When I try to point that out to you, you decide my explanation:


Agreed Kettenhunde, your incorrect summary and erroneous misrepresentation of what I actually wrote makes no sense

I did not say you where stupid or make any personal declaration against you, I said the pretense of the argument does not make any sense because it did not!

I point out you took up the flag for Buzzsaw without reading what I wrote.

You shouldn't be mad at me, be mad at yourself for just taking in what Buzzsaw wrote at face value.


Bit too old at 33 for that,

So you're some twenty years younger than me.

Good then have the maturity to read what others write before defending someone based on who presents the argument. Don't blame it on them when they point it out to you, blame it on yourself for not doing what you should have done in the first place.

Buzzsaw-
12-05-2009, 01:54 PM
Originally posted by Xiolablu3:
Buzzsaw is the one I should have been addressing, not you. The thread went downhill as soon as he posted. Apologies.

Actually I was the first person to move away from posting opinions, and to start posting original historical material that directly related to the erroneous claims which were made by other posters.

If I was a little harsh, I apologize, however that does not alter the fact that what was being claimed by Crumpp and others was not substantiated by any kind of examination of the facts, and that the points I put forward were relevant and to the issues.

A closer look should actually be taken at what Crumpp typically says. In nearly all his posts, he makes insinuations, personal attacks, etc. All you have to do is look at his most recent attack on Orville. He regularly declares feuds with anyone who contradicts him. More than anyone else on this forum, he is responsible for reducing the level of civility.

Dance
12-05-2009, 01:57 PM
Originally posted by Kettenhunde:

No, I said the Kreigsmarine DID control the channel during Operation Cerberus. That is a fact. It is therefore self evident that they were capable of controlling it tactically.



Define control. Other than one incident where the Kriegsmarine manage to slip a few ships back home to safer waters, in what way did they control the channel? Did they stop any allied shipping, did they deny the use of the channel to the allies, did they cause anything other than embarrassment?

How many other times did the Kriegsmarine risk capital ships in the channel? Let alone an invasion fleet.

stalkervision
12-05-2009, 02:35 PM
Originally posted by Dance:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kettenhunde:

No, I said the Kreigsmarine DID control the channel during Operation Cerberus. That is a fact. It is therefore self evident that they were capable of controlling it tactically.



Define control. Other than one incident where the Kriegsmarine manage to slip a few ships back home to safer waters, in what way did they control the channel? Did they stop any allied shipping, did they deny the use of the channel to the allies, did they cause anything other than embarrassment?

How many other times did the Kriegsmarine risk capital ships in the channel? Let alone an invasion fleet. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

actually the "channel dash" was quite the operation and a complete embarrassment to Churchill and the R/N at the time. You can see it in Adolph Galland's book.."The First and the Last.." The Germans were quite adapt and excellent improvisation and planning when they needed it but IMO Hitler didn't see the conquering of Great Britain as a big deal for his plans later on.

JtD
12-05-2009, 02:35 PM
It's like Bismarck controlled the North Atlantic during Rheinübung. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

At any rate, the British did not react until the Germans were almost clear of the channel.

Dance
12-05-2009, 02:51 PM
Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Dance:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kettenhunde:

No, I said the Kreigsmarine DID control the channel during Operation Cerberus. That is a fact. It is therefore self evident that they were capable of controlling it tactically.



Define control. Other than one incident where the Kriegsmarine manage to slip a few ships back home to safer waters, in what way did they control the channel? Did they stop any allied shipping, did they deny the use of the channel to the allies, did they cause anything other than embarrassment?

How many other times did the Kriegsmarine risk capital ships in the channel? Let alone an invasion fleet. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

actually the "channel dash" was quite the operation and a complete embarrassment to Churchill and the R/N at the time. You can see it in Adolph Galland's book.."The First and the Last.." The Germans were quite adapt and excellent improvisation and planning when they needed it but IMO Hitler didn't see the conquering of Great Britain as a big deal for his plans later on. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Re-read my post Stalkervision

I said what was this operation other than an embarrassment. Still looking for where the control element comes in.

stalkervision
12-05-2009, 03:17 PM
Originally posted by Dance:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Dance:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kettenhunde:

No, I said the Kreigsmarine DID control the channel during Operation Cerberus. That is a fact. It is therefore self evident that they were capable of controlling it tactically.



Define control. Other than one incident where the Kriegsmarine manage to slip a few ships back home to safer waters, in what way did they control the channel? Did they stop any allied shipping, did they deny the use of the channel to the allies, did they cause anything other than embarrassment?

How many other times did the Kriegsmarine risk capital ships in the channel? Let alone an invasion fleet. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

actually the "channel dash" was quite the operation and a complete embarrassment to Churchill and the R/N at the time. You can see it in Adolph Galland's book.."The First and the Last.." The Germans were quite adapt and excellent improvisation and planning when they needed it but IMO Hitler didn't see the conquering of Great Britain as a big deal for his plans later on. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Re-read my post Stalkervision

I said what was this operation other than an embarrassment. Still looking for where the control element comes in. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Read "The first and the last.." Once the British detected the move they were quite involved in stopping it. I believe it was a two or three day operation and the brits threw plenty of resources into it. They temporarily lost control of the channel in other words.

Jumoschwanz
12-05-2009, 03:26 PM
They could have won it with Gladiators.

With the german fighters short range and being under orders to stay in close formation with the bombers, they never had a chance.

There was only a fraction the number of Spits in the battle as there were Hurricanes anyway, everyone knows that, if all the Hurricanes were gone, that would have been noticed.

Pretty simple.

stalkervision
12-05-2009, 03:30 PM
i can see many ways how the greman, if really really serious about an invasion of Britain, could have accomplished it. Just one example MINES. The German's were the world leader in underwater mine technology. Screens of s-boats,subs and aircraft could have essentially shut off the channel to the Royal Navy for an invasion by laying massive amounts of mines in the channel and the Luftwaffe and kriegsmarine by blasting any mine sweepers that attempted to sweep them.

Dance
12-05-2009, 03:32 PM
Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Dance:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Dance:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kettenhunde:

No, I said the Kreigsmarine DID control the channel during Operation Cerberus. That is a fact. It is therefore self evident that they were capable of controlling it tactically.



Define control. Other than one incident where the Kriegsmarine manage to slip a few ships back home to safer waters, in what way did they control the channel? Did they stop any allied shipping, did they deny the use of the channel to the allies, did they cause anything other than embarrassment?

