Question:
If Operation Market Garden had succeeded would it have won the war by christmas 1944?

Choices:
yes
no
it depends, in what way?

 

No, because after they crossed the Rine the main goal wasn't Berlin anymore but the south and the north of germany. If they would have succeeded in Market garden I think they would just have done the same (against what Montgomery had expected I think).

Those who seriously want to know the answer, or those with a serious interest in history will take the time to read this...

Deep breath, crack the knuckles, and let's begin:

After the liberation of Brussels & Antwerp there were signs of a German general collapse all along the British front.

Channel ports were being captured or neutralized (cut off) by Canadian forces pushing up the coast.

The Americans under Bradley were meeting little opposition as they pushed through central France & southern Belgium.

The only place the Germans seemed determined to stand & defend was the Dutch Scheldt estuary which guarded the approaches to Antwerp. (The Breskens Pocket, a 50-mile nightmare of German defensive positions, dykes & canals, and low ground.)

Market Garden would bypass this, leaving it to the the Canadians to secure, while maintaining the momentum of the other Allied armies.

To keep that momentum going, Market Garden's purpose was to capture the bridge crossings at the Maas, Waal, and Rhine rivers using the Allied Airborne Corps.

Then British ground forces would strike north from Brussels, through the corridor through Holland that Market Garden would create, into Germany's Ruhr Valley.

It was to be the end-game move: Planned and intended to be the last major battle of the Western Front in the Second World War.

Ever since then, lots of folks have had lots of opinions on the subject.

Montgomery remained utterly convinced that it would've succeeded had he been given what he needed to make it work.

American Generals Maxwell Taylor and James Gavin (commanding the 101st & 82nd Airborne Division respectively) BOTH considered that had Eisenhower NOT hesitated in backing Monty's drive, the final phase of Market Garden would've succeeded.

Senior German Generals Speidel and Zimmermann after the war agreed that due to the total collapse of the German 5th and 7th Armies in Normandy, a concentrated all-out Allied attack in September - either through the Ruhr or Saar valleys to Berlin - could NOT have been resisted by German forces.

In basic terms, Market Garden's concept was that with German forces in disarray to focus Allied power for just such an all-out attack from either one flank (British - Ruhr Valley) or another (American - Saar Valley).

The reason he chose the northern route had nothing to do with 'hogging the glory for the Brits' as he's been accused of. He didn't care which route they went, so long as they went and is on record as saying so.

There were 2 reasons:

One was to permit the use of allied naval support from the North Sea coastline.

The other was to permit the use of North Sea ports to supply the advance because although Antwerp was the closest port in Allied hands, it couldn't be used until its approaches (the Breskens pocket) had been cleaned out.

So yes, to answer the question posted, the war would have ended sooner had the Allies been able to continue the route of the Germans.

SHAEF dropped the ball. And millions who wound up on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain paid the price for over half a century.

Very good point DarkAutumn, so you think had the allies been able to use their naval support to full advantage, the Germans would have been pushed back faster and faced defeat sooner? Alright and had the allies fighting on the western front advanced into the German heartland sooner than they did as a result of Market Garden, how do you think the fashion in which Europe was divided would have differed (communist & non-communsit sections), do you think we would have still given East Germany to Russia and it not, how much more do you think we would of advanced? Also, how do you think the German resistance would have been leading up to the surrender of Nazi Germany in contrast to what it was?

About Market Garden:

Yes, it failed. And everyone seems to focus on that.
Yet even in failure, it paid dividends: It created an Allied salient as far as Nijmegen in Holland, which was quickly consolidated and enlarged by the other corps of the British 2nd Army and the U.S. 101st and 82nd Airborne Regiments, thus establishing a firm forward area for staging further operations into Germany.

When the German armies in Normandy collapsed, and started running, they did half the job for the Allies by clogging their own rear areas, supply lines, potential staging areas, routes of march, etc that the German High Command needed to bring forces from elsewhere to counter the Allied advance. News of the Market Garden para drops added to that panic.

