I came across this claim in Osprey's "Ki-43 aces of the JAAF".

They also mention that the Ki-43-1 had defective 50 cal. explosive rounds that often exploded near or in the cowl (bringing down the aircraft!), and were thus often replaced in whole or in part by 7.7 mm guns, and that the Ki-43-1 had a skin wrinkling problems in the wingroots that were aleviated by Nakajima by putting a spring in the control cables, to reduce pilot authority at high loads!

I already knew about the .50 guns and weak wing problem of the -1 (both solved in the Ki-43-II except for a still slow synchronized rate of fire inherent to the Browning MG design), but what I didn't realize was how the Japanese .50 caliber round was so powerfully explosive...

Another thing that surprised me in the Osprey book, was that the Ki-43 seems to hold its own again many American fighters a lot better than the Zero, trading losses on a fairly even footing with P-40s, P-38s and p-47Ds. In fact, the only American aircraft the Ki-43-II seemed to really fear was the ... B-24! It just did not do enough damage to bring it down, and that seemed to be a much bigger problem than losses from US fighters!

A Ki-43 unit commander puts it this way to his pilots: -I will punch you in the face if, in a fight with American fighters, you get one bullet hole in your aircraft! I will punch you ALSO if, against an American bomber, you do NOT have bullet holes in your aircraft!-

Unlike the Zero, the Ki-43 had from the start self-sealing fuel tanks (improved on the -II), got significant factory-installed pilot back armor from July '43 (the Zero never really did...), and its .50 armament was seen as more useable against fighters than the Zero's.

Many accounts relates to damaged Ki-43-1 coming back with 16-20 50 cal. bullet holes, the aircraft being repairable. Somehow, I cannot remember a single instance of heavily damaged Zeroes making it back, except for Saburo Sakai and his famous eye injury. (I think the Zero was not heavily damaged even in this instance...)

Handling tests against a P-38 also showed that its controls froze at much higher speeds than those of the Zero, above 300 IAS, which could easily be close to 400-450 MPH TAS at some altitudes.

The quoted speed of 530 km/h was much inferior to the Zero, but was probably in fact 560 km/h with true WEP, the A6M5 Zero true WEP being around 590-595 km/h. (All the Japanese WWII aircraft true WEP figures are a murky area.)

One of the more startling fact I have gathered so far from the Osprey book, was that the Zero was NOT that well known during the war within Japan itself! The Ki-43 as an aircraft was FAR more famous, and units equipped with it got by far most of the wartime glory...

Given all of the above, is there any chance of the 6500 Ki-43 Oscar built having a similar number of kills to ALL the other Japanese fighters combined? 3500 Ki-84s, 10 000 Zeroes, 2400 Ki-61s, 1400 N1K1s, 1200 Ki-44s total 18 500 fighters.

It does not seem possible, but none of the late-war types saw use in favorable circumstances, and only the Zero had a similar range, reliability and duration of use to the Oscar.

It does seems possible it could have a lot more kills than the Zero, however.

Any notion of where Osprey got this quite categorical statement? Their book seems very well researched.

Gaston

Very interesting, I have a soft spot for the KI-44 but it was based on the 43 for the above mentioned good reasons which some I did not know.
As for Osprey, It seem's to me that they usualy do there homework and not just punch out propaganda or best guesses.

If they had these 50% of kills it's probably more a matter of circumstance than actual aircraft performance.

As we all know, the "don't get hit" concept doesn't work very well, in particular if you don't see the bandit attacking you.

Other people here are probably more knowledeable about Japanese planes...

But it may be because Japan's carrier air forces mainly only enjoyed superiority and importance from Pearl Harbor in December 1941 to Midway in June 1942, meanwhile land-based battles went on throughout the war.

I'm not sure how much carriers were used by the Japanese in the East Asia campaigns, but the Ki-43 would have been instrumental there fighting against the Dutch, British and Americans. At that point of the war the Allies had poor aircraft and badly trained pilots, whereas the Japanese had good planes and their pilots had gotten combat experience flying over China for years and years.

I think people today mainly think about the carrier-based battles when they think of Japanese and American fighters battling it out.

I'm not so sure that the Allied fighters opposing the Japanese in the early stages of the Pacific war were such poor planes. I think it was mainly a case of Allied fighters being caught with every disadvantage you can think of: outnumbered (sometimes 3 to 1), bad tactical situation (such as caught at takeoff or landing due to lack of early warning system), etc. Inadequate pilot training when compared to that of IJAAF and IJN didn't help either. With the exception of the Interceptor, Allied fighters were rugged aircraft which could take punishment that would down an A6M2 or Ki.43- Hurricane, P-40, Buffalo, Wildcat etc.