How many other times did the Kriegsmarine risk capital ships in the channel? Let alone an invasion fleet. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

actually the "channel dash" was quite the operation and a complete embarrassment to Churchill and the R/N at the time. You can see it in Adolph Galland's book.."The First and the Last.." The Germans were quite adapt and excellent improvisation and planning when they needed it but IMO Hitler didn't see the conquering of Great Britain as a big deal for his plans later on. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Re-read my post Stalkervision

I said what was this operation other than an embarrassment. Still looking for where the control element comes in. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Read "The first and the last.." Once the British detected the move they were quite involved in stopping it. I believe it was a two or three day operation and the brits threw plenty of resources into it. They temporarily lost control of the channel in other words. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yer but how did they 'control' the whole English Channel while they were running hell for leather for home and they were in the channel less than a day, it only took them 2 days to reach home.

Buzzsaw-
12-05-2009, 03:34 PM
Salute

Crumpp/Kettenhunde has made some claims about the Channel Dash and how successful the Germans were. Let's analyze those claims, that event, and determine whether or not he is up to his usual standards.


Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
Now the British did exibit a sustained effort to destroy the German ships in Brest but the Germans had some formibable defenses. They managed to fight off ~1800 RAF attacks with damage to only one vessel.


What are the facts?

From January to March, 1941 (Operation Berlin)—the two German Battlecruisers broke out into the Atlantic, with Gneisenau sinking 14 merchant ships and Scharnhorst sinking eight, from unescorted convoys. They returned to Brest for maintenance repairs, having suffered no damage during their cruise. However, they were required to be placed in drydock.

As soon as they arrived at Brest, the RAF began a series of bomber raids.

The day after one raid, an unexploded bomb was discovered next to Gneisenau's drydock, a highly dangerous situation. She was moved to the harbour and anchored. On 6 April 1941 she was torpedoed by a Bristol Beaufort at anchor, and now immobile, was towed back into drydock, where she was hit by four aerial bombs on the night of 9 April-10 April 1941. The damage was so severe she was laid up for repairs until December of 1941, nearly 8 months.

Regarding the Scharnhort's stay at Brest:

Initially put up in drydock for regular maintenance. Following these repairs, she was moved to La Rochelle, south of Brest, preparatory to a potential 2nd breakout into the Atlantic. However, while she was there, she was the target of a raid by RAF Halifaxes. On 24 July 1941 Scharnhorst was struck by a number of armour-piercing bombs that cracked her plates, caused flooding, along with an 8° list to starboard, serious damage, requiring a return to Brest and another stay in drydock, this lasting till December of 1941, a four month period out of action.

The above information clearly proves Crumpp's claims are incorrect, in fact both ships were hit, multiple times, and both were out of action for very lengthy periods of time.

In addition, Crumpp's claim that the Germans could move them south anytime they wanted is clearly false, the only ship moved south, the Scharnhorst, was immediately attacked by the RAF, and forced to return to Brest.


Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
...the Germans could have easily moved their Ships south farther away from British aircraft...


Further:

Crumpp's claim the Germans wanted to move their ships to Norway, and weren't concerned about the RAF raids is completely incorrect.


Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
The Germans were concerned about the security of Norway and convoy routes to Russia. They wanted their capital ships available to the North.


In fact, the main concern was the repeated RAF raids, and the continuing bomb/torpedo damage which was being inflicted on the Battlecruisers. Both were out of action more often than operational during their stay in Brest. The Germans had barely managed to get both ships operational by January '42, (even so, both had mechanical issues and Scharnhorst was far from 100% due faulty boiler tubes) if they delayed, the likelyhood was they would be hit by bombs again, and perhaps permanently damaged. The Kriegsmarine was desperate to get them out of Brest.


Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
In the Channel Dash, the German forces using a very well executed combined arms effort held the initiative and used it to successfully control the channel for safe passage.


The Germans picked the worst possible weather of the year, February, and conducted the first part of the mission at night, leaving at 22:45 hours. They were very fortunate in that the British submarine Sea Lion, which had been detailed to watch the harbour at Brest, broke off its patrol only 1 hour and ten minutes before the Battlecruisers left. When dawn arrived, the German ships were nearly at the Straits of Dover. At that time the visibility was very poor, of the 242 bombers the RAF sent out to look for the ships, only 39 aftually made contact. The British coastal batteries at Dover were unable to accurately fire at the Germans, as visibility was so limited they could not see their fall of shot. In addition, the regular Dover patrol of six destroyers had been assigned gunnery practice in the North Sea and were not at their normal station, they had to sail south to make contact, and were only able to conduct one attack prior to the Germans moving out of range.

The facts were, the Germans did not 'control the Channel', what they were able to do is take advantage of poor luck on the part of the British, as well as poor weather to slip through.

Even though that was the case, the Battlecruisers did not escape unharmed. Crumpp's claim that the Battlecruisers had:


Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
...safe passage.


Is clearly false.

In fact, both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau hit mines which had been laid by RAF Coastal Command aircraft in their path.

Gneisenau's mine created a small hole on starboard side of the ship's hull, temporarily knocking one of her turbines out of action. Scharnhorst hit two mines, the resulting damage required 3 months to repair.

So both ships were confined to drydock for repairs immediately after the operation.

And in fact, because Gneisenau was confined to drydock, she was a target for a RAF raid by 178 bombers on the night of 26 February–27 February 1942. She was hit severely in the bow and because her ammunition had not been unloaded after the Channel dash, those hits were compounded. The magazine caught fire, and the resulting explosion completely destroyed her entire bow section.

Gneisenau NEVER sailed into combat again. She remained in drydock for repairs for nearly the remainder of the war, the only use which could be made of her hulk was to be sunk as a blockship in Gotenhafen harbor on 23 March 1945.

So in fact, the real result of the Channel dash was the destruction of one of the two German Battlecruisers, and the other being put out of service for three months.

Hardly 'safe passage'... http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

stalkervision
12-05-2009, 03:51 PM
Originally posted by Dance:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Dance:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by stalkervision:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Dance:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kettenhunde:

No, I said the Kreigsmarine DID control the channel during Operation Cerberus. That is a fact. It is therefore self evident that they were capable of controlling it tactically.