Add to this the fact that panic itself is contagious. Germans who thought themselves safely behind the lines were suddenly treated to front line troops fleeing past them. Leaving it to them to stop the Allies, or run.
This added to the numbers of Germans fleeing away from the Allies and back towards the Reich, thus making the fog of war and general state of confusion even worse. Especially for German commanders trying to get a grip on the situation, restore order, and revive the morale of their men.

These obstacles wouldn't make the Allied task any easier. Which is just one more reason taking those crossings was vital to Market Garden's planners and the success of the operation.
It would've helped Allied forces to punch past, and through, into the Reich.

Had Market Garden succeeded, one result would've been forestalling the German last-ditch offensive through the Ardennes Forest (The Battle of the Bulge) later that year. Which is not to say just such a desperation move wouldn't have happened elsewhere. Just not where, and when, it did.

The northern thrust that Market Garden was meant to be seems to make good sense so far as the proposed use of naval assets goes. Hitting an enemy on one flank while they're already engaged on another is sound doctrine.

So had elements of the Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, etc ALL parked off shore and cut loose, the psychological impact of that would've added to the panic if not causing panic all on it's own.

And even if that gunfire was wasted on targets of zero value, merely being able to interdict German routes of supply, communication, retreat & advance, etc would've helped limit Germany's options in those area by denying them the use of those areas.

By creating fire zones with naval artillery, we could've kept them on the defensive and funnelled into areas we wanted them while adding to the mayhem by scaring the civilian population out of those areas and onto the roadways.

Also to be considered is the possibilities risking Aircraft Carriers in North Sea waters might've provided. Naval air assets would've assisted in target spotting thus increasing the effectiveness of naval shelling, while adding their own bombing and strafing to the maelstrom.

I'm not exactly sure if such a thing was included in the actual plan, but I've read that it was discussed.

Montgomery was criticized after Market Garden for NOT waiting for Antwerp to be opened for shipping. Yet part of the reason for bypassing that opportunity was the chance to seize North Sea ports to cut down the overland supply lines.

And such a move would've also help remove or neutralize the threat posed by whatever ships the German Kriegsmarine could muster, and deny the home ports to what U-boats remained operational after losing their ports on the French coast and elsewhere.

Considering all the benefits to be had from it's success, it's bizarre to look back and try to understand why SHAEF didn't give Market Garden the priority for supplies that it needed.

An obvious reason Market Garden failed was because the Germans had forces resting, refitting or plain relocated the Arnhem area that helped turn the tide of battle.

But it was Allied politics that killed things with more finality than any German bullet:

There wasn't enough supplies for both the Americans and the Brits to make an all-out effort. Who got priority of supply should've been a strictly military decision, not a political one.

Further straining the Allied supply and transport situation was SHAEF moving its headquarters from England onto Continental Europe so as to 'be there' for the final stage of the war. (Which needed transport and supplies to accomplish, establish, and sustain.)

Adding to this was the politically motivated decision to not have a single overall ground commander. Monty was reduced from that role to Brits being in charge of Brits, Yanks in charge of Yanks, etc.

And for what?
-Roosevelt and others in Washington didn't want the last great battle commanded by a British General (Monty).
Eisenhower too worried about American public perception of that, since they had more divisions fielded in Europe than any other Allied nation.

The British just wanted the bloody war over with. They'd been bled white, to the point where they'd had to actually borrow officers from the Canadians to have officers to command their units. (The CANLOAN program.) And, more tellingly, to enfore women's conscription to free up more men for field service.

Their forces were stretched thin from the Pacific, through the Middle East, to Italy, to Europe. To keep what their fielded units functioning, they needed supplies and manpower they just didn't have and couldn't get.

Either there'd be an early victory, or Britain would be forced to reduce. withdraw, or amalgamate forces because there weren't replacements or supplies to keep them in the field.

And, politically as well, to be able to retain some semblance of stature in the post war world by being able to project political power through military means.

The Canadians had managed to get by without conscription whatsoever up to this point of the war. And rather hoped they'd finish without a political crisis on the subject breaking out. (Which is exactly what did happen.) Up until then, it'd been a point of pride that the Canadian military was entirely comprised of willing volunteers.

The Free Poles had fought valiantly, but lost heart when they realized that Poland was being abandoned to the Soviets. And that none of them would have a home to return to. Reduced to having nothing left to fight for but killing Germans, they kept on killing Germans.