A much closer study of the air war over the Malay Barrier than has been done so far would, I think, largely disprove the "inferior aircraft" theory. Carriers weren't used very much in SE Asia during the Japanese invasion- they weren't really needed as the Japanese captured aerodromes during every stage of their advance. And, they made sure of air superiority before their next stage of advance.

Well you're probably right and I've always reckoned that the Allies did poorly against the Japanese prior to Midway more because of bad training rather than because of poor planes, but the storyline has always been that the Allied planes were worse than the Japanese planes, which were as slow or slower, had poorer armor, and had iffy armament, but obviously shone in the hands of a skilled pilot.

The Buffalo has always had a bad reputation because of its performance in that stage of the war. In Il-2 though it's a great plane (not that that is necessarily reflective of its performance in real life) and the Finns used their B-239 model ridiculously well against larger numbers of Russian planes (who to be fair also had the problem of poor training, whereas the Finns were better trained) though it was lighter and slower.

The Wildcat was definitely a great plane and a good match for the Zero if flown right, but it wasn't until after a while that the US figured out the best tactics, until then it was TnB bait for the Zero. And was it used that much outside of the carrier battles between Pearl and Midway? Like by the British and American forces in East Asia, the Phillipines etc?

And the P-40 was definitely a pretty decent plane if flown right, and I've always thought that it has received a poorer reputation than it deserved. Maybe its easier to blame your planes than your pilots and your military's lack of good training and resource management.

The Hurricane was a decent plane too obviously.

So were those planes the mainstay against the Japanese against the Ki-43?

I think the preponderance of islands in the Pacific could explain the Ki-43's kills superiority. They might also have seen more regular combat rather than the more occasional big, long-range raid escort like the Zero did. I heard long periods of inaction are very bad for pilot skill, and the Hellcat/Corsair were, in addition, much less fragile aircrafts than the US Army's liquid cooled engined aircrafts like the P-40, P-51 and P-38. Still, that the Ki-43 was more famous in Japan than the Zero I find particularly astonishing...

The China-Burma-India theater was a Ki-43 exclusivity also.

Little known is that after the fall of Okinawa (April of 1945!)the Japanese Army launched a massive land attack in China, lead for the very first time by an actual armored division(about 220 Type 97 tanks). There were no rapes or looting this time around apparently, as this was a much more professionally conducted campaign, and it was one of the Japanese Army's biggest success of the entire war!

Dozens of Allied airfields were captured, Gen. Chennault's entire air force having to flee China(!), while the Allied front was pushed back over hundreds of miles... This was due to Mao tacitly relieving pressure on the Japanese, to help cause the collapse of his enemy Thang Kai Check. Thousands of Allied aircraft fleeing dozens of airfields in front of a massive Japanese Army advance is not exactly the image I had of the Spring of 1945, but it did happen, incredibly enough... And is now utterly forgotten... (It did help weaken the Japanese against the Soviet attack in Mandchuria later on...)

In any case, the reputation of drastic inferiority of the Ki-43 to the Zero needs to be re-examined...