Define control. Other than one incident where the Kriegsmarine manage to slip a few ships back home to safer waters, in what way did they control the channel? Did they stop any allied shipping, did they deny the use of the channel to the allies, did they cause anything other than embarrassment?

How many other times did the Kriegsmarine risk capital ships in the channel? Let alone an invasion fleet. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

actually the "channel dash" was quite the operation and a complete embarrassment to Churchill and the R/N at the time. You can see it in Adolph Galland's book.."The First and the Last.." The Germans were quite adapt and excellent improvisation and planning when they needed it but IMO Hitler didn't see the conquering of Great Britain as a big deal for his plans later on. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Re-read my post Stalkervision

I said what was this operation other than an embarrassment. Still looking for where the control element comes in. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Read "The first and the last.." Once the British detected the move they were quite involved in stopping it. I believe it was a two or three day operation and the brits threw plenty of resources into it. They temporarily lost control of the channel in other words. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yer but how did they 'control' the whole English Channel while they were running hell for leather for home and they were in the channel less than a day, it only took them 2 days to reach home. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

They accomplished their objective of a temporary control of the channel which was the transfer of these ships to other ports. That was their objective No more no less. Control of the water way by the RAF and R/N means this wouldn't have been possible. Yet it happened.

stalkervision
12-05-2009, 03:54 PM
Originally posted by Buzzsaw-:
Salute

Crumpp/Kettenhunde has made some claims about the Channel Dash and how successful the Germans were. Let's analyze those claims, that event, and determine whether or not he is up to his usual standards.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
Now the British did exibit a sustained effort to destroy the German ships in Brest but the Germans had some formibable defenses. They managed to fight off ~1800 RAF attacks with damage to only one vessel.


What are the facts?

From January to March, 1941 (Operation Berlin)—the two German Battlecruisers broke out into the Atlantic, with Gneisenau sinking 14 merchant ships and Scharnhorst sinking eight, from unescorted convoys. They returned to Brest for maintenance repairs, having suffered no damage during their cruise. However, they were required to be placed in drydock.

As soon as they arrived at Brest, the RAF began a series of bomber raids.

The day after one raid, an unexploded bomb was discovered next to Gneisenau's drydock, a highly dangerous situation. She was moved to the harbour and anchored. On 6 April 1941 she was torpedoed by a Bristol Beaufort at anchor, and now immobile, was towed back into drydock, where she was hit by four aerial bombs on the night of 9 April-10 April 1941. The damage was so severe she was laid up for repairs until December of 1941, nearly 8 months.

Regarding the Scharnhort's stay at Brest:

Initially put up in drydock for regular maintenance. Following these repairs, she was moved to La Rochelle, south of Brest, preparatory to a potential 2nd breakout into the Atlantic. However, while she was there, she was the target of a raid by RAF Halifaxes. On 24 July 1941 Scharnhorst was struck by a number of armour-piercing bombs that cracked her plates, caused flooding, along with an 8° list to starboard, serious damage, requiring a return to Brest and another stay in drydock, this lasting till December of 1941, a four month period out of action.

The above information clearly proves Crumpp's claims are incorrect, in fact both ships were hit, multiple times, and both were out of action for very lengthy periods of time.

In addition, Crumpp's claim that the Germans could move them south anytime they wanted is clearly false, the only ship moved south, the Scharnhorst, was immediately attacked by the RAF, and forced to return to Brest.


Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
...the Germans could have easily moved their Ships south farther away from British aircraft...


Further:

Crumpp's claim the Germans wanted to move their ships to Norway, and weren't concerned about the RAF raids is completely incorrect.


Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
The Germans were concerned about the security of Norway and convoy routes to Russia. They wanted their capital ships available to the North.


In fact, the main concern was the repeated RAF raids, and the continuing bomb/torpedo damage which was being inflicted on the Battlecruisers. Both were out of action more often than operational during their stay in Brest. The Germans had barely managed to get both ships operational by January '42, (even so, both had mechanical issues and Scharnhorst was far from 100% due faulty boiler tubes) if they delayed, the likelyhood was they would be hit by bombs again, and perhaps permanently damaged. The Kriegsmarine was desperate to get them out of Brest.


Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
In the Channel Dash, the German forces using a very well executed combined arms effort held the initiative and used it to successfully control the channel for safe passage.


The Germans picked the worst possible weather of the year, February, and conducted the first part of the mission at night, leaving at 22:45 hours. They were very fortunate in that the British submarine Sea Lion, which had been detailed to watch the harbour at Brest, broke off its patrol only 1 hour and ten minutes before the Battlecruisers left. When dawn arrived, the German ships were nearly at the Straits of Dover. At that time the visibility was very poor, of the 242 bombers the RAF sent out to look for the ships, only 39 aftually made contact. The British coastal batteries at Dover were unable to accurately fire at the Germans, as visibility was so limited they could not see their fall of shot. In addition, the regular Dover patrol of six destroyers had been assigned gunnery practice in the North Sea and were not at their normal station, they had to sail south to make contact, and were only able to conduct one attack prior to the Germans moving out of range.

The facts were, the Germans did not 'control the Channel', what they were able to do is take advantage of poor luck on the part of the British, as well as poor weather to slip through.

Even though that was the case, the Battlecruisers did not escape unharmed. Crumpp's claim that the Battlecruisers had:


Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
...safe passage.


Is clearly false.

In fact, both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau hit mines which had been laid by RAF Coastal Command aircraft in their path.

Gneisenau's mine created a small hole on starboard side of the ship's hull, temporarily knocking one of her turbines out of action. Scharnhorst hit two mines, the resulting damage required 3 months to repair.

So both ships were confined to drydock for repairs immediately after the operation.

And in fact, because Gneisenau was confined to drydock, she was a target for a RAF raid by 178 bombers on the night of 26 February–27 February 1942. She was hit severely in the bow and because her ammunition had not been unloaded after the Channel dash, those hits were compounded. The magazine caught fire, and the resulting explosion completely destroyed her entire bow section.

Gneisenau NEVER sailed into combat again. She remained in drydock for repairs for nearly the remainder of the war, the only use which could be made of her hulk was to be sunk as a blockship in Gotenhafen harbor on 23 March 1945.

So in fact, the real result of the Channel dash was the destruction of one of the two German Battlecruisers, and the other being put out of service for three months.

Hardly 'safe passage'... http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


The British mines created more problem then anything else. That's why I believe mines could have also turned the balance for the Germans.