Indeed, by that time Churchill was full aware of Stalin's intentions to establish communist control over Poland and the Balkans while extending Soviet power as far into Germany as possible before the war ended.

And all that with the blind acquiesence of Roosevelt who had maintained that he 'understood' Stalin better than the British, and actually believed he could work with the Stalin.

The American government also seemed determined to divest the British of their empire, and didn't want to see the Brits playing at imperialism following the war. Roosevelt personally mistrusted the British not to try and recoup their empire, or even expand it.

In regards to Market Garden itself, even Monty's Chief of Staff deGuingand spoke of the consequences HAD Market Garden been given what it needed... And failed anyways:

What would the American people; their national pride and opinion have been HAD everything gone right and ended wrong? It could've created a bitter, and serious rift between the Allies. And, by the same token, had it succeeded it would've created envy and anger that the Brits got the glory.

Such suppositions aside, still another nail in Market Garden's coffin is that Eisenhower's broad-front policy.
Which hadn't worked in the First World War, either.
Ike was a great man. Just not a field soldier:

If you're of equal strength everywhere, but nowhere strong enough for decisive action, you're placing yourself in danger of the same stalemate that was the Western Front of 1914-18.

Which, apparently, he felt was the better course of action than giving either thrust (American or British) the priority and causing an outraged uproar from which one hadn't been.

Even still, nothing excuses promised American support for Market Garden not materializing where and when it was supposed to:

The ground thrust by British General Horrocks 30th Corps fought through to Nijmegen. But beyond the Waal they came under fierce German counter attacks from his left and right flanks. And the Americans were supposed to be covering his right flank.

This required the Brits to divert transport to bring up the 8th British Corps to cover Horrocks' right flank and stop the Germans cutting the road BEHIND Horrocks' advance. Which the Germans did do, 3 times as a matter of fact.

Leading elements of 30th Corps actually did link up with the Airborne units, but were in turn themselves cut off and trapped with the Paratroops by German panzer attacks. Despite all, that proves Market Garden could have succeeded. And makes the scope of the tragedy that it didn't all the greater.

Throughout the war, one of Britains aims had been forcing the dispersement of German forces by maintaining the Royal Navy's freedom at sea.

With their Navy, they could threaten the coasts of: France, Norway, even the German Reich's North Sea shore itself. They were a danger to Mediterranean shores as well: the coasts of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and the Gulf of Trieste (gateway to the Balkan states), Egypt, Palestine, North Africa, etc.

And to counter those danger zones, the Germans had to maintain forces in all those regions which stretched supply lines, etc.

The Italian theatre gave the Allies the staging ground for an attack up through the Adriatic.

Seizing Vienna ahead of the Russians was one of Churchill's cherished wartime goals.

And it would've worked: All of Germany's satellite states in the region (Romania, etc) were far more afraid of the Russians than they were of turning on the Germans.

They'd (secretly) agreed to support the Allied cause if a landing in force was made anywhere in the region. (Turkey too would've come into the war on the Allied side if that'd happened.)

Such actions were in those countries own best interests. And they would've gladly preferred to have fought as free Allies rather than what happened to them when Soviet forces rolled over them.

The fact is that the Americans underestimated the Soviets. While the British, and even the Germans, did not. (Nazi peace overtures to the Allies were what? -To join forces and jointly defeat the Communist threat.)

What became the Soviet Bloc wouldn't have had this Adriatic advance up through Hungary's Po Valley been undertaken.

That no such attempt was made was political.
Roosevelt and Marshall were almost paranoid of the British and possible ulterior motives the Brits may, or may not, have actually had.

Which led England's Alanbrooke to wonder after the war how things would've turned out if they'd had MacArthur instead of Marshall. (Alanbrooke, even Montgomery, considered MacArthur the greatest general of World War 2.)

And complicating matters further in favour of the Russians:

Eisenhower took it on himself to privately arrange with Stalin to leave Berlin to the Russians, and to halt the Western Allies short of that goal.

The recent back and forth with the current Iraq War has led many patriotic Americans to claim how America brought freedom to x-number of millions worldwide. And how Iraq was a continuation of that. Even hard core ultranationalists like Anne Coulter made the same claim.