Gaston

Over Malaya and Singapore, the RAF initially used the Buffalo, later joined in January 1942 by Hurricane IIBs- plus part of 2-Vl.G-V of the ML with Brewster B-339Cs. Note that the Buffalo Mk.I and Brewster B-339C were NOT the same- the RAF had overloaded their version with all sorts of "useful and necessary" extras (such as flare bins and flare chutes) which made the plane some 250 kg heavier than the Dutch version. This, of course meant the Dutch version was faster, had a better climb rate and was more manoeuverable. The RAF started stripping their Buffs of all the ballast, restricted fuel load to 60% except for long-range missions and in some cases fitted .303s instead of the .50s, giving a cool take-off weight reduction of about 450 kg/1,000 lbs over a standard Buff. Result: a plane that actually became a serious fighter.
Later, over Java, the Dutch found that with a fuel load of 50% or less the Brewster could actually turn with the Ki.43- though not outturn it. Even so, no mean feat. 50 or 60% fuel still gave the Brewsters a better range than a Hurricane with full fuel load so slashing the fuel was no big handicap.
The Buff was also used over Burma and some of 67 Sqn's pilots who later flew the Hurricane IIB considered the humble Buffalo to be the better plane.
The USMC at Midway were stuck with the F2A-3, which like the standard Buff Mk.I was overweight thanks to all sorts of stuff the USN insisted on- they wanted a scout plane with a huge range on internal fuel and that was exactly what Brewster gave them. Add that the USMC pilots at Midway were green and you have a recipe for disaster. However, some experienced USMC pilots who later flew F4Fs at Guadalcanal would have preferred having the F2A-2 to the F4F (note: NOT the F2A-3!). But the F4F got the nod because (a) Brewster's plant was outdated and badly managed, leading to low production rates and (b) the Buff was a convenient scapegoat to take the blame for the disasters in the Far East.
Most Commonwealth pilots who flew the Buff in the Far East had little or no proper combat training. Ditto for the Dutch pilots- pre-war, available funds had been spent on the ML's Glenn Martin bomber force. Until 20 Hawk 75A-7s arrived in late 1940, the sole fighter defence for Java was a few P-6E Hawks! There was NO fighter doctrine or training scheme; in late 1940 three pilots were sent to the UK to undergo training at an OTU there, then serve with an operational RAF squadron before returning to the NEI. Two were killed on operations, the third returned to the NEI a few days before war broke out in the Far East. A second batch of three pilots had been sent to the UK later in 1941 and were recalled after the Pacific war broke out, but did not arrive in the Far East until after the fall of Java. There were radar stations at Singapore and Mersing, on Malaya's east coast, but none in the NEI until after Singapore fell. A few stations were assembled in West Java with the first becoming operational on Feb. 26th 1942- too late to be of any real help.
Apart from pilot training, the main problem was not inferior fighters but simply too few. The Dutch had ordered 20 Hawk 75A-7s, 24 CW-21B Interceptors and 92 Brewsters (71 delivered) in all- to defend a HUGE territory. Place the NEI over Europe, and from the western tip of Sumatra to the eastern border of Dutch New Guinea, it stretches from Portugal to the Urals. A number of Brewsters were wasted in defending Ambon and Tarakan in small numbers- they were simply overwhelmed. Malaya wasn't much better, with four squadrons supposed to provide air defence for a territory the size of England.
The Philippines had Seversky P-35s and some P-40s of various marks; the P-35s WERE outclassed, the P-40s overwhelmed. Again, no proper early warning system, leading to planes destroyed on the ground, or caught during or shortly after take-off.
Much was expected of the Hurricanes, but there were, again, too few, which were thrown into the fight in dribs and drabs. Furthermore, to improve their performance they had the outer two pairs of .303s removed to reduce weight and thus improve climb rate and manoeuverability. Unfortunately, it wasn't enough.

quote:

Originally posted by Gaston444:
In any case, the reputation of drastic inferiority of the Ki-43 to the Zero needs to be re-examined...

Gaston

I also think the use of the Oscar was more popular than what is commonly depicted in war stories because allied pilots usually referred to anything Japanese as a "Zero". I think a lot of misconceptions come from the misuse of this term.


Bill

Past spending pages debunking what I just read here.....My advice is simple....

Never, ever, ever just rely upon a single publication to gather your facts. If what you wrote comes from the book then I strongly suggest you do two things, get other information more statistically/technically oriented, and if you have not the urge then at least ask on j-aircraft.

The Ki-43 was a great aircraft in 1941......By late 43 it was well past its prime, this noted by many, many Japanese officers and aces......In kind Nakajima was an incredible company, that held true through the entire war. Yet you can't get a plow horse to win the kentucky derby.......Also a number of the statements about the technical side of them are off base.

K2

For all you Buffalo fans, please note that the Buffalo, even the F2A-2, was a terrible carrier fighter simply because its landing gear became unreliable after a few carrier landings.

Landings on the back half of a 250m carrier are bit more stressful than ones made on a 1000m grass strip for some reason, and the aircraft that does it regularly has to have beefed up structure and special equipment. It needs extra range because it is expected to escort the dive bombers and torpeckers to the enemy's fleet, and you want YOUR carrier to be as far away as possible from the enemy's planes and ships.

Please also note that USN and USMC pilots got the measure of the Zero after their first clash with it at Coral Sea, and usually managed to come away from their combats with a better than 1:1 kill ratio against it in the Wildcat thereafter. They might have done nearly as well in the Buffalo, had they any faith that the landing gear would work when they got back to their carriers.

About that stuff on Allied pilots in the Pacific and CBI being poorly trained, I can only point out that the Allied air forces had NO knowledge about the capabilities of the Zero or the Ki-27 Nate, much less the brand new Oscar in late 1941, while the Japanese had full reports on the abilities of the Allied fighters.

It is the natural instinct of a fighter pilot to dogfight if he has any faith in his own machine's capabilities; unfortunately, that just played into the Japanese' hands in the first six months or so of the war, and a lot of well trained and capable men died before they had a reasonable chance to figure out what their aircraft could do better than the Japanese fighters.