Does anyone realize what a problem mines were for the allies on d-day even without the Luftwaffe being at all involved in the invasion.

Dance
12-05-2009, 03:54 PM
I'm not playing tit for tat with you Stalkervision, I have my opinion you're entitled to yours.

stalkervision
12-05-2009, 03:56 PM
Originally posted by Dance:
I'm not playing tit for tat with you Stalkervision, I have my opinion you're entitled to yours.

"So it goes...."

Kettenhunde
12-05-2009, 04:06 PM
During the action the British carried out 110 attacks using 675 aircraft of which 42 were shot down. 500 tonnes of bombs were aimed at the squadron. Scharnhorst expended 400 x 10.5 cm, 900 x 3.7 cm and 6.000 x 2 cm shells.

Here is a time line of the action...

http://www.scharnhorst-class.d.../scharncerberus.html (http://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharnhorst/history/scharncerberus.html)

Apparently the French Resistance even let the British know the ships were sailing. At one point a British plane flew right over the task force but failed to break radio silence.

Even the coastal batteries at Dover tried to get in on the action but failed to cause any damage or hinder the Germans control of the Channel.

I don't think a case can be made that the British did not try to stop the Germans.

The Germans through combined arms tactically controlled the channel to move their ships.

Tactical control is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements necessary to accomplish the mission.

In 1940 both England and Germany could exert tactical control of the Channel but neither had strategic control.

In this case, the German Navy needed to control the channel if they were to use it instead of the longer journey through the Denmark straights.


How many other times did the Kriegsmarine risk capital ships in the channel?

How many times did the Royal Navy risk capital ships in the channel?


Did they stop any allied shipping,

Certainly the Germans stopped Allied shipping on occasion just as the Allies stopped German shipping on occasion. Ultimately the Allies strategic control of the Channel but that was years away in 1940.

In this case, the Allies failed to stop German movement of capital ships through the English Channel.


did they deny the use of the channel to the allies,

In this case, yes they did and the Allies fails to deny the Germans use of the channel.

The Germans operated everything from seaplanes to torpedo boats and merchants in the Channel just like the Allies.


did they cause anything other than embarrassment?

Yes, they caused some damage to the Royal Navy in this operation to control the channel.


On board Gneisenau, Captain Fein decided that Worcester was done for. In his report, he wrote: "I watched our heavy guns score direct hits on the English destroyer and it seemed to me that she heeled so far over under the impact that she nearly capsized. I ordered our guns to cease fire, as there seemed no point in wasting shells on a ship already sinking. No destroyer, or any ship of that size, could be hit that heavily and survive."

But Worcester did survive. Out of her complement of 130, 100 were either killed or wounded.

http://www.scharnhorst-class.d.../scharncerberus.html (http://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharnhorst/history/scharncerberus.html)

Dance
12-05-2009, 04:24 PM
You still seem to be missing the point we are talking about this one operation, the Kriegsmarine got away with this once, they did not control the channel in as far as preventing other ships from using it, or any other tactical advantage other than escape.

Still failing to see here, the control of the entire channel? They had a local advantage through surprise, weather, and defensive failures. If they had total control surely they could have done what they wished, sailed up the Thames perhaps http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

GBrutus
12-05-2009, 04:26 PM
Clutching at straws...

GBrutus
12-05-2009, 04:29 PM
Originally posted by Dance:
That's your input is it GBrutus? Care to prove it?

Wasn't aimed at you, Dance.

Dance
12-05-2009, 04:31 PM
Soz, withdrawn.

GBrutus
12-05-2009, 04:42 PM
So why didn't the Germans just sit their capital ships there in the channel and maintain their apparent control? Why did they go scurrying to cover? Dance raises some very good points here.

stalkervision
12-05-2009, 04:51 PM
Originally posted by GBrutus:
So why didn't the Germans just sit their capital ships there in the channel and maintain their apparent control? Why did they go scurrying to cover? Dance raises some very good points here.

why would they risk their capitol ships from direct air raids. Most of english shipping didn't need to use the mid channel and had been diverted already.

good points? TYO.. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-wink.gif

GBrutus
12-05-2009, 04:58 PM
So they had neither control of the sea or the air then? Capital ships are useless if you sit them in port all day long.

stalkervision
12-05-2009, 05:06 PM
Originally posted by GBrutus:
So they had neither control of the sea or the air then? Capital ships are useless if you sit them in port all day long.

I believe that Hitler and the high command was sold a bill of goods by Goring as to the difficulty of the campaign against Britain as in Dunkirk. I believe Hitler's heart wasn't really in it to begin with and when the campaign became more difficult then goring promised this is when the whole thing was called off. Galland and many others point to Hitler's expressions on the battle about this.

Kettenhunde
12-05-2009, 06:08 PM
So why didn't the British just sit their capital ships there in the channel and maintain their apparent control?

I think because the Germans would have sunk them....


So the British had neither control of the sea or the air then?

I guess not but I think they were at war so there their enemies worked to deny them control.

I guess they could assemble for an operation in order to gain tactical control of the air or sea.

Sort of like Dieppe in 1942....

GBrutus
12-05-2009, 06:20 PM
You're getting good at this misquoting business aren't you, Kettenhunde?

Kettenhunde
12-05-2009, 06:57 PM
You're getting good at this misquoting business aren't you, Kettenhunde?

Misquote implies a mistake. That was intentional to drive home a point.

Do you get that point?

All the best,

Crumpp

Buzzsaw-
12-05-2009, 07:27 PM
Originally posted by stalkervisionhttp://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gifoes anyone realize what a problem mines were for the allies on d-day even without the Luftwaffe being at all involved in the invasion.

Quite correct. The Allied shipping losses to mines were many times those due to naval or air combined. Of course, many of the mines were dropped by aircraft in the same way the mines were which damaged the two German Battlecruisers.

Waldo.Pepper
12-05-2009, 11:11 PM
"The removal of the fleet-in-being from Brest greatly simplified the Royal Navy's arduous Atlantic duties, so Britain emerged from this in a better position strategically but having suffered a major defeat psychologically. It happened at the time of the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse and the loss of Singapore. The reaction of the public and the lower levels of military command was one of fury, as it was seen to be incompetence of the kind demonstrated at Pearl Harbor. The Prime Minister's investigation found everything in order, and no senior officers were disciplined or replaced."

From Technical and Military Imperatives by Louis Brown. Page 228.