Truth is, all those millions under Soviet domination that we in the West squared off against for all the years of the Cold War only came under that domination because we let them.

And we in the West let them by not pushing forward along every possible axis of advance to take Berlin and end the war before the Russians got as far as they did.

Consider the paranoia of nuclear war in the 50's. The McCarthy era of 'commies under every bed', etc.
And the massive military spending by all sides.

The proxy wars fought by client states of the west and the Soviet Bloc. And the wars in which one side took active participation, such as Vietnam for the Americans or Afghanistan for the Soviets.

Think of the effect all these things had on individual nations and lives.
-Especially those harmed by the situation which arose from, and is directly attributable to, what the Western Allies did and did not do in the Second World War.

Events like the collapse of communism caused suffering and hardship for peoples we could've prevented from having to suffer communism in the first place.

Yes, good came of the Cold war era.
Such as technological advancements like the internet itself.

But even still: Before AND after the Normandy landings, Churchill and Alanbrooke were still trying to talk the Americans into using Italy to springboard an assault into Germany through the Balkans.

Hitler might've been taken alive, like Saddam.

We also might've ended up fighting the soviets.
(Which is what many wanted to do as long as everyone was armed to the teeth and battle hardened.)

Imagine a world where we'd sorted out the Russians BEFORE their spies gave them the secrets to atomic weaponry...

One where communism wasn't bankrupted over the course of generations, but crushed decisively before it could ruin the peoples, economies, cultures, and environments that the Soviet system wreaked havoc on.

Just something to think about...

I enjoyed reading that alot, I argee with almost everything in your opinion, even the cons of the American government (I am an American).

I personally love the idea of the Soviets being cut off by the western allies and all of the German satellite nations rising up and being saved, I think the world could have been a better place (and as you said it was very possible, I think Patton would have approved if it) but sadly Roosevelt was not all there and like you said again, thought he could work with the Russian leader and thought he understood him very well, which he did not.

If we decided to stop the Russians' advance we could have put a huge amount of damage on the iron curtain. The way we Americans see it by popular belief is, us and the Brits, Canadians, Dutch, Poles, French,etc. were all on the same boat with the Russians to try to stop the Germans for reaking havoc on the peoples of Europe so you will find why we think we are the "great liberty bringers" and alot of why American conception of the matter is flawed, so I fully agree that our point of view looking back is awkard and we definitly should have helped the Brits alot more. Also, we think the cold war was just suddenly brought up by the Russians but most of us don't realize there were some things we could have seen and been more ready for.

If Poland, Romania, Hungary, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, etc. were all on our side, Russia would have had a time spreading influnce and getting resources (or at least, thats what I think) and those nations clearly hated communist rule (e.g.solidarity in Poland) so Soviet marxism would have possibly died faster.

I also think it is a d*mn shame politics had such a big role in messing up the war effort and that our biggest commander, Eisenhower went on certain beliefs (I still think he was pretty fit for his job though).

Speaking of SHAEF, do you happen to catch "IKE: Countdown to D-day"? And if so, do you think this is an accurate portrail of the supreme allied command in the months leading up to June 5th, then June 6th (personally I got a totally different outlook for the generals than with a bunch of history books)?

And you said that the German satellite nations feared Russia more than turning on the Germans, why was this so, do the Russians showcase their brutality more fiercly than the Germans (I personally thought the peoples of these nations looked upon the aftermath of the death of Reinhard Heydrich as a grim guide)?

And finally I just want to know, is your user name named after the WW1 zeppelin offensive or something else?

Just a short addition to this thread. Wasn't one of the plans (if Market Garden succeded) to have an open window to hit at the heart of the Germans war factories and in doing so disable their forces?

The Ruhr Valley was the heartland of German industrial production.
It's home to Mercedes, Porsche, the mighty Krupps steelworks, etc.

That made the place vital to Germany's interests/survival.
It was therefore vital to deny Germany possession of it.

So yes, Market Garden was deliberately planned to enable the Allies to drive on Berlin through the Ruhr.

The only problem was: There wasn't much left in the Ruhr to deny to the Germans except for the actual terrain:

German General Heinz Guderian is the 'father of modern armored warfare.'
He's the guy who (essentially) invented the German Blitzkrieg.