Sometimes being well trained doesn't mean that you are well prepared. Most of those men were ready for a fight--just not that kind of fight. Most of them would have put up a much more credible performance against most other air forces.

cheers

horseback

I've read that book must say it is one of the best Osprey Ace titles I've read to date... thumbs up for that one.

Anyway.

quote:

Originally posted by horseback:
It is the natural instinct of a fighter pilot to dogfight if he has any faith in his own machine's capabilities; unfortunately, that just played into the Japanese' hands in the first six months or so of the war, and a lot of well trained and capable men died before they had a reasonable chance to figure out what their aircraft could do better than the Japanese fighters.

Yes I can imagine the shock and horror of those men who actually encountered and fought those nimble fighters on wrong way... I guess it wasn't of much help even if they were all Chuck Yeagers, Don Gentiles or Bud Andersons... the Japanese fighters excel so much in that kind of fight that even below average skilled fighter pilot will have opportunity to take shot at US aircraft... I've read several reports, many of those in this book on how some Japanese pilots noted that "if he just pointed nose of his fighter down and firewalled it I would never come close"... unfortunately lack of information and heat of the battle did their part...

The F2A-1 and F2A-2 did have problems with its landing gear, but these were largely overcome by 1941 with (a) strengthened struts (b) an increase in tyre pressure. However, the problems recurred with the overweight F2A-3.
The Allies did have knowledge of the capabilities of the Ki.27 and A6M2; Chennault had warned them, but the powers that be in the RAF and USAAC chose to ignore these warnings- certainly nothing was passed down the line to the squadrons.
By late February 1942 ML pilots would not hesitate in dogfighting with the Ki.43s, finding that the Brewster and Interceptor could turn with their opponents (nearly all of the Hawk 75s had been lost by then). The Oscar could outclimb the Brewster, but the Brewster could easily outdive the Ki, had a better top speed, a heavier armament, some pilot armour, armour glass windscreen, self-sealing fuel tanks, a reflector gunsight and was a much sturdier plane. The Interceptors also had reflector gunsights; unfortunately, the fuel tanks could not be made self-sealing as they were an integral part of the wing structure. At the moment I don't know whether any pilot armour or armour glass windscreens were fitted. By this time, however, too many planes had been lost- most on the ground, some in accidents and the others in combat. The problem was not inferior planes, but simply too few.

Quote:"The Ki-43 was a great aircraft in 1941......By late 43 it was well past its prime, this noted by many, many Japanese officers and aces......In kind Nakajima was an incredible company, that held true through the entire war. Yet you can't get a plow horse to win the kentucky derby.......Also a number of the statements about the technical side of them are off base."

-Of course it was outdated in 1943, the real question is, was it any more outdated than the A6M Zero?

From what I learned from Ki-43 aces and every available source, it was a terrible aircraft in 1941: The pilots were afraid to fly and maneuver with it, its guns exploded upon firing, and it wrinkled its wingroots under loads... This is the very first thing ANY Ki-43 pilot will tell you about the early models... ALL those problems were fixed in the II model in 1943, but some wingroot wrinkling still occurred, leading to the widespread use of springs in the control cables.

So your only factual statement is demonstrably false. As for the other technical issues, if you won't stoop to tell us what they are, why bother posting?

Gaston

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-eBmnpCO18

In this interview, Major Yohei Hinoki, an IJA ace with estimative of more them 12 enemy planes destroyed, altough his official number is 7, mostly in the Ki-43, talks about this aircraft and adress some points Gaston444 mentioned in the last post about reliability issues.

This message has been edited. Last edited by: Wildnoob,

hi wildnoob,

nice video!
i especially like the way, how most japanese pilots (well, those, which i saw so far) tell their memories - it sounds always very descriptive and to the point, without much personal additions.
however, it doesn't relate much to gaston's statements. gaston - in summary - seems to conclude from the book he posted that the 'hayabusa' has 50% of all fighter hills and he raises the question, how it compares to the zero.
in the video, the japanese pilot states how low the early iscar was regarded, and that the later version had been much better. that is not the discussion...
he doesn't mention the zero at all, and even says, that the later oscar was obsolete, although an improvement.

quote:

Originally posted by Gaston444:
From what I learned from Ki-43 aces and every available source,...

i think, the point made by billfish is, that it is not sufficient to conclude only from one source. also the numbers mentioned (i guess, speed related) are not to get from that one source.
in his reply, gaston now mentions 'every available source' and 'aces' he learned from. still he fails to note them, but complains about billfish's missing facts...

imo, the topic is an interesting one. for once, it would be good to know about japanese impressions and the nimbus of one or the other craft. this the more, as the zero indeed has more fame - probably because it has been used by the navy (and such the better known engagements). i would be interested in success and the comparison of both crafts.
still it needs more than own conclusions taken out of only one book.