This issue of control really is a red herring. If the Germans had control of the channel (any portion of it) then I can't understand why they would have to 'dash.' Why is it refereed to as a channel dash if they had such control as is being implied?

The dash was a retreat into safer waters. Not a glorious foray.

JtD
12-05-2009, 11:16 PM
You guys are funny. Now if I was to hypothesize that neither side had full control of the Channel, would that be too reasonable to be true? I don't get why you are getting so worked up over making a none binary situation into one. It's kind of pointless.

Waldo.Pepper
12-05-2009, 11:28 PM
Originally posted by JtD:
You guys are funny. Now if I was to hypothesize that neither side had full control of the Channel, would that be too reasonable to be true? I don't get why you are getting so worked up over making a none binary situation into one. It's kind of pointless.

+1

Channel = No man's land. Brown makes this very point in the work I referenced.

M_Gunz
12-05-2009, 11:30 PM
If the Brits controlled the channel then the dash would have failed. But the dash held onto nothing.
Call control potential, the dash was kinetic.

Dance
12-06-2009, 04:25 AM
Thing is I can't find where anyone said the Brits had control of the channel, only that the Germans didn't.

Bremspropeller
12-06-2009, 04:57 AM
Well, obvously, they had during the Dash.

Dance
12-06-2009, 05:11 AM
Then running away equates to having control, interesting concept.

Bremspropeller
12-06-2009, 05:51 AM
No, "running away" without being hassled equals control.

Dance
12-06-2009, 06:01 AM
"For three large warships and six destroyer escorts, to sail up the English Channel undetected for 300 miles seems incredible. However, the weather and faulty radar equipment served the Germans well and gave them 13 hours at sea undetected. Ramsey’s defence force was also in disarray. His MTB (motor torpedo boat) force based in Ramsgate had been in action the previous night and was still recovering from this; Bomber Command’s planes would have found it nearly impossible to operate because of the weather conditions and the Bristol Beaufort squadrons based around the coast were forced to use different air strips because the one they wanted to use (North Coates) was snow bound. One patrol pane had flown directly over Ciliax’s force but had not broken radio silence and only passed on its information when the plane had reached its base – by which time the convoy was steaming passed Beachy Head in Sussex.

At Dover, the gun batteries based there engaged the Germans. However, their shells fell short simply because they had to guess the exact whereabouts of the ships because of the poor weather conditions. MTB’s from Dover attacked but they could not get near to the ships and had to fire their torpedoes from a distance of 2 miles – none hit. German fighter cover was ferocious. An attack by torpedo-carrying Swordfish planes also failed. All six planes were lost in the attack and their commander, Lieutenant-Commander Eugene Esmonde, was awarded the Victoria Cross.

As the German convoy continued to steam towards its base, there were more British attacks. Poor weather, poor communications and a curious desire for secrecy even among the British forces fighting during the attack all played a part in the Germans successfully getting through.

The bad weather (cloud at 700 feet) meant that bombers could not get to the 7000 feet they needed to drop their armour-piercing bombs if they were to be effective – they simply could not see their targets. Of the 242 bombers involved in the engagement, only 39 are known to have dropped their bombs – and none of them found their target. British destroyers sent out from Harwich to attack the Germans were attacked by planes from the RAF as no-one had told the RAF that destroyers from Harwich were being sent into action.

At dawn on February 13th, the German convoy sailed into port. The Scharnhorst had hit a mine but Ciliax was eager to contact Berlin that their operation had been a great success. The Germans had lost just one of their minor escort ships and seventeen fighter planes. The British response to the breakout from Brest had been ineffective from a military point of view. However, there were few recriminations as the Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen and Scharnhorst were now all bottled up to the east of Britain where they could play no part in the Battle of the Atlantic. Even the commander of the Kriegsmarine, Admiral Raeder, stated that the Germans had won “a tactical victory (but) had suffered a strategic defeat.” Roosevelt contacted Churchill to congratulate him on what had occurred:"



Seems to me the only thing in control was Murphy's Law and the weather.

Kettenhunde
12-06-2009, 06:41 AM
Seems to me the only thing in control was Murphy's Law and the weather.

Noted....

I will agree in all military operations it is God and Murphy in control.

Of course, Dance, that simply could be one side of the event based on incomplete facts. All of it is true, but just presented from one perspective only.

For example....


However, the weather and faulty radar equipment served the Germans well and gave them 13 hours at sea undetected.


We know the Germans jammed the radar instead of it being "faulty". They kept aerial jamming platforms aloft to cover the fleet while it was underway.


Radar jamming by 2 HE 111’s from Paris

This is an interesting detail, the German Navy sent 80 minesweepers into the Channel to mark and clear the narrow lanes that were deep enough for capital ships.


Since the ships could reach maximum speeds only in deeper waters, marker buoys indicated channels with depths in excess of 15 meters. 119 mines were cleared in advance from these channels by 80 minesweepers.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_...OB_WWII_Cerberus.htm (http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Atlantic/OOB_WWII_Cerberus.htm)


Now if I was to hypothesize that neither side had full control of the Channel, would that be too reasonable to be true?

That is what I said in my very first post....


The English were marginalized by the Channel in 1940 as much as they were saved by it. It is an obstacle without political allegiance.

Bremspropeller
12-06-2009, 06:48 AM
Seems to me the only thing in control was Murphy's Law and the weather.


Looks like german weather-guessers know their profession pretty well then.

Of course, same applies to the allied guys for the 6th of June landings in 1944.

Kettenhunde
12-06-2009, 06:51 AM
Looks like german weather-guessers know their profession pretty well then.


Exactly, It could be luck or it could have been good planning depending on whose perspective.

To one side it was lucky and to the other, it was detailed planning based on good assumptions.

Could have been faulty equipment or it could have been detailed planning using combined arms with electronic countermeasures in action....

Dance
12-06-2009, 07:15 AM
I'l accept the Germans used the weather to the maximum advantage to cover their escape, but does using it constitute having control of the channel, I think not. As far as the D-day landings are concerned, that was an offensive operation to capture objectives, not to escape.

As I've already said, I don't claim that the British had control. I just have an opinion on the claims that because these ships got away, that these ships controlled the channel.

I can't see me changing my mind on that, though you're perfectly entitled to disagree.

Kettenhunde
12-06-2009, 08:45 AM
to cover their escape,


Once again, perspective.....