He was put in charge of all production & deployment of armour for the 3rd Reich. He stated that the Ruhr had "ceased to exist as a viable economic area" by the end of 1943 because of nonstop Allied bombing raids.

German Luftwaffe General of Fighters Adolf Galland, a wartime fighter ace, also said the same about the Ruhr in a book he wrote after the war.

Still, the impact on German morale would've been considerable. Plus the Germans had made some inroads into hiding production facilities underground to avoid Allied bombers.

And a final piece of obscure trivia:
The Ruhr, geologically-speaking, isn't really a Valley. It's a Basin.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: DarkAutumn,

I'm an artist professionally.
My user name comes from the name of my business: DarkAutumn Arts.

I missed the show on Eisenhower, but my take on the man is this:
He was a man of great personal courage, honour, and fair play.
He was a great man, a great statesman, just not a combat leader.

For instance, he failed to appreciate that the Germans had more divisions in Normandy than the Allies did before D-Day and even AFTER it.

His 'broad front' policy made no sense considering the Germans had the advantages of organized defences backed by road and rail transport.

It gave the Germans the upper hand for moving & massing forces for attack, defense, retreat, resupply, rallying, etc because no matter where the Allies were confronting them, the Allies weren't strong enough to strike a decisive blow.

By not giving priority of supply to Market Garden, he doomed it's success.
One of it's goals WAS the Ruhr Valley as a route to Berlin.

And yet, after Market Garden, he took it on himself to contact Stalin directly and inform Stalin that his (Ike's) intentions were to isolate the Ruhr from the rest of Germany and that he had no particular interest in Berlin. He'd have had the bloody place had he supported the plan instead of letting it wither and die.

The Berlin Wall, the Berlin Airlift, Kennedy's "Ich Bin Ein Berliner!" speech, the desperate escape attempts from the Soviet zone, etc ALL would NOT have happened BUT for Eisenhower.

About the German satellite states:

Consider what those nations had already experienced in the living memory of their citizenry:

The Austro-Hungarian empire, The Russian Revolution, etc.
These are countries that achieved their self-determination and had no desire to lose that freedom.

Being neighbours to the Russians, witnesses to the Communist revolution and overthrow of the Czarist rulers, the wartime Stalinist purge of the Soviet military, etc they knew what things were like for nations under Communist domination (ie: The Ukraine) they wanted no part of any Marxist-Leninist 'worker's paradise'.

Plus they'd see what life was like for those under communism from their forces participating in the German invasion of Soviet territories.

Consider what life was like in the region for those countries.
The present nation of Moldova is a good example:

Moldova, if you've never heard of it, is a small landlocked country sandwiched between Romania and the Ukraine.

Formerly the principality of Moldavia, it's eastern region was annexed by Imperial Russia in 1812 and renamed 'Bessarabia'.

What remained became part of Wallachia in 1859, and both later became part of the kingdom of Romania.

Bessarabia declared independence from Russia in 1918 at the end of the First World War. The Soviets annexed it back at the start of World War 2 under the Nazi-Soviet Molotov-VonRibbentrop Pact.

The Soviets lost it to the Nazis, then took it back again at the end of the war and reorganized it as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. (Which involved giving parts of it's territory to the Ukraine by the way.)

And when communism finally fell apart in Europe, it declared itself the Republic of Moldova back in '91.

That's what life was like just for one postage-stamp sized country with a total current national population about the size of the city of Toronto. (5 million or so.)

And prior to all that, they had Greeks, Turks, Romans, Dacians, Scythians, Goths, Carps and pretty much everyone else fighting back and forth and claiming control throughout the length and breadth of recorded history.

One of the busiest little places you never heard of.

Extrapolate from that example, and you can better understand why the countries of the region had zero desire to be under any foreign control.

The countries that cooperated with Nazi Germany did so only to preserve some semblance of their autonomy and to prevent their populations suffering the brutality that German invasion visited upon Poland, etc.

If the Americans had gone along with the British proposal to strike up through the Balkan states, we would've swelled our ranks with the addition of the military forces of those countries. (Romania alone could've handed us 14 divisions, many already combat-hardened & experienced from fighting alongside the Germans in Russia.)