I doubt whether self-sealing tanks were fitted to the Ki.43-I series, certainly during the initial stages of the Pacific war; this is the first time I have seen any reference to this. Other publications such as the Profile Publications work on the Oscar and William Green state the opposite; the Ki.43-Is had NO pilot armour, self-sealing tanks or armour glass windscreens. The Ki.43-II introduced these refinements, as the IJAAF realized during the campaign for the Malay Barrier that omitting them had been a mistake. It is, of course, possible that the -Is were retrofitted with these items at a later date in the field, possibly using -II series parts (assuming they were interchangeable with -I series parts) or otherwise using parts specially made by Nakajima or subcontractors. It is also possible that -Is were fitted with reflector gunsights in the field.
Retrofitting these items would have improved the Oscar's survivability; downside of the coin would have been somewhat reduced overall performance as all these items would have increased the plane's weight. Which leaves the IJAAF pilots with a plane that had poor gunpower, structural weaknesses and low top speed, certainly by late 1942 or 1943 standards, though still with outstanding manoeuverability and a decent climb rate.

quote:

Originally posted by Gaston444:
Quote:"The Ki-43 was a great aircraft in 1941......By late 43 it was well past its prime, this noted by many, many Japanese officers and aces......In kind Nakajima was an incredible company, that held true through the entire war. Yet you can't get a plow horse to win the kentucky derby.......Also a number of the statements about the technical side of them are off base."

-Of course it was outdated in 1943, the real question is, was it any more outdated than the A6M Zero?

From what I learned from Ki-43 aces and every available source, it was a terrible aircraft in 1941: The pilots were afraid to fly and maneuver with it, its guns exploded upon firing, and it wrinkled its wingroots under loads... This is the very first thing ANY Ki-43 pilot will tell you about the early models... ALL those problems were fixed in the II model in 1943, but some wingroot wrinkling still occurred, leading to the widespread use of springs in the control cables.

So your only factual statement is demonstrably false. As for the other technical issues, if you won't stoop to tell us what they are, why bother posting?

Gaston

..... Ummmm, Gaston - LEBillfish has been around for quite a while on this forum and is generally regarded as one of the three well adjusted adults who regularly post here on Ubizoo. As her logo suggests, she has a considerable interest in Japanese a/c of WW2. The way I see it, the real point she made in her post is not to rely upon single sources - good advice, IMHO. The fact that she did not vomit forth an avalanche of data contradicting your remarks suggests, to me at least, that she simply is not interested in developing this into a great debate.

I do admire your enthusiasm on the subject and regularly read your posts. Just add a little chill and stay cool.

quote:

Originally posted by Gaston444:
Little known is that after the fall of Okinawa (April of 1945!)the Japanese Army launched a massive land attack in China, lead for the very first time by an actual armored division(about 220 Type 97 tanks). There were no rapes or looting this time around apparently, as this was a much more professionally conducted campaign, and it was one of the Japanese Army's biggest success of the entire war!

Dozens of Allied airfields were captured, Gen. Chennault's entire air force having to flee China(!), while the Allied front was pushed back over hundreds of miles... This was due to Mao tacitly relieving pressure on the Japanese, to help cause the collapse of his enemy Thang Kai Check. Thousands of Allied aircraft fleeing dozens of airfields in front of a massive Japanese Army advance is not exactly the image I had of the Spring of 1945, but it did happen, incredibly enough... And is now utterly forgotten...

Which campaign or battle are you referring to?

quote:

Originally posted by deepo_HP:
hi wildnoob,

nice video!
i especially like the way, how most japanese pilots (well, those, which i saw so far) tell their memories - it sounds always very descriptive and to the point, without much personal additions.
however, it doesn't relate much to gaston's statements. gaston - in summary - seems to conclude from the book he posted that the 'hayabusa' has 50% of all fighter hills and he raises the question, how it compares to the zero.
in the video, the japanese pilot states how low the early iscar was regarded, and that the later version had been much better. that is not the discussion...
he doesn't mention the zero at all, and even says, that the later oscar was obsolete, although an improvement.

Oh, sorry, I edited my post but seems didn't post the correction on it about this. Swear I've did.

Corrected now, was to mean *some points" Gaston saied in his last post about the citation of pilot's complains to early models.