Was it an "escape" or a planned to move in order to shift assets to locations they were needed?


At a meeting with Admiral Raeder at Rastenburg, Hitler pressed for Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen to be withdrawn from Brest to counter an expected invasion of Norway, Hitler’s “Zone of Destiny”.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_...OB_WWII_Cerberus.htm (http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Atlantic/OOB_WWII_Cerberus.htm)

Perhaps you mean the generalization that Capital ships in harbor can do nothing for the nations military except defend themselves.

In that case I would agree that they "escaped" a situation they could not be utilized.


As I've already said, I don't claim that the British had control. I just have an opinion on the claims that because these ships got away, that these ships controlled the channel.

When they sailed passed Dover and the Royal Navy Defenses moved out to stop them, did they succeed?

Who controlled the Channel at that moment?

Who do you think controlled the Hess Battery at 0635hrs on the morning of August 19, 1942?


By 05.40, Mills-Roberts had established himself in a wood close to the battery and intended to wait another thirty-five minutes but at that moment the guns opened fire on the main convoy.

http://www.historyofwar.org/ar...battles_dieppe2.html (http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_dieppe2.html)

Dance
12-06-2009, 09:28 AM
As I said your entitled to disagree with my opinion as I yours. I'm not going to change my opinion, just as you are not going to change yours, so that's that really.

Kettenhunde
12-06-2009, 09:51 AM
Certainly you entitled to an opinion just as I or anyone else is entitled to one as well as the ability to express it.

Your opinion was noted without the need for you to repeat it. You are free just as I am to participate in the thread or not.

Some things are opinion while others are not.

Liking eat or not liking to eat tomatoes is an opinion on the taste of tomatoes. Some tomatoes are red when ripe is a fact.

When the Germans defeated the Royal Navy forces sent to stop them from using the channel, the Germans then controlled the channel.

That is fact.

Just as when the British soldiers took the Hess Battery, they controlled the guns. That is a fact.

All the best,

Crumpp

Dance
12-06-2009, 10:07 AM
What you consider fact, I consider opinion. Something else we can disagree on.

JtD
12-06-2009, 10:31 AM
Originally posted by Bremspropeller:
No, "running away" without being hassled equals control.

Interesting concept. So the British controlled the Altafjord when the X-craft planted mines under Tirpitz.

I never thought of it that way.

Bremspropeller
12-06-2009, 10:34 AM
Did anybody try to catch them? http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

jasonbirder
12-06-2009, 10:56 AM
So...if I can understand things correctly...

The Germans had Strategic Assets (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau & the Prinz Eugen) in the French Atlantic ports - a position from where they presented a strategic threat to Britain's vital interests (the Atlantic shipping lanes).
However, because of British Air Attacks and the reluctance to use them in an offensive role as intended (as surface raiders) because of overwhelming RN naval superiority:- A decision was made to withdraw them to safer ports...and make them available for a defensive role in another theatre.

Whilst the withdrawal was succesful, one asset (the Scharnhorst) was damaged so badly it was out of action for nearly a year another (the Gneisenau) was damaged and ultimately never sailed again prior to being broken up...

...and this is presented as an example of a stunning German Naval success !?!

Kettenhunde
12-06-2009, 11:16 AM
and this is presented as an example of a stunning German Naval success !?!

Tactically it was a stunning success and great example of combined arms coordination.

Is that so hard to acknowledge?

It just a fact the Germans controlled the channel during the operation.

It is also a fact that the Royal Navy did not control the channel. Both nations could and did exert tactical control when needed.

The German Navies failure to exploit the move by leaving the ships bottled up in harbor in Norway was much more effective than any Royal Navy operation against them.

The German Navy of its own accord removed them from fight. That has to go down in history as a very large blunder on their part.

Those ships could have been used to cut off the Arctic Convoy route to Russia which would have been much more effective than the Atlantic Convoy routes at stopping Russia.

The U-Boats at the time of Cerberus were successful at destroying ships faster than the Allies could build them in the Atlantic. The Atlantic was a battle Germany was firmly winning.


We have the benefit of hindsight in seeing that in just a few years those successes would be reversed and the Battle of the Atlantic swing irreversibly in favor of the Allies. That hindsight did not exist when the decision was made to move the ships to the North.

In Hitlers mind, the greatest threat was Russia and he feared a Norway invasion that would link England and Russia.


Of course, <insert next person who considers just one sides perception of an event>, that simply could be one side of the event based on incomplete facts. All of it is true, but just presented from one perspective only.

http://forums.ubi.com/eve/foru...571007018#6571007018 (http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/1761062908?r=6571007018#6571007018)

JtD
12-06-2009, 11:58 AM
Jason, the situation for the German vessels in Brest wasn't good at all. There was little chance they could operate in the Atlantic with anywhere near the effectiveness of 1941. The Allies had destroyed a large part of the supply network and the US had entered the war. It didn't make much sense to commit them, so they posed the same strategic threat in Brest to the Atlantic convoys they posed in Norway to the North Cape convoys. But they were at a much higher risk in Brest.

This is of course quite a bit of a what if, but the chances are they would not have accomplished much more than the Bismarck did. The battle of the Atlantic was fought by the U-Boats in 1942.

Waldo.Pepper
12-06-2009, 12:26 PM
Originally posted by Kettenhunde:
We know the Germans jammed the radar instead of it being "faulty". They kept aerial jamming platforms aloft to cover the fleet while it was underway.

[QUOTE]Radar jamming by 2 HE 111’s from Paris

My God that is an arrogantly misinformed and incomplete understanding of the days events! So much so that it sounds like something I would say! http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

Anyway regarding the jamming. This is a small point but I think it is important to point out since you are making quite a lot out of it.

While it was clever for the Germans to incorporate an attempt to jam the radars of the British. What is not recognized in this effort is that it amounted to nothing. As the larger failure of the Germans to create a complete picture of the radar coverage that the British had on the channel rendered the entire jamming effort futile. Centimeter wavelength radars completely discovered the passage of the ships rendering the jamming effort a mere fillip to morale.

Again I quote (at length) from the Loius Brown book ...