This message has been edited. Last edited by: DarkAutumn,

I would have answered your question myself WindogNZ, but I knew if DarkAutumn did he would have answered ...well how he did, in far greater depth than I could have come close to, nice read DarkAutumn!

Inside me is a frustrated historian/history professor/military author just trying to get out. sigh.

But the artist thing lets me work with some truly gorgeous women and momma didn't raise no fool.

Wait your an author, professor and historian? Or is that just your state of mind?

PS you should write a novel!

I'm (mostly) a portraiture artist, working in the digital medium, to use the technical terms.

But with the amount of military factoids and trivia I've got stuck in my head I probably ought to become a historian or author.

For Example: A Bridge Too Far once wasn't.

The British sent a military expedition to Flanders (Holland) under the 'Grand Old Duke of York' to fight against revolutionary France.

That expedition experienced the worst winter (1794-95) in living memory.

The River Waal at Arnhem froze so deeply soldiers could march across and sentries froze to death at their posts.

Few people realize the British had already been through the area once before in history.

Or that a sort-of Napoleonic Dunkirk for British forces was conducted from Bremen when the British government decided to put an end to what was called a 'catastrophic campaign.'

The British left behind 206 dead.
Only 6 died from enemy action.

I never knew that. D*mn Darkautumn you know alot.

RIP lads

You know one thing that Ike condradicts about himself with his broad front policy is that he was good friends, and kept supporting Patton, who was well known for striking with force in a concentrated spot and continually driving forward which wasn't Ikes style at all. - Just a short addition

quote:

Originally posted by RMaule:
I never knew that. D*mn Darkautumn you know alot.

RIP lads

Bad Form, Old Boy! You can't leave it to us mere colonials across the pond to remember all the glorious history of Empire for you!
It'll cost you rounds down the pub if I ever get back over to Merry Olde England.

But seriously (and even more Trivial):

The regular folks back then didn't think much of the (then) Duke of York.
What they said about him became a nursery rhyme for children:

"The Grand Old Duke of York... He had 10 Thousand Men.... He marched them to the top of the hill... And marched them down again."

quote:

Originally posted by WindogNZ:
You know one thing that Ike condradicts about himself with his broad front policy is that he was good friends, and kept supporting Patton, who was well known for striking with force in a concentrated spot and continually driving forward which wasn't Ikes style at all. - Just a short addition

It's true that Ike thought much of Patton.
And Ike's opinion carried a lot of weight as Supreme Allied Commander.
Consider the slapping incidents in Sicily for which Patton was relieved of command:

"Eisenhower had decided that Patton was far too valuable to the war effort to lose. His audacious, driving leadership was surely needed at this stage of the game. Eisenhower's plan was to have Patton apologize to the soldiers he had slapped and also to all of the personnel in his Army in Division formation. Knowing Patton's pride, he felt that this would be severe punishment, indeed. In Beatrice Patton's words, "The deed is done and the mistake made, and I'm sure Georgie is sorrier and has punished himself more than anyone could possibly realize ... I just hope they won't kick him to death while he's down."

Some of the correspondents at AFHQ, including Demaree Bess of the Saturday Evening Post had learned of the slappings. They acquiesced in the reporting of the situation because they were uncertain if Patton might not be subject to a Court Martial for his actions. They contacted Eisenhower prior to submitting the story for publication. Eisenhower then had a meeting with three of the Senior Correspondents at AFHQ during which he had explained the situation to them and the exact course of action that he had followed, hoping that the matter would then be completely settled. The correspondents decided as a group to drop the matter. They, too, thought Patton too valuable a man to lose."

source: http://www.pattonhq.com/unknown/chap08.html

Having been a soldier, I can attest that there are times and circumstances when an officer is not only entitled, but required, to use force on a soldier under his command. Deadly force if necessary.

But those are combat situations where the fate of a unit, engagement, or overall battle hangs in the balance. Not in hospitals behind the lines.
Personally, I believe Patton should have stood immediate court martial.
And Eisenhower as well, to answer for why Patton's leash wasn't yanked hard and Patton reigned in and reminded of his duty and his place.