"Radar featured prominently for both sides in this action. Gen Martini personally supervised this aspect on the German side. The Kriegsmarine insisted on complete radio silence to include the ships' radar. This prevented them from using their Seetakt sets to obtain their positions from prominent land features or radar beacons. Given that the antenna arrangements of the Seetakt allowed almost no back-leakage of radiation and that their direct beams could hardly have been received on the English side until near Dover, this was probably an unnecessary and not very helpful restriction, but the squadron was able to navigate successfully nevertheless. As a substitute the shore stations were to locate the ships, which had IFF, and radio their positions to them. In practice this proved difficult, owing to the inherently poor directional accuracy of the shore-based Seetakt sets and an unreliable IFF performance that made distinguishing between the ships difficult. On top of this, communication failures at times failed to get the information assembled and transferred, so the navigation officers had to pay close attention to their fathometers and the depths indicated on the charts. There were also a series of marker boats at various points.

The British radar of which Martini was aware was the 1.5 m CD/CHL sets all along the coast. No shore-based radar would be able to observe the squadron except in the vicinity of the Dover Straits, so Martini set up 1.5 m jamming devices there, starting with very little interference but increasing it slightly from day to day until the level was thought adequate to mask reflections from the ships. This tactic did not fool Lieutenant Colonel B E Wallace, who quickly called attention to it but was ignored. In desperation he went to R V Jones, Head of Scientific Intelligence, and implored to be taken seriously. Jones had a top officer from the Telecommunications Research Establishment on the spot the next day—just in time for the passage of the ships.

Unknown to Martini, however, there were new 10 cm NT 271 coast defense sets (also called CD mark IV) installed on the southern coast. These were essentially the same as the Navy type 271 but with a 2 m paraboloid. Four that were within range of the squadron's path were located at Ventnor, Beachy Head, Fairlight and Dover. A fire had put the Ventnor station out of operation the night before, and it may have been out of range anyway, but the others worked just as intended. During mid-morning of 12 February 1942 the Beachy Head and Fairlight stations reported a force of large vessels at the far side of the Strait moving much faster than a normal convoy. These two reports then began winding their way to the Dover Coast Defence Operations Room. At the same time aircraft observed the ships visually but made no report until after landing, as strict radio silence prevailed, and their report also began its way toward Dover. Well over an hour later, Dover observed the ships with their own NT 271. It was their first news of the affair, as word of the other sightings had still not arrived.

The most important radar sighting was the one that was not made. Patrols had been set up for Coastal Command in three regions in the vicinity of Brest by Hudson bombers equipped with ASV mark II. These planes had been watching the harbor for seven months and their procedures had become slack. The patrols did not overlap and equipment failures were not allowed to disturb routine. ASV mark II was capable of spotting surfaced submarines, and a capital ship would have been the largest target the operators had ever encountered, but they were not there. In a maddening series of equipment failures—both in aircraft and in radar—the German ships passed the patrol regions when they were not covered.

Martini made no provision for jamming these sets, which is strange given the demand that there must be no discovery during the dark part of the passage. It is especially puzzling because British ASV capability had been known since the preceding May, yet the detailed plans saw no problem in the possibility that air surveillance might have radar. One can only conclude that this was another of the many examples of something kept secret from those who needed to know.
The feeble attempts to sink the escaping ships concern this account only peripherally. All attacks were made piecemeal. Some were marked by great courage enhanced by knowledge of the small chance of either success or survival. The heavy guns at Dover, which initiated British action, seemed impressive until one inquired about their rates of fire and ability to follow moving targets; none of their 33 rounds hit. Motor torpedo boats failed to penetrate the protective cover of the German destroyers and E-boats to a range that would have allowed hope of a successful launch. Next came the pathetic attack of six Swordfish torpedo bombers, all of which were shot down. Had they been able to attack as planned at night, the specialty in which they excelled, the result might have been otherwise, but they attacked during the day with one-tenth the fighter cover intended and suffered the fate of all torpedo bombers that had to face an overwhelming fighter and AA defense. A flotilla of six 20-year-old destroyers went straight after the big ships accompanied by Beaufort torpedo bombers properly escorted by Spitfires. In the waning daylight and bad weather the mixture of destroyers and aircraft from both sides gave generous examples of mistaken identity with fights between enemies at times appearing to be the exception, because visual IFF had problems as severe as radar IFF. Bomber Command's high-level attacks at the end of the day seldom found the target, let alone hit it.

As night closed the squadron had to thread its way—not too successfully—through mine fields. This would have been an excellent time to use Seetakt with radar beacons on shore to navigate, but strict radio silence was still enforced. The two battle cruisers were damaged by encounters with three mines. The Gneisenau received a blast followed by subsequent bombing from which she was never to recover; the Scharnhorst went on to meet a futile but heroic end in the waters off northern Norway; the Prinz Eugen served in the Baltic and ended her career as a test ship for an atomic bomb at Bikini Atoll."

pps 226-228.

Luck is important.

Kettenhunde
12-06-2009, 12:42 PM
Luck is important.

I am not making quite a bit of a point about it. It is a fact, the Germans did jam the radars.

Looks they missed a few and did not blanket the screen. That is very common in war.


These planes had been watching the harbor for seven months and their procedures had become slack. The patrols did not overlap and equipment failures were not allowed to disturb routine.

But it is not luck.

It is something else entirely. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_wink.gif

JtD
12-06-2009, 12:57 PM
In a maddening series of equipment failures—both in aircraft and in radar—the German ships passed the patrol regions when they were not covered.

M.J.Whitley describes this part a bit more detailed:

A Hudson of the RAF did take off for surveillance in the evening, but got into contact with a Ju-88 night fighter. To get by it undetected, it switched off the radar, and when switching it back on, a fuse failed. The simplicity of this defect was not detected by the crew, which did rtb. The Germans got through that section undetected.
The next section was to be searched by another Hudson, which also had a broken radar, and the Germans got through here as well.
Finally, the third patrol had to rtb an hour early, which happened to be just an hour before the Germans slipped through that section, too.

It's always interesting to see how small details like a burned fuse can have a huge impact on a large scale operation.

Kettenhunde
12-06-2009, 01:17 PM
but got into contact with a Ju-88 night fighter.

Interesting details. It is the small things that get you.

A chance contact combined with either operators who did not know their equipment or a flaw in the radar design.

Driving on with broken pieces of equipment and a failure to provide overlapping coverage or some form of relief for your watch.

That will do it.

It is not that the Germans were lucky in this case.

stalkervision
12-07-2009, 09:05 AM
Imo the german's could have established local superiority long enough for a landing. Continuing resupply of the shore troops would have been more problematical thou. This would have needed the germans to air drop a force in the major RN naval bases to keep the RN out of the fight or at least a submarine blocking force for these harbors.

and needless say without the spitfire the British would have been in a real heap of trouble. http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/winky.gif

barfo1983
12-07-2009, 11:02 AM
JtD Posted Sun December 06 2009 09:31 Hide Post
quote:
Originally posted by Bremspropeller:
No, "running away" without being hassled equals control.


Interesting concept. So the British controlled the Altafjord when the X-craft planted mines under Tirpitz.

I never thought of it that way.


Point set and march to JtD http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/clap.gif

barfo1983
12-07-2009, 11:04 AM
Point, set and 'match' "DO'H!!!!"

stalkervision
12-07-2009, 11:47 AM
well not actually barf but whatever floats your boat.. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_biggrin.gif

The British had temporary control right around the Tirpitz. http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_razz.gif http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

thefruitbat
12-07-2009, 01:46 PM
To nobody in particular, just because one side does not control an area, it dosen't mean that the other side does. They might, they might not.

What some of you seem to consider control, is v amusing http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/25.gif

regards, fruitbat

stalkervision
12-07-2009, 03:03 PM
and visa versa..

gkll
12-07-2009, 11:00 PM
Some Brit admiral or another defined seapower as something like "to use that stretch of sea for your own purposes, or to deny such use to the enemy". Control of the sea is the exercise of seapower.

So this haggling over 'control' of the channel is mostly a semantic argument. From my perspective and as an RN fanboi, I would have to say the dash was a fair exercise of 'control'. The 'control' was dependent as Gunz said on a certain 'kinetic' emphasis to German plans; it was not possible as a stop and linger mission, it did in fact rely on speed and concentration of force. Nothing wrong with that, at all. However the kind of control demonstrated was in no way similar to that required for an invasion, full stop on that. My opinion as expressed in two other extensive threads has not changed, which is that under no scenario was an invasion of the UK possible fall of 40, even with the total loss of 11 group RAF. Leit and Ratsack and a few others were by no means in total agreement, the thread is worth a reread for those curious. Me I think Horseback captured a lot relevant in this thread. Plenty of other interesting points as well, example is dispatch of an armored brigade to N Africa, the best armor in the country. This authorized as I recollect in August before the BOB fully got rolling let alone seemed definitive one way or another.

EDIT < Before this thread got mixed with "RN as the Sure Shield" vs "RAF Flashy Flyboys win the Day!" it was about Hurris Spits and 109s... on this issue I am ambivalent... 109s outperformed Hurris pretty nicely and assuming the Brits were pilot limited you would have just the 600 frontline Hurris... so incremental effects might have led to the defeat of 11 group. And a lot of hurried work to up the Hurris ha ha>

horseback
12-08-2009, 10:30 AM
Some Brit admiral or another defined seapower as something like "to use that stretch of sea for your own purposes, or to deny such use to the enemy". Control of the sea is the exercise of seapower. Actually, there are a couple of major types of sea power: control and denial.

The USN, RN & (to a lesser extent) IJN were primarily set up as sea control type navies. They had the mission and ability to take possession of and make use of a body of water while denying its use to anyone else. This required a large investment in several major surface combatant types as well as carriers and submarines, supported by a substantial fleet of oilers, repair ships and specialized troop carriers/amphibious ships. This allowed them to support very long logistics lines, protect their own civilian shipping and ultimately project their sea/air power at great distances from their shore bases while denying the enemy use or control of those seas.

The Germans and later, the USSR, had a sea denial type of sea power. They were set up with the primary mission to control their own territorial waters (in cooperation with land based assets), but the only way they could project sea power into ‘blue water’ was in a stealthy, hit and run, disruptive form of sea denial, primarily targeting civilian shipping and the disruption of enemy logistics (and even today, most heavy lift transport has to be done by sea). Their ultimate goal was to prevent the other side from using the sea lanes or to make it as expensive as possible. They lacked the major surface types, both combatant and support fleets, as well as shore based infrastructure to control the waters at any great distance from their own coastal waters, even the waters of recently conquered territory.

As to Cerberus, the Germans were able to take advantage of some holes in the British command and control communications system, aided by fortuitous electronic and human failures. From their point of view, the fact that they got their ships through the Channel was proof that their countermeasures worked. Whether they did everything right or just got lucky that one time is moot.

However, when we talk about air to surface radars in February of 1942, we are talking about a fairly recent development. Getting the size of the system down to something that could be conveniently carried on an aircraft with a useful range AND the ability to survive a trip through enemy air space as a practical concept was less than a couple of years old; the systems were first generation, hard to obtain in useful numbers, practically hand made and pretty large and clunky. Ease of operation or crew/technician convenience were totally secondary concerns.

Having a backup aircraft on hand may simply have been impossible, given how tempramental and rare those airborne sets were at that time, while half the point of standing guard is to make the other guy aware that he's being watched. If my radar system wasn't working and I didn't have another aircraft ready to go, I'd send the original plane and crew on theri scheduled flight to make the bad guys at least think that they were being watched...

cheers

horseback

Kettenhunde
12-08-2009, 10:39 AM
I'd send the original plane and crew on theri scheduled flight to make the bad guys at least think that they were being watched...


I am sure 70 years later that would be known fact in the orders.

thefruitbat
12-08-2009, 11:02 AM
Returning to the original question, and dare i say it, i'm going to add some observations from the game itself, since along with the history, it is a game forum too http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/partyhat.gif

I've started to make a BoB campaign, and have been flying lots of scenario's from both sides, and what is key is they are many plane engagements.

What i have noticed, is that i get more kills flying the same mission in a bob hurri, than i do in a bob spit.

I think this is for a few reasons, firstly because it is a much better gun platform, steady in the aim, unlike the much more jumpier spit, secondly the gun arrangement is much tighter. And thirdly, because they are many plane engagements, position rather than outright performance is much more important. 1v1 outright performance shines through much more readily, but in a long drawn out engagement, maintaing e and postion much more relevant, and the performances are all close enough to be the pilot, not the plane.

Still prefer to be in a spit though against good oposition, that jumpiness it what makes it extreamly agile.

Oh, i get many more kills per flight in the 109, damn cannons http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_redface.gif

So i guess i'm saying they would to the original question, as long as i wasn't flying for the luftwaffe.

Based on a game, lol.

fruitbat